November 08 v. UT Chandigarh Admn & Ors.

Panjab (Pakistan). The first Prime Minister of independent India conceptualized the vision of setting up a new Capital city for the Punjab State. The idea was transformed into reality when the site was chosen and a new city known as ‘Chandigarh’ was planned out by the famous French Architect Monsieur Le Corbousier. While some of the important buildings, now known as the Marvels of Modern Architecture, were still under construction, the Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Act, 1952 was legislated for the following Objects & Reasons:- “The construction of the New Capital of Punjab at Chandigarh is in progress. It is considered necessary to vest the State Government with legal authority to regulate the sale of building sites and to promulgate building rules on the lines of Municipal Bye-laws so long as a properly constituted local (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) body does not take over the administration of the city. The Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) Bill, 1952, seeks to carry out the above objects and to repeal the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952, which is a President’s Act and is due to expire in April, 1953. Vide Punjab Govt. Gazette Extraordinary, dated the 23rd July, 1952.” (11).(cid:1) The Legislature reinforced its will for the planned development of Chandigarh by enacting yet another supplementary legislation known as Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952, with the following Objects & Reasons:- “The Punjab Government are constructing a New Capital named “Chandigarh”. The master plan providing for the future extension of the Capital will extend over a much greater area than the area acquired so far the construction of the first phase of the Capital. To ensure healthy and planned development of the new city it is necessary to prevent growth of slums and ramshackle construction on the land lying on the periphery of the new city. To achieve this object it is necessary to have legal (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) authority to regulate the use of the said land for purposes other than the purposes for which it is used at present.” (12).(cid:1) The legislative policy to develop not only a planned New Capital City but also to prevent haphazard unregulated clusters on its periphery upto a distance of 5 miles, can be unequivocably foreseen from an integrated reading of two contemporaneous Legislations. (13).(cid:1) Section 3 of the 1952 Act empowers that “the Central Government may sell, lease or otherwise transfer, whether by auction, allotment or otherwise, any land or building belonging to the Government in Chandigarh on such terms and conditions as it may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, think fit to impose.” (14).(cid:1) It is relevant to mention here that earlier Section 9 of the 1952 Act empowered the Estate Officer to resume the site or building and forfeit the whole or part of consideration money paid by an allottee on the ground of non-payment of entire consideration money or the breach of any condition of transfer or of any Rule framed under the Act. Section 9, however, was declared violative of Articles 14 & 19(1)(f) of the Constitution by the Supreme Court in M/s. Jagdish Chand Radhey Shyam, appellant vs. the State of Punjab & Ors., (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) respondents, (1972) 3 SCC 428, for there were no guidelines as to when the Government will resort to either of the two remedies as the Government could selectively discriminate in proceeding against one person in one manner and another person in another manner; and that Section 9 was a totally unreasonable restriction on the enjoyment of property. (15).(cid:1) Section 9 was formally omitted by the Capital of Punjab (Development & Regulation) (Amendment) Act, 1973 and was substituted by Sections 8-A introduced retrospectively since

01.11.1966, the date when the Union Territory of Chandigarh came into being. Section 3 of the Act was also amended. The new provisions were intended to cure the defects viewed in Section 9 by the Supreme Court. One of the curative steps that the Legislature took was insertion of a provision for compliance of the principles of natural justice before the resumption of a property by the Estate Officer. (16).(cid:1) Section 8-A of the 1952 Act is the pivotal point of controversy and it reads as follows:- “8-A Resumption and forfeiture for breach of conditions of transfer. – (1) If any transferee has failed to pay consideration money or any instalment thereof on account of the sale of any site or building or both, under section 3 or has committed a breach of any other conditions of such sale, the Estate Officer may, by (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) notice in writing, call upon the transferee to show cause why an order of resumption of the site or building, or both, as the case may be, and forfeiture of the whole or any part of the money, if any, paid in respect thereof which in no case shall exceed ten per cent of the total amount of the consideration money, interest and other dues payable in respect of the sale of the site or building or both should not be made. (2) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the transferee in pursuance of a notice under sub-section (1) and any evidence he may produce in support of the same and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter, the Estate Officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing make an order resuming the site or building or both, as the case may be, so sold and directing the forfeiture as provided in sub-section (1), of the whole or any part of the money paid in respect of such sale.” (17).(cid:1) Section 8-A obligates the Estate Officer to show cause a transferee who fails to pay the consideration money, full or in part, or has breached any condition of sale, as to why an order of resumption of the site or building, as the case may be, and forfeiture of the whole or in part of the money, be not passed. Its sub-section (2) assimilates the principle of audi alteram partem. (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (18).(cid:1) An order of resumption of a site or building passed under Section 8-A is appealable and/or revisable under Section 10(1) & (4) which reads as under (relevant extracts only):- “10. Appeals and revision. – (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Estate Officer made under [sections 8 or 8A] may, within thirty days of the date of the communication to him of such order, prefer an appeal to the Chief Administrator in such form and manner as may be prescribed : Provided that the Chief Administrator may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) The Chief Administrator may, after hearing the appeal, confirm, vary, or reverse the order appealed from and may pass such orders as he deems fit. (3) xxx (4) Where a person is aggrieved by any order of the Chief Administrator, deciding a case under sub- section (2) or sub-section (3), he may, within thirty days of the date of communication to him of such decision, make an application in writing to the Central Government for revision against the said decision and the Central Government may confirm, (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) alter or rescind the decision of the Chief Administrator.” (19).(cid:1) Section 8 of the 1952 Act enables the Estate Officer to impose penalty not exceeding the due amount and recover the arrears of rent due and penalty in respect of a leasehold site or building. Section 13 provides a penalty of Rs.500/- with a further fine extendable to Rs.20/- for each corresponding day if a person fails to comply with the directions issued in respect of erection of a building under Section 4 or if he does not properly maintain the site or building despite a direction issued to this effect under Section 6 of the Act. Likewise, Section 15 of the 1952 Act prescribes penalty upto Rs.500/- for breach of the Rules including an additional fine upto Rs.20/- per day for a continuing contravention, without prejudice to the prosecution of such violators as well as forfeiture of the property or part thereof, within six months of the beginning of erection or re- erection of the building in violation of Rules. (20).(cid:1) The power to make Rules for carrying out the purposes of 1952 Act is embodied in Section 22 and it says that:- “22. Power to make rules. – (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, such rules may (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:- (a) the terms and conditions on which any land or building may be transferred by the Central Government under this Act; (b) the manner in which consideration money for any transfer may be paid; (c) the rate of interest payable, and the procedure for payment of instalments, interest, fees, rents or other dues payable under this Act; (d) the terms and conditions under which the transfer of any right in any site or building may be permitted; (e) erection of any building or the use of any site; (f) levy of fees or taxes under section 7; (g) the terms and conditions for the breach of which any site or building may be resumed; (h) the conditions with regard to the buildings to be erected on sites transferred under this Act ; (i) the form of notice and the manner in which notices may be served; (j) the form and manner in which appeals and application under this Act may be filed and the court fees leviable on such appeals and applications; (k) the matters referred to in sub-section(2) of section 5; (l) any other matter which has to be or may be prescribed.” (21).