State Bank of India v. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-I, Chandigarh & Anr.

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH Present: Mr. Vikas Chatrath, Advocate, for the petitioner. *** AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J. (ORAL) Prayer in the present writ petition is for quashing of the Award dated 09.11.2009 (Annexure P-1), vide which the Labour Court has remanded back the case to the disciplinary authority to take the decision afresh after affording the opportunity of being heard to the workman as per the direction given by the Tribunal in the body of the Award. The Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has further held that the disciplinary authority is directed to complete these proceedings within three months from the date of receiving the copy of the Award so that further delay is not caused in dispensation of justice. Counsel for the petitioner contends that despite the evidence being on record, which was led by the petitioner-Bank to the effect that the correct date of birth of respondent No. 2-workman was 01.07.1934, which CWP No. 6652 of 2010 2 was based on documentary evidence, the Court below has not taken that into consideration and no finding has been recorded on this count. He contends that even if the disciplinary proceedings are found to be not in accordance with the statutory Rules governing the service or in violation of the principles of natural justice but still the Management has been given liberty under the Act itself to prove that the order of termination against the workman was correct and in accordance with law. He, on this basis, contends that the Award passed by the Labour Court dated 09.11.2009 (Annexure P-1) cannot be sustained. In support of this contention, counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of this Court in the case of Ishwar Singh vs. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum- Labour Court, Hisar and others, 2009 (3) SCT 154. He further contends that if an employee has taken benefit of the date of birth initially supplied by him to the Army at the time of his recruitment, he cannot be permitted to resile from the same while seeking employment in any other place. He relies upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Santokh Singh Sidhu vs. State of Punjab and others, 2006 (3) SLR 812. I have heard the counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the records of the case. A perusal of the Award would show that the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has come to a conclusion that the requirement of issuance of a show cause notice of the proposed punishment has not been complied with by the petitioner-Management while terminating the service of respondent No. 2-workman. The disciplinary authority when did not agree with the report of the Enquiry Officer and dissented in its opinion, the said dissent note should have been forwarded to respondent No. 2- workman, so that he could give his explanation to that effect. That having CWP No. 6652 of 2010 3 not been done, the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated. On the basis of these conclusions, which factum is not challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition, the following directions were issued by the Central Government, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chandigarh:- “Accordingly, the punishment awarded to the workman is set aside. The case is remanded back to the disciplinary authority to take the decision afresh after affording the opportunity of being heard to the workman as per the direction given by this Tribunal in the body of the Award. The disciplinary authority is directed to complete these proceedings within three months from the date of receiving the copy of the Award so that further delay is not caused in dispensation of justice.” The directions, which have been issued by the Court below, are innocuous and no relief as such has been granted to the workman rather the petitioner-Management has been given liberty to comply with the principles of natural justice, as has been brought about in the body of the Award, which defects were pointed out to the Management. In this view of the matter, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the evidence led by the Management should have been taken into consideration while determining the legality or otherwise of the termination order, cannot be accepted. There can be no dispute with regard to the contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner that the Labour Court does have jurisdiction to determine the legality or otherwise of the order passed by the punishing authority in the disciplinary proceedings by going through the evidence, which is led by the parties with regard to the factum of the order being in CWP No. 6652 of 2010 4 accordance with law or justified. But keeping in view the directions, which have been issued by the Labour Court, it would not be appropriate to interfere in the impugned Award as no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner-Bank. What has been observed by the Court in the Award is no compliance of the principles of natural justice. Respondent No. 2-workman has been given an opportunity to explain his position before the Management after he is given the dissenting note of the disciplinary authority and then to consider his reply and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The judgments, which have been relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, cannot be disputed and the ratio laid down in the said judgments cannot be disputed with but keeping in view the observation made herein above, this Court is of the view that in extra- ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, interference in the Award, impugned herein, is not called for. Dismissed. Counsel for the petitioner, at this stage, states that since the petitioner has finally approached this Court by availing the remedy of writ jurisdiction, the period which was granted by the learned Central Government, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chandigarh has since expired and the said period may be extended to comply with the directions. In the light of the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner and the approach of the petitioner to this Court, the period, as directed by the Labour Court for complying with the directions, is extended by two months' from today. April 09, 2010 ( AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ) JUDGE