Charan Singh v. DHBVNL

Mr.S.K.Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the complaint (Annexure P-1) was not maintainable before learned Special Judge at Narnaul. He also contended that the summoning order dated 03.01.2012 (Annexure P-2) was without Criminal Revision No.995 of 2012 (O&M) 3 jurisdiction on the ground that learned Special Judge could not take cognizance of the complaint without its commitment to his court. He further submitted that the application (Annexure P-3) presented by the petitioner for his discharge had also been dismissed wrongly vide the order Annexure P-5, therefore, the orders Annexures P-2 and P-5 are liable to be quashed. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gangula Ashok vs. State of A.P. (2000)2 SCC 504, and another judgment passed by this Court in Parkash Kaur Vs. Gurbachan Kaur 2000(4) RCR(Crl.) 339. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and gone through the material available on record. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the complaint could not have been instituted directly before learned Special Judge, Narnaul, by over-riding the mandatory provisions of Sections 190, 200 and 209, Cr.P.C which prescribe the presentation of a criminal complaint before Area Magistrate and then its committal to the court of Session after taking into account the material available on record. The contention raised by learned counsel is misconceived so far as the present case is concerned. Section 151 of Electricity Act, 2003, stipulates that: x x x x x x x “Provided further that a Special Court constituted under Section 153 shall be competent to take cognizance of an offence without accused being committed to it for trial.” Criminal Revision No.995 of 2012 (O&M) 4 The authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. In para 10 of Gangula Ashok's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “Section 193 of the Code has to be understood in the aforesaid backdrop. The section imposes an interdict on all Courts of Session against taking cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction. It can take cognizance only if “the case has been committed to it by a magistrate”, as provided in the Code. Two segments have been indicated in Section 193 as exceptions to the aforesaid interdict. One is, when the Code itself has provided differently in express language regarding taking of cognizance, and the second is when any other law has provided differently in express language regarding taking cognizance of offences under such law. The word “expressly” which is employed in Section 193 denoting to those exceptions is indicative of the legislative mandate that a Court of Session can depart from the interdict contained in the section only if it is provided differently in clear and unambiguous terms. In other words, unless it is positively and specifically provided differently no Court of Session can take cognizance of any offence directly, without the case being committed to it by a magistrate.” (Emphasis supplied) Section 151 of the Electricity Act, 2003, is reproduced as under for ready reference: “151. Cognizance of offences- No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this Act except upon a complaint in writing made by Appropriate Government or Appropriate Commission or any of their Criminal Revision No.995 of 2012 (O&M) 5 officer authorized by them or a Chief Electrical Inspector or an Electrical Inspector or license or the generating company, as the case may be, for this purpose: Provided further that a special court constituted under Section 153 shall be competent to take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed to it for trial.” Both the above said authorities are relating to the offence punishable under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. In the said Act, there is no provision authorizing the Special Judge to take cognizance without commitment of the accused but under the Electricity Act, 2003, Section 151, clearly provides that a Special Court constituted under Section 153 shall be competent to take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed to it for trial. Therefore, finding no infirmity, illegality or impropriety in the impugned orders (Annexures P-2 & P-5) passed by learned Special Judge, Narnaul, the present petition is hereby dismissed. 24th April, 2012 Seema (Naresh Kumar Sanghi) Judge