(cid:1) The power under Section 22 has been intermittently invoked to enact or amend various sets of Rules. The Chandigarh (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (Sale of Sites and Buildings) Rules, 1960 are also the creation of Section 22 of the 1952 Act. These Rules lay down the procedure to be followed for the auction and allotment of sites, their use, procedure in case of misuse, payment of instalments or time permissible for erection etc. Rule 11-D was added in these Rules vide Notification dated 04.10.1979 and it remained operative till its deletion on 31st January, 2007. Rule 11-D of the 1960 Rules (relevant extracts only) was to the following effect:- “11-D. Retransfer of Site. - (1) Where a site has been resumed under section 8A of Act No. XXVII of 1952 for any reasons, the Estate Officer may on an application, retransfer the site to the outgoing transferee, on payment of an amount equal to 10 per cent of the premium originally payable for such property or one- third of the difference between the price originally paid and its value at the time when the application for transfer is made, whichever is more. However in the case of a person who is serving or who has served in the Armed Forces of the Union, the amount payable by him or his legal heir for the retransfer of a site shall be 10% of the price originally payable for such site or 5% of the difference between the price originally payable and its value at the time when application for transfer is made, which ever is more. Provided that such transfer shall be permissible only if– (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (i) where the site has been resumed on ground of misuser, the misuser has stopped; (ii) where the site has been resumed for non- payment of price, all outstanding dues including forfeiture have been paid; (iii) where the site has been resumed for breach of any conditions of sale, the breach has been remedied and conditions fulfilled. Notwithstanding anything contained in the proviso above, when the site has been resumed on ground of misuser or non-completion of the building on it within the stipulated period, the Estate Officer may allow the retransfer on the applicant agreeing to vacate or have the misuser vacated or the building completed as the case may be within such reasonable period as the Estate Officer may stipulate. Explanation. -. xxx xxx (2) xxx (3) xxx (4) xxx (5) xxx xxx” (22).(cid:1) Chandigarh Leasehold of Sites and Building Rules, 1973 (in short, 'the 1973 Rules') are also notified under Section 22 of the Act. Rule 21-B of these Rules added on 04.10.1979 was in pari materia to Rule 11-D of 1960 Rules and it has also been deleted with effect from the same date i.e. 31st January, 2007 when Rule 11-D of the 1960 Rules stood deleted. The only distinction between the two sets of Rules is that while 1960 Rules deal with the transfer of a (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) building or site by way of sale or allotment on free-hold basis, the 1973 Rules regulate the leasehold properties. BRIEF HISTORY OF 1st CHALLENGE TO SECTION 8-A (23).(cid:1) The constitutionality of Section 8-A of the 1952 Act was put to trial before a Full Bench of this Court in Ram Puri vs. Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh, AIR 1982 P&H 301 on the following grounds:- (i)(cid:1) Section 8-A continued to suffer from the same vice as was the Section 9; (ii)(cid:1) Section 8-A was hit by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution as the resumption of a property amounted to divestiture of ownership possession without paying compensation; (iii)(cid:1) Section 8-A vested the Authority with such unguided and arbitrary powers that it was violative of the Fundamental Right to property guaranteed under Article 31 of the Constitution; (iv)(cid:1) Alternatively, Section 8-A was applicable only to such transferees who for want of payment of total consideration had not perfected their title of ownership; and (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (v)(cid:1) There could be no forfeiture of title or possessory rights after full payment of consideration money as the transferee became absolute owner of the property. (24).(cid:1) This Court by majority repelled these contentions and held Section 8-A to be in conformity with Articles 14, 19(1)(f) & 31 of the Constitution of India. (25).(cid:1) The issue of validity of Section 8-A was again raked up after a long silence in Babu Singh Bains etc. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 565 which pertained to the misuse of a residential house by the allottee to run “Blue-Star Guest House”, contrary to the terms and conditions of allotment. The site was resumed and the appeal/revision against that order were dismissed. The Chandigarh Administration then initiated eviction proceedings under the Public Premises Act, giving rise to yet another bout of litigation upto the final Court wherein the allottee was heard afresh on the merits of resumption order but no illegality having been found, the resumption order as well as the order(s) declining the allottee’s prayer for condonation of delay in applying for re-allotment of the site under Rule 11-D, were upheld. Since the allottee attacked on the vires of Section 8-A of the 1952 Act and relied upon Rule 11-D for the re- transfer of resumed site, both the provisions were considered at length (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) by the Apex Court. Section 8-A was upheld on the anvil of Article 14 and the majority view in Ram Puri’s case was also approved. (26).(cid:1) The Supreme Court in Babu Singh Bains further held that once the Statute occupied the field and gave power to resume the land or building subject to the conditions mentioned therein, the general principles of resumption and other principles remained no more relevant. Maganlal Chhagganlal Pvt. Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1974) 2 SCC 402 was relied upon to knock the bottom of the plea of constitutional invalidity of Section 8-A on the anvil of Article 14 when softer course under Section 15 was available and it was held that Section 8-A does not become invalid on that score. It was also laid down that after deletion of Section 9 procedural safeguards have been provided in Section 8-A and in view of having provided fair procedure, the said provision does not become arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. (27).(cid:1) The last plea raised by the allottee, pinning hope on Rule 11-D, was also rejected outrightly by the Apex Court in Babu Singh Bains and rather it questioned the very legality and propriety of this Rule saying that "It would be a constant sprout of corruption and abuse of Rule 11-D for diverse reasons which in the interest of smooth administration need to remove the irritant. However, we need not dwell upon it any further as it is not necessary for the purpose of (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) deciding the question in this case. Suffice it to state that Rule 11-D is only an enabling provision to make an application. The Estate Officer has discretion to re-grant the land or building which stood already resumed and vested in the State. Of course, he cannot arbitrarily reject the petition; he has to give reasons in support thereof as contemplated in Rule 11-D itself.” (28).(cid:1) In Chandigarh Administration through the Estate Officer, Union Territory, Chandigarh vs. M/s. Johnson Paints and Varnish Co., (1996) 8 SCC 374 also the Hon'ble Supreme Court came very heavily on Rule 11-D and doubted the very bona fides behind introducing the said Rule. In that case an industrial plot was firstly resumed for non-payment of the due instalments but was restored on deposit of the due amount with penal interest. Thereafter the allottee kept the plot unused for speculative purposes hence it was resumed the second time for breach of allotment conditions. The allottee unsuccessfully challenged the second resumption order and then sought re-allotment under Rule 11-D. (29).(cid:1) The Supreme Court turned down the prayer for re-transfer of the resumed site in M/s. Johnson Paints and Varnish Co.’s case holding that “once the original allotment stands cancelled and the resumption becomes final, the allottee has no right in the allotted site. Rule 11-D deals with only discretionary power given to the Estate (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) Officer. The only right the erstwhile outgoing transferee had was to make an application. On making the application, he has to satisfy the criteria laid down under the Rule. We doubt the very bona fides in introducing Rule 11-D to provide a back door entry from the lost rights. But on the facts in this case, it is not necessary to go into the wisdom of introducing Rule 11-D. Suffice it to state that it does not clothe him with any right to the allotment as of right. It being a discretionary benefit sought to be given to the outgoing transferee in the language of the rule, the outgoing transferee must, in fact and in reality, be the real, genuine and bona fide transferee and for him alone the benefit may be given for consideration under Rule 11.” (30).(cid:1) The adverse remarks of the severest nature made against the very substratum of Rule 11-D also did not deter the Authorities to persist with this Rule and it took more than 10 years to see sense and delete Rule 11-D and Rule 21-B from the 1960 and 1973 Rules, respectively, w.e.f. 31.01.2007. (31).(cid:1) It is equally significant to cite M/s. Teri Oat Estates Pvt. Ltd. vs. UT Chandigarh & Ors., (2004) 2 SCC 130, where a commercial site allotted on leasehold basis was resumed for non- payment of the consideration money. The instalments were not deposited despite many opportunities granted by the appellate and revisional authorities and the matter was taken before the Hon’ble (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) Supreme Court. The constitutional validity of Section 8-A was expressly questioned in this case also and the Supreme Court after dwelling upon the vires of the 1952 Act upheld Section 8-A on the strength of Babu Singh Bain’s case save as it applied the ‘doctrine of Proportionality’, keeping the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, in view as the appellant had deposited the entire consideration money under the orders of the Court and restored the site by imposing a penalty of Rs.15 lacs on the allottee. It was, however, observed that "there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that if the intention of the allottee is dishonest or with an ill motive and if the allottee does not make any payment in terms of the allotment or the statute with a dishonest view or any dishonest motive, then Section 8(A) can be taken recourse to." (32).(cid:1) The principle of ‘Proportionality’ for restricting the power of forfeiture, only as a last resort was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Jagmohan Singh vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 38 also when it said that :- “In Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. vs. U.T., Chandigarh & Ors. [(2004) 2 SCC 130], this Court has taken notice of the fact that different orders were being passed by the High Court from time to time. The orders passed by the High Court (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) have been upheld therein upon applying the doctrine of proportionality as contra-distinguished from Wednesbury Unreasonableness principle. [(See also Jitendra Kumar & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Anr. [(2008) 2 SCC 161].

