RANGDEEP SINGH NISHA v. STATE OF PUNJAB

Judgment

#1. The present petition has been instituted under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), seeking the concession of regular bail pending trial in connection with FIR No. 0013 dated

09.03.2025, initially registered under Section 22 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, with Section 29 of the NDPS Act having been added subsequently, at Police Station Dharamgarh, District Sangrur (Annexure P-1).

#2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that on 09.03.2025, a police party headed by ASI Mewa Singh was on routine patrol and surveillance duty in the area falling between Village Jakhepal and Village Kanakwal Bhagua. At about 6:30 P.M., the police allegedly noticed five CRM-M-14541-2026 (O&M) -:2:- persons sitting on the eastern side of the canal near the kacha path, surrounding a black plastic bag and rummaging through its contents. On noticing the arrival of the police party, the said persons allegedly attempted to flee but were apprehended by the police officials.

2.1. Upon inquiry, the apprehended persons disclosed their identities as Rinka Singh, Jaspreet Singh @ Happy @ Chibba, Shaganpreet Singh @ Happy, Ragdeep Singh @ Nisa, and Harvinder Singh @ Vicky. The Investigating Officer informed each of them of their statutory rights under Section 50 of the NDPS Act and served separate notices in that regard. The accused allegedly consented to the search being conducted by the Investigating Officer himself.

2.2. During the search of the black plastic bag, the police allegedly recovered 600 intoxicant tablets. The recovered contraband, along with the plastic bag, was converted into a sealed parcel in accordance with the prescribed procedure and sealed with the seal bearing impression "MS", while the sample seal was prepared separately. The seal, after use, was entrusted to ASI Gamdur Singh. The recovered contraband was taken into possession through separate seizure memos and the necessary procedural formalities were completed. On the basis of the aforesaid recovery, a ruqa

was dispatched to the Police Station, pursuant to which the present FIR came to be registered under Sections 22, NDPS Act, and investigation was thereafter set into motion. During the course of investigation, Section 29 of the NDPS Act was subsequently invoked.

#3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant- petitioner contends that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the CRM-M-14541-2026 (O&M) -:3:- present case and is entitled to the concession of regular bail. It is submitted that the alleged recovery has already been effected and the petitioner has remained in judicial custody since 23.09.2025. Learned counsel further submits that the investigation stands concluded and the challan has already been presented before the competent Court, thereafter no further custodial interrogation of the petitioner is required. It is argued that the trial is still at an initial stage and is likely to consume considerable time before reaching its logical conclusion, the delay being wholly attributable to the prosecution and not to the petitioner. It is, therefore, contended that continued incarceration of the petitioner would amount to punitive detention before adjudication of guilt, which is alien to the settled principles governing grant of bail and would also infringe the petitioner's valuable right to a speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. On these premises, it is prayed that the petitioner be enlarged on regular bail pending trial.

#4. The custody certificate produced by the learned State counsel is taken on record, subject to all just exceptions.

4.1. Learned State counsel has vehemently opposed the prayer for grant of regular bail and submits that, having regard to the nature and gravity of the accusations, the quantity of contraband allegedly recovered, and the seriousness of the offences punishable under the NDPS Act, the petitioner does not deserve the concession of regular bail at this stage. It is further contended that the allegations disclose the petitioner's active involvement in the commission of the offence and that his release on bail CRM-M-14541-2026 (O&M) -:4:- may prejudice the fair conduct of the trial. It is, therefore, prayed that the present petition, being devoid of merit, be dismissed.

#5. The right to a speedy trial is an integral facet of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The constitutional mandate is not confined merely to ensuring a fair trial but also obligates the State to conclude criminal proceedings within a reasonable time so that the process itself does not become punitive.

#6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, 1980 (1) SCC 81, authoritatively held that the right to a speedy trial is an essential and integral part of Article 21, and that any procedure which permits prolonged incarceration without expeditious trial cannot be regarded as fair, just or reasonable. The aforesaid principles are in consonance with the Constitution Bench decisions in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225, and P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002 (4) SCC 578, wherein it was held that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right flowing from Article 21 and constitutional courts are duty-bound to intervene wherever inordinate and unexplained delay results in denial of substantive justice.

