Cwp No. 5080 of 2024 · Punjab And Haryana High Court · 2026

Judgment

#1. The present petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned order dated 27.02.2024 (Annexure P-15) passed by respondent No.2, whereby the candidature of the petitioner for the post of Post Graduate Teacher (PGT) Hindi has been rejected. CONTENTIONS

#2. Learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia contends that the respondent No.2-Haryana Public Service Commission issued Advertisement No.31/2022 dated 19.11.2022 (Annexure P-1) inviting online applications for recruitment to 70 posts of Post Graduate Teachers (PGT) in the subject of Hindi for the Mewat Cadre in the Secondary Education Department, Haryana. It is submitted that Clause 10 of the advertisement prescribed the age eligibility as not less than 18 years and not more than 42 years as on the closing date fixed for submission of online applications, i.e. 12.12.2022. The petitioner, whose date of birth is 27.12.1980, was fully eligible on the said date and possessed the requisite educational qualifications, namely, Graduation, M.A. (Hindi), B.Ed., NET and Ph.D., besides having a consistent good academic record, as evident from Annexures P-2 to P-8.

#3. It is further submitted that the petitioner submitted her online application on 01.12.2022 and was allotted Roll No.5030 (Annexure P-9). On the date of submission of the application as well as on the original closing date, i.e. 12.12.2022, the petitioner was admittedly below 42 years of CWP-5080-2024 3 age and was fully eligible in terms of the conditions contained in Advertisement No.31/2022. Respondent No.2 subsequently issued a corrigendum dated 23.11.2022 (Annexure P-10), whereby only the essential qualifications for the posts of PGT Political Science and PGT Physics were amended pursuant to the amendments carried out in the Service Rules. The corrigendum specifically provided that all other conditions of advertisement would remain unchanged.

#4. Respondent No.2 thereafter issued announcements dated

25.11.2022 (Annexure P-11) and 27.12.2022 (Annexure P-12), extending

the last date for submission of online applications firstly up to 25.12.2022 and thereafter up to 01.01.2023. However, neither the corrigendum nor either of the announcements introduced any amendment or modification in the age eligibility criteria prescribed under Advertisement No.31/2022. Learned counsel submits that the extensions were confined only to the last date for submission of applications and did not alter the eligibility conditions governing the recruitment.

#5. It is argued that the petitioner was treated as eligible throughout the selection process and was permitted to participate in the Screening Test held on 09.09.2023, wherein she secured 76.50 marks out of 100 and stood second in the State of Haryana. The result thereof was declared on

03.10.2023. Thereafter, the petitioner was also permitted to appear in the Subject Knowledge Test conducted on 30.10.2023, the result whereof was declared on 16.02.2024. However, despite having qualified the said CWP-5080-2024 4 examination, her marks were not disclosed and her name was omitted from the list of candidates shortlisted for interview scheduled on 05.03.2024.

#6. Thereafter, vide e-mail dated 23.02.2024 (Annexure P-13), respondent No.2 informed the petitioner that her candidature was provisionally liable to be rejected on the ground that she was overage by five days as on 01.01.2023. The petitioner immediately submitted a detailed reply/representation dated 26.02.2024 (Annexure P-14), pointing out that she was fully eligible on the original cut-off date stipulated in Advertisement No.31/2022. However, the said representation was rejected vide order/announcement dated 27.02.2024 (Annexure P-15), holding that since the petitioner’s date of birth is 27.12.1980, she had crossed the maximum age limit by five days as on 01.01.2023.

#7. Learned counsel vehemently contends that the action of respondent No.2 is wholly arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the terms of Advertisement No.31/2022. It is argued that when the advertisement was issued on 19.11.2022, the petitioner satisfied all the eligibility conditions, including the age criterion prescribed under Clause 10 thereof. Merely because the last date for submission of applications was subsequently extended, without any corresponding amendment the eligibility conditions, respondent No.2 could not alter the cut-off date for determining age eligibility to the prejudice of the petitioner. It is contended that neither the corrigendum dated 23.11.2022 nor the subsequent announcements extending the last date of submission of applications amended the age CWP-5080-2024 5 eligibility clause, and, therefore, the impugned rejection of the petitioner's candidature is unsustainable in law.

