Mukesh Gupta & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Anr.

Present: Mr. Harish Sharma, Advocate, for the petitioners. Mr. Amandeep Singh Rai, AAG, Punjab. Mr. G.S. Sandhu, Advocate, for respondent No.2. SABINA, J. Petitioners have filed this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the FIR No.137 dated

10.9.2008, under Sections 406,420 of Indian Penal Code (in short 'IPC'), Police Station Sarabha Nagar, District- Ludhiana and consequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the parties have arrived at a compromise with the intervention of the relatives and friends. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that as per the compromise Rs.10 lacs have been paid to the respondent No.2 towards past, present and future maintenance and alimony. Respondent No.2 had made a statement before the Additional Crl. Misc. No. M- 24175 of 2008 2 District Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Ludhiana in a petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 that she will have no objection if the FIRs lodged by her are quashed in view of the settlement between the parties. A decree of divorce on the basis of mutual consent has been passed by the Additional District Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Ludhiana on 12.11.2009. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has not disputed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The statement made by the respondent No.2 before the Additional District Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Ludhiana (Annexure P-6) reads as under :- “I was married to petitioner no.1 Avdesh Bansal on

6.12.2005 accordingly Hindu religion rites and ceremonies. We lived and cohabited together as husband & wife at Ludhiana and male child namely Zyan was born of their wedlock on 23.3.07, who is living in my custody. Due to indifferent attitude and incompatibility of temperaments we have decided to live separately as we could not adjust ourselves with each other. All the efforts of my relatives and friends for reconciliation have turned futile and we have now decided to dissolve our marriage by decree of divorce by mutual consent. It has been decided between us that minor child Zyan shall remain in my custody in case of my remarriage he will remaining in the custody of my father Crl. Misc. No. M- 24175 of 2008 3 Naresh Aggarwal who shall be responsible for his education etc. through out his life. I have received Rs.10 lacs vide demand draft 3.10.09 bearing no.054605 drawn on Axis Bank Ludhiana for sum of Rs.10 lacs in lieu my past present and future maintenance and alimony.

In case my father requires guardianship certificate from any court of law my husband Sh. Avdesh Bansal have agreed not to contest for the same and he has further agreed to given his consent for the same. I have also received all my dowry articles Istridhan etc. I have also received my belongings from the court of Sh. Tarsem Mangla JMIC on suporday the same is my exclusive property my husband shall not claim same in future. I have also lodged two FIRs no.115 dated 26.6.07 u/s 406/498 IPC etc. and FIR no.137 dated 10.9.08 u/s 406/420 IPC both with PS Sarabhanagar and I have under taken to make a statement for getting the same quashed from any court of law including the Hon'ble High Court. A decree by mutual consent be decided in my favour.” As per the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Kulwinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab, 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1052, High Court has power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to allow the compounding of non-compoundable offence and quash the prosecution where the High Court felt that the same was required to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or to otherwise secure the ends of Crl.

Misc. No. M- 24175 of 2008 4 justice. This power of quashing is not confined to matrimonial disputes alone. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another JT 2008 (9) SC 192 in para Nos.26 and 24 has held as under :- “26. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facts. The question which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?