Gurjit Singh v. RAM CHAND GUPTA, J.(Oral)

the medico legal report and that though petitioner was armed with fire-arm and, however, no fire-arm injury has been received by the injured and hence, no offence under Section 307 IPC is made out. Law is well settled that at the time of framing of charge, only prima facie case is to be seen and even if there is strong suspicion about the commission of offence and the involvement of the accused, it is sufficient for the Court to frame charge and that there is no necessity of formulating the opinion about the prospect of the conviction. Law is also well settled that veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously gone into at that stage. On the point authoritative pronouncement of Hon’ble Apex Court in Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affiars, West Crl.R.No.2438 of 2010 (O&M) -2- Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja anothers, 1980 AIR (SC) 52 can be referred, relevant paragraph of which reads as under:- “18. It may be remembered that the case was at the stage of framing charges; the prosecution evidence had not yet commenced. The Magistrate had, therefore, to consider the above question on a general consideration of the materials placed before him by the investigating police officer. At this stage, as was pointed out by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged; may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.” In State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, etc. 1996 (2) RCR (Criminal) 480, Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:- “33. The aforesaid shows that if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.” In State of M.P. v. Sudhir Pingle, 2000(1) RCR (Criminal) 523, it was observed as under: Crl.R.No.2438 of 2010 (O&M) -3- “4. In our view, it is apparent that the entire approach of the High Court is illegal and erroneous. From the reasons recorded by the High Court, it appears that instead of considering the prima facie case, the High Court has appreciated and weighed the materials on record for coming to the conclusion that charge against the respondents could not have been framed. It is settled law that at the state of framing the charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused. The Court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the material produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then a charge has to be framed. The charge can be quashed if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross- examination or rebutted by defence evidence, if any, cannot show that accused committed the particular offence. In such case, there would be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi etc. v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjayya and others etc. 1991 (1) RCR (Crl.) 89: 1990 (4) SCC 76, after considering the provisions of Sections 227 and 228, Cr.P.C., Court posed a question, whether at the stage of framing the charge, trial Court should marshal the materials on the record of the case as he would do on the conclusion of the trial? The Court held that at the stage of framing the charge inquiry must necessarity be limited to deciding if the facts emerging from such materials constitute the offence with which the accused could be charged. The Court may peruse the records for that limited purpose, but it is not required to marshal it with a view to decide the reliability thereof. The Court referred to earlier decisions in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, 1977 (4) SCC 39, Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, 1979 (3) SCC 4 and Supdt. and Rememberancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Crl.R.No.2438 of 2010 (O&M) -4- Kumar Bhunja, 1979 (4) SCC 274, and held thus:” “From the above discussion it seems well settled that at the Sections 227-228 stage the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court may for this limited purpose shift (sift ?) the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.” In another judgment of Hon’ble Apex court in Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt.Ltd., v. Sanjay Chaudhary and ors. 2008 (4) RCR (Criminal) 640, on the question of framing of charge, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under: “11. The present case is not one where the High Court ought to have interfered with the order of framing the charge. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, even if there is a strong suspicion about the commission of offence and the involvement of the accused, it is sufficient for the court to frame a charge. At that stage, there is no necessity of formulating the opinion about the prospect of conviction. That being so, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained and is set aside. The appeal is allowed.” Hence, in view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of Hon’ble Apex Court, learned trial court is only to see prima facie case at the time of framing of charge and even if the Court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence, it can frame the charge though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence and probative value of the material of the record cannot be gone into and that the material brought on the record by the prosecution has to be accepted as truth at that stage. As per details of the injuries given by the petitioner in the petition the following injuries were sustained by the injured: Crl.R.No.2438 of 2010 (O&M) -5- “i) An incised wound 4 cm x 1 cm on the left shoulder 2 cm posterior to the acromion process. Fresh bleeding present- Adv. X-ray (L) Shoulder-AP-LAT. ii) An incised wound 7 cm x 1 cm over the right parietal occipital region, bone deep. Fresh bleeding present- Adv. X- ray (L) Skull-AP-LAT. iii) An incised wound 2 cm x 0.5 cm on anterior aspect of left leg, 8 cm below Tibial fuberosity. Fresh bleeding present. Adv.-X-ray (L) leg. iv) An incised wound 3 cm x 0.5 cm on anterior aspect of (R ) leg, 5 cm below Tibial fuberosity. Adv.X-ray (R )leg. v) An incised wound 2 cm x 0.5 cm on anterior aspect of (R ) leg, 8 cm below Tibial fuberosity. Fresh bleeding presnt. vi) An incised wound 3 cm x 0.5 cm on middle finger of left hand Palmer aspect- over the metacarpus phalanx geal joint. Adv.-X-ray (L ) hand.” Brief allegations are that complainant was way-laid by the petitioner and the co-accused while armed with deadly weapons, i.e., kirpans and fire-arm and caused as many as 6 incised wounds to the complainant. Hence, in view of these facts, no interference in the impugned order is called for. It cannot be said that the impugned order is in any way illegal or erroneous, warranting interference by this Court. There is no merit in the present revision petition. The same is, hereby, dismissed.

7.9.2010 (Ram Chand Gupta) Judge