#8. Moreover, it is brought to the attention of this Court that vide order dated 04.03.2024, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had permitted the petitioner to provisionally appear for interview and directed the respondents to keep one post of PGT Hindi (Mewat Cadre) under general as well as EWS category vacant during the pendency of the petition. The result was subsequently produced in Court and the petitioner had secured more marks than the last selected candidate in the general category. Accordingly, it is argued that the petitioner is entitled to be considered and selected for the post of PGT Teacher.

#9. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2-Commission submits that in terms of Clause 10 of Advertisement No.31/2022 (Annexure P-1), the age of a candidate was required to be reckoned with reference to the closing date prescribed for submission of online applications. Since the last date ultimately stood extended up to 01.01.2023 vide announcement dated 27.12.2022 (Annexure P-12), the petitioner's eligibility was rightly assessed with reference to the said date, on which she had admittedly crossed the upper age limit by five days.

#10. Learned counsel further refers to the announcement dated

24.05.2023 (Annexure R-2/1), whereby Advertisement Nos.31/2022 and 32/2022 were withdrawn with a stipulation that fresh advertisements would issued. Thereafter, Advertisement No.41/2023 dated 24.06.2023 CWP-5080-2024 6 (Annexure R-2/2) came to be issued, pursuant to which the petitioner submitted a fresh application (Annexure R-2/3) and participated in the selection process. It is submitted that Note (i) appended to Advertisement No.41/2023 specifically stipulated that, in respect of candidates who had earlier applied pursuant to Advertisement No.31/2022, the cut-off date for determination of age would be 01.01.2023. It is further provided therein that the earlier application details would be verified on the basis of the application number furnished by the candidate. Reliance is also placed upon Note (ii) of Advertisement No.41/2023 to contend the said advertisement was not to be treated as a continuation of Advertisement No.31/2022.

#11. Learned counsel also refers to Clause 1 of Advertisement No.41/2023 to contend that every candidate was under an obligation to satisfy himself/herself regarding fulfillment of all eligibility conditions before submitting the application and that mere participation in the recruitment process did not confer any right of selection. Since the petitioner was admittedly overage by five days as on 01.01.2023, her candidature was rightly rejected.

#12. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.3 submits that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief as she has neither challenged Advertisement No.41/2023 nor the validity of the conditions incorporated therein, particularly the stipulation prescribing 01.01.2023 as the cut-off date for determination of age. CWP-5080-2024 7

#13. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that Advertisement No. 41/2023 is a mere continuation of the earlier Advertisement No. 31/2022 (dated 19.11.2022), as the vacancies advertised in the latter were subsumed into the former. Consequently, it is argued that upon the resumption of a disrupted recruitment process, the selection must proceed from the stage of interruption under the original terms and conditions, once the cause of disruption is cured. It is further submitted that the petitioner met all eligibility criteria under the initial advertisement and successfully submitted her application on 01.12.2022, well before the closing date of 12.12.2022. Having accepted her application under Advertisement No. 41/2023, Respondent No. 2 cannot now alter the eligibility criteria midstream, as it is a settled principle of law that the ‘rules of the game’ cannot be changed after the selection process has commenced. It is contended that Respondent No. 2 is misinterpreting the age eligibility clause in Advertisement No. 41/2023, and therefore, the petitioner’s eligibility must relate back to the date specified in Advertisement No. 31/2022.

