AT CHANDIGARH v. State Bank of Patiala & Ors.

respondent-Bank on 4.5.1970 and was confirmed as such. During the C.W.P.No.3013 of 2004 -2- .... course of his service, a criminal case was registered against him under the provisions of Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code on 15.7.1986. He was tried accordingly and was convicted & sentenced, but the appeal preferred by him, resulted in his acquittal. Paragraph 14 of the judgment dated 22.3.2002 (Annexure P14) passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Barnala, which is relevant, is reproduced below:- “14. So coming to the conclusion,it is certainly stand established from the evidence that the accused-appellant Lakhbir Singh had no role to play in the alleged offence as he neither conspired with the accused-appellant Chamkaur Singh nor had any role to play in causing disappearance of the evidence and his conviction is only based on the presumptions. Notwithstanding alleged relation of accused-appellant Lakhbir Singh with accused-appellant Chamkaur Singh, it cannot be said that accused-appellant Lakhbir Singh had conspired with accused-appellant Chamkaur Singh, in view of the decision 1999(1) RCR (Crl.) 717 (Supra) and 1990(3) RCR 665 (Supra). In view of AIR 1979 SC 1324 (Supra), the involvement of accused-appellant no role to play in the offence instead PW1 Sarup Chand who actually participated in the offence was given up by the police for the reasons best known to the police, who only had introduced accused-appellant Chamkaur Singh as Satpal Singh with the complainant bank against whom the C.W.P.No.3013 of 2004 -3- .... prosecution had been able to prove the guilt beyond any shadow of doubt. Thus, for the reasons stated above, the appeal of accused-appellant Lakhbir Singh is allowed and judgment of conviction and order of sentence are set aside and he is hereby acquitted of the offence charged with, whereas no merits are found for the interference in the appeal preferred by accused-appellant Chamkaur Singh be taken into custody to serve out the sentence imposed by the trial Court.” The State of Punjab filed a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment, Annexure P14, but the same was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 1.10.2002 (Annexure P15). Thereafter, the petitioner made several representations urging the respondents to take him back in service. A legal notice was also issued by him, but no action was taken by the respondents. A civil suit was also filed by the respondent-Bank against the petitioner and Chamkaur Singh alias Satpal Singh for recovery of the loss which was allegedly caused by them, but the same was dismissed qua the petitioner as is evident from Annexure P2. Aggrieved by the inaction of the respondents, the petitioner filed the instant petition with a prayer that the impugned order be set aside and that he be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. In their written statement, the respondents have not disputed the facts as narrated above, but have merely averred that according to Section 10 of the Banking Regulation Act,1949, a person who has been convicted C.W.P.No.3013 of 2004 -4- .... by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude can not continue in the employment of the bank. A plea has also been taken that according to the Bipartite Settlement and relevant instructions, a disciplinary action can always be initiated against a bank employee, who is involved in a misconduct even though he has been acquitted by the Court dealing with criminal matters. It has been admitted that a suit for recovery was filed, but the same was dismissed against the petitioner. However, it was averred that it does not make any difference to his case. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material on record. There is no doubt that the disciplinary proceedings could have been initiated against the petitioner despite his acquittal by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a criminal case. However, as the reply of the respondents suggests, the disciplinary proceedings were only contemplated but were never carried out. It is the categoric case of the petitioner that till date no disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against him. In this view of the matter, the dismissal of the petitioner from service without following the procedure of law, i.e., issuance of notice and holding of enquiry, can, at best, be termed to be patently illegal. There is absolutely no justification for dismissal of the petitioner without having recourse to the process of law. Not even a feeble attempt has been made by the respondents to justify such a dismissal except to say that since the petitioner had been convicted by the Court in trial, that itself was a ground to warrant his dismissal from service. The stand of the respondents is neither justified nor justiciable and is C.W.P.No.3013 of 2004 -5- .... unsustainable in the eyes of law and equity. It is a clear case where the petitioner has been hounded by the respondents and treated unfairly. No apparent justification has been made out for dismissal of the petitioner. In Union of India Versus Madhusudan Parsad, 2003 STPL (LE) 32745 SC, the Apex Court observed that where the employer was at fault by terminating services of its employee without holding any enquiry, the grant of back wages will be justified. The Supreme Court in Jasbir Singh Versus Punjab & Sind Bank & Ors., 2007(1) S.C.T. 57 (S.C.) held that where the bank failed to prove any charge against the employee in the civil as well as criminal court, he is entitled to be reinstated with back wages,continuity of service and other consequential benefits. Having regard to the aforesaid, the instant petition is accepted and the impugned order is set aside. As a consequence, the petitioner would be deemed to be in service of the respondents till the date he would have superannuated in July,2009 as has been stated by the counsel for the petitioner and shall be entitled to all the benefits accrued to him on account of pay and allowances. The respondents are further directed to grant all the benefits to the petitioner till the date of his superannuation within a period of four months from today. July 19,2010 “SCM” ( Mahesh Grover ) Judge