Sarva Haryan aryana Gramin Bank and Another SUS v. itioner
Case Details
CWP-10432 432-2020 1 N THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJA IN TH AT CHANDIGA DIGARH NJAB AND HARYANA 220 Sombir CWP-104 Date of D 10432-2020 (O&M) te of Decision: November 12, 2025 Sarva Haryan aryana Gramin Bank and Another SUS VERSUS itioner .....Petitioner ...Responden ondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HA E HARPREET SINGH BRAR Present : Mr. Anil Ghanghas with Mr. r the Mr. Abhishek, Advocates for the petitioner. Mr. Ravindra Jain, Advocate w vocate cate with Mr. Sunil Gupta, Advocate for the respondent(s)-Bank. **** HARPREET REET SINGH BRAR, J. (Oral) 1. The present writ petition has bee of the as been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution tution of India with a prayer for issu or or issuance of an appropriate writ or order in the n n the nature of certiorari quashing the .2016 ing the charge-sheet dated 27.12.2016 (Annexure P ure P-2), the inquiry report dated 13 ), the ted 13.02.2019 (Annexure P-11), the punishment o ment order dated 14.05.2019 and the o .2019 d the order in appeal dated 15.10.2019 (Annexure P ure P-15) ordering the petitioner’s e and er’s removal from the service and further prayin praying for issuance of a writ in the ecting in the nature of mandamus directing the responde pondents to reinstate the petitioner in ential ner in service with all consequential benefits and s and pay arrears of salary with intere the interest @ 12% per annum from the date the same e same became due till the date of actu of actual payment. PUNEET CHAWLA 2025.12.02 12:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-10432 432-2020 2 2. Learned counsel for the petition at the petitioner inter alia contends that the petitioner ha ner has been dismissed from servic d the service without being provided the CCTV foota footage, and that the petitioner ha in the er has since been acquitted in the criminal case al case. It is argued that once the pe d, the the petitioner has been acquitted, the impugned or ned order of dismissal is liable to be fficer to be set aside. The Inquiry Officer based the fin the findings solely on the bank acco m the k account entries retrieved from the computer. Th ter. The entire fraud was allegedly c , who edly committed by one Satpal, who transferred th rred the amount into the accounts of h mbers ts of himself and his family members i.e. his wife, wife, mother, and sister-in-law by us of the by using the ID and password of the petitioner as ner as well as the IDs of other empl urther employees. Learned counsel further submits that s that the petitioner was not named
Legal Reasoning
l was named in the FIR; only Satpal was arrayed as a as an accused. Neither the Inqui ishing Inquiry Officer nor the punishing authority con ity considered the petitioner’s defenc ion of defence regarding the production of CCTV footag footage. The petitioner relies on Ann t, had n Annexure P-12 to submit that, had the CCTV fo TV footage been produced before the facts ore the Inquiry Officer, the true facts would have c have come to light. The petitioner wa Bank ner was not even present in the Bank on 11.01.201 1.2016, as he was on election duty on quiry uty on that day; however, the Inquiry Officer failed r failed to consider this material fact. while fact. It is further submitted that while some emplo employees were spared, only few , was few including the petitioner, was subjected to d ted to departmental action. The Inquir nquiry Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry in haste and w e and without supplying the petitioner levant tioner with the necessary and relevant documents re fence. ents required for an effective defence. 3. Per contra, learned counsel fo bmits sel for the respondent-Bank submits that all docum documents demanded by the petition e duly etitioner from time to time were duly PUNEET CHAWLA 2025.12.02 12:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-10432 432-2020 3 supplied. Th d. The charge-sheet was issued on tioner d on 27.12.2016, but the petitioner repeatedly de dly delayed the proceedings on one eking one pretext or another by seeking irrelevant do ant documents that had no nexus wit . The us with the disciplinary inquiry. The petitioner wa ner was afforded sufficient time and a efend and adequate opportunities to defend himself in a f in accordance with the applicable is no licable regulations, and there is no violation of on of any statutory rule. It is further oner’s urther submitted that the petitioner’s acquittal in t al in the criminal case, by itself, is e the elf, is not a ground to set aside the disciplinary a inary action. 4.
