Shweta v. State of Haryana & Ors.

Judgment

#1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the action of the respondents in not permitting the petitioner to rejoin the post of PGT English and in failing to take a final decision on the communication dated 26.05.2025 (Annexure P-12). A further prayer has been made for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to permit the petitioner to rejoin the post of PGT English and to decide her claim in accordance with law.

#2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contends that the petitioner was appointed as PGT English in the Mewat Model Schools Society, Nuh (for short, “the Society”), vide appointment letter dated

02.09.2013 (Annexure P-1). The petitioner successfully completed her period

of probation, whereupon her services were confirmed vide order dated CWP-17620-2026 -2-

16.04.2015, as is discernible from Annexure P-2. A show-cause notice dated

21.09.2016 (Annexure P-3) was issued to the petitioner, alleging that M.A. (English) degree acquired by her from the Eastern Institute for Integrated Learning in Management University, Jorethang (Sikkim) i.e., EIILM University was not recognised. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply thereto on 29.09.2016 (Annexure P-4), explaining the validity of her M.A. (English) degree.

#3. Learned counsel further submits that the services of the petitioner were terminated vide order dated 27.10.2016 (Annexure P-5), without issuance of a charge-sheet or conduct of a regular departmental inquiry. Learned counsel also submits that a cancellation report was subsequently prepared in FIR dated

04.11.2016, registered under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC at Police Station Nuh, and the same was accepted by the jurisdictional Court after the complainant tendered no objection thereto. Learned counsel further submits that the Government of Haryana took over the Society, along with its existing incumbents, on 23.11.2021 (Annexure P-8). It is contended that, once the cancellation report in the criminal case registered against the petitioner had been accepted, she was entitled to be reinstated in service. The representation dated 28.02.2025 submitted by the petitioner was rejected in a mechanical manner vide a non-speaking order dated 02.04.2025 (Annexure P-11). Furthermore, the Director, Secondary Education, Haryana, vide communication dated 26.05.2025 (Annexure P-12), requested the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Mewat Development Board- cum-Vice-Chairman, Mewat Model Schools Society, Nuh, to consider the CWP-17620-2026 -3- subsequent representation dated 19.04.2025 submitted by the petitioner and take necessary action thereon.

#4. Learned counsel further contends that the impugned termination order is not sustainable in law, as the principles of natural justice were not complied with before passing the same. Mere issuance of a show-cause notice, without serving a charge-sheet or conducting a regular inquiry, could not have justified termination of the petitioner’s services. The impugned action is stated to be contrary to the settled principles of law and violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. It is, thus, prayed that the present writ petition be allowed and the respondents be directed to permit the petitioner to rejoin the post of PGT English.

#5. Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the prayer made by the petitioner and submits that a show-cause notice dated 21.09.2016 (Annexure P-3) was duly issued to her, setting out the reasons for the proposed action and affording her an opportunity to submit her defence. The petitioner duly responded thereto on 29.09.2016 (Annexure P-4), explaining her position. Learned State counsel further refers to the impugned order dated 27.10.2016 (Annexure P-5) and submits that the M.A. (English) degree acquired by the petitioner from EIILM University, Sikkim, was sent for verification by the erstwhile Society. The verification request was returned with the remark, “University Centre closed”. Thereafter, the University Grants Commission, New Delhi, was approached, which, vide communication dated 13.05.2016, stated that the Director, Higher Education, Human Resource Development Department, Government of Sikkim, could validate the degrees awarded during the academic session 2009–10 to students admitted within the CWP-17620-2026 -4- territorial jurisdiction of the State of Sikkim, on the basis of the admission records available at the University’s Sikkim Campus. As advised by the University Grants Commission, the Director, Higher Education, Human Resource Development Department, Government of Sikkim, was also approached. It was informed through email that the M.A. (English) course undertaken by the petitioner was not included in the list of courses approved by the University Grants Commission/Distance Education Council for being offered by EIILM University. Although the petitioner claimed to have obtained the M.A. (English) degree through the regular mode from EIILM University, the said claim was contrary to the official communications received from the competent authorities. Learned State counsel further submits that Clause 7 of the petitioner’s appointment letter specifically stipulated that in case the documents submitted by her were found to be false at any stage or she was found ineligible for the post in question, her services would be liable to be terminated without notice and appropriate action would be taken against her in accordance with law. It is also submitted that the petitioner was employed by the erstwhile Society without following any transparent process of selection and that her appointment was granted solely on the basis of the M.A. (English) degree in question. Since the engagement of the petitioner was purely contractual in nature, she is not entitled to the protection available under Article 311 of the Constitution of India.

#6. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and going through the record, I find no merit in the writ petition. It transpires that the petitioner was engaged as PGT English in the erstwhile Society on

02.09.2013. There was a clear-cut stipulation in her appointment letter CWP-17620-2026 -5- (Annexure P1) under Clause 7 that “in case your document or statement is found to be false at any stage or you are not found qualified for the post as per CBSE norms or police report is adverse against you, your services shall be terminated without any notice and action will be taken against you under the law”.

#7. At this stage, reference may also be made to the legal maxims nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria, meaning that no person can be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, and sublato fundamento cadit opus, meaning that once the foundation is removed, the entire superstructure must fall. When employment itself has been secured by playing fraud on the hiring authority, the delay in discovery of the charade cannot be used as a defence against adverse consequences. Since the petitioner obtained employment on the basis of a forged and fabricated certificate, her service becomes void ab initio. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Prohlad Guha, 2024 AIR SC 3588 and this Court in Kuldeep vs. State of Haryana in CWP-26033-2025 decided on 03.09.2025.

