GURMEET SINGH GEETU v. STATE OF PUNJAB

Judgment

#1. The present Third Petition has been filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (B.N.S.S.) (corresponding to Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) for grant of regular bail

to the petitioner in FIR No. 137 dated 02.06.2025, registered under Section 21-B of the NDPS Act (Sections 21-C, 27-A and 29 of the NDPS Act added subsequently), at Police Station Gate Hakima, District Amritsar, during the pendency of the trial.

#2. As per the prosecution case, the present FIR was registered on

02.06.2025 on the basis of a police complaint alleging recovery of 220 grams of heroin from the possession of the co-accused during patrolling proceedings. During investigation, the co-accused disclosed the involvement of the present petitioner in the illegal possession and dealing of contraband. On the basis of the said disclosure statement and the material collected during investigation, the petitioner was nominated as an accused in the present case. The prosecution further alleges that during further investigation, the petitioner was arrested on 07.06.2025 and his involvement in the present offence was found. CRM-M-33215-2026 2 After completion of investigation, the final report under Section 193 of the BNSS was presented before the learned Trial Court and charges have already been framed against the petitioner.

#3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case and was not named in the FIR. It is contended that the alleged recovery of 220 grams of heroin was effected from the co-accused and no contraband was recovered from the petitioner. The name of the petitioner surfaced only during investigation on the basis of the disclosure statement of the co-accused and there is no other incriminating material connecting him with the alleged offence.

3.1 Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner is in custody since 07.06.2025. The investigation is complete, challan has been presented before the learned Trial Court on 15.12.2025 and charges have been framed on

06.02.2026. Therefore, the petitioner is no longer required for custodial interrogation and the trial is likely to take considerable time for conclusion.

3.2 It is further submitted that the petitioner had earlier filed two bail petitions. The first petition bearing CRM-M-53202 of 2025 was dismissed as withdrawn on 16.10.2025. Thereafter, another petition bearing CRM-M-69237 of 2025 was dismissed on 22.12.2025, with costs of Rs.5,000/- imposed upon the petitioner, which have already been deposited. Learned counsel submits that the present petition has been filed on account of subsequent change in circumstances, including further custody of the petitioner and framing of charges. It is, thus, prayed that the petitioner may be enlarged on regular bail during the

#4. Notice of motion. CRM-M-33215-2026 3

#5. Ms. Navreet Kaur, AAG, Punjab, has put in appearance on behalf of the respondent-State and opposes the prayer for grant of bail and submits that the petitioner is a habitual offender involved in dealing with narcotic/psychotropic substances and drug money. It is contended that the co- accused was apprehended on 02.06.2025 with 220 grams of heroin and, pursuant to his disclosure statement, further recovery of 802 grams of heroin was effected.

5.1 Learned State counsel further submits that during interrogation, the co-accused disclosed that he was supplying heroin, allegedly smuggled from Pakistan, to the present petitioner, on the basis of which the petitioner was nominated as an accused and formally arrested on 07.06.2025. Learned State counsel submits that the allegations against the petitioner are serious in nature and the rigours of the NDPS Act are attracted; therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to the concession of regular bail.

#6. I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at considerable length and have carefully perused the paper book as well as the material placed on record with their able assistance.

#7. The right to a speedy trial is an integral facet of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The constitutional mandate is not confined merely to ensuring a fair trial but also obligates the State to conclude criminal proceedings within a reasonable time so that the process itself does not become punitive. CRM-M-33215-2026 4

#8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, 1980 (1) SCC 81, authoritatively held that the right to a speedy trial is an essential and integral part of Article 21, and that any procedure which permits prolonged incarceration without expeditious trial cannot be regarded as fair, just or reasonable. The aforesaid principles are in consonance with the Constitution Bench decisions in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225, and P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002 (4) SCC 578, wherein it was held that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right flowing from Article 21 and constitutional courts are duty- bound to intervene wherever inordinate and unexplained delay results in denial of substantive justice.

#9. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 and in Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 (2) SSC(Criminal) 271, the Court categorically held that "the right to a speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence." It was further held that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial, without commencement or reasonable progress of the trial, effectively converts pre-trial detention into a form of punishment and cannot be CRM-M-21208-2026 (O&M) -5- constitutionally sustained. The Court observed that if the State or the prosecuting agency is unable to secure an accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial, it cannot oppose the grant of bail merely on the ground of the seriousness of the allegations, as Article 21 prevails over statutory restrictions where continued incarceration becomes oppressive and justified. CRM-M-33215-2026 5

#10. This constitutional position has acquired greater significance in prosecutions under special statutes containing restrictive bail provisions. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is undoubtedly a stringent penal statute enacted to combat the menace of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The principle was specifically applied to prosecutions under the NDPS Act in Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352. The Apex Court held that Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot be construed so rigidly as to compel indefinite incarceration of an undertrial merely because the trial has not progressed. The Court observed that a literal interpretation of Section 37, divorced from constitutional values, would amount to sanctioning punitive detention before conviction. It was emphatically held that where the State is unable to conclude the trial within a reasonable time, the rigours of Section 37 necessarily yield to the constitutional mandate of Article 21. The Court further observed that Section 436A Cr.P.C. applies even to prosecutions under special statutes and constitutes an important legislative safeguard against indefinite pretrial detention.

