Prabhat Sharma & Pratibha Sharma v. State of Punjab & Anr.

Mr.Rajan Bansal, Advocate with respondent No.2. M ehinder S ingh S ullar , J . (Oral) The symposium of the facts, culminating in the commencement, relevant for disposal of present petition and emanating from the record, is that the marriage of Mona Goyal complainant-respondent No.2 was solemnized with Prabhat Sharma-petitioner No.1 as per Hindu rites and ceremonies on 27.1.2008. After solemnization of the marriage, the parties resided together as husband and wife, but no issue was born out of the said wedlock. The parties could not adjust with each other and due to the differences, the complainant-respondent No.2 lodged a criminal case against her husband and other relatives, vide FIR No.274 dated 15.11.2009 on accusation of having committed the offence punishable under section 498-A IPC by the police of Police Station City Barnala.

2. Concisely, according to the complainant, although her father gave sufficient dowry articles including the jewellery, but the petitioners-accused were not satisfied with the same. They started demanding more dowry articles and abusing her as well as her parents in this context. They taunted her on one pretext or the other for bringing less dowry. Crl.Misc.No.M-4468 of 2010 2

3. Levelling a variety of allegations and narrating the sequence of events, in all, the prosecution claimed that the petitioners treated the complainant with cruelty on account of and in connection with the demand of dowry. On the basis of aforesaid allegations and in the wake of complaint made by the complainant Mona Goyal, the present case was registered against the petitioners in the manner indicated here-in-above.

4. During the pendency of investigation, good sense prevailed and the matter was compromised between the parties at the intervention of respectables, friends and relatives. It is also not a matter of dispute that the parties have filed a joint petition for divorce by way of mutual consent, as envisaged under section 13- B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short “the Act”) in the Court of Addl. District Judge, Barnala after settling their dispute. They have broken all the relations with each other and decided to live separately. The judgment and decree passed by the Addl.Distt.Judge are Annexures PX and affidavit of complainant is Annexure PY in this relevant connection.

5. In this manner, the petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing the FIR (Annexure P1) and all subsequent proceedings thereto on the basis of compromise (Annexure P2), invoking the provisions of section 482 Cr.PC, inter-alia, pleading that the parties have filed divorce petition by way of mutual consent and do not want to prolong the litigation. In order to substantiate the validity of the compromise, the parties, vide their separately recorded statements, have reiterated that they have compromised the matter with the intervention of respectables, friends and relations and prayed for quashing of the criminal proceedings. As per compromise (Annexure P2), the parties reiterated that due to temperamental differences, they could not pull on, they are living separately since

16.1.2009; the dispute between them has been resolved with the intervention of relatives and family, they were granted divorce (Annexure PX) in petition filed by them u/s 13-B of the Act; the complainant does not want to prosecute the Crl.Misc.No.M-4468 of 2010 3 petitioners in the criminal case as they want to live peacefully, she would also not file any claim for her mutual future maintenance against the petitioners and FIR (Annexure P1) be quashed.

6. Above being the position on record, now the short and significant question that arises for determination in this petition is as to whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to quash the criminal prosecution or not?

7. Having regard to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, having gone through the record with their valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to me, justice would be sub-served if the parties are allowed to compromise the matter in this relevant direction.

8. The theory of penology/strict punishment underwent a drastic change with the passage of time and the evolution of law of settlement appeared on the scene, which is primarily based on the theory of reformation of the accused. The statutory penal provision pales into insignificance in the wake of insertion of new Chapter XXI-A by Amendment Act No.2 of 2006 and amendment in expansion of scope of compounding the offences under section 320 Cr.PC. At the same time, the law of settlement of criminal disputes by virtue of compromise is not res- integra and is well settled. The clear and explicit intention of the Legislature was transformed in reality by Hon'ble Apex Court in cases Manoj Sharma v. State & Ors. 2008(4) RCR (Criminal) 827; B.S.Joshi v. State of Haryana 2003 (2) RCR (Crl.) 888 (SC) and Full Bench of this Court in case Kulwinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1052.

9. The epitome of the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments is that the power under section 482 Cr.PC has no limits. However, the High Court will exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and caution. The Court is a vital and an extra-ordinary effective instrument to maintain and control social order. The Courts play role of paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony and ever- lasting congeniality in society and resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise Crl.Misc.No.M-4468 of 2010 4 between two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate and prompt attention of a Court which should endeavour to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is adhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery if the statement is fair being free from under pressure.

10. However, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manoj Sharma's case (supra), has restricted the scope of quashing the criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise in serious offences and ruled (para 33) as under:- “There can be no doubt that a case under Section 302 IPC or other serious offences like those under Sections 395, 397 or 304B cannot be compounded and hence proceedings in those provisions cannot be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.PC, or in writ jurisdiction on the basis of compromise. However, in some other cases, (like those akin to a civil nature) the proceedings can be quashed by the High Court if the parties have come to an amicable settlement even though the provisions are not compoundable. Where a line is to be drawn will have to be decided in some later decisions of this Court, preferably by a larger bench (so as to make it more authoritative). Some guidelines will have to be evolved in this connection and the matter cannot be left at the sole unguided discretion of Judges, otherwise there may be conflicting decisions and judicial anarchy. A judicial discretion has to be exercised on some objective guiding principles and criteria, and not on the whims and fancies of individual Judges. Discretion, after all, cannot be the Chancellor's foot.”

11. Meaning thereby, the High Court has unlimited power to quash the criminal proceedings, relatable to matrimonial and property disputes, on the basis of lawful settlement within the frame work and restriction depicted by Hon'ble Apex Court.

12. As is evident from the record that in the instant case, the parties are lawfully agreed to settle the dispute. The restriction of heinous offences emanating Crl.Misc.No.M-4468 of 2010 5 from the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manoj Sharma's case (supra) is not at all attracted to the present case. Therefore, to my mind, there is no impediment in translating the wishes of the parties into reality and to quash the criminal prosecution to set the matter at rest to enable them to live in peace and to enjoy the life and liberty in a dignified manner as guaranteed by and as contemplated in the Constitution of India.

13. In the light of the aforesaid reasons, the instant petition is hereby accepted. Consequently, FIR No.274 dated 15.11.2009 (Annexure P1) and all other subsequent proceedings thereto are quashed and all the accused are discharged, in the obtaining circumstances of the case.

16.9.2010 (Mehinder Singh Sullar) AS Judge