#14. Moreover, learned counsel argues that Respondent No. 2, having duly accepted the petitioner’s application under Advertisement No. 41/2023 and permitted her to participate in both the screening and subject knowledge tests, is now estopped from altering its stance. It is submitted that the respondent’s initial interpretation of the eligibility conditions was correct, and the subsequent restrictive interpretation is merely an CWP-5080-2024 8 afterthought designed to defeat the petitioner’s accrued rights. The petitioner is a meritorious candidate who, pursuant to the interim directions of this Court, participated in the interview process and secured marks higher than the last selected candidate. In view of these facts and circumstances, it is argued that a right having vested in favor of the petitioner, cannot be arbitrarily denied or extinguished by the respondents. OBSERVATION & ANALYSIS

#15. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record with their able assistance, it transpires that respondent No.2- Commission had issued Advertisement No.31/2022 dated 19.11.2022 (Annexure P-1) inviting online applications for recruitment to 70 posts of Post Graduate Teachers (PGT) in the subject of Hindi for the Mewat Cadre in the Secondary Education Department, Haryana. Clause 10 of the said advertisement lays down the age limit and explicitly states that candidates should not be less than 18 years and not more than 42 years as on the closing date fixed for submission of online application forms to the commission i.e.

12.12.2022. The petitioner submitted her online application on 01.12.2022 and on the date of submission of the application as well as on the original closing date, i.e. 12.12.2022, the petitioner was below 42 years of age and was fully eligible. Clause 10 of Advertisement No.31/2022 is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: “10. AGE LIMITS: Candidate should not be less than 18 years and not more than 42 years, as the closing date fixed for submission of CWP-5080-2024 9 online application forms to the commission i.e. 12.12.2022.”

#16. Subsequently, vide corrigendum dated 23.11.2022 (Annexure P-10), Respondent No.2 amended the essential qualifications for the posts of PGT Political Science and PGT Physics pursuant to the amendments carried out in the Service Rules. Pertinently, the corrigendum specifically provided that all other conditions of the advertisement would remain unchanged. However, vide announcements dated 25.11.2022 (Annexure P-11) and

27.12.2022 (Annexure P-12), the last date for submission of online applications was extended firstly up to 25.12.2022 and thereafter up to

01.01.2023. Relevant portion of the aforesaid announcements dated

25.11.2022 and 27.12.2022 is reproduced hereunder: “Announcement It is hereby announced for the general information of the candidates who are aspirant for the 3863 and 613 Posts of Post Graduate Teachers (PGTs) in various subjects, for Haryana Cadre & Mewat Cadre respectively, which was advertised vide Advertisement No. 31/2022 and 32/2022 published on

20.11.2022 followed by Corrigendum dated 23.11.2022, that the Commission has decided to extend the last date fixed for submission of on-line application form upto 25.12.2022 and the link For submission of online application will now open from 27.11.2022. Dated: 25.11.2022” (Emphasis added) “ANNOUNCEMENT CWP-5080-2024 10 It is hereby announced for the information of the candidates who are aspirants for the post of Post-Graduate Teachers (PT's) in various subjects, for Haryana & Mewat Cadre, which were advertised vide Advt. No. 31/2022 & 32/2022 published on 20.11.20222 followed by corrigendum dated 23.11.2022, that the Commission has decided to extend the last date for submission of on-line application form upto 01.01.2023. Dated: 27.12.2022” (Emphasis added)

#17. This Court finds merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the aforementioned announcements merely extended the last date for submission of online applications and did not alter the eligibility conditions governing the recruitment. It is worth noting that neither the corrigendum nor either of the announcements introduced any amendment or modification in the age eligibility criteria prescribed under Clause 10 of Advertisement No.31/2022. Thus, the cut-off date for determining age eligibility remained to be 12.12.2022, while the last date for submission of online applications stood extended to 01.01.2023.