15. In Teri Oat (supra), it was opined that the power of forfeiture should be taken recourse to as a last resort and the action of the statutory authority is required to be judged on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India...” PETITIONERS’ CASE:- (33).(cid:1) The core contentions elucidated by counsel for the petitioners on the premise that the subject reference has opened a new vista to re-convulse even settled issues may be summarized as follows:- (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4) (cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4) (cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:19)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:4) (cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:23)(cid:24)(cid:1)(cid:23)(cid:3)(cid:1)(cid:25)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:16)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:26)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:27)(cid:23)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:28)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10) – It was argued that constitutionality of Section 8-A can be tested on the touch-stone of Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 of the Constitution as the Fundamental Rights guaranteed thereunder were enforceable when Section 8-A was enacted by Parliament vide Act No.XVII of 1973 (retrospectively from 01.11.1966). Since ‘resumption’ under (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:9)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) Section 8-A absolutely divests the allottee of ownership and possessory rights without payment of any compensation, it derogated the Fundamental Right ‘to acquire, hold and dispose of property’ which remained guaranteed till June 20, 1979 when the Constitution (Forty-fourth) Amendment Act, 1978 was passed diluting the right to property from a ‘Fundamental’ right to the ‘Constitutional’ one. To substantiate the contention that a provision brought on a Statute Book before June 20, 1979 must also satisfy the test of Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31, reliance is placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in (i) Waman Rao & Ors. vs. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362; (ii) State of Maharashtra vs. Kamal Sukumar Durgule, (1985) 1 SCC 234; (iii) Chairman, Railway Board vs. CR Rangadhamaiah, (1997) 6 SCC 623. (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:25)(cid:6)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:27)(cid:29)(cid:29)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:28)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:9) – It was urged that ‘Right to Property’ is still a Constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution hence no person can be “deprived of his property save by authority of law” which according to Hon'ble Supreme Court in KT Plantation Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1, means – (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) "(a). Right to acquire, hold and dispose of property has ceased to be a fundamental right under Constitution of India. (b). Legislature can deprive a person of his property only by authority of law. (c). Right to acquire, hold and dispose of property is not a feature of the Constitution, but only a Constitutional right. (d). Right to Property, since no more a fundamental right, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 cannot be generally invoked, aggrieved person has to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution." It was emphasized that the principle of eminent domain must be read into Article 300-A to vouch for ‘public purpose’ as a pre- condition to deprive a person of his property and right to claim ‘compensation’, failing which the ‘authority of law’ shall subvert to police dominion as against the rule of law. Since Section 8-A does not qualify the twin test of ‘public purpose’ and payment of ‘compensation’ in lieu thereof that the resumption of property under the 1952 Act is directly in teeth of Article 300-A of the Constitution. Additional support was drawn from the decisions (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:15)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) in (i) Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. (1995) 1 Suppl. SCC 596; (ii) State of West Bengal & Ors. vs. Vishnunarayan & Associates Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (2002) 4 SCC 134; and (iii) Rajiv Sarin vs. State of Uttrakhand (2011) 8 SCC 708. (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4) (cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4) (cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:4) (cid:22)(cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:7)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:4) (cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:4) (cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:20)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:7)(cid:4) (cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:31)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:14)(cid:7)(cid:19)(cid:6) (cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:9)(cid:20)!(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:4) (cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:23)(cid:24)"#(cid:4) (cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:25) – It was submitted that the legislative object behind enacting 1952 Act was to vest the State Government (now UT Administration) with a legal authority to regulate the sale of building sites and to promulgate building rules in the lines of Municipal Byelaws. The Act does not envisage unjust enrichment of the Administration through resumption and re-sale of properties. Prior to insertion of Section 8-A there used to be three remedies available under the Act to deal with the default against the non-payment of allotment price i.e. (i) Section 3(3) created a charge over the allotted property till the due instalments were paid; (ii) the due amount was recoverable as arrears of land revenue under Section 8; and lastly (iii) the site could be resumed under Section

9. Similarly, in case of misuse of the site or violation of Building Byelaws, (i) penalties could be imposed under Section 13, or (ii) the building could be ordered to be altered or demolished by (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) following the procedure laid down in Section 15 before inflicting the final blow of resumption. Section 8-A though was intended to cure the legal defects found in Section 9 in M/s. Jagdish Chand Radhey Shyam's case (supra), however, it has taken away more than one alternative remedy available earlier for the recovery of due instalments, emboldening the Estate Officer to resume a site outrightly for the non-payment of such dues. Power of ‘Resumption’ is said to have over-shadowed and hidden away the softer penal alternatives and thus the legislative object of 1952 Act has been shrunk as a measure to confiscate properties instead of regulating them to keep Chandigarh as a planned city as envisaged under Section 8-A is arraigned to have rendered Section 15 redundant which no penalty for breach of any rule is leviable after expiry of six months’ period from the date of erection or re-erection of a building in contravention of the building Rules as held by a Full Bench of this Court in Bakshish Kaur Saini vs. UT Chandigarh, AIR 1994 P&H 1 (FB) and the Estate Officer would deliberately allow the said period to expire and then invoke Section 8-A for the same misdemeanour so as to impose the harshest penalty in comparison to the softer action of Rs.500/- plus Rs.20/- per day for continuous breach permissible under Section 15 of the Act. (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:31)(cid:3)(cid:4) (cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4) (cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:21)(cid:4) (cid:15)(cid:10)!(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:8)$(cid:4) (cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:31)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:31)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:22)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:23)%(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:26)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:19)(cid:15) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:22)(cid:2)(cid:30)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:14) – It was reiterated that every action, whether legislative or executive, affecting one’s fundamental, constitutional, civil or human rights must satisfy the test of it being just, reasonable, fair and non-discriminatory to retain constitutionality within the circumference of Article 14 or other provisions of our Constitution. The petitioners on this similitude firstly urged that robbing off a person of his property without paying just compensation through legislative means like Section 8-A is per se arbitrary and breeds inequality. Secondly, the very object of inserting Section 8-A was to wipe out the discriminatory consequences noticed by the Supreme Court in Section 9 in M/s. Jagdish Chand Radhey Shyam's case but the true understanding of import and impact of Section 8-A leaves no room to doubt that the very cure has increased the ailment of discrimination manifold as the Estate Officer may in a given case take recourse to Section 15 and impose a fine only but may choose to sleep over for six months and then resume the property for an identical violation of the Building Byelaws. There are no inbuilt safeguards or guidelines in the Act nor there is any embargo that Section 8-A cannot be invoked unless the defaulter (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) has been firstly dealt with under Section 15 or other provisions containing minor penalties. Section 8-A is alleged to have invested more arbitrary and discriminatory powers in the Estate Officer to act as per his whims and fancies. It was argued that the majority in Ram Puri misconstrued the Supreme Court decision in Maganlal Chhagganlal Pvt. Ltd. (supra) though the latter surely held that where a Statute providing for a more drastic procedure different from the ordinary procedure, covers the whole field which is covered by the ordinary procedure also without any guidelines as to the class of cases in which either procedure is to be resorted to, the Statute will be hit by Article 14. The petitioners also cited AP State Financial Corporation vs. M/s. GAR Re-rolling Mills & Anr., (1994) 2 SCC 647, to say that when two remedies are available for the same relief, the party to whom the said remedies are available has the option to elect either of them but that doctrine would not apply to cases where the ambit and scope of the two remedies is essentially different. Reference was made to yet another decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Mrs. Kamal P.Kumar, (1985) 1 SCC 234, wherein the definition of phrase “vacant land” coupled with the discretion conferred upon the competent authority to declare a land as a vacant land without laying down (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) any guidelines to control that discretion, were held to be violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The decisions in (i) Krishna vs. State of UP, (2007) 15 SCC 320; (ii) Karnataka State Financial Corporation vs. Narasimahaiah, (2008) 5 SCC 176; and (iii) Shantilal Walchand Kothari vs. Smt. Shantabhai Purushottam Deshmukh, AIR 1984 Bom 306 were also quoted in aid. (cid:1)(cid:31)(cid:3)(cid:4)&(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:25)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:18)(cid:2)(cid:31)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:15)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:7)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:4)’(cid:22)(cid:9)(cid:31)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:2)((cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:14)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:15)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:14)(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:2)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:17)(cid:21)(cid:4) (cid:7)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4)’(cid:22)(cid:9)’(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:8)(cid:21)(cid:4)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:16)((cid:6)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:26)(cid:16)(cid:21)(cid:4) (cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:4) (cid:2) ’(cid:17)(cid:2)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10) – 'Resumption', in fact embodies all the ingredients of penalty. The power to confiscate and consequential forfeiture of right or interest in a property is thus sore and severe. Statutes conferring such powers must be strictly interpreted as the expropriatory power cannot be inferred by implication. The confiscatory power of 'resumption', therefore, is subject to other overriding rights, like to claim 'compensation' at least equivalent to the value fetched by the resumed property on afresh auctioning. Such like rights are recognized even in the case of a third party like Bank if it has a charge over the resumed property. Right to seek 'compensation' therefore must be read into Section 8-A through purposive (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) construction so as to save it from the rigors of Articles 19(1)(f), 31 & 300-A of the Constitution. The decision in O.Konavalov vs. Commander, Coast Guard Region, (2006) 4 SCC 620, dealing with confiscatory provisions contained in the Customs Act, 1962 has been relied upon in this regard. (cid:1)(cid:31)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4) (cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4) (cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4) ’(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:6)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:22) (cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:7)(cid:6)’(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:4) (cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:4) (cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4) )(cid:14)(cid:8)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:4) *(cid:25)(cid:25)(cid:2)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:22)$(cid:4) (cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:4) +(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:2)(cid:25)(cid:2)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:25)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:4) (cid:6),(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:4) (cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:4) ’(cid:6)(cid:10)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:4) ’(cid:22)(cid:9)(cid:31)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:4) (cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:23)(cid:24)"#(cid:4) (cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:8) – The impugned provision vests the authorities under the Act with unbridled, uncontrolled and unguided powers to resume a building even for minor misuse of a part of it. The power to resume an entire property ought not to be exercised unless the authority has exhausted all other penal remedies and the allottee is incorrigible to a degree that the other penalties have been rendered ineffective. In the absence of mandatory guidelines or a policy of self-restraint for the authorities, resumption has become the rule of the day while other penalties are an exception. Rule 11-D used to salvage the situation as a tool of checks and balances viz. Section 8-A but after its deletion the resumption power has become a Draconian piece of legislation. (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (cid:1)(cid:31)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4) &(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:23)(cid:24)"#(cid:4) (cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4) (cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:4) (cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:9) (cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:9)(cid:20)(cid:14)(cid:9)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:25)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:7)(cid:19)(cid:2)(cid:6)(cid:31)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4) ’(cid:15)(cid:22)’(cid:9)(cid:14)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:25)(cid:15)(cid:17)(cid:25)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:17) (cid:6)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:9)(cid:20)!(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:31)(cid:6)(cid:14) - The Reasons and Objects behind enactment of 1952 Act were to develop Chandigarh as a planned Capital city of Punjab State and its provisions were to remain operative till the occupation of the field by an elected local body under the Municipal laws. Chandigarh is now a fully developed city. Parliament has already extended the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 to the Union Territory of Chandigarh enacting the Punjab Municipal Corporation Law (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1994 (in short, ‘the 1994 Act’). In view of enunciation in Rameshwar Prasad & Ors. vs. State of UP & Ors. (1983) 2 SCC 195 the Statement of Objects and Reasons of an Act have to be read with the Act itself hence, the 1952 Act has lost its sanctity and has become obsolete. To support the contention that a legislative Act can be declared obsolete once it has achieved the purpose and fulfilled the objectives, reliance is placed on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (dead) by LRs vs. Union of India & Ors. (2008) 5 SCC 287. Articles 243-P & 243-Q have also been ascribed to canvass that in view of phrase "shall" mentioned therein, setting up a Municipality is the (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) constitutional mandate which has since been given effect in the UT Chandigarh, leaving no other field to operate for the 1952 Act. (cid:1)(cid:31)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4) &(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:4) (cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4) -(cid:9)(cid:10).(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:5)(cid:15)’(cid:22)(cid:6) (cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:28)(cid:9)(cid:15)(cid:22)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:4) /0(cid:14)1(cid:4)2(cid:9)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4)3(cid:16)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4)4(cid:16)(cid:22)(cid:10)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:28)(cid:9)1(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4)5(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:15)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:19)(cid:4) 5(cid:16)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:20)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:18)(cid:2)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:20)(cid:4)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:31)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:4) (cid:20)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:4) (cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:4) - The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 6 of its order in M/s. Johnson Paints and Varnish Co.’s case (supra) that "Rule 11-D deals with only discretionary power given to the Estate Officer. The only right the erstwhile outgoing transferee had was to make an application... We doubt the very bona fide in introducing Rule 11-D to provide a back-door entry from the lost rights", or that "it is not necessary to go into the wisdom of introducing Rule 11-D. Suffice it to state that it does not clothe him with any right to the allotment as to right" and that to avail the benefit of Rule 11-D, "the outgoing transferee must, in fact and in reality, be the real, genuine and bona fide transferee" were elaborate to mean that Rule 11-D was an 'enabling provision' vesting discretionary powers in the Estate Officer to re-allot the land or the building which already stood resumed. The inconsequential observations doubting the bona fide in introducing Rule 11-D to provide a back-door entry (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) from the lost rights, the petitioners claimed, are indeed obiter dicta as neither validity of Rule 11-D was an issue raised nor the Supreme Court expressed any final view in relation thereto. Similarly, para 16 in Babu Singh Bain's case essentially follows para 6 in M/s. Johnson Paints and Varnish Co. and the observation that "it would be a constant sprout of corruption and abuse of Rule 11-D for diverse reasons which in the interest of smooth administration need to remove the irritant", too was obiter dicta as in this very paragraph it was held that discretionary power under Rule 11-D to re-grant the land or building which stood already resumed and vested in the State, cannot be arbitrarily exercised while rejecting the petition and the Estate Officer "has to give reasons in support thereof as contemplated in Rule 11-D itself". The later observations are said to have impliedly approved that Rule 11-D could be resorted to for fair, valid and just reasons. The two set of observations when juxtaposed are reconcilable to hold that power under Rule 11-D can be sparingly used, if need be. The Hon'ble Supreme Court thus did not intend nor did it completely erase Rule 11-D from the Rule Book. Contrarily, in Jyotsna Kohli vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh & Ors., (2004) 12 SCC 516, the Supreme Court recognised the right to seek re-allotment under (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) Rule 11-D and permitted the allottee to take its benefit even while upholding the resumption order passed under Section 8-A. Davinder Singh Pannu vs. Chandigarh Administration, (2003) 2 PLJ 210, is yet another case where the Estate Officer was directed to favourably consider application for re- transfer/re-allotment. A series of reported judgments of this Court wherein the resumption orders were upheld but right to seek re-allotment was protected, have also been referred to. To say that a 'judgement' of the Supreme Court has to be read in the context of questions which arose for consideration in that case and an obiter dictum is distinguished from ratio decidendi and only the latter carries binding force within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution, the petitioners relied upon (i) M/s. Raval & Co. vs. KG Ramachandran, (1974) 1 SCC 424; (ii) State of UP & Anr. vs. