Baljit & Ors. v. JUDGMENT

share in the property. She further challenged the registered Release Deed and registered Will executed by her father in favour of the defendants on the plea that the property being ancestral, Beg Chand had no competence to exclusively alienate the same.

#3. The defendants contested the suit by pleading that Beg Chand had become exclusive owner of the property by virtue of a judgment and decree dated 05.01.1970 passed in Civil Suit No.631 of 1969 followed by RSA No. 2134 of 2026 (O&M) muta(cid:22)on of inheritance and subsequent registered release deeds executed by the daughters of Ramji Lal. It was further pleaded that the property had ceased to retain the character of ancestral coparcenary property and had become the separate property of Beg Chand, who was fully competent to execute the registered Release Deed and the registered Will.

#4. Upon apprecia(cid:22)on of the oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit by judgment dated 23.10.2017 holding that the plain(cid:22)ff had failed to establish that the property retained the character of ancestral coparcenary property in the hands of Beg Chand. The challenge to the registered Will and Release Deed was also rejected.

#5. The appeal preferred by the plain(cid:22)ff has also been dismissed by the learned Addi(cid:22)onal District Judge by judgment dated 26.02.2026. During pendency of the appeal, an applica(cid:22)on seeking permission to adduce addi(cid:22)onal evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC was also dismissed holding that the proposed evidence rela(cid:22)ng to par(cid:22)(cid:22)on proceedings had no bearing upon the controversy involved in the appeal.

#6. Challenging concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that both the Courts have completely misread the evidence. It is argued that the revenue record establishes that the property was inherited by Ramji Lal from his forefathers and consequently con(cid:22)nued to remain ancestral in the hands of Beg Chand. It is further contended that a+er the amendment of Sec(cid:22)on 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, the appellant acquired a birth right in the property and the Courts below have erred in trea(cid:22)ng the same as self-acquired property. Learned counsel further submits that the judgment and decree dated

05.01.1970 could not have the effect of conver(cid:22)ng ancestral property into self-acquired property and consequently the registered Release Deed and Will executed by Beg Chand are not binding upon the appellant.

#7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have carefully perused the record. RSA No. 2134 of 2026 (O&M)

#8. The controversy involved in the present appeal is essen(cid:22)ally factual. The en(cid:22)re claim of the plain(cid:22)ff rests upon the asser(cid:22)on that the property retained its ancestral coparcenary character in the hands of Beg Chand. The burden to establish the said founda(cid:22)onal fact squarely rested upon the plain(cid:22)ff.

#9. Both the Courts below have me(cid:22)culously examined the documentary evidence relied upon by the plain(cid:22)ff and have concurrently found that the plain(cid:22)ff failed to establish an unbroken chain of inheritance from the common ancestor. The translated revenue documents relied upon by the plain(cid:22)ff were not proved in accordance with law, as neither the translator nor any competent revenue official was examined to prove their authen(cid:22)city. Even otherwise, the documents did not establish that the suit property was the very property inherited from the common ancestor. These findings are based upon proper apprecia(cid:22)on of evidence and cannot be termed either perverse or contrary to the record.

#10. Apart from the aforesaid, the Courts below have concurrently no(cid:22)ced that the judgment and decree dated 05.01.1970 brought about a family seBlement between Ramji Lal and his sons, whereby specific shares were alloBed to each of them. The said decree was not merely passed but stood acted upon for decades and was consistently reflected in the subsequent revenue records. The Jamabandi for the year 1996-97 itself depicts separate possession of the respec(cid:22)ve sharers over specified khasra numbers, clearly indica(cid:22)ng that the earlier joint status had already come to an end.

#11. Once a par(cid:22)(cid:22)on is effected amongst coparceners and separate shares are alloBed, the property held by each alloBee therea+er ceases to remain joint coparcenary property inter se the separated branches. The Courts below have therefore rightly concluded that the property held by Beg Chand therea+er assumed the character of his separate property qua his descendants. The reliance placed by the learned first appellate Court upon RSA No. 2134 of 2026 (O&M) Mukesh Kumar v. Gulab Singh, 2016(1) Law Herald 371, correctly reflects the seBled legal posi(cid:22)on.

