Vikas Khanna v. Pawan Kumar

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. N. MITTAL * * * Present : Mr. Sandeep Arora, Advocate for the petitioner. * * * L. N. MITTAL, J. (Oral) : Accused Vikas Khanna has filed the instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short – Cr.P.C.) impugning order dated 26.03.2008 (Annexure P-3) passed by learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Amritsar, as affirmed in revision petition by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Amritsar, vide judgment dated 20.08.2011 (Annexure P-4). Respondent-complainant filed complaint Annexure P-1 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the accused- petitioner. When the case was pending for defence evidence of the accused- Crl. Misc. No. M-30379 of 2011 2 petitioner, he moved application dated 29.02.2008 (Annexure P-2) for permission to seek opinion of Handwriting Expert regarding age of ink used in the signatures of the accused-petitioner on the impugned cheque and age of the ink used by the complainant, while filling the cheque in question.

The said application has been dismissed by trial Magistrate vide impugned order dated 26.03.2008 (Annexure P-3). Revision petition against the said order preferred by the accused-petitioner has been dismissed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Amritsar, vide impugned judgment dated 20.08.2011 (Annexure P-4). Feeling aggrieved, the accused has filed the instant petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the case file. Counsel for the petitioner, relying on a judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Uppu Jhansi Lakshmi Bai vs. J. Venkateswara Rao reported as AIR 1994 Andhra Pradesh 90 contended that opinion of Expert can be obtained to determine age of the disputed handwriting. Counsel for the petitioner also relied on a judgment of Madras High Court namely P. R. Ramakrishnan vs. P. Govindarajan reported as 2008 (1) R. C. R. (Criminal) 33, wherein disputed cheque, on which the accused had denied his signatures, was ordered to be sent to Handwriting Expert for comparison with admitted signatures of the accused.

I have carefully considered the aforesaid contentions, but the Crl. Misc. No. M-30379 of 2011 3 same cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Perusal of the impugned orders of the courts below reveals that the impugned complaint was instituted on 26.10.2004. Complainant closed his evidence on 09.12.2006. Statement of the accused-petitioner under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded on 13.01.2007. The case was then adjourned to 17.02.2007 for defence evidence. Thereafter, the accused availed of several opportunities for his defence evidence. Many last opportunities were also granted. It was on 29.02.2008, when one more final opportunity had been granted to the petitioner-accused for his defence evidence, that the petitioner came out with application (Annexure P-2) for permission to examine the Handwriting Expert. There is no explanation why the said application was not moved at the earliest stage, when the case was fixed for defence evidence for the first time on 13.01.2007 for

17.02.2007. The instant application is a clear attempt in the series of acts of the accused-petitioner to intentionally delay the disposal of the criminal complaint, which was instituted almost seven years ago. The application has been rightly dismissed by the trial Magistrate, as upheld by the Revisional Court. The trial Magistrate has closed the evidence of the accused-petitioner by Court Order and there is sufficient justification for the same. In view thereof, the petitioner cannot be permitted to further delay the disposal of the criminal complaint by adopting all tactics. The petitioner has been granted more than sufficient opportunities to lead his defence Crl. Misc. No. M-30379 of 2011 4 evidence. In this view of the matter, no fault can be found with the orders of the courts below. In these circumstances, judgments in the cases of Uppu Jhansi Lakshmi Bai (supra) and P. R. Ramakrishnan (supra), cited by counsel for the petitioner, have no applicability to the facts of the instant case. It may also be added that second revision petition at the hands of the petitioner is barred by Section 397 (3) Cr.P.C. and the instant petition in the garb of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is only second revision petition, which is not tenable. It may be repeated that even on merits, the petitioner has no case for interference. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in the instant petition, which is accordingly dismissed in limine. October 04, 2011 monika ( L. N. MITTAL ) JUDGE