08.05.2025 KULWINDER SINGH KULWINDER STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS v. CORAM: HON HON’BLE
Case Details
LPA-1379-2025 2025 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CHANDIGARH LPA-1379-2025 (O&M) Decided on: 08.05.2025 KULWINDER SINGH KULWINDER STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS versus CORAM: HON HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR SINGH SUDHIR SINGH HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK JAIN ALOK JAIN HON ….Appellant .Appellant s ….Respondents
Legal Reasoning
Present:- Mr. Mr. Pardeep Kumar Kapila, Advocate , Advocate for the appellant. SUDHIR SINGH, J. SUDHIR SINGH CM-3380-LPA LPA-2025 ***** For the reasons given in the application, the same is allowed. For the reasons given in the application, the same is allowed. For the reasons given in the application, the same is allowed. For the reasons given in the application, the same is allowed. Delay of 370 days in filing the appeal is condoned. days in filing the appeal is condoned. 2025 LPA-1379-2025 Challenge in the instant intra Court appeal is to the order dated Challenge in the instant intra Court appeal is to the order dated Challenge in the instant intra Court appeal is to the order dated Challenge in the instant intra Court appeal is to the order dated passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition 01.04.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed on the ground of delay and la filed by the appellant was dismisse d on the ground of delay and laches. 2. laid challenge Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant had laid challenge Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant had Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant had
Decision
2 with the writ petition), to the communication dated 31.12.2024 (Annexure P-2 with the writ petition), to the communication dated 31.12.2024 (Annexure P to the communication dated 31.12.2024 (Annexure P whereby his claim for the post of Constable had been rejected. whereby his claim for the post of Constable had been rejected. whereby his claim for the post of Constable had been rejected. 3. As per the facts on record, pursuant to the ad As vertisement issued per the facts on record, pursuant to the advertisement issued in the year 2010, the appellant had applied for the post of Constable and had in the year 2010, the appellant had applied for the post of Constable and had in the year 2010, the appellant had applied for the post of Constable and had in the year 2010, the appellant had applied for the post of Constable and had appeared for the physical/recruitment test. In the result declared by the appeared for the physical/recruitment test. In the result declared by the appeared for the physical/recruitment test. In the result declared by the appeared for the physical/recruitment test. In the result declared by the HIMANSHU 2025.05.20 14:01 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Page 1 of 5 5 LPA-1379-2025 (O&M) respondent-Authorities, the appellant was granted only 24 marks, which included 10 marks on the education count and 14 marks for the height, which according to the appellant was wrongly measured by the Committee as 5 feet 11 Inch. The total marks obtained by the appellant were 24, whereas the cut off marks were 25. It is the case of the appellant that he had made various representations to the respondent-Authorities, but to no avail. It was further averred by the appellant that in 2011 again the recruitment for the post of Constable was conducted and this time also, the appellant was awarded 25 marks which were one mark less than the cut off marks of 26. It is further averred by the appellant that action of the respondent-Authorities was totally illegal inasmuch as in 2010, he was awarded marks by taking his height as 5 feet 11 inch, whereas in 2011 the said height was taken by the respondent- Authorities as 5 feet 11 inch ¾ . Thus, it was alleged by the appellant that the respondent-Authorities had denied him the appointment on the arbitrary and legally unsustainable grounds. 4. The learned Single Judge, has noticed that the appointment process pertained to 2010, but the appellant had kept sleeping over his right and had only approached the Court in 2025. Thus, while relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others, 2024 SCC Online SC 551, it was held that the writ petition was hit by the doctrine of delay and laches. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently contended that in the writ petition filed before the learned Single Judge, the appellant had duly explained that he had been running from pillar to post by approaching the respondent-Authorities right from 2010-2011, in respect of HIMANSHU 2025.05.20 14:01 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Page 2 of 5 LPA-1379-2025 (O&M) his grievance(s). It is, thus, submitted that cause of action having accrued to him on day to day basis, the finding of the learned Single Judge that there was an inordinate delay in filing the writ petition, is not tenable in the eyes of law. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have also gone through the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 7. It may be noticed that as per the appellant himself, he had served legal notice upon the respondent-Authorities on 10.09.2024, which was responded to by the Senior Superintendent of Police on 31.12.2024. It was the said communication which was challenged by the appellant by way of the writ petition before the learned Single Judge. As noticed above, the recruitment process pertained to 2010. There is no explanation on the part of the appellant for the delay of nearly 13 years in approaching the Court. It is settled law that the delay is genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. It is further settled that the delay disentitles a party to the discretionary relief under the Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If a litigant keeps sleeping over his rights for a long period and wakes up when he does have an impetus either from the judicial verdict of the Court or otherwise, such litigant is not entitled to any relief. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25 has held as under:- “Delay, laches and acquiescence 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence interconnected on many occasions. are overlapping and However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could HIMANSHU 2025.05.20 14:01 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Page 3 of 5 LPA-1379-2025 (O&M) identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. Laches 21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. slackness”. thus It 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. 23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. Acquiescence 24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other. HIMANSHU 2025.05.20 14:01 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Page 4 of 5 LPA-1379-2025 (O&M) 25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis.” 8. We find that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge do not call for any interference. 9. In view of the above, we find that there is no merit in the present appeal and the same is dismissed on merits as also being barred by limitation. 10. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. ( SUDHIR SINGH ) JUDGE ( ALOK JAIN ) JUDGE 08.05.2025 himanshu Whether speaking/reasoned: Whether reportable: Yes/No Yes/No HIMANSHU 2025.05.20 14:01 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/judgment. Page 5 of 5