Dalbir Singh Dhindsa & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.

most of the petitioners in the writ petitions were duly served with personal notices. He contends that the mandate of Section 38 is not that each individual has to be served individually when there are co-owners to a property. It would be a sufficient notice if the same has been served on one of the co-owners. In support of this contention, counsel relies upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Teja Singh & others C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -6- vs. The State of Punjab and another, 1995 PLJ 419. He contends that most of the petitioners had preferred objections to the notice issued under Section 36 of the PTI Act which were duly considered by the competent Authority and rejected. Most of the petitioners have accepted the amount of compensation and have filed references under Section 18 of the LA Act which is pending adjudication before the Tribunal. In cases where the compensation has not been accepted, the same stands deposited with the competent Authority and the petitioners may claim the same. He, thus, contends that the writ petition is not maintainable after the passing of the award in the light of various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. As regards the contention of the petitioners with regard to the effect of 73rd and 74th amendment of the Constitution of India, he contends that the same would not be applicable to the Trust as the functions of the Trust would not fall within the purview of the District Level Planning Committee. In support of this contention, counsel for the petitioners relies upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in C.W.P.No.4702 of 2008, Dwarka Dass and others vs. State of Haryana and others decided on 28.5.2010. He, on this basis, prays that the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed being devoid of any merit. On the objection raised by the respondents that the petitioners have approached this Court after the passing of the Award, counsel for the petitioners contends that the compensation amount so offered to the petitioners as per the award, has not been accepted by them and some of them have also not preferred reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Accordingly, he prays that the present writ petitions be allowed and the notifications issued under Sections 36 and 42 (Annexures C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -7- P-1 & P-2 respectively) of the Act and the Award (Annexure P-3) be quashed. We have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. The first contention which requires to be dealt with is whether the service of notice under Section 38 of the PTI Act on a co-owner or occupier would amount to sufficient service of notice as envisaged under it. This would not detain us for long as the issue stands concluded against the petitioners in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Teja Singh's case (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras 6 to 9 held as follows:- “6. The question thus arises whether notices on one co-owner is notice on other co-owners. Indisputably the petitioner Nos.1, 4, 5 and 6 being brothers, are co- owners. Similarly, Vikram Singh and Kartar Singh are brothers and are co-owners. It is stated across the bar by Shri Sharma that the brothers are not on speaking terms. The fact that all of them have jointly filed the appeal in this Court and engaged the same counsel, would clearly indicate that they are sailing together and the professed hostile terms is a pretense.

7. It is true that Section 38(1) provides that every person whom the Trust has reason to believe, after due enquiry, to be the owner of any immovable property which it is proposed to acquire in executing the scheme or the occupier, shall be served with the notice thereof. C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -8- Section 79(2) of the Act in this behalf lends some clue on the due service of notice on co-owner. It states that every notice other than a public notice and every bill issued under this Act shall, unless it is otherwise expressly provided under this Act, be served or presented when a notice is required or permitted under this Act to be served upon an owner or occupier, as the case may be, of a building or land, it shall not be necessary to name the owner or occupier therein and the service thereof in such cases not otherwise specifically provided for in this Act shall be effected either by giving or tendering the notice, or sending it by post, to the owner or occupier, or if there be “more owners or occupiers than one, to any one of them”. It would thus be clear that the legislature itself being aware of the existence of co-owners or occupiers, authorised the Trust to have the notice given, tendered or served on one owner or occupier and such service of notice is legal and valid notice. Even otherwise on principle of law also, it is common knowledge that every co-owner may not be in occupation of the land or may not be cultivating the land or be in actual possession. He may be residing elsewhere due to educational or pursuit of professional job etc. So, they may not be available for service. Legislature being cognizant to this situation, has taken care to see that if more than one owner or occupier have interest in the land and the land belonging C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -9- to co-owners or occupiers is sought to be acquired, service on one, is taken as service on all the co-owners.

8. Shri Sharma contends that if the Act would not have provided for any procedure for such service, then only the benefit of Section 79(2)(a) gets attracted and since Section 38 has otherwise provided, the procedure for service of notice, benefit under Section 79(2)(a) is not available. We find no force in the contention. A conjoint reading of these clauses would clearly postulate that when the Act has not otherwise specifically provided the notice served etc. on one is a notice to or on behalf of co-owners and is a valid notice. Section 38 did not expressly state that notice shall be served on all owners if more than one co-owners has interest in the land under acquisition. Reliance on clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 38 to contend that that “every person” referred therein would include all co-owners and that, therefore, notice is required to be served on all the co-owners is misconceived. It is to be remembered that clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 38 gives power to the Trust to effectuate service of notice on the person whom the Trust has reason to believe, after due enquiry, to be the owner or occupier of the immovable property sought to be acquired for implementing the scheme. The formation of belief of ownership or occupation is distinct and separate from the service of notice on those found to have joint C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -10- ownership. What clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 38 contemplates is only to find out who is believed to be owner or occupier of the land sought to be acquired by the Trust. If this is noted, it would be clear that the aforesaid clause does not deal with service of notice, which has been dealt by Section 79(2)(a).

