M/s Director and Warden Fisheries & Anr. v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bathinda & Anr.

pendency of the same, a settlement was arrived at between the parties and the respondent No. 2/Workman was reinstated in service with continuity thereof, but without back wages. After his reinstatement, he continued to work at Gurdaspur till 03.03.1999 and, thereafter he was transferred to Fish Farmers Development Agency, Bathinda. He continued to work at Bathinda till

31.10.1999, when his services were terminated with effect from 01.11.1999 without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as neither any notice was issued nor pay in lieu of notice or compensation granted to him as mandated under Section 25-F of the Act. He submitted his demand notice against his termination and when the conciliation proceedings failed, the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Bathinda, for C.W.P. No. 6625 of 2010. -3- adjudication. The petitioner/Management took a stand that the Chief Executive Officer was not the competent authority to transfer a casual labour from one office to other office of the Agency. It was admitted that the respondent No. 2/Workman had worked as Fisherman at the Fish Farmers Development Agency, Gurdaspur, before he joined at Bathinda and worked from April,1999 to 31.10.1999 for a period of 187 days at Bathinda, and as he had not completed 240 days in service, thus, he was not entitled to any benefit under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The parties led their respective evidence before the Industrial Tribunal. The factual aspect is not in dispute that earlier the respondent No. 2/Workman was working at Gurdaspur with the Fish Farmers Development Agency and thereafter, in pursuance to the transfer order dated 01.03.1999, Annexure-P-2 (Ex.W-4), he joined service at Fish Farmers Development Agency, Bathinda. It is not in dispute that if the period of service rendered by the respondent No. 2/Workman at Gurdaspur, is taken into consideration, the same would be more than 240 days in service in 12 preceding months from the date of his termination. It is noteworthy that the respondent No. 2/Workman had worked under the same Department in the same capacity and his services were transferred in pursuance to the oral directions issued by the Chairman- cum-Director of the Fish Farmers Development Agency. Reference in this regard can be made to the Order dated 01.03.1999 [Annexure-P-2(Ex.W-4)], passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Fish Farmers Development Agency, Gurdaspur, which reads as follow :- “ In view of resolution passed by the Managing Committee dated 11.12.1998 the Department was requested to adjust daily wage workers working with this Agency due to contingent fund balance coming virtually to zero stage vide letter No. 5 dated 08.01.1999. The CEO FDDA Bhathinda, requested Chairman FFDA’s for sanction for engagement of 4 Labourers vide letter 3645 dated 15.02.1999 against which the worthy Chairman asked him to get these labourers from this agency. C.W.P. No. 6625 of 2010. -4- Now CEO FFDA Bathinda requested for these Labourers vide letter No. 110 dated 23.02.1999 upto 30.04.1999. The agency is not in position to pay the wages to Labour for a single day and the Labour has already been asked to work at their own risk, in case the funds are not made available vide this office letter No. 462-66 dated 08.06.98, so in compliance of the instructions of the Chairman and unavoidable contingent situation of the FFDA Gurdaspur the daily wages labour may be asked to go the CEO FFDA Bhatinda for further deployment till further order of the Chairman-cum-Director." A perusal of the above Order would show that the said transfer order was passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Fish Farmers Development Agency, Gurdaspur, on the basis of the instructions of the Chairman-cum- Director as per Project Report (Annexure-P-6) for setting up of Fish Farmers Development Agency, reliance whereof has been made by counsel for the petitioner/Management. It is apparent from Annexure-P-6 that the Managing Committee is the final authority and the Chairman-cum-Director would be the Competent Authority as according to the averments of the petitioner, since 1998, Director and Warden, Fisheries, Punjab, Chandigarh, is the competent authority to cancel or modify the decision of the Managing Committee. There is nothing on the record to even suggest that such a decision has been taken by the Director and Warden, Fisheries, Punjab. Since the decision of the Managing Committee as referred to in the Order dated 01.03.1999 (Annexure- P-2), has not been annulled or rescinded, the services of respondent No. 2/Workman stood rightly transferred from Gurdaspur to Bathinda, and he continued to work there till the date of termination. It would not be out of way to mention here that the Project Report (Annexure-P-6), on which reliance has been placed by counsel for the petitioner/Management was not produced before the Industrial Tribunal. In the light of the above, the contention as raised by counsel for the petitioner/Management cannot be accepted. The findings as recorded by the Industrial Tribunal, Bathinda, thus, cannot be faulted with as the same are based on correct appreciation and C.W.P. No. 6625 of 2010. -5- interpretation of the evidence both oral and documentary brought on record, which do not call for any interference by this Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Versus K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, has in para-7 explained the limits of jurisdiction of the High Courts in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, which reads as follow :- “

7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is C.W.P. No. 6625 of 2010. -6- based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1995-1 SCR 1104: ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233): Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 (AIR 1958 SC 398) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168.” In view of the above, there cannot be said to any illegality committed by the Industrial Tribunal, Bathinda, which would call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Finding no merit in the present writ petition, the same stands dismissed. May 27, 2010. sjks. (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH) JUDGE