Criminal Revision No. 1437 of 2005 · Punjab And Haryana High Court · 2010

were tried in case FIR No.114 dated 16.11.1998 at Police Station Rampura under Sections 324, 323, 34 IPC. Roop Singh was admitted in Civil Hospital, Rampuraphul on 16th November, 1998. He made a complaint to the police that he was serving as Guard in the department of Wildlife and Forest Protection, Bathinda. He owns agricultural land at village Rampura. The fields of Gurdip Ram father of accused No.2 to 4 adjoins his fields. Regarding the boundary, there was a dispute and cement poles were installed at the boundary in between the land of both the parties. On 16th November, 1998 at about 9/10 a.m., complainant found that the cement pole was uprooted. The complainant was talking with his Siri (labourer engaged by sharing Criminal Revision No.1437 of 2005 2 crop), when all the three accused came armed with Gandasas. The accused allegedly gave injuries. The complainant examined PW-1 Mohinder Singh and PW-2 Buta Singh. Complainant Roop Singh himself appeared as PW-3. Dr.Pushpinder Kaur appeared as PW-4. She proved injuries on the person of Roop Singh complainant. SI Sucha Singh appeared as PW-5. He had conducted the investigation. The trial Court held that the ocular version given by PW-3 Roop Singh complainant has been duly corroborated by the medical evidence and convicted the accused respondents No.2 to 4. The trial Court sentenced accused Tarsem Chand to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- under Section 324 IPC and for a period of one year with a fine of Rs.1000/- under Section 323/34 IPC, in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Accused Bhola Ram and Chand Ram were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.1000/- each under Section 323 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for one year with fine of Rs.1000/- each under Section 324/34 IPC, in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. It was further ordered by the trial Court that period of custody, if any, be set forth out of substantive sentence. Aggrieved against the same, accused respondents had filed an appeal. The appellate Court acquitted the accused respondents on the ground that Mohinder Singh PW-1 and Buta Singh PW-2 have not supported the complainant and were declared hostile, as they had resiled from the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Criminal Revision No.1437 of 2005 3 Once the testimony of witnesses is not believed on the ground that the complainant had introduced two witnesses, who had not witnessed the occurrence, this Court will not disturb the findings of the lower appellate Court on the ground that it amounts to wrong appreciation of the evidence. In the present case, State has decided not to file appeal against acquittal. The view formulated by the lower appellate Court is the one, which is possible. The judgment of the lower appellate Court is neither perverse nor perfunctory. It was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in AIR 1968 Supreme Court 707 Mahendra Partap Singh vs. Sarju Singh and another, relying upon D.Stephens vs. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196, as under: “only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polajlal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 (AIR 1951 SC 316), this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is “perverse” or “lacking in true correct perspective”. It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788), it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take Criminal Revision No.1437 of 2005 4 place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court, was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned judge has re- weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2145 (V 60 C 352), Hon'ble apex Court observed as under: “This Court then proceeded to observe that the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasized that this jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when “there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice.” In face of prohibition in Section 439(4), Cr.P.C., for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re-trial. No Criminal Revision No.1437 of 2005 5 doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court’s power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been over-looked only (either?) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. In Mahendra Pratap Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 287 = (AIR 1968 SC 707) (supra) the position was again reviewed and the rule laid down in the three earlier cases reaffirmed. In that case the reading of the judgment of the High Court made it plain that it had re-weighed the evidence from its own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This court pointed out that it was not the duty of the High Court to do so while dealing with an acquittal on revision, when the Government had not chosen to file an appeal against it. “In other words” said this Court, “the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” Similar view was reiterated by Hon'ble apex Court in Bansi Lal and others vs. Laxman Singh, (1986) 3 Supreme Court Cases 444. Criminal Revision No.1437 of 2005 6 Again, Hon'ble apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others, 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 181, held that it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. In Vimal Singh vs. Khuman Singh and another, (1998) Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1574 and in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, 2002 AIR (SC) 2907, the High Court has been reminded of its very limited jurisdiction in revision against acquittal. It is well settled that unless any legal infirmity in the procedure or in the conduct of trial or patent illegality is pointed out, the revisional Court will not interfere. I find no merit in the instant revision petition to interfere while exercising revisional jurisdiction as learned counsel for petitioner has failed to point out any illegality or irregularity. There is no merit. Present revision petition is dismissed. February 19, 2010 [KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA] JUDGE