9. Thus we hold that service of notice on one of the co-owners, when more than one have interest in the acquired land, would be sufficient service of notice on other co-owners. Therefore, non-service of notice on the petitioners No.1, 4 and 6 and Bikram Singh does not invalidate the scheme framed by the Trust. So it is a valid scheme.” The second contention of the counsel for the petitioners with regard to the non-applicability of the provisions of the PTI Act for the work of development in view of 73rd and 74th amendment of the Constitution of India with special reference to the provisions as contained in Articles 243-G, 243-N, 243-Q, 243-ZD & 243 ZF, the same is no more res integra in the light of the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Dwarka Dass's (supra) wherein it has been held as follows:- “It is argued that the State of Haryana has not constituted the Regional Development Committee even though a period of one year has elapsed and, thus, the present acquisition is ex- facie illegal. It must be kept in mind that Article 243ZD of the Constitution deals with a subject which essentially falls within C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -11- the State list at entry No.6 and that is why it stipulates a discretion in the State to legislate for the purposes mentioned therein. In Shanti G. Patel and others vs State of Maharashtra and others, (2006) 2 SCC 505, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :- “ 9. Article 243-W whereupon great emphasis has been laid by the petitioners herein provides for an enabling clause so as to enable the State to endow by law the municipality with such powers and authority, as may be necessary, to enable the State to make, by law, by endowing the municipalities to function as institutions of self-government which may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities subject to the conditions which may be specified in the Twelfth Schedule. The Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution referable to Article 243-W, inter alia, provides for urban planning including town planning, regulation of land- use and construction of buildings. Thus, Article 243-W contains merely an enabling provision, and it does not mean that the State is obligated to provide for such a statute. The Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, in any event, does not envisage that the existing laws would become non-operative or a vacuum would be created in the matter of enforcement of existing laws relating to urban planning and/or regulation of land-use and construction of buildings, etc.” C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -12- In yet another later decision in Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority and others, Civil Appeal No.4097 of 2010 decided on 5.5.2010, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the question of acquisition of certain land on the ground that it was invalid with reference to Parts IX and IXA of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :- “ 12. Part IX and IX-A of the Constitution, relating to Panchayats and Municipalities were inserted by the Constitution (Seventy- third Amendment) Act, 1992 and Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992. Part IX and IX-A came into force on 24.4.1993 and 1.6.1993 respectively. The object of Part-IX was to introduce the Panchayat system at grass root revel. As Panchayat systems were based on State legislations and their functioning was unsatisfactory, the amendment to the Constitution sought to strengthen the Panchayat system by giving a uniform constitutional base so that the Panchayats become vibrant units of administration in the rural area by establishing strong, effective and democratic local administration so that there can be rapid implementation of rural C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -13- development programmes. The object of Part-IX as stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons is extracted below :- ` In many States, local bodies have become weak and ineffective on account of variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular elections, prolonged supersessions and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a result, urban local bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-Government. Having regard to these inadequacies, it is considered necessary that provisions relating to urban local bodies are incorporated in the Constitution, particularly for- (i) putting on a firmer footing the relationship between the State Government and the Urban Local Bodies with respect to :- (a) the functions and taxation powers, and (b) arrangements revenue sharing. C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -14- (ii) ensuring regular conduct of elections. (iii) ensuring timely elections in the case of supersession; and (iv) providing adequate representation for the weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women.'

22. To enable the municipalities (that is municipal corporations, municipal councils and Nagar Panchayats) to function as institutions of self-government, Article 243W authorizes the legislature of a State to endow to the municipalities, such powers and authority as may be necessary, by law. Such law made by the State legislature may contain provision for the devolution of powers responsibilities municipalities, with respect following : (i) The preparation of plans for economic development and social justice; and (ii) The performance of functions and implementation of schemes as C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -15- may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the following matters (earmarked in the twelfth schedule) :

1. Urban planning including town planning.

2. Regulation of land-use and construction of buildings.

3. Planning for economic and social development.

4. Roads and bridges.

5. Water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes.

6. Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management.

