Criminal Revision No. 130 of 2005 · High Court of Punjab And Haryana · 2010

in case FIR No. 57 dated 25.11.1995, registered at Police Station Budhlada, under Section 11 of the Punjab Colonies Regulation Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as “1975 Act”). However, after trial, they were acquitted of the charge by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mansa, vide its judgment dated 30.10.2003. Admittedly, the acquittal of accused has been recorded in the FIR case. The State of Punjab has opted not to file an appeal against Criminal Revision No. 130 of 2005 2 their acquittal. But the acquittal has been assailed in the present revision petition filed by the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the District Magistrate took a conscious decision not to prefer an appeal against the acquittal of accused/respondents. In the present case, FIR was lodged on a written application dated 28.8.1995 Ex.PW.1/A, submitted by the Junior Engineer, Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority, Bathinda, stating that these accused had sold 20 plots to different persons and 20 sale deeds have been executed. Most of the plots sold consisted of 75 Sq. yards, 100 sq. yards and 125 sq. yards. The trial Court, in its well reasoned judgment, had noticed the following points for determination:- “i) Whether there is sufficient evidence on the part of the prosecution that the sale deeds were executed by the accused jointly to set up a colony? ii) Whether the accused have jointly sold five or more than five plots? iii) Whether the sale deeds mentioned the iv) v) recital as property/land sold for residential building or commercial purpose? Whether the complaint is within time? Whether in the absence of any site plan, the version of PW.1 suggesting that selling of plots of small sizes leads to the presumption that it was sold for residential Criminal Revision No. 130 of 2005 3 or commercial purpose is to be accepted? vi) Whether the other accused for which no sanction was obtained is yet hit by Section 13 of Punjab Regulation of Colonies Act, 1975? vii) Whether the accused has the right to take the plea that the land was situated outside the municipal limits and the provisions of Punjab Regulation of Colonies Act, 1975 was not applicable?” The trial Court held that each accused had sold the plots individually and there was no evidence that the plots were sold jointly and no accused had sold more than five plots. Furthermore, the trial Court had noticed recital in the sale deeds that the plots have been sold for cultivation. The trial Court further held that the prosecution of the accused is barred under Section 468 Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that even though the State has not filed an appeal, the petitioner is aggrieved as on the plots, residential houses are constructed and they cause pressure upon the petitioner for providing infrastructure. The view formulated by the trial Court is the one, which can be formulated on the facts and circumstances of the case. It was held in Mahendra Partap Singh v. Sarju Singh and another, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 707, relying upon D.Stephens v. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196, as under: “Only two grounds are mentioned by this Criminal Revision No. 130 of 2005 4 Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polajlal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 (AIR 1951 SC 316), this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is “perverse” or “lacking in true correct perspective”. It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788), it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case Criminal Revision No. 130 of 2005 5 or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court, was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2145 (V 60 C 352), Hon'ble apex Court observed as under: “This Court then proceeded to observe that the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought Criminal Revision No. 130 of 2005 6 fit to appeal, but it was emphasized that this jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when “there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice.” In face of prohibition in Section 439(4), Cr.P.C., for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re-trial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court’s power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which Criminal Revision No. 130 of 2005 7 was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; iv) Where the material evidence has been over-looked only (either?) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. In Mahendra Pratap Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 287 = (AIR 1968 SC 707) (supra) the position was again reviewed and the rule laid down in the three earlier cases reaffirmed. In that case the reading of the judgment of the High Court made it plain that it had re- weighed the evidence from its own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This court pointed out that it was not the duty of the High Court to do so while dealing with an acquittal on revision, when the Government had not chosen to file an appeal against it. “In other words” said this Court, “the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down Criminal Revision No. 130 of 2005 8 by this Court and has acted in breach of them.” Similar view was reiterated by Hon'ble apex Court in Bansi Lal and others v. Laxman Singh, (1986) 3 Supreme Court Cases

444. Again, Hon'ble apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others, 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 181, held that it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. In Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh and another, (1998) Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1574 and in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, 2002 AIR (SC) 2907, the High Court has been reminded of its very limited jurisdiction in revision against acquittal. It is well settled that unless any legal infirmity in the procedure or in the conduct of trial or patent illegality is pointed out, the revisional Court will not interfere. I find no merit in the instant revision petition to interfere while exercising revisional jurisdiction as learned counsel for petitioner has failed to point out any illegality or irregularity. Hence, the present revision petition is dismissed. March 8, 2010 “DK” (Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia) Judge