#18. Thereafter, vide announcement dated 24.05.2023 (Annexure R- 2/1), Advertisement No.31/2022 was withdrawn and Advertisement No.41/2023 dated 24.06.2023 (Annexure R-2/2) came to be issued, pursuant to which the petitioner submitted a fresh application (Annexure R-2/3) and participated in the selection process. At this juncture, reference must be made to Note (i) and (ii) appended to Advertisement No.41/2023, which state as follows: CWP-5080-2024 11 “NOTE: (i) Candidates who had applied earlier in response to Advertisement No. 31/2022 dated 19.11.2022 issued by Haryana Public Service Commission (HPSC), would have to submit fresh application. Their eligibility conditions with regard to Age, Fee deposition and having qualified HTET would be considered as per the cut-off date of the advertisement against which the candidates had applied earlier. In respect of other eligibility conditions, the determination of eligibility shall be with respect to the closing date for submission of online application form of this advertisement i.e. 18.07.2023. The cut-off date for Advertisement No. 31/2022 issued by HPSC was

01.01.2023. The candidates would be asked to provide their earlier Application No. and on entering the same, the application would be verified on the basis of the data already available with the Commission in response to earlier Advertisement. (ii) This advertisement should not be considered as a continuation of the earlier advertisement mentioned above.” (Emphasis added)

#19. A perusal of the aforesaid reveals that candidates, such as the petitioner, who had earlier applied pursuant to Advertisement No. 31/2022 were required to submit fresh applications. However, their eligibility with respect to age, payment of application fee, and qualification of HTET was expressly required to be determined with reference to the cut-off date applicable to Advertisement No. 31/2022, under which they had originally applied. This Court is of the considered view that respondent No.2- Commission has erroneously interpreted the cut-off date for determining eligibility under Advertisement No. 31/2022 as 01.01.2023. As noticed CWP-5080-2024 12 hereinabove, the announcements dated 25.11.2022 (Annexure P-11) and

27.12.2022 (Annexure P-12) merely extended the last date for submission of online applications. They neither amended nor modified Clause 10 of Advertisement No. 31/2022, which prescribed the cut-off date for determining eligibility. Consequently, the relevant cut-off date for determining the petitioner’s eligibility with respect to age remained

12.12.2022, on which date the petitioner admittedly fulfilled the prescribed eligibility criteria.

#20. Reliance in this regard can be placed on the judgement rendered by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in LPA 127 of 2025, titled as ‘Aditya Kumar and ors v. Union of India and anr’, wherein the Court has held as follows: “6. Admittedly, there was no stipulation, in Chapter 3 or Chapter 4 or anywhere else in the Information Bulletins or any other documents relevant to the ESSE 2023, stating that the cut-off date for determining eligibility, or by which date the aspiring candidates were required to be in possession of the requisite educational qualifications, would always coincide with the last date for submitting applications. It is this unjustified presumption that has stood in the way of the appellants succeeding in the writ petition instituted by them, and is also the reason why the present appeal must necessarily fail.

#7. Reverting to the facts, the last date for submitting applications, as stipulated in Chapter 4 of the Information Bulletin, originally fixed as 18 August 2023 for the posts of TGT and Hostel Wardens and 31 July 2023 for PGTs all other posts, was extended in both cases. For aspirants to the posts of PGT, the last date for submitting application CWP-5080-2024 13 forms was extended first till 18 August 2023 and thereafter till 19 October 2023, and for aspirants to the post of TGT, the last date for submitting application forms was similarly extended to 19 October

#8. Just as there was no stipulation, in the Information Bulletin, to the effect that the cut-off date for determining eligibility would always coincide with the last date for submitting the application forms, equally, while extending the last date for submitting application forms, the NESTS did not extend the cut-off date for determining eligibility.

#9. In other words, the cut-off date for determining eligibility, by which date the candidates were required to be in possession of the requisite educational qualifications, remained 31 July 2023 for the post of PGT and 18 August 2023 for the posts of TGT and Hostel Wardens.

#36. Thus, where the advertisement stipulates a cut-off date, that date is, to all intents and purposes, sacred. It can be called into question only if it is in conflict with existing recruitment rules or any other statutory prescription or proscription.