8. Fire services. Urban forestry, protection of the environment and promotion of ecological aspects.

9. Safeguarding the interests of weaker sections of society, including the handicapped and mentally retarded.

10. Slum improvement upgradation. C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -16-

11. Urban poverty alleviation.

12. Provision of urban amenities and facilities such as parks, gardens, playgrounds.

13. Promotion cultural, educational and aesthetic aspects.

14. Burials and burial grounds; cremations, cremation grounds; and electric crematoriums.

15. Cattle pounds; prevention of cruelty to animals.

16. Vital statistics including registration of births and deaths.

17. Public amenities including street lighting, parking lots, bus stops and public conveniences.

18. Regulation of slaughter houses and tanneries. The aforesaid powers and authority (enumerated in the twelfth Schedule) may also be endowed to the Ward Committees which are required to be constituted, by Article 243S xx xx.

23. On the other hand, the purpose and object of the BDA is to act as a development authority for the development of the city of C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -17- Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto. The Preamble of BDA Act describes it as `an Act to provide for the establishment of a Development Authority for the development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and for matters connected therewith. The development contemplated by the BDA Act is “carrying out of building, engineering or other operations in or over or under land or the making of any material change in any building or land and includes redevelopment” (vide Section 2(j) of BDA Act). Therefore, the purpose is to make lay outs, construct buildings or carry out other operations in regard to land. Municipalities are not concerned with nor entrusted with functions similar to those entrusted to BDA under the BDA Act, that is building, engineering or other operations by forming layout of plots with all amenities, construction of houses and apartments, as a part of any scheme to develop a city. Municipalities are concerned with the overall economic development providing social justice (urban poverty alleviation and slum improvement) regulating land use and C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -18- constructions, providing amenities (roads, bridges, water supply, fire services, street lighting, parking, bus stops, public conveniences), promoting education and culture etc. Neither urban town planning nor regulation of land use and construction, is similar to the `development' as contemplated in BDA Act, that is carrying out building, engineering operations in or over or under land. It would thus be seen that the object and functions of a Municipal Corporation are completely different from the object and purpose of a development authority like BDA, BDA is not a municipality. Therefore, it cannot be said that mere existence of Municipal Corporations Act, duly amended to bring it in conformity with Part IX-A of the Constitution, will nullify or render redundant, the BDA Act. Xx

26. The appellants submitted that the powers, authority and responsibilities to be endowed by the State Legislature upon the Municipalities are enumerated in Article 243W read with Twelfth Schedule; that Articles 243ZD and 243ZE require the State C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -19- government to constitute a District Planning Committee at District Level and a Metropolitan Planning Committee for every Metropolitan Area; that such Metropolitan Planning Committee is required to prepare a draft development plan for the Metropolitan Area as a whole. It was contended that the BDA Act was a Legislation which related to some of the responsibilities and functions of Municipalities, enumerated in the Twelfth Schedule to the Constitution read with Article 243W and that its provisions, in particular, sections 15 to 19 were inconsistent with the provisions of Part IXA of the Constitution; that no law can entrust powers and responsibilities referred to in Article 243W including those relating to matters listed in Twelfth Schedule to an authority other than an authority having popular mandate; and that therefore the BDA Act entrusting such powers and responsibilities to a non-elected authority ceases to be in force.