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. (1991) 4 SCC 139; (iii) M/s.A-One Granites vs. State of UP & Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 537; (iv) Director of Settlements, AP & Ors. vs. MR Apparao & Anr., (2002) 4 SCC 638; (v) Chandramohan Pandurang Kajbaje vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2008) 1 SCR 187; (vi) Arun Aggarwal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 4 RCR (Crl.)137. (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:15)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (cid:1)(cid:2),(cid:3)(cid:4)&(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:4)6(cid:15)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:23)(cid:23)(cid:12)7(cid:4)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:25)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:15)(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:18)$(cid:4) (cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:20)(cid:22)(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:22)(cid:20)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:22)(cid:21)(cid:4) ’(cid:9)(cid:26)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:6),(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:7)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:4) (cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13) – It was argued that Rule 11-D protected Section 8-A against unconstitutionality for it enabled an allottee to seek re-allotment of the resumed property on payment of prevalent market rate. Rule 11-D, according to the petitioners, was a device to impose highly exorbitant penalty on the allottee beyond the scope of Section 15 of the 1952 Act as the resumed site was allowed to rest in his hands only on payment of the 'current market price’. The Rule successfully achieved the avowed object of preventing violations or misuse of a site through the deterrent effect of dissipated penalty. Rule 11-D thus was subservient to public interest and had no element of ‘discretion’ as was erroneously represented before the Supreme Court M/s.Johnson Paints and Varnish Co. or Babu Singh Bains cases. While the Estate Officer had no discretion to refuse re- transfer of the resumed site if the previous allottee was ready and willing to abide by the fresh terms and conditions of allotment including payment of current market price, the allottee too had no choice but to accept re-transfer on the terms and conditions thrust on him. Rule 11-D successfully stood to the test of time and held the field for about 28 years before its (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) sudden deletion without any rhyme or reason. The Chandigarh Administration has not come up with any just explanation for the deletion of Rule 11-D except to take shelter behind the adverse comments made on its validity by the Supreme Court more than a decade ago. It is also the petitioners’ case that Section 8-A would not have survived in Ram Puri’s case but for the fact that Rule 11-D came to its rescue. (cid:1),(cid:3)(cid:4)6(cid:15)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:23)(cid:23)(cid:12)7(cid:4)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:9)(cid:14)’(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:31)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:21)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:16)((cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:26)(cid:16)(cid:21)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:10)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:7)(cid:7)(cid:22)(cid:15)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:25)(cid:16)(cid:31)(cid:9)(cid:15)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:4) (cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:9) (cid:4) (cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:26)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:27)(cid:23)1(cid:29)(cid:23)1#(cid:29)(cid:29)8(cid:4) (cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:4) (cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:14)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:4) (cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:16)’’(cid:17)(cid:2)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:4) (cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:25)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:4) (cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:4) (cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:15) (cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:20)(cid:6)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10) – One of the principal contention is that the existing rights under a Statute ought to be determined according to its provisions prevailing and applicable at the time when such rights accrued. The amendment or repeal of the Statute cannot take away the rights which had accrued before such amendment or repeal. The same principle governs the subordinate legislation as well. It was argued that the benefit of Rule 11-D or Rule 21-B, as the case may be, shall remain available to those allottees to whom sites were allotted before 31st January, 2007 as ‘right to re-allotment’ shall be deemed to be one of the terms and conditions of their allotments. (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) Alternatively, the petitioners are said to have applied for re- transfer of the resumed sites under Rule 11-D or Rule 21-B before these Rules were omitted from the Rule Book on 31st January, 2007, their applications deserve to be entertained and decided on the assumption that the afore-stated Rules were still in force. The effect of deletion thus cannot be applied retrospectively to take away the right to seek re-transfer accrued in favour of the applicants when the Rule(s) were operative. It is explained in CWP No.167 of 2010 that the petitioner-Trust made an application under Rule 11-D within six months of the resumption proceedings attaining finality i.e. on 16th October, 1997 but its application was kept pending for 9 long years compelling it to obtain a direction from this Court for a time- bound decision which was to expire on 6th February, 2007 and a few days before that Rule 11-D was deleted to defeat the Trust’s legitimate right under the existing Rule. The plea that a legislation, subordinate or otherwise, cannot be brought into force retrospectively to take away a vested right or adversely affect such right, has been aided with catena of decisions including (i) State of Gujarat & Anr. vs. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni & Ors. (1983) 2 SCC 33; (ii) Mahabir Vegetable Oils Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2006) 3 SCC (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) 620; (iii) Union of India & Ors. vs. Asian Food Industries, (2006) 13 SCC 542; (iv) Brig. Harbans Singh vs. Union Territory, 1989 (2) RCR (R) 400; (v) Ajmer Singh vs. Union of India, 1996(3) RCR (C) 126; (vi) Bharat Rattan Dr. Baba Sahib Bhim Rao Ambedkar Cooperative Transport Society Ltd., Narnaund vs. State of Haryana, 2005(2) RCR (C) 243; (vii) M/s.Kumar Brothers (Chemists) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh & Ors., 2008(3) RCR (C) 4; (viii) Harbinder Singh Dhillon & Anr. vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh & Ors. 2008(1) LAR 26 (ix) Subhash Chander & Anr. vs. HUDA & Anr., 2009(2) RCR (C) 164; (x) Escorts Ltd. vs. Union of India & Anr., 2010(2) RCR (C) 60. (cid:1),(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)&(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4)’(cid:9)(cid:26)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:4)(cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:6)(cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:6)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:22)(cid:2)(cid:30)(cid:19)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:4)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:4)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:15) (cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4) (cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:18)(cid:2)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:17)(cid:21)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:4) (cid:7)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:25)(cid:17)(cid:2)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:26)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:4) ’(cid:22)(cid:9)(cid:31)(cid:2)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:9)(cid:25)(cid:4) (cid:8)(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4) 9(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:2)(cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:4) (cid:28)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:13)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:16) (cid:9)(cid:15)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:10)(cid:15)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4) (cid:7)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:17)(cid:15)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:7)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:7)(cid:8) – The petitioners claimed that offer of allotment, acceptance by the allottee of its terms and conditions and the deposit of allotment price amounts to a concluded contract within the meaning of Chapter-I of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which cannot be rescinded unless held to be a voidable contract. It was also argued that even if it were to be a case of breach of contract, there lies a remedy with the Administration (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) to seek compensation as per Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act rather than resuming the site or building through confiscatory power. (cid:1),(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)&(cid:19)(cid:6)(cid:4) (cid:16)!(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:2)(cid:8)(cid:21)(cid:4)(cid:31)(cid:2)(cid:6)(cid:26)(cid:4)(cid:2)(cid:10)(cid:4)6(cid:16) (cid:4)3(cid:15)(cid:22)(cid:2)(cid:4)(cid:18)(cid:9)(cid:6)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:21)(cid:4)(cid:18)(cid:9)(cid:26)(cid:10)(cid:4) (cid:7)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:4) (cid:17)(cid:16)(cid:26)(cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:10)(cid:18)(cid:4) (cid:7)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:4) (cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:22)(cid:4) (cid:22)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:7)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:14)(cid:2)(cid:18)(cid:6)(cid:22)(cid:16)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:9)(cid:10) - As a corollary to and cumulative effect of the multi-dimensional contentions noticed above, counsel for the petitioners very passionately discoursed that the majority view in Ram Puri has stumbling legal foundations, hence the core question wheeling around the Constitutional sustainability of the power of resumption without payment of compensation conferred by Section 8-A requires serious re-consideration by this larger Bench. RESPONDENT’S COUNTER:- (34).