#37. The appellants have not sought to build up any such case. Their only case is that, with the extension of the last date for submitting applications to 19 October 2023, they believed that the cut-off date for acquiring eligibility/educational qualifications also stood extended till 19 October 2023.

#38. The belief may have been bona fide, but it was mistaken. It does not flow from either expressly or by necessary implication, from the CWP-5080-2024 14 provisions of the Information Bulletin.” (Emphasis added)

#21. Although Note (ii) of Advertisement No. 41/2023 expressly stipulates that the said advertisement is not a continuation of Advertisement No. 31/2022, Note (i) creates a legal fiction by extending continuity to candidates who had applied pursuant to Advertisement No. 31/2022 for the limited purpose of determining their eligibility with respect to age, fee deposition and having qualified HTET. By specifically protecting the age eligibility of such candidates on the basis of their earlier applications, respondent No. 2-Commission itself recognized them as constituting a distinct class entitled to differential treatment.

#22. The underlying object of carving out this distinct class was to ensure that candidates who were eligible when the recruitment process was initially commenced in 2022 were not deprived of consideration merely because of the subsequent withdrawal of the advertisement or the administrative delay attributable to the respondents. Consequently, the eligibility of such candidates must necessarily be tested with reference to the original cut-off date applicable under Advertisement No. 31/2022, namely

12.12.2022, and not the administratively extended date of 01.01.2023, which was relevant only for extending the period for submission of applications and did not alter the prescribed eligibility criteria.

#23. Another factor that weighs on the mind of this Court is that the petitioner participated in the Screening Test held on 09.09.2023 and secured CWP-5080-2024 15

76.50 marks out of 100, thereby securing the second position in the State of Haryana. Further, pursuant to the interim directions issued by this Court, the petitioner was permitted to provisionally appear in the interview. A perusal of the final result reveals that she secured marks higher than the last selected candidate in the General category. Significantly, the respondent No. 2- Commission rejected the petitioner’s candidature solely on the ground that she was overage by a mere five days as on 01.01.2023. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, such a hyper-technical approach cannot be sustained, particularly when the petitioner was otherwise fully eligible on the original cut-off date and has demonstrated merit exceeding that of the last selected candidate.

#24. It is settled law that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is discretionary and equitable in nature, and is required to be exercised to advance the cause of justice. While granting relief, this Court is duty-bound to balance the competing rights and equities of the parties. Depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, this Court is empowered to mould the relief and pass appropriate orders which justice may demand and equities may project. Reliance in this regard can be placed on the judgement rendered by a two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement, 2008(14) SCC 58 wherein, speaking through Justice C.K. Thakker, the following was held: “80. Now, it is well settled that jurisdiction of High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 is discretionary and equitable. Before more CWP-5080-2024 16 than half a century, the High Court of Allahabad in the leading case of Jodhey v. State, AIR 1952 Allahabad 788 observed; "There are no limits, fetters or restrictions placed on this power of superintendence in this clause and the purpose of this Article seems to be to make the High Court the custodian of all justice within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction and to arm it with a weapon that could be wielded for the purpose of seeing that justice is meted out fairly and properly by the bodies mentioned therein. "

#81. The power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution conferred on every High Court over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction is very wide and discretionary in nature. It can be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to meet the ends of justice. It is equitable in nature. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction, a High Court not only acts as a court of law but also as a court of equity. It is, therefore, power and also the duty of the Court to ensure that power of superintendence must 'advance the ends of justice and uproot injustice'.

#82. In Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal, (2002) 1 SCC 100, dealing with an order passed by the High Court setting aside an order of Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, this Court stated; "Time and again this Court has reminded that the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution is to advance justice and not to thwart it. The very purpose of such constitutional powers being conferred on the High Courts is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The look out of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through CWP-5080-2024 17 an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice became the byproduct of an erroneous view of law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law".