27. While it is true that BDA is not an elected body like the municipality, it has several elected representatives as members. C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -20- Section 3 relates to the Constitution of the Authority and provides that the Authority shall consist of 22 members and made up as follows :- `Six officers of the BDA viz, The Chairman, The Finance Member, The Engineering Member, The Town Planning Member, The Commissioner and Secretary of the Authority. (All of them are full-time employees, three of them are specialists in finance, engineering and town planning. -Four elected representatives, that is, two members of State Legislature assembly and two counsellors of Bangalore Municipal Corporation. -One representative of the State government and four representatives of statutory corporations, that is, the Commissioner Bangalore Municipal Corporation representatives of Bangaore Water Supply Sewerage Board, Karnataka Electricity Board, and Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. -Six members of the public (with C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -21- minimum of one woman, one person belonging to SC/ST, and one representing labour). - One Architect.' It would thus be seen that members of the BDA represent different interests and groups, technical persons and elected representatives. Further, no development scheme can be finalised or put into effect without the sanction of the State Government which in turn has to take note of any representation the Bangalore Municipal Corporation in regard to development scheme. Therefore, the mere fact that BDA is not wholly elected body as in the case of a municipal corporation will make no difference. The membership pattern is more suited to fulfil the requirements of a specialist agency executing development schemes. We therefore find no merit in the contention that provisions of BDA Act become inoperative, on Parts IX and IX-A of the Constitution coming into force.” C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -22- In the present case also, it must be held that the existing laws would not become non-operative or vacuum would be created in the matter regarding acquisition of land for a public purpose. Similarly, it is also held that the functions of the Agricultural Marketing Board as well as of the Haryana Urban Development Authority would not fall within the strict purview of the District Level Planning Committee.” Similar is the position in the present case. The PTI Act, as the preamble discloses, was enacted with a view to make provisions in the improvement and expansion of towns in Punjab. The Act provides for the creation and incorporation of Trust which are charged with the duty of carrying out of the work in the local area within its jurisdiction. It has been provided therein as to what the constitution of the Trusts would be and the manner in which the proceedings of the Trusts and their Committees are to be conducted. Chapter IV provides for the Schemes under the Act which are for general improvement or rebuilding i.e. street schemes and deferred street schemes; development and expansion schemes; housing accommodation schemes and re-housing schemes for the disabled persons. Combination of the Schemes and matters which may be provided for the Scheme has also been spelt out thereunder. The process and the procedure for acquisition of the property or execution of the schemes have also been provided. The Trust is a legal entity. The screening of the various provisions of the Act shows that the provisions for constitution of the Trust and invest it with vast powers for carrying out various development and improvement schemes. The State Government may, by notification, C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -23- propose to acquire a part or whole of any part of the Municipality or any locality adjacent thereto. The functions of the Improvement Trust are specialized functions which have been assigned to it under the State Legislation and would not be affected by the 73rd and 74th amendment of the Constitution of India. The contention, as raised by the counsel for the petitioners, thus, deserves to be rejected. The next contention which has been raised by the counsel for the petitioners is that Article 14 of the Constitution of India has been violated as the petitioners have been discriminated against while determining the market value of their land and the grant of compensation merely because the PTI Act has been invoked for acquiring the land of the petitioners whereas had the LA Act been pressed into service, the petitioners would have been granted higher benefit. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust and another vs. Vitthal Rao and others (supra) holds that the different principles of compensation cannot be laid if the land is acquired for or by an Improvement Trust or Municipal Corporation or the Government because as far as the owner is concerned, it does not matter to him whether the land is acquired by one Authority or the other. It is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another, under which the land is acquired. If the existence of two Acts enables the State to give different treatment from another equally situated, the owner who is discriminated against can claim the protection of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the contention of the counsel for the petitioners does carry weight as far as the claim of the petitioners with regard to the discrimination qua the enforcement of different principles of compensation for acquisition of land C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -24- is concerned. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of the PTI Act and the LA Act in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust and another vs. Vasant Rao and others, AIR 2002 SC 3499 wherein while considering Improvement Acts of Punjab and Nagpur as well as U.P. and taking into consideration Vitthal Rao's case (supra) as also U.P.Avas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Jainul Islam and another, (1998) 2 Supreme Court Cases 467, held that when a subsequent legislation often makes a reference to the earlier legislation so as to make the provisions of earlier legislation to be covered by later legislation, such legislation may either be (i) referral legislation which merely curtails a reference to, or the citation of the provisions of the earlier Statute or (ii) a legislation by incorporation whereunder the provisions of earlier legislation to which reference is made, are incorporated into the later legislation by reference. If it is a referential legislation, the provisions of earlier legislation to which reference is made in a subsequent legislation would be applicable as it stands on the date of application of such earlier legislation to matters referred to in the subsequent legislation but it is a legislation by incorporation, the rule of construction is repeal of earlier statute which is incorporated but it does not affect operation of the subsequent statute in which it has been incorporated i.e. made after the date of incorporation of such statute and does not effect the subsequent statute in which it is incorporated. In paras 48, 49 and 50 in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust vs. Vasant Rao and another (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- “48. So far as the U.P. Act is concerned the judgment in U.P. Avas Evam and Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam and another (supra) answers all the C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -25- questions raised before us. It has been held that so far as the U.P. Act is concerned the Land Acquisition Act, as modified, stands incorporated in the U.P. Act. However, as a matter of construction it was held that Section 55 of the U.P. Act, while incorporating the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act intended to apply to acquisition made under the U.P. Act the beneficial amendments that may be brought about for determination and payment of compensation, in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. There was nothing in the U.P.Act which precluded the Court from adopting such a construction, and this was necessary to save the Act from the vice of arbitrary and hostile discrimination. (emphasis applied).

