Civil Writ Petition No. 9940 of 1999 Date of decision: 27th July & Anr. v. The Financial Commissioner (Revenue) Punjab & Ors.

examined, it will be necessary to give brief resume of facts of the case. The petitioner was enrolled by the respondent-Board as an Apprentice Engineer on 27th January, 1976. After completing the period of apprenticeship, the petitioner was posted as Assistant Engineer on 27th Civil Writ Petition No.9940 of 1999 2 July, 1976. In the year 1981, the petitioner was posted as Sub Divisional Officer in TLC Sub Division No.2, Hoshiarpur. A chargesheet (Annexure P- 1) was served upon the petitioner, in which in the statement of charges, six incidents were taken into consideration and it was proposed that the petitioner be charged for the same. The petitioner filed reply to the chargesheet and a regular departmental enquiry was conducted against him. The Enquiry Officer, in his report, had held that charge No.1 partly and charge No.4 were proved against the petitioner. Whereas, the petitioner was absolved of the charges No.2, 3, 5 and 6. The punishing authority, on the basis of report of the Enquiry Officer, passed an order dated 9th January, 1986 (Annexure P-2) dismissing the petitioner from service of the respondent-Board. It will be pertinent to note the relevant portion of the order of dismissal (Annexure P-2), wherefrom it is clear that charge No.1 was partly proved and the petitioner was held guilty of charge No.4. The same reads as under: “4. AND WHEREAS, the Inquiry Officer submitted his enquiry report wherein the charge No.1 against Er.Mohinder Singh has proved to the extent (a) that the respondent (Er.Mohinder Singh) demanded Rs.800/- by way of illegal gratification but this amount was not actually paid by Sukhdev Singh (b) that the demand of this amount was made in the presence of Sh.Bhagwant Singh school teacher on 9.2.77 (c) that he retained the test report beyond the stipulated period for the purpose of extracting illegal gratification, from the consumer. The charge No.4 also proved against the officer.” Aggrieved against the same, the petitioner filed an appeal. The appellate authority came to a conclusion that opportunity of personal hearing ought to be afforded to the petitioner by Chairman of the respondent-Board. Para No. 7 of the order passed by the appellate authority reads as under: Civil Writ Petition No.9940 of 1999 3 “7. AND WHEREAS, the appeal/supplementary appeal preferred by him was considered by the appellate authority i.e. WTMs in their meeting held on 16.4.86 and it was decided that:- ‘The appeal of Er. Mohinder Singh, AEE was considered and it was decided that personal hearing to the officer may be given by the Chairman and the case be reviewed’.” Finally, vide Annexure P-3, the appellate authority converted the punishment of dismissal from service into stoppage of one annual increment with cumulative effect and the petitioner was reinstated into service. The relevant portion of the impugned order dated 8th May, 1986 reads as under: “11. NOW THEREFORE, the Punjab State Electricity Board is pleased to reinstate Er.Mohinder Singh, AEE, and to convert the punishment of dismissal from service into stoppage of one annual increment with cumulative effect. The intervening period i.e. the date on which he relinquished charge and the date on which he will take over will be treated as leave of the kind due.” The above said order, whereby the order of dismissal of service of the petitioner was set aside and one annual increment with cumulative effect was stopped, was challenged by the petitioner by filing a civil suit. The Civil Judge (Junior Division), Batala vide his judgment dated 31st January, 1996 (Annexure P-4), came to the following conclusion: “The learned counsel for the plaintiff further argued that no show cause notice was issued to him prior to the imposing the punishment of dismissal. He further requested that neither the show cause notice nor any personal hearing was given to the plaintiff while imposing major penalty. He submitted that it has clearly violated the principles of natural justice. While going through the enquiry proceedings, one comes to a Civil Writ Petition No.9940 of 1999 4 consideration conclusion that no show cause notice was served on the delinquent official nor he was given a personal hearing to explain his position. In a situation where the employee has not been given even the enquiry report, it was atleast desirable at the part of the department that he should have given the opportunity to explain his position. Nothing of this sort has happened and it tantamounts to clear violation of the principles of natural justice.

