Municipal Corpora(cid:16)on, Faridabad v. Dayawa$

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued by: Mr. Amit Jhanji, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Priyanka Kansal, Advocate for the appellant(s) in RSA-3641-2000 and for the pe(cid:16)(cid:16)oner(s) in COCP-251-2001. Mr. Vishal Garg, Advocate for the respondent. DEEPAK GUPTA, J. **** The present appeal has been filed by the plain(cid:16)ff against the judgment & decree dated 26.07.2000 passed by the learned First Appellate Court, learned Addi(cid:16)onal District Judge, Faridabad, whereby the appeal preferred by the defendant–Municipal Corpora(cid:16)on, Faridabad was accepted and the suit of the plain(cid:16)ff was dismissed, reversing the judgment dated YOGESH MEHTA 2026.05.06 17:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document PAGE N: 1 OF 6 PAGES

24.12.1998 of the learned trial Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Faridabad, which had partly decreed the suit by gran(cid:16)ng relief of injunc(cid:16)on, while declining declara(cid:16)on of ownership.

2. The trial Court record was requisi(cid:16)oned and perused. For the sake of clarity, the par(cid:16)es are referred to as per their status before the trial Court.

3. The case of the plain(cid:16)ff, as set up in the plaint, is that she is the owner in possession of land measuring 23 kanal 4 marla comprised in Khasra Nos.19/1, 22/2 and 44 situated in village Palla, District Faridabad. It was asserted that her possession over the suit land dates back several decades, allegedly for more than a century, and that she had constructed residen(cid:16)al quarters over part of the land, installed electricity connec(cid:16)ons, and paid house tax to the defendant corpora(cid:16)on. It was further pleaded that a Johar (pond) earlier existed on a por(cid:16)on of the land, which was subsequently filled and brought under cul(cid:16)va(cid:16)on by the plain(cid:16)ff. According to her, the defendant had no right, (cid:16)tle or authority over the suit property and, despite earlier evic(cid:16)on proceedings under the Public Premises Act having been dismissed, the defendant was again aCemp(cid:16)ng to interfere in her possession. On these averments, she sought a declara(cid:16)on of ownership and a decree of permanent injunc(cid:16)on restraining interference in her possession.

4. The defendant–Municipal Corpora(cid:16)on contested the suit by denying the plain(cid:16)ff’s ownership and possession. It was specifically pleaded that Khasra No.44 is a public pond forming part of shamlat deh meant for the benefit of the general public and that the plain(cid:16)ff had no right therein. The remaining averments of the plaint were also denied and dismissal of the suit was prayed for.

5. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed necessary issues and the par(cid:16)es led evidence. The plain(cid:16)ff relied primarily on revenue YOGESH MEHTA 2026.05.06 17:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document PAGE N: 2 OF 6 PAGES records, house tax receipts, and oral evidence to establish long possession. The defendant relied upon revenue entries and statutory provisions to show that the land, par(cid:16)cularly Khasra No.44, vested in the Gram Panchayat and subsequently in the Municipal Corpora(cid:16)on.

6. Upon apprecia(cid:16)on of evidence, the trial Court held that the plain(cid:16)ff had failed to prove her (cid:16)tle to the suit property and, therefore, was not en(cid:16)tled to a declara(cid:16)on of ownership. However, the trial Court found that the plain(cid:16)ff was in seCled possession of the suit land and accordingly, granted a decree of permanent injunc(cid:16)on restraining the defendant from interfering in such possession except in due course of law.

7. Aggrieved by the grant of injunc(cid:16)on, the defendant preferred an appeal. The First Appellate Court, aGer reappraisal of the en(cid:16)re evidence and taking into considera(cid:16)on addi(cid:16)onal revenue records, reversed the findings of the trial Court. It concurred that the plain(cid:16)ff had failed to prove (cid:16)tle but went further to hold that even possession of the plain(cid:16)ff over Khasra No.44 was unauthorized, as the said land was recorded as gair mumkin Johar and formed part of shamlat deh, ves(cid:16)ng in the Gram Panchayat and thereaGer, in the Municipal Corpora(cid:16)on. Consequently, it held that no injunc(cid:16)on could be granted against the true owner. In respect of Khasra Nos.19/1 and 22/2, although possession of the plain(cid:16)ff was no(cid:16)ced, the Appellate Court declined injunc(cid:16)on on the ground that the plain(cid:16)ff had not paid separate court fee for the relief of injunc(cid:16)on, once the relief of declara(cid:16)on had been declined. The suit was thus dismissed in en(cid:16)rety.

8. Challenging the above said reversal, learned senior counsel for the appellant has contended that both Courts below had, in substance, recognized the possession of the plain(cid:16)ff over the suit land and that the First Appellate Court erred in trea(cid:16)ng possession over Khasra No.44 as unauthorized despite revenue entries reflec(cid:16)ng such possession since at YOGESH MEHTA 2026.05.06 17:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document PAGE N: 3 OF 6 PAGES least the year 1973-74. It is further argued that earlier proceedings under the Public Premises Act had failed and that the finding regarding non- payment of court fee for injunc(cid:16)on is legally unsustainable, as the relief of injunc(cid:16)on, even if consequen(cid:16)al, does not require separate court fee in the manner assumed by the Appellate Court.