#86. In Mohammad Swalleh v. Third Additional District Judge, Meerut, (1988) 1 SCC 40, an erroneous order was passed by the Prescribed Authority refusing to grant eviction of the tenant under the relevant law. It was set aside by the District Court in appeal though no such appeal was maintainable. When the matter reached this Court, the Court refused to interfere with the order since justice had been done "though technically the appellant had a point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper".

#87. The learned counsel for the Company placed heavy reliance on Shangrilla Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1996) 5 SCC 54. In a suit by A, an order was passed by the Estate Officer against B holding that it was in unauthorized occupation and was liable to be evicted under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. He also ordered B to pay damages of Rs. 12 lakhs. An appeal was filed by B against the order and the Appellate Authority confirmed the order of eviction. The High Court, however, felt that an opportunity ought to have been afforded to B to prove that it was a lawful sub - tenant. The matter, therefore, required remand. At that stage, A prayed that in that case, the matter be remanded as a whole to be decided afresh considering the question of payment of rent/damages also. The High Court upheld the plea, negativing the contention of B that A had never challenged the order setting aside the direction as to payment of damages. B approached this Court. CWP-5080-2024 18

#88. Dismissing the appeal, confirming the order of the High Court and adverting to substantial justice, this Court stated; "It is well - settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief. What precisely has been done by the learned Single Judge, is clear from the above emphasised words which be re - read with advantage. The question of claim to damages and their ascertainment would only arise in the event of the Life Insurance Corporation, respondent, succeeding to prove that the appellant Company was an unlawful sub tenant and therefore in unauthorized occupation of public premises. If the finding were to go in favour of the appellant Company and it is proved to be a lawful sub - tenant and hence not an unauthorized occupant, the direction to adjudge the claim for damages would be rendered sterile and otiose. It is only in the event of the appellant Company being held to be an unlawful sub - tenant and hence an unauthorized occupant that the claim for damages would be determinable. We see therefore no fault in the High Court adopting such course in order to balance the equities between the contestants especially when it otherwise had power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution in CWP-5080-2024 19 addition. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that when the occupation of the premises in question was a factor in continuation the liability to pay for the use and occupation thereof, be it in the form of rent or damages, was also a continuing factor. The cause of justice, as viewed by the High Court, did clearly warrant that both these questions be viewed inter - dependently. For those who seek equity must bow to equity".

#89. From the above cases, it clearly transpires that powers under Articles 226 and 227 are discretionary and equitable and are required to be exercised in the larger interest of justice. While granting relief in favour of the applicant, the Court must take into account balancing interests and equities. It can mould relief considering the facts of the case. It can pass an appropriate order which justice may demand and equities may project. As observed by this Court in Shiv Shankar Dal Mills v. State of Haryana, (1980) 1 SCR 1170, Courts of equity should go much further both to give and refuse relief in furtherance of public interest. Granting or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon considerations of justice, equity and good conscience.” (Emphasis added) CONCLUSION

#25. In view of the foregoing discussion and the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, the present petition is allowed in the following terms: a. The impugned order dated 27.02.2024 (Annexure P-15) passed by respondent No.2-Commission, whereby the candidature of the CWP-5080-2024 20 petitioner for the post of Post Graduate Teacher (PGT) has been rejected, hereby stands quashed and set aside. b. Since the petitioner fully satisfies the eligibility criteria for the post of PGT Hindi (Mewat Cadre) in terms of the cut-off date of

12.12.2022 and has secured marks higher than the last selected candidate in the General category, the respondents are directed to forthwith appoint the petitioner to the said post. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential notional benefits but shall not be entitled to any arrears of salary for the period during which she did not actually discharge duties. c. The respondents shall complete the aforesaid exercise within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.

#26. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

14.07.2026 P.C. (HARPREET SINGH BRAR) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned. : Yes/No Yes/No Whether Reportable :