11. As an upshort of my brief discussion above, I decide both these issues in favour of the plaintiff.” Therefore, the civil suit was accepted and the impugned orders dated 9th January, 1986 (Annexure P-2) and dated 8th May, 1986 (Annexure P-3) were set aside. As the Civil Court had set aside the orders, respondent-Board proceeded to issue fresh chargesheet on all the six charges, including those of which the petitioner was earlier exonerated. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Parkash Nath Saidha’s case (supra), in which it was held that in case a fresh enquiry is ordered on the ground that the principles of natural justice were not adhered-to, then the subsequent enquiry will only be confined to those charges of which the delinquent official was held guilty and to the sufferance of such an employee, fresh enquiry will not include those charges of which he was earlier absolved. The following portion of the judgment rendered in Parkash Nath Saidha’s case (supra) will make it explicitly clear: “5. Mr. J.N. Kaushal, learned counsel for the appellant, vehemently contends that the Commissioner was not competent to order a de novo enquiry into those charges of which the appellant had been exonerated by him as a result of the previous enquiry. Such a course – maintains the learned counsel – offends against the cardinal principle of natural justice that a person once exonerated of certain charges after a trial be not vexed again with regard to the same charges. Civil Writ Petition No.9940 of 1999 5 This principle against double-jeopardy it is contended is applicable even to departmental enquiries. It is added that the previous order exonerating the appellant of four charges was a quasi-judicial order that could not be recalled by the Commissioner. Counsel has also pointed out that the observations of Mahajan, J. in his judgment dated October 11, 1963, could not be construed as suggesting or directing a de novo departmental enquiry even with regard to those charges of which the Commissioner had previously exonerated the appellant.

6. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel has referred to S.V.G. Iyengar v. State of Mysore AIR 1961 Mysore 37, The State of Haryana and others v. Roshan Lal Sharma, 1970 SLR 739 and some observations of the Supreme Court in Makeshwar Nath Srivastava v. The State of Bihar and others, AIR 1971 SC 1106. It appears to us that the contentions of Mr.Kaushal must prevail. … … …” XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX

8. The Letters Patent Bench (consisting of S.B. Capoor and R.S. Narula, JJ.) in Roshan Lal Sharma’s case (ibid) held. ‘Dropping of certain charges against the public servants meaning the exoneration therefrom is a quasi-judicial order and not liable to be varied at the will of the authority unless the relevant statute or the rules give the authority the power to review.’ In that case, the appellant was exonerated by the Financial Commissioner of certain charges at the preliminary stage even before the start of the full-fledged enquiry. In the instant case, however, the appellant was exonerated of certain charges after a full-fledged departmental enquiry by a competent authority viz. the Commissioner. No statutory provisions or rules have been brought to our notice, which give the commissioner the power to review his quasi-judicial order of December 7, 1950, by which he had exonerated the appellant of all but three charges. The only effect of the Civil Writ Petition No.9940 of 1999 6 judgment dated October 11, 1963, of this Court was to quash that enquiry in so far as it related to charges 3, 6 and 15.” Counsel for the respondent-Board has not been able to cite any contrary judgment. Accordingly, in view of the ratio of law laid in Parkash Nath Saidha’s case (supra), charge No.2, 3, 5 and 6 are hereby quashed, as no substance was found by the punishing authority. Charge No.4 shall also not be pressed against the petitioner, as the appellate authority has absolved the petitioner qua that charge. Part of Charge No.1 only remains against the petitioner and the same shall be limited to the extent for which the petitioner was earlier made liable. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has retired in the year 2009 and the charges pertain to the year 1976, therefore, in view of the delay the remaining charges ought to be quashed. There is no ground before this Court to say that due to delay, any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. Rather, the delay has occurred due to the litigation initiated at the instance of the petitioner. However, considering the fact that the petitioner has already retired, the authorities are directed to decide the matter finally within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. With the observations made above, present writ petition is disposed of. July 27, 2010 [KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA] JUDGE