#11. Recently, in Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109 and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC Online SC 1693, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that prolonged incarceration militates against the most cherished fundamental right under Article 21. The Court observed that where the accused has remained in custody for an unduly long period and the trial is nowhere near completion, constitutional liberty must prevail over the statutory embargo contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court succinctly held that conditional liberty CRM-M-33215-2026 6 must override the statutory embargo when the constitutional guarantee itself stands threatened. Similarly, the Apex Court has recently reaffirmed these constitutional principles in.

#12. Thus, the legal position that emerges from the above authorities is that while offences under the NDPS Act are undoubtedly grave and the statutory conditions governing bail are stringent, the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21 remains paramount. Courts are required to balance the societal interest in effective prosecution with the individual's fundamental right to personal liberty. Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without meaningful progress in the trial cannot be justified merely by invoking the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. In such exceptional circumstances, Constitutional Courts are duty-bound to harmonise the statutory restrictions with the fundamental right to personal liberty and ensure that pre-trial detention does not degenerate into punishment before adjudication of guilt. Where delay is inordinate and not attributable to the accused, constitutional courts are empowered to grant appropriate relief so as to prevent violation of Article 21.

#13. It is equally relevant to note that while Section 37 prescribes stringent conditions for grant of bail, the NDPS Act itself reflects the legislative intent that such prosecutions should proceed expeditiously. Section 36 empowers the Government to constitute Special Courts for the very purpose of ensuring speedy trial of NDPS offences. Therefore, the statutory scheme itself proceeds on the assumption that greater restrictions on bail are constitutionally sustainable only when accompanied by equally expeditious adjudication. Where the State fails to provide the infrastructure necessary for CRM-M-33215-2026 7 speedy disposal, continued reliance upon Section 37 alone would produce an unconstitutional imbalance between individual liberty and societal interest. Delay defeats that legislative premise. If trials remain pending for years because of systemic inadequacies, repeated adjournments, non-production of witnesses, or institutional delays not attributable to the accused, continued incarceration ceases to be preventive and assumes a punitive character.

#14. Be that as it may, considering the custody period already undergone by the petitioner, ie. 01 year, 01 month and 15 days, and the fact that the alleged recovery of 220 and 802 gms of heroin was effected from the co-accused and no contraband was recovered from the petitioner, whose name surfaced only during investigation on the basis of the disclosure statement of the co-accused, this Court finds that the petitioner has remained in custody for a substantial period. It is further relevant to note that the investigation already stands completed, the final report under Section 193 of the BNSS has been presented before the learned Trial Court, and charges have already beenframed Since none of the prosecution witnesses have been examined so far, it is evident that the trial is likely to take considerable time to reach its logical conclusion. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the continued incarceration of the petitioner would not serve any useful purpose.

#15. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be admitted on regular bail, subject to furnishing requisite bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned/Illaqa Magistrate/Duty Magistrate, as the case may be, and further subject to the following conditions:-

#1. The petitioner shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat, or promise to any person acquainted with CRM-M-33215-2026 8 the facts and circumstances of the case so as to dissuade such person from disclosing such facts before the Court or to the investigating agency.

#2. The petitioner shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence in any manner whatsoever, nor shall attempt, directly or indirectly, to influence, intimidate, or contact any prosecution witness.

#3. The petitioner shall not leave the territorial limits of India without obtaining the prior permission of the learned Trial Court. In the event he is in possession of a passport, he shall furnish its particulars before the Investigating Officer as well as the learned Trial Court.

#4. The learned Illaqa Magistrate/Duty Magistrate, before accepting the bail and surety bonds, shall obtain from the petitioner his permanent residential address as well as present correspondence address, duly supported by appropriate documentary proof. The Investigating Officer shall verify the correctness of the said addresses within 48 hours from the acceptance of the bail bonds and shall place a verification report on the record. In the event either of the addresses is found to be false, fictitious, or incorrect, it shall be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation of the concession of bail in accordance with law.

#5. The petitioner shall furnish before the learned Trial Court, either at the time of furnishing the bail bonds or within such period as may be specified by the Court, Permanent Account Number (PAN), Aadhaar Number, particulars of all operative bank accounts, and a declaration disclosing details of immovable properties, if any. Any concealment of material particulars or furnishing of false information shall constitute a valid ground for seeking cancellation of bail in accordance with law.

#6. The petitioner shall intimate the Investigating Officer as well as the learned Trial Court, in writing, of any change in residential address or mobile number within seven days from the date of such change.

#7. The petitioner shall not commit any offence of a similar nature during the pendency of the trial and shall remain present before the learned Trial Court on each and every date CRM-M-33215-2026 9 fixed, unless his personal appearance is exempted in accordance with law. He shall not absent himself from the proceedings without obtaining prior permission of the learned Trial Court. In the event of any violation of the aforesaid conditions or his unauthorized absence from the trial proceedings, it shall be open to the learned Trial Court to proceed in accordance with law, including cancellation of the concession of regular bail and issuance of appropriate coercive process, including warrants of arrest. (VIRINDER AGGARWAL) JUDGE

22.07.2026 Whether speaking/reasoned Whether reportable : : Yes/No Yes/No