49. This Court also found that the provisions of the Nagpur Act, with which we are concerned, were similar to the provisions of the U.P. Act. This aspect of the matter has been discussed in paragraph 27 of the report. We have also considered the provisions of the Nagpur Act as well as the provisions of the Punjab Act. We are satisfied that the aforesaid two Acts as well as and the U.P. Act have a common scheme and pattern. All the three legislation relate to town planning and development and each one of them specifies the various schemes that may be undertaken. For acquisition of land for the purposes of any of the schemes under the said Acts, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been made applicable C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -26- with certain modifications as contained in the schedule to the said Acts which are numerous and substantial. The modifications made are also similar. We have found no distinction in the three Acts which may have a bearing on the question relating to legislative incorporation of the Land Acquisition Act in the State Act. We are, therefore, of the view that what has been held by this Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Jainul Islam and another (supra) with regard to U.P. Act holds good for the Punjab Act as well as the Nagpur Act. Consequently we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in Bhatinda Improvement Trust vs. Balwant Singh and others (supra) that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have not been incorporated into the Punjab Act and that they have merely been cited or referred to in the Punjab Act.

50. It may be noticed that in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v.Jainul Islam and another (supra) this Court highlighted the fact that though under the Land Acquisition Act as amended in its application to the State of U.P. There was no provision for grant of solatium, by the U.P.Act such solatium was provided for. The intention of the legislature was apparent that it wanted to confer the benefit of solatium by modifying Section 23 (2), which benefit was not available under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as it was applicable in the State of U.P. at the time of enactment of the U.P. Act. C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -27- So far as the Punjab Act and the Nagpur Act are concerned, the schedules do not modify the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act which provides for payment of solatium. However, a proviso was added to the effect that sub-section (2) shall not apply to any land acquired under the State Acts in question. The added proviso is identical in both the State Acts. This clearly implies that where acquisition was made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as modified, the legislature did not intend to deprive the claimants of solatium as provided under the Land Acquisition Act. But solatium was not payable in cases of acquisition under the State Acts. There are provisions in both the State Acts which permit the State to acquire lands for the purposes of the schemes without resorting to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act such as acquisition by purchase, lease, exchange, or otherwise, or acquisitions contemplated under deferred street scheme, development scheme and expansion scheme. In respect of such acquisitions solatium is not payable. Such cases are similar to the acquisitions under Section 53 of the Bombay Town Planning Act which was considered by this Court in Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat and others (supra). In these circumstances with a view to save the law from the vice of arbitrary and hostile discrimination, the provisions must be construed to C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -28- mean, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by the 1984 Act relating to determination and payment of compensation would apply to acquisition of land for the purposes of the State Acts. It must, therefore, be held that while incorporating the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in the State Acts, the intention of the legislature was that amendments in the Land Acquisition Act relating to determination and payment of compensation would be applicable to acquisition of lands for the purposes of the State Acts. Consequently the claimants are entitled to the benefits conferred by Section 23(1-A), if applicable, and Sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by the 1984 Act for acquisition of land for the purposes of the State Acts under Sections 59 of both the Nagpur and the Punjab Acts.” It may, however, be noted here that it was held in the above case that as far as the determination and payment of compensation is concerned, Sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would be applicable. The same principles as provided under the LA Act, for determination and payment of compensation would be applicable as sub- section (b) of the Section 59 of the PTI Act provides that the LA Act shall be applicable subject to further modification as indicated in the Schedule of the PTI Act. The Schedule only talks of replacement of Notification C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -29- under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act by notification under Sections 36 and 42 of the PTI Act. It does not talk about the determination and payment of compensation. Thus, the provisions of the LA Act, would be applicable for determination of compensation to the land acquired under the PTI Act. In the light of the above judgment, the contention as raised by the counsel for the petitioners with regard to the prejudice caused to the petitioners by acquisition under the PTI Act depriving them of the benefit of the LA Act for determination and payment of compensation is totally misplaced and thus the challenge made by the petitioners on the ground of discrimination cannot be accepted. Since most of the petitioners have already preferred Reference under Section 18 of the LA Act, in the light of the above observations, they would be entitled to the determination and payment of compensation as per the provisions of the LA Act. The petitioners, who have not preferred Reference under Section 18 of the LA Act, may now make an application for Reference under Section 18 of the LA Act to the Collector, if so advised, within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. If such a reference is made, the Collector shall refer their claim to the Tribunal forthwith. In view of the above, the writ petitions stand disposed of. A photostat copy of this order be placed on the files of connected cases. ( JASBIR SINGH ) JUDGE ( AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ) JUDGE December 15th , 2010 poonam Whether referred to Reporters? Yes/No C.W.P.No.43 of 2008 -30-