#12. There is yet another significant circumstance, which completely demolishes the appellant's claim. The first appellate Court has no(cid:22)ced that the appellant herself disclosed her age as about 45 years while appearing in evidence in the year 2016, meaning thereby she was not even born when the decree dated 05.01.1970 had already disrupted the joint status of the family. Consequently, the appellant never acquired any birth right in the property as a coparcener.

#13. The amendment of Sec(cid:22)on 6 of the Hindu Succession Act undoubtedly confers equal coparcenary rights upon daughters, but it does not revive a coparcenary, which had already ceased to exist much prior thereto. The decision of the Cons(cid:22)tu(cid:22)on Bench in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1, while recognising equal rights of daughters in an exis(cid:22)ng coparcenary, does not lay down that a par(cid:22)(cid:22)on which had already aBained finality decades earlier stands reopened.

#14. Equally meritless is the challenge to the judgment and decree dated 05.01.1970. The decree remained unques(cid:22)oned for nearly five decades and was con(cid:22)nuously acted upon in the revenue record. Except making bald allega(cid:22)ons of fraud and misrepresenta(cid:22)on, the plain(cid:22)ff produced no evidence whatsoever to establish that the decree had been procured by fraud. Fraud is required to be pleaded with full par(cid:22)culars and proved by cogent evidence. Mere asser(cid:22)ons cannot dislodge a decree which has aBained finality and has regulated the rights of the par(cid:22)es for decades.

#15. The challenge to the registered Will and Release Deed also does not merit any acceptance. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that the execu(cid:22)on and aBesta(cid:22)on of the Will stood duly proved in terms of Sec(cid:22)ons 63 of the Indian Succession Act and 68 of the Indian Evidence Act by examining the deed writer and the aBes(cid:22)ng witness. Once the statutory requirements stood sa(cid:22)sfied, the burden shi+ed upon the plain(cid:22)ff to establish suspicious circumstances surrounding the execu(cid:22)on of the Will. RSA No. 2134 of 2026 (O&M) Except her own interested tes(cid:22)mony, no evidence whatsoever was produced to establish either want of testamentary capacity or fraud. The concurrent finding recorded by both the Courts below is thus based upon seBled principles governing proof of testamentary documents and calls for no interference.

#16. The dismissal of the applica(cid:22)on under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC also suffers from no illegality. The appellate Court has correctly no(cid:22)ced that the proposed addi(cid:22)onal evidence rela(cid:22)ng to par(cid:22)(cid:22)on proceedings neither sa(cid:22)sfied the statutory requirements contained in Order XLI Rule 27 CPC nor had any bearing upon the principal issue regarding the ancestral character of the property. It is well seBled that addi(cid:22)onal evidence at the appellate stage is an excep(cid:22)on and not the rule. Unless the condi(cid:22)ons prescribed under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC are sa(cid:22)sfied, a party cannot be permiBed to fill up lacunae le+ in the trial. The learned appellate Court has rightly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148.

#17. The jurisdic(cid:22)on of this Court under Sec(cid:22)on 100 CPC is confined to substan(cid:22)al ques(cid:22)ons of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below cannot be interfered with merely because another view may also be possible. Unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based upon no evidence, or suffering from a substan(cid:22)al error of law, interference is wholly unwarranted.

#18. In the present case, both the Courts below have, upon comprehensive apprecia(cid:22)on of the evidence, concurrently held that: (i) the plain(cid:22)ff failed to prove that the suit property retained the character of ancestral coparcenary property; (ii) the decree dated 05.01.1970 had already disrupted the coparcenary nature of property and had aBained finality; (iii) the property held by Beg Chand therea+er became his separate property; RSA No. 2134 of 2026 (O&M) (iv) the registered Will and Release Deed stand duly proved in accordance with law; and (v) the plain(cid:22)ff has failed to establish any legal right in the suit property.

#19. None of the aforesaid findings has been shown to suffer from perversity, misreading of evidence or any legal infirmity warran(cid:22)ng interference in second appeal.

#20. No substan(cid:22)al ques(cid:22)on of law, much less one arising from the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below, arises for considera(cid:22)on in the present appeal.

#21. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applica(cid:22)on(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. July 06, 2026 Sarita (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned? Whether reportable? : : Yes/No Yes/No Uploaded on: July 06, 2026