(cid:1) The Senior Standing Counsel for the UT Administration at the outset raised a preliminary objection against the enlargement of the scope of reference, reminding us of the illiberal issue sent for our consideration vide order dated 16.11.2010 namely, the effect of deletion of Rule 11-D on the Constitutionality of Section 8-A. He maintained that the short question raised in the reference order effectively finds its answer in the majority view in Ram Puri’s case as well as in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Babu (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) Singh Bains and M/s. Teri Oat Estates Pvt. Ltd. and if we were to convinced that deletion of Rule 11-D did affect Constitutionality of Section 8-A, the matter eventually would have to be referred to a five-Judges’ Bench as Ram Puri was decided by a Full Bench comprising three-Judges. (35).(cid:1) Mr. Kaushal divided the question emanating from the reference order into two parts i.e. (i) whether Section 8-A can withhold the test of Constitutionality on its own? and (ii) whether Section 8-A was valid for all these years as it had Rule 11-D to support it? He maintained that if the sanction of resumption of sites and buildings including divestiture of title within its sweep made available in the hands of the authorities is held to be just and in public interest, the petitioners’ abortive attempt for revival of the concluded proceedings by raising various other issues would not arise for our consideration. (36).(cid:1) We were taken to the decisions in Ram Puri and Babu Singh Bains in extenso to substantiate the points that:- (i) Section 8-A was upheld as it has inbuilt safeguards and the arbitrariness brought into fore by Section 9 was cured while enacting Section 8-A. (ii) The Constitutionality of Section 8-A was tested on the anvil of Articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution and it was held that the new provision violated none. (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (iii) The decision in Ram Puri (para 86) consciously noticed that resumption leads to divestiture of title but upheld it as an ultimate civil sanction in the armoury of the Authorities to effectuate the twin purpose of the 1952 Act; (iv) The questions that Section 8-A ultra vires fundamental guarantees contained in our Constitution or is de hors of the rule of law, were raised and negated by the highest Court of the land in Babu Singh Bains without the aid and assistance of Rule 11-D; (v) The Supreme Court in Babu Singh Bains case not only approved the validity of Section 8-A, but also nearly struck down Rule 11-D, it being full of arbitrary and improper discretionary powers; (vi) The Full Bench in Ram Puri has nowhere said, not even impliedly, that Rule 11-D was the soul or breath of Section 8-A; (vii) There was only a passing reference to Rule 11-D in Ram Puri after rejection of the contentions founded upon Articles 14, 19(1)(f) or 31 of the Constitution; (viii) The reasons given by Full Bench in Ram Puri while upholding Section 8-A have got the seal of approval from the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Babu Singh Bains and (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) again in M/s. Teri Oat Estates Pvt. Ltd. case hence it is impermissible to re-open a settled issue; (ix) Section 8-A passed the litmus test of reasonableness when the Full Bench held that the power of resumption deserves to be vested in larger public interest though it could be the last resort only. (x) The provisions regarding opportunity of being heard and forfeiture of the consideration money not exceeding 10% were found to be the golden rules of audi alteram partem. (xi) The Full Bench further held that the right to property though was a Fundamental Right when Section 8-A was enacted but the rights under Article 19(1)(f) read with Article 31 were not absolute and an individual could be deprived of such rights when those are in conflict with public interest. (37).(cid:1) Mr. Kaushal also retorted to those contentions which were not raised by the writ-petitioners in Ram Puri or Babu Singh Bains and maintained that even the new challenges mounted on Section 8-A merit rejection. He urged that Section 9 was struck down in M/s. Jagdish Chand Radhey Shyam for want of guidelines in the Act as the Government could act discriminatorily by taking lenient action against one defaulter and a harsh one of resumption against the (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:9)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) other. The discrimination so perceived in M/s. Jagdish Chand Radhey Shyam's case was later disapproved by the Constitution Bench in Maganlal Chhagganlal [P] Ltd. laying down that where a Statute provides for more drastic procedure different from that of the ordinary procedure without any guidelines as to the class of cases in which either procedure is to be resorted to, the Statute though will be hit by Article 14 yet the provision for appeal may cure the defect. Nonetheless, the Legislature cured the pointed defects while inserting Section 8-A which possesses inbuilt guarantees and safeguards to (i) ensure a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed resumption; (ii) restriction on forfeiture beyond 10% of the total amount; (iii) the obligation on the Estate Officer to give reasons in support of his conclusion after giving opportunity to lead evidence; and (iv) the statutory remedy of appeal and revision under which the resumption order can be 'varied', 'reversed', 'altered' or 'rescinded'. (38).(cid:1) The contention that Section 8-A is violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(f) or 31 of the Constitution was refuted with a pointed reference to previous decisions by the Full Bench of this Court in Ram Puri and later on by the Supreme Court in the Babu Singh Bains case, where Section 8-A, on identical grounds, was challenged. He argued with reference to Article 31 as it existed before 44th Amendment to the Constitution, that no meaningful contention of its violation was raised (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) by the aggrieved allottees in the above-cited two decisions nor did they have now been able to establish their right to seek compensation which could arise only in a case of ‘acquisition’ of property. The civil sanction of 'resumption', on the other hand, is a somewhat punitive action taken for violation of building byelaws or breach of terms and conditions of allotment. It was maintained that if Section 8-A did not violate Article 31, it could not on the same analogy delict Article 300-A also as the deprivation of an allottee of his property due to ‘resumption’ is by the authority of law on a proven charge under the 1952 Act which in no circumstances amounts to taking away one's property through police power. It was clarified that since the 'resumption' power can be invoked as a last resort only when the other punitive actions have failed to deter the violators, it is neither unjust or unreasonable nor does it violate anyone's human rights. It was vehemently argued that an allottee who calumniously violates and breaches the regulatory laws applied uniformly in the UT Chandigarh and is relentless to deface the very legislative objects of the 1952 Act, cannot cry hoarse for protection of his fundamental or human rights for which he must give equal respect to the ‘duties’ tied with such rights. (39).(cid:1) Counsel for the respondents also denied that Section 8-A or for that matter the 1952 Act as a complete Code violates Article 14 (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:15)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) of the Constitution. According to him, Section 8-A should be seen not in isolation but as a part of the composite legislative scheme to find out whether it satisfies the test of reasonableness. Reliance was placed on (i) Jyoti Pershad vs. The Administrator for the Union Territory Of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602; and (ii) Hari Shankar Bagla vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 465, to urge that when the Legislature lays down the policy and indicates the rule or the line of action which should serve as a guidance to the authorities and where such guidance is expressed in the statutory provision conferring the power, no question of violation of Article 14 can arise. (40).(cid:1) It was disputed that 1952 Act has become obsolete after the Punjab Municipal Corporation Law (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1994 came into force. Pointed reference was made to Section 424- A of the 1994 Act which expressly states that "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 (Punjab Act No.XXVII of 1952) and of the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952 (Punjab Act No.1 of 1952) and the rules, regulations, bye-laws, notifications, orders, scheme, form or notice made thereunder shall continue to be applicable in relation to the development and regulation of the Union Territory of Chandigarh as immediately (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:11)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) before the commencement of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Law (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1994". It has thus never been the intention of the Legislature that the 1952 Act should cease to operate after enforcement of the Municipal Laws. It is pointed out that Sections 226, 275, 280, 312, 343, 346 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act dealing with public streets, building scheme, hygienic system, restrictions on use of premises etc. have also been made inapplicable to UT Chandigarh to keep the enforceability of 1952 Act intact. (41).(cid:1) The petitioners' plea that 1952 Act was transitory in nature or has become obsolete after achieving its purpose or fulfillment of objectives was also refuted saying that Section 8-A needs to be in operation for the consistently regulated and planned development and should Section 8-A be deleted the very object of setting up Chandigarh as a planned city shall fail. Section 8-A is the most effective armoury in the hands of the authorities to rein in the haphazard growth therefore the said provision needs to be perpetually co-terminus with Chandigarh’s present status. It is pointed out that 'development' is a dynamic and not static process and if Section 8-A is omitted from the Statute Book or declared redundant at this stage then the efforts put in by the Administration to develop Chandigarh (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) in a concerted and well devised manner since its very inception would be an exercise in futility. (42).