✦ Punjab & Haryana High Court · 03 Jul 2026

Cr No. 4969 of 2026 · Punjab And Haryana High Court · 2026

Case at a glance

Provisions considered

Key paragraphs

  • Para 1111. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and others, (1976) 4 SCC 184, wherein it was held that in an eviction proceeding, it is sufficient if the landlord possesses a better title than the…
  • Para 1212. The proposed amendment, therefore, neither facilitates adjudication of the real controversy nor merely elaborates an existing defence. Rather, it seeks to introduce an altogether new and mutually destructive plea by withdrawing the earlier admission regarding the jural relationship between the parties. The principles governing…
  • Para 1515. The impugned order is based upon correct appreciation of the statutory provisions as well as the law laid down by the Supreme Court and, therefore, does not call for interference. Consequently, present petition is hereby dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.

Judgment

It is well settled that though amendment of a written statement is generally viewed more liberally than amendment of a plaint, a party cannot be permitted to withdraw a clear admission if such withdrawal would completely displace the case of the opposite party. In Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal and others, (1998) 1 SCC 278, the Supreme Court held that an amendment withdrawing an admission which confers a valuable right upon the opposite party should ordinarily not be permitted. Similar principle was reiterated in Usha Balashaheb Swami and others v. Kiran Appaso Swami and others, (2007) 5 SCC 602, wherein it was observed that while inconsistent pleas may be permissible in a written statement, an amendment cannot be allowed, if it amounts to withdrawal of an unequivocal admission resulting in serious prejudice to the opposite party.

#10. Even otherwise, the defence sought to be introduced is legally untenable. Once the relationship of landlord and tenant has been admitted, the tenant is estopped from disputing the title of the landlord during continuance of the tenancy by virtue of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The doctrine is founded upon public policy that a tenant who entered possession under the landlord cannot subsequently question the landlord's title so long as he continues in possession under that tenancy.

#11. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and others, (1976) 4 SCC 184, wherein it was held that in an eviction proceeding, it is sufficient if the landlord possesses a better title than the tenant and the tenant cannot ordinarily question such title. Similar view was reiterated in Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai and others, (2002) 6 SCC 16, holding that a tenant is estopped from disputing the landlord's title and cannot resist eviction proceedings on that ground.

#12. The proposed amendment, therefore, neither facilitates adjudication of the real controversy nor merely elaborates an existing defence. Rather, it seeks to introduce an altogether new and mutually destructive plea by withdrawing the earlier admission regarding the jural relationship between the parties. The principles governing amendment of pleadings have been CR-4969-2026 2026:PHHC: 090076 comprehensively summarised by the Supreme Court in Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons and others, (2009) 10 SCC 84, wherein it was held that amendments which are mala fide, cause prejudice to the opposite party, fundamentally alter the nature of the case or are unnecessary for determining the real controversy deserve to be rejected.

#13. The learned Rent Controller has also noticed that the ejectment proceedings have remained pending since 2019 and that after commencement of evidence, the tenants have repeatedly resorted to interlocutory applications, including an application under Order XIV Rule 5 CPC and successive proceedings before this Court. The present application was, therefore, rightly viewed as another attempt to protract the adjudication. Such finding is based upon the record and cannot be said to suffer from perversity.

#14. It is equally well settled that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised sparingly to keep subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction and not to correct every error of law or fact. Unless the impugned order is shown to be patently perverse, without jurisdiction or in manifest violation of settled legal principles, interference is unwarranted. In Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329, and Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others, (2015) 5 SCC 423, the Supreme Court authoritatively explained that Article 227 does not confer appellate jurisdiction upon the High Court.

#15. The impugned order is based upon correct appreciation of the statutory provisions as well as the law laid down by the Supreme Court and, therefore, does not call for interference. Consequently, present petition is hereby dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.

03.07.2026 Vivek (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE Whether Speaking/reasoned Whether reportable Yes No

Questions this judgment answers

Which statutory provisions did this judgment involve?

Constitution of India — art. 227; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. VI r. 17; O. XIV r. 5; Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — s. 116.

Which court decided this case, and when?

Punjab & Haryana High Court, on 03 Jul 2026. The bench was DEEPAK GUPTA.

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