Legal Reasoning
I have heard the learned counsel ed the ounsel for the parties and perused the record with th with their able assistance. 5. A bare perusal of the paper bo tment per book reveals that the department followed the ed the procedure established under la dings nder law to conduct the proceedings and come to t me to the conclusion. Further it transpi emise transpires that the petitioner’s premise is that he has he has been given clean chit in the c ch he the criminal manner and as such he should get ex get exonerated from the disciplinary p nary proceedings as well. 6. A Three Judge Bench of the H Ajit the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajit Kumar Nag Nag v. G.M. (P.J.) Indian Oil Corp 764 Corporation Ltd 2005 (7) SCC 764 while speak speaking through Justice C.K. T .K. Thakker made owing the following ations, observations, “12. As far as acquittal of the a rt is the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the s the the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an acti ible. action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fai by a s fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not deba sing ebar an employer from exercising power in accordance with Rule The Rules and Regulations in force. The PUNEET CHAWLA 2025.12.02 12:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-10432 432-2020 4 two proceedings - criminal an irely l and departmental - are entirely different. They operate in diffe rent different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object flict bject of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on off uiry offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the and the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accorda n a ordance with service Rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating sta d in g statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or bef tally before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such and Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to The to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is nece n is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of p the of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The n of The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings inal ings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on th the n the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove th ond e the guilt of the accused 'beyond reasonable doubt', he cannot be . In ot be convicted by a court of law. In departmental enquiry, on the be the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent offic the officer on a finding recorded on the basis of 'preponderance of the of probability'. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magis ipso agistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the l nary he liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation e to tion. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the was the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, sing urt, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be o be quashed and set aside.” (emphasis added) dded) 7. Further reliance in this regard Judge egard may be placed on Two Judge Bench of the of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ia v. rt in Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kum Kumar Banerjee 2025 INSC 149 rough 149 which while speaking through PUNEET CHAWLA 2025.12.02 12:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-10432 432-2020 5 Justice Sande Sandeep Mehta, made the following o wing observations. “34. 4. In our considered view, the Divi rror Division Bench fell into grave error in subs substituting the standard of proof re a- of required in a criminal trial vis-a vis the s the disciplinary enquiry conducted ttled cted by the employer. It is a settled princip inciple of law that the burden la in a n laid upon the prosecution in a crimin iminal trial is to prove the case beyo ver, beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a di a disciplinary enquiry, the burden ited den upon the department is limited and it d it is required to prove its case on ance e on the principle of preponderance of pro probabilities. In this regard, we ar t of e are benefited by the judgment of this Co is Court in the Union of India v. Sard 618 Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 wherei erein this Court held as follows:- "15. . . . A disciplinary proceed The ceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof required is that o ility that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonab that onable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likel with likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which a raw ch a reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case as a case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision are ision based on it. Where there are some relevant materials which and ich the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably t the ably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the ourt t the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction und the under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at a the t an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has bee n of s been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the ssed the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. . . ."” ded) (emphasis added) 8. It is a trite principle of service ju It is a ental ice jurisprudence that departmental proceedings a dings and criminal trials operate in di erned e in distinct spheres and are governed by fundamen damentally different standards. An or by a An order of acquittal recorded by a PUNEET CHAWLA 2025.12.02 12:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-10432 432-2020 6 criminal cour al court does not, by itself, operate as a tiation te as an automatic bar to the initiation or continuati tinuation of disciplinary proceedings set of edings arising from the same set of facts, nor doe or does it mandate the exoneration o e. The tion of the delinquent employee. The objective of ve of a criminal trial is to ascertain or the ertain the guilt of an accused for the purpose of in e of inflicting punishment as per crim s that er criminal law, and it mandates that the prosecuti secution prove its case beyond a re rast, a d a reasonable doubt. In contrast, a departmental ental enquiry is aimed at determinin nt has rmining whether a public servant has breached the ed the codified rules of conduct a nd its uct and service discipline, and its findings can s can validly rest on the preponderanc t rules derance of probability. The strict rules of evidence a ence and procedure applicable to a c ported to a criminal court are not imported into a domes domestic enquiry. Consequently, the l in a y, the mere fact of an acquittal in a criminal case al case does not ipso facto invalidate ental lidate a duly conducted departmental proceeding o ding or the penalty imposed thereon, s held ereon, provided the enquiry was held by a compete mpetent authority, followed the presc to the prescribed procedure, adhered to the principles of les of natural justice, and its conclusi edible nclusions are based on some credible evidence. 