#7. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 and in Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 (2) SSC(Criminal) 271, the Court categorically held that "the right to a speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence." It was further held that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial, without CRM-M-14541-2026 (O&M) -:5:- commencement or reasonable progress of the trial, effectively converts pre- trial detention into a form of punishment and cannot be constitutionally sustained. The Court observed that if the State or the prosecuting agency is unable to secure an accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial, it cannot oppose the grant of bail merely on the ground of the seriousness of the allegations, as Article 21 prevails over statutory restrictions where continued incarceration becomes oppressive and unjustified.

#8. This constitutional position has acquired greater significance in prosecutions under special statutes containing restrictive bail provisions. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is undoubtedly a stringent penal statute enacted to combat the menace of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The principle was specifically applied to prosecutions under the NDPS Act in Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352. The Apex Court held that Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot be construed so rigidly as to compel indefinite incarceration of an undertrial merely because the trial has not progressed. The Court observed that a literal interpretation of Section 37, divorced from constitutional values, would amount to sanctioning punitive detention before conviction. It was emphatically held that where the State is unable to conclude the trial within a reasonable time, the rigours of Section 37 necessarily yield to the constitutional mandate of Article 21. The Court further observed that Section 436A Cr.P.C. applies even to prosecutions under special statutes and constitutes an important legislative safeguard against indefinite pre-trial detention. CRM-M-14541-2026 (O&M) -:6:-

#9. Recently, in Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109 and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC Online SC 1693, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that prolonged incarceration militates against the most cherished fundamental right under Article 21. The Court observed that where the accused has remained in custody for an unduly long period and the trial is nowhere near completion, constitutional liberty must prevail over the statutory embargo contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court succinctly held that conditional liberty must override the statutory embargo when the constitutional guarantee itself stands threatened. Similarly, the Apex Court has recently reaffirmed these constitutional principles in.

#10. Thus, the legal position that emerges from the above authorities is that while offences under the NDPS Act are undoubtedly grave and the statutory conditions governing bail are stringent, the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21 remains paramount. Courts are required to balance the societal interest in effective prosecution with the individual's fundamental right to personal liberty. Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without meaningful progress in the trial cannot be justified merely by invoking the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. In such exceptional circumstances, Constitutional Courts are duty-bound to harmonise the statutory restrictions with the fundamental right to personal liberty and ensure that pre-trial detention does not degenerate into punishment before adjudication of guilt. Where delay is inordinate and not attributable to the accused, constitutional courts are empowered to grant appropriate relief so as to prevent violation of Article 21. CRM-M-14541-2026 (O&M) -:7:-

#11. It is equally relevant to note that while Section 37 prescribes stringent conditions for grant of bail, the NDPS Act itself reflects the legislative intent that such prosecutions should proceed expeditiously. Section 36 empowers the Government to constitute Special Courts for the very purpose of ensuring speedy trial of NDPS offences. Therefore, the statutory scheme itself proceeds on the assumption that greater restrictions on bail are constitutionally sustainable only when accompanied by equally expeditious adjudication. Where the State fails to provide the infrastructure necessary for speedy disposal, continued reliance upon Section 37 alone would produce an unconstitutional imbalance between individual liberty and societal interest. Delay defeats that legislative premise. If trials remain pending for years because of systemic inadequacies, repeated adjournments, non-production of witnesses, or institutional delays not attributable to the accused, continued incarceration ceases to be preventive and assumes a punitive character.

#12. Having bestowed thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and upon a prima facie appraisal of the material placed on record, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner cannot be subjected to prolonged or indefinite pre-trial incarceration merely because the allegations pertain to a commercial quantity under the NDPS Act. The object of pre-trial detention is to secure the presence of the accused during trial and not to inflict punishment prior to conviction. Admittedly, the petitioner has remained in judicial custody since 23.09.2025, and prior thereto had also undergone custody for a period of approximately two months and seven days, thus completing incarceration of more than one CRM-M-14541-2026 (O&M) -:8:- year. As per the prosecution version itself, five persons were allegedly found sitting together with a single polythene bag containing 600 tablets of Tramadol Hydrochloride lying in their midst, and all of them were allegedly having their hands inside the said bag. Whether such circumstances are sufficient to establish conscious possession and whether the prosecution version ultimately inspires confidence are matters which can only be adjudicated upon after the evidence is led during the course of trial. At this stage, no conclusive opinion is either warranted or permissible.