(cid:1) Mr. Kaushal while concluding his submissions did not forget to remind even at the cost of repetition that the scope of reference may not be broadened as the only question to be re- determined by this larger Bench pertains to the constitutional validity of Section 8-A of the 1952 Act after the deletion of Rule 11-D from the Statute Book which, according to majority in Ram Puri, “tampers the rigour and softens the strictness of resumption by making it possible to offer the same property to the original transferee on certain liberal terms…”. REASONS TO UPHOLD SECTION 8-A IN RAM PURI:- (43).(cid:1) The conventional recourse for us would be to dissect the majority view in Ram Puri or the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Babu Singh Bains so as to find out whether the Section 8-A was upheld by drawing any implied or express aid and effect of Rule 11-D or Section 8-A was declared intra vires to the Constitution de hors of Rule 11-D? The answer to these questions by all means will also set at rest those contentious issues which were duly considered in Ram Puri and Babu Singh Bains cases but have been re-argued before us in a different flavour. (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (44).(cid:1) It would, therefore, be appropriate at this stage to cull out the following reasons that weighed with the majority in Ram Puri to uphold Section 8-A:- (i)(cid:1) “Now apart the above subsequent amendments introduced in Sections 3 and 8 as also the deletion of Section 9 altogether and substitution by Section 8-A of the Act was designed to and has undoubtedly cured the infirmities which their Lordships had discerned in the previous provisions in Jagdish Chand Radhey Shyam's case (AIR 1972 SC 2587). By these legislative changes the charge on the transferred site has been abolished and similarly the clog on the transfer to the third party stands removed." (ii)(cid:1) "Further there are now in-built guarantees and safeguards provided in Section 8-A itself by ensuring a reasonable opportunity to show cause against any proposed resumption or forfeiture." (iii)(cid:1) "A further limitation that forfeiture in no case shall exceed 10 per cent of total amount of consideration money has been itself laid down therein." (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (iv)(cid:1) "The Estate Officer is obliged to record his reasons after giving adequate opportunity including the right to lead evidence to the transferee before passing an order adverse to his interest." (v)(cid:1) "Further the statute and the rules thereunder provide for an appeal and revision against such orders. Therefore it is now vain to contend that Section 8-A suffers from the vice of discrimination or in any way violates the equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution.” (vi)(cid:1) “At the very threshold one has to remind oneself that the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property is not an absolute right. It can be hedged in by the imposition of reasonable restrictions on its exercise in the interest of general public. Apart from this express limitation imposed by the Constitution itself, binding precedents of the Final Court have authoritatively highlighted that in this context considerations of larger, social and public purpose are germane to the construction of this Article.” (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (vii)(cid:1) “Now it seems plain from the ratio of Jyoti Parshad's case (AIR 1961 SC 1602) (supra) that the challenge to the constitutionality of a statute on the anvil of Article 19(1)(f) is not merely to be judged from the particular provisions of the section alone. It is permissible and indeed desirable for the Court to take judicial notice of the facts which led to the enactment of the statute and the avowed objects and reasons thereof. Again the preamble to the Act may provide a clue to its interpretation. Further the provisions of the impugned section along with the other supplementary provisions of the Act as also the statutory rules made thereunder, have all to be viewed as a whole for testing its constitutionality.” (viii)(cid:1)“The larger purpose of the planned development and regulation of the new capital city, as spelled out in the preamble of the Act, is the fixed Pole Star to which the ultimate exercise of the power of resumption under Section 8-A is hitched. What deserves highlighting herein is that this power of resumption under Section 8-A is merely a discretionary and an enabling power. The statute (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) does not lay down any mandate that it must necessarily be exercised in a particular situation. (ix)(cid:1) "The word used in both the sub-sections is 'may' and not 'shall'…” “…To put it in plain language it is not mandatory for the authority to order resumption, but only in extreme cases it enables it to do so when the other powers and sanctions to enforce the purpose of the Act have failed, or in the circumstances it is the only remedial power which can be applied. Therefore, it is farcical and imaginary to assume that the authority would necessarily use this power arbitrarily and whimsically and that they will use this hammer to swat a fly.” (x)(cid:1) “Reference must also be made to the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 6, 13 and 15 of the Act, which provide a variegated armoury of sanctions and penalties against the violation of the Act, rules or the conditions of allotment. It seems to be rather writ large in the statute itself that normally resort would be made to these provisions before applying the ultimate sanction spelled out in Section 8-A.” (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (xi)(cid:1) “In the last analysis even if an order of resumption has been made, Rule 11-D which has been recently added to the rules must be adverted to which is in the following terms :- "11-D. (1) Where a site has been resumed under Section 8-A of Art No. XXVII of 1952 for any reasons, the Estate Officer may on an application, retransfer the site to the outgoing transferee, on payment of an amount equal to 10 per cent of the premium originally payable for such property or one-third of the difference between the price paid and its value at the time when the application for transfer is made whichever is more: xx xx xx." It is obvious that this rule tampers the rigour and softens the strictness of resumption by making it possible to offer the same property to the original transferee on certain liberal terms.” (xii)(cid:1) “It well-settled unconstitutionality does not attach to a provision of law merely because there may be remote possibilities of the abuse of power conferred thereby. In such a situation it is only the arbitrary or the wrongful (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:9)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) exercise of the power which can be struck down but not the statute itself.” (xiii)(cid:1)“In conclude, in the larger conspectus of the purposes of the Act itself, its preamble; the specific provisions of Section 8-A; the setting in which it is placed along with the supplementary sections of the Act and the rules framed thereunder; it has to be held that the enabling power of resumption conferred thereby is only a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right to hold, acquire and dispose of property and is, therefore, in no way violative of Article 19(1)(f).” (xiv)(cid:1)“The provisions of S.8-A give not the least inkling of any distinction between transferees who have paid the whole of the consideration money due and those who have as yet to pay some part of the consideration money or the instalments and other dues thereon. The power of resumption thereunder as analysed by me earlier applies uniformly to all transferees in the happening of the three preconditions referred to in para 30 above. Neither on principle nor on the language of S.8-A is it possible to draw any distinction betwixt transferees who have paid the full (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) consideration money and those against whom some amounts are lawfully outstanding in accordance with the contract.” (xv)(cid:1) “The anomalous results that flow therefrom have already been noticed and it is hardly any satisfaction to hold that the legislature should now intervene to remedy the mischief. In view of the exhaustive discussion in the earlier part of this judgement this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is also to be rejected.” (45).(cid:1) Having held that Section 8-A was in concord with the Constitution, the majority in Ram Puri analysed the true nature and scope of Section 8-A through the following self-imposed question:- “Herein the core question is the import of the word 'resumption' which indeed has primarily necessitated this reference to the Full Bench. Does it connote in essence a divestiture of title? Or, does it mean canvassed on behalf of the petitioner only a temporary divesting of posses in favour of a trustee who is obliged to restore the same if the default is later rectified.” (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:15)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (46).(cid:1) The Full Bench then navigated through the previous case law and taking cue from an earlier Full Bench decision in Brij Mohan vs. Chief Administrator, AIR 1980 P&H 236, wherein this Court had held that “The proposed order of resumption has dual consequences; (i) the depriving of ownership right in the site or building which concerns only the owner of the site or building; and (ii) the deprivation of the lessee of his lawful possession thereof…”, very aptly concurred with the said view. (47).(cid:1) The Full Bench in Ram Puri thereafter found that the Division Bench decision in Amrit Sagar Kashyap vs. Chief Commissioner, UT Chandigarh (1980) 82 PLR 441, was in direct and headlong conflict with that of the Full Bench in Brij Mohan’s case and consequently overruled the same. The Full Bench in Ram Puri posed yet another question (48).(cid:1) as :- “What is the true import and width of the word 'resumption' designedly used by the legislature in Sec.8-A?” (49).(cid:1) After a long and analytical journey of dictionary meanings, case law and comparative study of provisions, the majority concluded that :- (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:17)(cid:19)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) “…However, there is no manner of doubt that resumption in the sense of a divestiture of title would be the ultimate civil sanction in the armoury of the authorities to effectuate the twin purpose of a regulated and planned development as also the expeditious creation of the capital city in the State.” (50).(cid:1) The Full Bench in its penultimate paragraph reiterated with a sharp note of caution that the power of resumption is the ultimate civil sanction and must, therefore, be a weapon of last resort inevitably it should be used with great caution and circumspection. (51).