9. A Two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ n of e Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. P. . P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC ustice CC 610, speaking through Justice Kurian Josep Joseph, made the following observatio ervations in this regard: “12. Despite the well-settled po bing d position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has ority has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedin the edings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry of ge I y officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the discipli also ciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central al Administrative Tribunal. In In PUNEET CHAWLA 2025.12.02 12:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-10432 432-2020 7 disciplinary proceedings, the H t act e High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal se of peal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/2 dia, 26/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreci igh preciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a comp competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according d in rding to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violati ural olation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceed oceedings; (d) the authorities have disable g a sabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some con the considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the c have he case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influen eous fluenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations (f) the conclusion, on the very f rary ery face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reason have asonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority h dmit ity had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evid evidence; (h) the disciplinary authorit itted hority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which infl h influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on d on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 o , the 27 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusio the lusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in acc accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some le ings e legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the ve it the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; PUNEET CHAWLA 2025.12.02 12:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-10432 432-2020 8 (vii) go into the proportionality ocks ality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” dded) (emphasis added) 10. Furthermore, a Two-Judge Be preme ge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.R S.R. Tewari vs. Union of India, aking dia, (2013) 6 SCC 602, speaking through Just h Justice B.S Chauhan, made the f n this the following observations in this regard: “ 29. In Union of India SCC dia v. R.K. Sharma [(2001) 9 SCC 592 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 767 : A ourt : AIR 2001 SC 3053] , this Court explained the observations m anjit s made in Ranjit Thakur [Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987 &S) 987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113 : AIR 1987 f the 1987 SC 2386] observing that if the charge was ridiculous, the puni ngly punishment was harsh or strikingly disproportionate it would warr , the warrant interference. However, the said observations in Ranjit Tha n of Thakur [Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 ATC 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113 : AIR 1987 SC 2386] are at a are not to be taken to mean that a court can, while exercising t iew, ng the power of judicial review, interfere with the punishment m the ent merely because it considers the punishment to be disproportio y in rtionate. It was held that only in extreme cases, which on the or their face, show perversity or irrationality, there could be jud ould e judicial review and courts should not interfere merely on compass passionate grounds. ” 11. It is settled law that this Court owers Court may only exercise its powers under Article Article 226 of the Constitution of Indi ded in f India when the findings recorded in disciplinary inary action are arbitrary, tainted ty, or inted with procedural illegality, or manifest prej st prejudice. This Court cannot re-app ts and ppreciate the matter on merits and substitute the ute the conclusion drawn by the conce wn. A concerned authority with its own. A PUNEET CHAWLA 2025.12.02 12:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-10432 432-2020 9 High Court Court cannot sit in appeal over d linary ver decisions taken in disciplinary proceedings. dings. The Court must confine itself t gs are itself to ensuring that the findings are justified by d by the material on record, the p ted in the proceedings were conducted in compliance w ance with prescribed procedure and p e, and and principles of natural justice, and the penalty im alty imposed is proportionate to the m the misconduct. 12. In the present case, the inquiry petent quiry was conducted by a competent authority, a c ity, a charge-sheet was issued, the pe y, and the petitioner submitted a reply, and the inquiry quiry officer, after considering the turned g the material on record, returned findings of gu s of guilt on charges of negligence, de ishing ce, dereliction of duty, and tarnishing the image of age of the Board. The disciplinary au dings ary authority accepted these findings and imposed posed the penalty of termination. 13. The mere fact that the petitione in the titioner was not charge-sheeted in the criminal case al case does not ipso facto vitiate the s. The te the departmental proceedings. The standards of rds of proof and objectives in crimina edings riminal and departmental proceedings tinct. are distinct. 14. The petitioner has failed to dem y was to demonstrate that the inquiry was conducted in ted in violation of natural justice, or th on no e, or that the findings are based on no evidence, or ce, or that the punishment is shocki thus shockingly disproportionate and thus perverse. Th se. The submissions made by the k re- the petitioner essentially seek re appreciation iation of evidence, which is beyond ew in yond the scope of judicial review in writ jurisdicti risdiction. 15. Consequently, this Court finds n ith the finds no grounds to interfere with the impugned or ned order. The writ petition being d dingly eing devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed. PUNEET CHAWLA 2025.12.02 12:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-10432 432-2020 10 16. 17. No other point was raised or arg or argued. Pending application(s), if any, sh
Decision
any, shall also stand disposed of. November P.C 12, 2025 RAR) (HARPREET SINGH BRAR) JUDGE Whether speaking/r Whether Reportable king/reasoned. : Yes/No Yes/No ortable. : PUNEET CHAWLA 2025.12.02 12:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document