12.1. It is also not disputed that the investigation stands concluded, the final report has already been presented before the competent Court, and the petitioner's further custodial interrogation is no longer required. The prosecution has cited numerous witnesses, the trial is still at its nascent stage, and there is no immediate likelihood of its conclusion in the near future. Consequently, continued detention of the petitioner would serve no meaningful investigational purpose. At the stage of consideration of a petition for regular bail, this Court is not expected to undertake a meticulous appreciation of the evidence, the object of bail being only to secure the presence of the accused during trial and not to impose punitive detention before adjudication of guilt. In the totality of the facts and circumstances, particularly the substantial period of incarceration already undergone by the petitioner, the completion of investigation, presentation of the challan, absence of any further requirement of custodial interrogation, the apparent improbability of the prosecution version, and the fact that the trial is likely to consume considerable time before CRM-M-14541-2026 (O&M) -:9:- reaching its logical conclusion, this Court is of the considered opinion that no useful purpose would be served by prolonging the petitioner's incarceration pending trial. Accordingly, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, lest it prejudice either side during trial, the petitioner is held entitled to the concession of regular bail.

12.2. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed, and the applicant-petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail, subject to his furnishing the requisite bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned/Illaqa Magistrate/Duty Magistrate, as the case may be, and further subject to the following conditions:- i. The petitioner(s) shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat, or promise to any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case so as to dissuade such person from disclosing such facts before the Court or to the Investigating Agency. ii. The petitioner(s) shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence in any manner whatsoever, nor shall the petitioner(s), directly or indirectly, attempt to influence, intimidate, or contact any prosecution witness. iii. The petitioner(s) shall not leave the territorial limits of India without obtaining the prior permission of the learned Trial Court. In the event any of the petitioner(s) is in possession of a passport, the particulars thereof shall be furnished before the Investigating Officer as well as the learned Trial Court. iv. Before accepting the bail and surety bonds, the learned Illaqa Magistrate/Duty Magistrate/C.J.M. concerned shall obtain from the petitioner(s) the permanent residential address as well as the CRM-M-14541-2026 (O&M) -:10:- present correspondence address, duly supported by appropriate documentary proof. The Investigating Officer shall verify the correctness of the said addresses within 48 hours of the acceptance of the bail bonds and place a verification report on record. In the event any of the addresses is found to be false, fictitious, or incorrect, it shall be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation of the concession of bail in accordance with law. v. The petitioner(s) shall furnish before the learned Trial Court, either at the time of furnishing the bail bonds or within such period as may be specified by the Court, the Permanent Account Number (PAN), Aadhaar Number, particulars of all operative bank accounts, and a declaration disclosing details of immovable properties, if any. Any concealment of material particulars or furnishing of false information shall constitute a valid ground for seeking cancellation of the concession of bail in accordance with law. vi. The petitioner(s) shall intimate the Investigating Officer as well as the learned Trial Court, in writing, of any change in residential address or mobile number within seven days of such change. vii. The petitioner(s) shall not commit any offence of a similar nature during the pendency of the trial and shall remain present before the learned Trial Court on each and every date fixed, unless personal appearance is exempted in accordance with law. The petitioner(s) shall not absent from the proceedings without obtaining prior permission of the learned Trial Court. In the event of violation of any of the aforesaid conditions or unauthorized absence from the trial proceedings, it shall be open to the learned Trial Court to proceed in accordance with law, including cancellation of the CRM-M-14541-2026 (O&M) -:11:- concession of bail and issuance of appropriate coercive process, including warrants of arrest.

#13. In light of the final disposition of the captioned matter, all pending miscellaneous and interconnected applications are hereby deemed disposed of. The adjudication of the primary dispute has spent the force of these ancillary proceedings, rendering them infructuous ex facie. Consequently, no independent or supplemental orders are warranted or required in respect thereof.

21.07.2026 Gaurav Sorot ( VIRINDER AGGARWAL) JUDGE Whether reasoned / speaking? Whether reportable? Yes / No Yes / No