(cid:1) The Full Bench finally held that:- “Equally it is well to remember that even where resumption has necessarily to be resorted to it should be liberally tampered with provisions of the recently inserted R.11-D which empowers the authority to retransfer the site to the original transferee in specified situations. I would, therefore, hold that though the judicious and lawful exercise of the powers of resumption must be upheld and in certain situations may (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:14)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) be both necessary and desirable, yet any arbitrary or discriminatory application thereof would at once attract the ever vigilant power of the Court under the writ jurisdiction.” (52).(cid:1) Ram Puri uninterruptedly held the field for 14 successive years on both counts, namely, resumption of a property on any of the prescribed grounds as also the desirability of its re-allotment to the same allottee on revised terms and conditions as per Rule 11-D. The Full Bench unambiguously though impliedly inserted the doctrine of proportionality in Section 8-A when it said that ‘resumption’ is the ultimate civil sanction and must be ‘a weapon of last resort’. (53).(cid:1) It will thus be an exercise in futility to say that Rule 11-D ever saved Section 8-A in Ram Puri's case. The Full Bench unequivocally held that Section 8-A did not suffer from the vice of discrimination nor did it violate the equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitution. It also held that Section 8-A was a reasonable restriction in public interest on the Fundamental Right to acquire, hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f). The Full Bench viewed that it was farcical and fanciful to imagine that the authority would use the power of resumption arbitrarily or whimsically, rather various provisions suggest that normally resort would be made to Sections 4,5,6,13 & 15 of the Act before applying the ultimate sanction (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) spelled out in Section 8-A. The majority view neither referred to nor relied upon Rule 11-D for the sustenance of these reasons. (54).(cid:1) The Full Bench consciously used the expression “in the last analysis” before observing that Rule 11-D “tampers the rigor and softens the strictness of resumption by making it possible to offer the same property to the original transferee on certain liberal terms”. (55).(cid:1) The Full Bench in Ram Puri was sentient of the consequences of resumption while posing the question – Does it connote in essence a divestiture of title? And answered by saying that the order of resumption has dual consequences, namely, deprivation of ownership right in the site or building and deprivation of the lessee of his lawful possession. The devastating effect of resumption was approved by the Full Bench holding it as “ultimate civil sanction in the armoury of the authorities” to effectuate the twin purpose of the Act. Having said that, the Full Bench impressed upon the authorities that wherever resumption has to be resorted to it should be liberally tampered with the provisions of the recently inserted Rule 11-D which empowered the Authority to re-transfer the site to the original allottee as per the new terms and conditions. (56).(cid:1) The occasional reference to Rule 11-D in Ram Puri was merely an acknowledgement of a fact brought on record without allowing it to infringe or effect its decision-making process nor was the (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:13)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) Full Bench driven away by this Rule to reach its verdict in favour of Section 8-A. To say it differently, every finding given by the majority is padded by reasons other than Rule 11-D. Having upheld resumption as an ultimate civil sanction to deprive the allottee of his ownership right and possession of the site or building, there was no compulsion for the Full Bench to look for a device for tampering with the rigor or to soften the strictness of resumption. The factual observations made by the Full Bench on the effect of Rule 11-D is not a declaration of conditional validity of Section 8-A of the 1952 Act. SUPREME COURT ON SECTION 8-A:- (57).(cid:1) The shadow of doubt on the legality of resumption power under Section 8-A, were there any, was removed and it was allowed to be in full bloom by the Supreme Court in Babu Singh Bains, disapproving the minority view in Ram Puri and holding that “the majority judgement has rightly focused the question in the correct perspective and had held that Section 8-A is valid in law and therefore, not violative of Article 14”. (58).(cid:1) In addition, the Supreme Court also viewed that :- (i) “Sections 8-A was brought on statute with a view to bring it in conformity with the purpose the Act seeks to subserve." (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (ii) "It would, however, appear that the learned Judge, with due respect, sought to set the clock back to the Amendment by constructing the meaning of the words 'forfeiture' and 'resumption' and the consequential effect on general principles of law without giving needed effect to the object of the Amendment." (views on the minority judgement in Ram Puri) (iii) "Once the statute occupied the field and gave power to resume the land or building subject to the conditions mentioned therein, the general principles of resumption and other principles considered therein absolutely remained no more relevant." (iv)"In Northern India Caterers (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. State of Punjab & Anr. [AIR 1967 SC 1581], this Court had held that when there are two modes of procedure, one being more drastic and harsher than the other without any guidelines, invocation of the former was violative of Article 14 which was reversed by a larger Bench in Maganlal Chhagganlal [P] Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. [AIR 1974 SC 2009] knocking the bottom of the plea of (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) constitutional invalidity of Section 8-A on the anvil of Article 14." (v) "Though softer course under Section 15 was available, Section 8A does not become invalid on that score." (vi)"Section 9 has been deleted and procedural safeguards have been provided in Section 8-A. Therefore, Section 8A, having provided procedure, does not become arbitrary and violative of Article 14." (vii)"For these reasons and also for the reasons given in the majority judgment, we are of the view that Section 8-A is not violative of Article 14 since it has prescribed an in-built procedure of giving an opportunity and right to adduce evidence and consideration thereof by the Estate Officer before resumption and to pass a reasoned order in support thereof." (viii) "The order is also subject to an appeal before the Chief Administrator. If permissible, within circumscribed parameters, appellate order may be subject to judicial review under Article 226." (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:17)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) (ix)"The vice pointed out by this Court in Jagdish Chander's case (supra) has been cured by introducing Section 8-A. It would, therefore, be clear that the resumption under Section 8-A is not only in case of non-payment of dues under the sale but for violation of the conditions of the sale, the rules, regulations and other relevant conditions applicable in that behalf.” (59).(cid:1) The definitive and eloquent self-speaking reasons reproduced above should leave no one guessing that the Supreme Court besides giving its own reasons upheld Section 8-A by approving the majority judgement in Ram Puri's case. (60).(cid:1) The appellant before the Supreme Court in Babu Singh Bains incidentally sheltered behind Rule 11-D as a last resort though he had applied for re-transfer of the resumed property after 13 years and his perceived right to seek re-transfer occasioned for the Court to reiterate the view already taken by it in M/s. Johnson Paints and Varnish Co.’s case and to doubt the very bona fide in introducing Rule 11-D as a source of backdoor entry. (61).(cid:1) The vires of the 1952 Act, with special reference to Section 8-A, was unsuccessfully re-agitated before the Supreme Court, after more than seven years in M/s. Teri Oat Estates Pvt. Ltd. case. (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) Following Babu Singh Bains and approving the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Puri, the Hon’ble Supreme Court again thwarted the challenge though re-enforced that the drastic power of resumption and forfeiture has to be taken recourse to as a last resort. The doctrine of proportionality was also read implicit in Section 8-A. IS THE DECISION IN BABU SINGH BAINS AN OBITER DICTA AND SUB SILENTIO ? (62).(cid:1) It is the solemn duty of all Courts within the territory of India to follow the judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as they amount to declaration of the law under Article 141 of the Constitution. It is the ratio decidendi, namely, the reasons assigned in support of its conclusion by the Supreme Court which are binding in nature. Mere observations or what has been finally done in a given case without laying down the law would not constitute as an obligatory ratio of the Supreme Court judgement to be followed by the Courts in India. Equally true is that a decision of the Supreme Court is an authority for the point in issue it decides and not for what was neither decided nor there was an occasion for it to express its opinion. Per contra, an obiter dicta is the expression of view by a Court on a question of law though raised before it but did not arise for consideration in such a manner that the case could not have been decided unless such question was also answered. It is thus an incidental statement made (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:12)(cid:4)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:4) (cid:16)(cid:4)(cid:9)(cid:18)(cid:4)(cid:16)(cid:4) in a Court opinion that was not required for deciding the case. It may be a superfluous observation without which also the lis could be effectively adjudicated. “Obiter dicta is more or less presumably unnecessary to the decision. It may be an expression of a viewpoint or sentiments which has no binding effect”.1 (63).(cid:1) An obiter or indirectly-expressed view by the Supreme Court on a pointedly raised issue does carry persuasive value though may not be binding on a co-ordinate Bench. It is however, equally well placed that an obiter of the Supreme Court is worthy of respect, has persuasive value and considerable weight and in the absence of any direct pronouncement on that question elsewhere by the Supreme Court, it has a binding force on the High Courts.2 (64).(cid:1) Sub silentio in literal sense is known as ‘under silence’. It may be simplified to say that when the later opinion of a superior Court reaches a result contrary to the previous view of the inferior Court or Bench, the latter case by necessary implication overrules sub silentio the previous inconsistent view. Additionally, when a decision is not expressed, not accompanied by reasons and not proceeding on a conscious consideration of an issue, cannot be deemed to be a law