9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the judgment of the First Appellate Court, submiJng that Khasra No.44 is a Johar forming part of shamlat deh, which vests in the Gram Panchayat and thereaGer, in the Municipal Corpora(cid:16)on by opera(cid:16)on of law. It is argued that no injunc(cid:16)on can be granted against the true owner, par(cid:16)cularly when the possession is unauthorized. As regards the other khasra numbers, it is submiCed that the Appellate Court rightly declined relief on account of improper court fee.

10. Having heard learned counsel for the par(cid:16)es and perused the record, this Court finds that the controversy essen(cid:16)ally revolves around three aspects: (i) (cid:16)tle of the plain(cid:16)ff, (ii) nature of possession, and (iii) en(cid:16)tlement to injunc(cid:16)on.

11. Insofar as (cid:16)tle is concerned, both Courts below have concurrently held that the plain(cid:16)ff has failed to establish any ownership over the suit property. Learned counsel for the appellant has fairly conceded this posi(cid:16)on. The said finding is based on apprecia(cid:16)on of evidence, par(cid:16)cularly revenue record and so, calls for no interference.

12. Coming to Khasra No.44, the revenue record clearly shows that the land is recorded as gair mumkin Johar. Under Sec(cid:16)on 2(g)(4) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regula(cid:16)on) Act, 1961, a Johar falls within the defini(cid:16)on of shamlat deh and vests in the Gram Panchayat under Sec(cid:16)on 4 thereof. It is not disputed that the estate subsequently vested in the Faridabad Complex Administra(cid:16)on and thereaGer in the Municipal Corpora(cid:16)on. The plain(cid:16)ff’s predecessor was not shown in possession of this YOGESH MEHTA 2026.05.06 17:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document PAGE N: 4 OF 6 PAGES khasra number in earlier jamabandis and such entry appears only from the year 1973-74 onwards without any suppor(cid:16)ng order of competent authority. In these circumstances, the possession of the plain(cid:16)ff over Khasra No.44 has rightly been held to be unauthorized.

13. It is a seCled principle that no injunc(cid:16)on can be granted against the true owner in respect of public land, par(cid:16)cularly when the possession is without authority. The finding of the First Appellate Court in this regard, therefore, calls for no interference.

14. However, the posi(cid:16)on stands on a different foo(cid:16)ng insofar as Khasra Nos.19/1 and 22/2 are concerned. The revenue record consistently reflects possession of the plain(cid:16)ff’s predecessor since at least the jamabandi for the year 1954-55. Though such possession does not confer ownership, par(cid:16)cularly when the land originally vested in the Panchayat and thereaGer in the Municipal Corpora(cid:16)on, it nevertheless establishes seCled and con(cid:16)nuous possession. The nature of possession recorded as “bashrah malkan bawajah hissedari” indicates possession under a claim traceable to revenue entries and cannot be equated with that of a rank trespasser.

15. The law is well seCled that a person in seCled possession, even if not the owner, is en(cid:16)tled to protect such possession against forcible dispossession except in accordance with law. The trial Court had rightly granted injunc(cid:16)on on this basis.

16. The First Appellate Court declined injunc(cid:16)on qua these khasra numbers solely on the ground that separate court fee had not been paid for the relief of injunc(cid:16)on once the relief of declara(cid:16)on had been declined. This reasoning cannot be sustained. The nature of relief must be gathered from the substance of the plaint and not its form. Where a plain(cid:16)ff seeks to protect exis(cid:16)ng possession, the relief of injunc(cid:16)on assumes an independent character and cannot be denied merely on technical grounds rela(cid:16)ng to YOGESH MEHTA 2026.05.06 17:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document PAGE N: 5 OF 6 PAGES court fee. At best, the plain(cid:16)ff could have been directed to make good the deficiency, if any.

17. In this regard, the principle that the substance of relief prevails over its form has been consistently recognized, and where possession is established, denial of injunc(cid:16)on on a mere technicality would result in grave injus(cid:16)ce.

18. Accordingly, the present appeal is partly allowed. The dismissal of the suit in respect of Khasra No.44 is affirmed. However, in respect of Khasra Nos.19/1 and 22/2, the judgment of the First Appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored to the extent that the plain(cid:16)ff is granted a decree of permanent injunc(cid:16)on restraining the defendant– Municipal Corpora(cid:16)on from interfering in her possession over the said khasra numbers except in due course of law.

19. It is, however, directed that in case any deficiency in court fee is found, the same shall be made good by the plain(cid:16)ff within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of this order.

21. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. As regards COCP No. 251 of 2001, the same had been filed by the appellant seeking ini(cid:16)a(cid:16)on of contempt proceedings against the respondent for alleged viola(cid:16)on of the interim order dated 13.11.2000 passed by this Court. However, during the course of arguments, the said pe(cid:16)(cid:16)on was not pressed. Consequently, the same is dismissed as not pressed. A photocopy of this order be placed on the file of connected case.

06.05.2026 Yogesh (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Yes/No Whether reportable:- Uploaded on: 06.05.2026 YOGESH MEHTA 2026.05.06 17:26 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document PAGE N: 6 OF 6 PAGES