Manjit Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors.

suit but its judgment and decree was reversed by the First Appellate Court CWP No.18815 of 2006 (O&M) -2- vide judgment and decree dated 21.05.2004. The petitioner thereafter, filed a fresh application before the Director, Land Records, Punjab, which was dismissed by holding that as the order dated 05.09.1994, has been set aside by a civil court and judgment and decree has been affirmed by the High Court, the Director, Land Records, Punjab, has no jurisdiction to pass any further orders. Counsel for the petitioner argues that as the petitioner was granted liberty by the First Appellate Court, to file a fresh application, the Director, Land Records, Punjab was duty bound to have decided the application on merits. It is further submitted that as in his initial order dated 05.09.1994, the Director, Consolidation, had held that there is a deficiency in the petitioner's land, the petitioner's application should have been accepted and the deficiency should have been made good. Counsel for the private respondents, on the other hand, submits that consolidation proceedings concluded well before the petitioner approached the Director, Consolidation, and therefore, the application was even otherwise not maintainable. It is further submitted that as the land has fallen within municipal limits, and is no longer agricultural land, the Director Consolidation, has no jurisdiction to alter or amend the scheme sanctioned more than 2/3 decades ago. I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. The Director, Consolidation, committed an error in dismissing the application on the ground that the order dated 05.09.1994 has been set aside as the First Appellate Court granted liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh application. However, the question that arises for adjudication is whether the petitioner can be granted any relief in view of the delay in approaching CWP No.18815 of 2006 (O&M) -3- the Director Consolidation, and that in the meanwhile, the land has fallen within municipal limits of M.C.Tanda,. Section 42, of the Act, empowers the State Government, to call for and examine the record of any case “at any time”. The expression “any time” inheres an obligation to invoke the provisions of Section 42 , within “reasonable time.” Section 42 does not afford a license to a party who has slept over his rights for decades together to wake up from his slumber and unsettle, rights settled over a long period of time. In order to place these conclusions in their correct perspective, it would be appropriate to reproduce a relevant extract from a judgment of this Court reported as Gram Panchayat of Village Ban Bhaura, Tehsil Malerkotla V. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab and others, 2004(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 298:- "10. The question whether a petition under Section 42 can be filed at any time and the authority constituted under the Act can entertain the same ignoring the long delay between the finalisation of the consolidation proceedings and filing of the petition was considered by the Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat v. Director consolidation of Holdings, 1989(2) Suppl. SCC 465; 1989 (20 RRR 554 (SC) and Gram Panchayat, Kakran v. Additional Director of Consolidation and another, 1997 (8) SCC 484; 1997(4) RCR (civil) 498 (SC). In the second decision, the Supreme Court referred to the earlier decision and observed:- "This, however, cannot be understood as CWP No.18815 of 2006 (O&M) -4- enabling the party which is aggrieved by the repartition to make an application under Section 42 after an unreasonably long lapse of time. Even where no period of limitation is prescribed, the party aggrieved is required to move the appropriate authority for relief within a reasonable time. In fact this Court in the case of Gram Panchayat V. Director, Consolidation of Holdings dealing with Rule 18 itself, said that when no limitation is prescribed for an application under Section 42 dealing with confirmation of the scheme, the application should be made within a reasonable time and this question will have to be decided on the facts of each case. In that case the delay of about 3 years and 8 months in filing an application under Section 42 by the Panchayat was held to be not unreasonable. In the present case, however, the delay is of 40 years. We have tried to ascertain from the 2nd respondent whether is any explanation unreasonable and inordinate delay. But no satisfactory explanation appears to be there for this inordinate delay in making the application under Section 42. The only CWP No.18815 of 2006 (O&M) -5- contention which has been urged before us by Respondent no.2 relates to the application of Rule 18 and the period of limitation prescribed therein not being applicable where the challenge is to the consolidation scheme and repartition. But even if Rule 18 is not directly attracted, an application which is made after such inordinate delay ought not to have been entertained. It is also contended by the 2nd respondent that the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the order of the Additional Director of Consolidation in a writ petition because the land in question continued to remain in the name of the proprietary body. He drew out attention to Rule 16(ii) of the said Rules. Rule 16(ii), however, quite clearly provides that the management of such land shall be done by the Panchayat of the estate or estates concerned on behalf of the village proprietary party and the panchayat shall have to utilise the income and the benefits of the estate or estates concerned. Even before the Additional Director, the appellants were made a party-respondent. This contention, therefore, has no merit." CWP No.18815 of 2006 (O&M) -6-

11. By applying the ratio of the aforementioned decisions to the facts of this case, I hold that the impugned order suffers from an error of law, inasmuch as, respondent no.1 entertained and allowed the petition filed by respondent Nos.3 to 6 without considering the issue of delay of 29 years and concurrent finding recorded by the civil Courts that they were not the owners of the land in question." It is, therefore, apparent that the remedy under Section 42 must be availed within reasonable time and then also after pleading sufficient cause for the delay. The petitioner, admittedly, filed the petition under Section 42 of the Act, after a delay of more than two decades. The petitioner was therefore, disentitled to any relief, even if the Additional Director, Consolidation, had granted liberty to approach the Director, Consolidation. It would also be necessary to mention that in the meanwhile, the land has fallen within municipal limits of M.C. Tanda and is part of an urban estate. The long lapse of time and the fact that the land is part of an urban estate disentitles the petitioner to any relief. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, I find no reason, in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, to accept the petitioner's submission. The petitioner may however, seek such other remedy as may be available, in accordance with law. Dismissed with no order as to costs.

04.08.2010 shamsher [RAJIVE BHALLA] JUDGE