#8. Reliance in this regard can also be placed on the judgment rendered by a two-Judge bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Singh vs. Savitri Devi and others (2003) 8 SCC 319, wherein speaking through Justice S.B.Sinha, the following was opined: “15. Commission of fraud on court and suppression of material facts are the core issues involved in these matters. Fraud as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. 16. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by word or letter. CWP-17620-2026 -6-

#17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. 18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. 19. In Derry v. Peek, (1889)14 AC 337 : (1886-90) All ER Rep 1 : 58 LJ Ch 864 : 61 LT 265 (HL). it was held: "In an `action of deceit the plaintiff must prove actual fraud. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without caring whether it be true or false. A false statement, made through carelessness and without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, may be evidence of fraud but does not necessarily amount to fraud. Such a statement, if made in the honest belief that it is true, is not fraudulent and does not render the person making it liable to an action of deceit. 20. In Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, at p. 23, it is stated: "The true and only sound principle to be derived from the cases represented by Slim v. Croucher, (1860)1 De GF & J 518 : 29 LJ Ch 273 : 2 LT 103 : 45 ER 462. is this: that a representation is fraudulent not only when the person making it knows it to be false, but also when, as Jessel, M.R., pointed out, he ought to have known, or must be taken to have known, that it was false. This is a sound and intelligible principle, and is, moreover, not inconsistent with Derry v. Peek, (1889)14 AC 337 : (1886-90) All ER Rep 1 : 58 LJ Ch 864 : 61 LT 265 (HL).. A false statement which a person ought to have known was false, and which he must therefore be taken to have known was false, cannot be said to be honestly believed in. 'A consideration of the grounds of belief', said Lord Herschell, 'is no doubt an important aid in ascertaining whether the belief was really entertained. A man's mere assertion that he believed the statement he made to be true is not accepted as conclusive proof that he did so.'" 21. In Bigelow on Fraudulent Conveyances, at p. 1, it is stated: "If on the facts the average man would have intended wrong, that is enough."

#22. It was further opined: "This conception of fraud (and since it is not the writer's, he may speak of it without diffidence), steadily kept in view, will render the administration of the law less difficult, or rather will make its administration more effective. Further, not to enlarge upon the last matter, it will do away with much of the prevalent confusion in regard to 'moral' fraud, a confusion which, in addition to other things, often causes lawyers to take refuge behind such convenient and indeed useful but often obscure language as 'fraud upon the law'. What is fraud upon the law? Fraud can be committed only against a being capable of rights, and 'fraud upon the law' darkens counsel. What is really aimed at in most cases by this obscure contrast between moral fraud and fraud upon the law, is a contrast between fraud in the individual's intention to commit the wrong and fraud as seen in the obvious tendency of the act in question."

#23. Recently this Court by an order dated 3-9-2003 in Ram Preeti Yadav v. CWP-17620-2026 -7- U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education, (2003)8 SCC 311 : JT 2003 Supp (1) SC 25. held: "Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. Although negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud. (See Derry v. Peek, (1889)14 AC 337:.) In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956)1 All ER 341: the Court of Appeal stated the law thus: 'I cannot accede to this argument for a moment. No court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a court , no order of a minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever;" In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994)1 SCC 1 this Court stated that fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal."

#24. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.”(emphasis added)

#9. Further, a three-Judge bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Jainendra Singh vs. State of U.P. Tr. Prinl. Sec. Home (2012) 8 SCC 748, has categorically held that no estoppels would operate in favour of those who acquired employment by defrauding the employer. Speaking through Justice Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, the following was held: “31. As noted by us, all the above decisions were rendered by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of two-Judges and having bestowed our serious consideration to the issue, we consider that while dealing with such an issue, the Court will have to bear in mind the various cardinal principles before granting any relief to the aggrieved party, namely: (i) Fraudulently obtained orders of appointment could be legitimately treated as voidable at the option of the employer or could be recalled by the employer and in such cases merely because the respondent employee has continued in service for a number of years, on the basis of such fraudulently obtained employment, cannot get any equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer. (ii) Verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to the post under the State and on account of his antecedents the appointing authority if find not desirable to appoint a person to a disciplined force can it be said to be unwarranted. (iii) When appointment was procured by a person on the basis of CWP-17620-2026 -8- forged documents, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer and, therefore, it would create no equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer while resorting to termination without holding any inquiry. (iv) A candidate having suppressed material information and/or giving false information cannot claim right to continue in service and the employer, having regard to the nature of employment as well as other aspects, has the discretion to terminate his services. Purpose of calling for information regarding involvement in any criminal case or detention or conviction is for the purpose of verification of the character/antecedents at the time of recruitment and suppression of such material information will have clear bearing on the character and antecedents of the candidate in relation to his continuity in service. (v) The person who suppressed the material information and/or gives false information cannot claim any right for appointment or continuity in service. xxx”

#10. Even for the sake of arguments, it is accepted that the degree possessed by the petitioner was not a forged one, the same was nevertheless not a valid degree on the basis of which she could have been offered appointment to the post of PGT English.

#11. Moreover, the engagement of the petitioner by the erstwhile Society was purely contractual in nature, as such it does not involve any public-law element. In the absence of any violation of statutory rules, it is a debatable issue whether the writ jurisdiction of this Court can be invoked. The petitioner also slept over her rights for nearly ten years and challenged the impugned termination order dated 27.10.2016 (Annexure P5) only in the year

#2026. Furthermore, the acceptance of cancellation report would not come to the aid of the petitioner, as the matter essentially involves a service dispute arising from a contractual employment, which ordinarily cannot be enforced in writ jurisdiction.

#12. No other argument has been raised. CWP-17620-2026 -9-

#13. In view of the discussion hereinabove, this Court does not find it appropriate to invoke its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed.

#14. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. July 10 , 2026. ‘om’ ( HARPREET SINGH BRAR ) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned. : Whether Reportable. : Yes/No Yes/No