Criminal Misc. No. M-14168 of 2010 (O&M) v. State of Haryana & Anr.

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAWAB SINGH Present: None for the petitioners. Mr. Satyavir Yadav, DAG, Haryana. NAWAB SINGH J. This petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of First Information Report No.409 dated December 6th, 2008 under Sections 147, 148, 307 and 323 read with Section 149 of Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 registered in Police Station Hodal, District Faridabad on the basis of compromise.

The legislature had in its wisdom identified the various offences in which it thought that a resolution of the dispute would be in the interest of the society. The provisions of Section 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure deals with "compounding of offences". It provides two tables, one containing description of offences which can be compounded by the person mentioned in it and the other containing description of offences which can be compounded with the permission of the Court by the persons indicated therein. Only such offences as are included in the said two Tables can be compounded and none else. Sub-Section (9) of Section 320 of the Code imposes a ban in the following terms: "(9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section. "

While commenting upon Section 320 of the Code, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manoj Sharma vs. State & others 2008 (4) RCR(Criminal) 827 has observed vide paragraph No.27 as Criminal Misc. No. M-14168 of 2010 (2) under:-

Since Section 320 Cr.P.C. has clearly stated which offences are compoundable and which are not, the High Court or even this Court would not ordinarily be justified in doing something indirectly which could not be done directly. Even otherwise, it ordinarily would not be a legitimate exercise of judicial power under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to direct doing something which the Cr.P.C. has expressly prohibited. Section 320(9) Cr.P.C. expressly states that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by that Section. Hence, in my opinion, it would ordinarily not be a legitimate exercise of judicial power to direct compounding of a non- compoundable offence.

It was further observed in paragraph No.33:-

There can be no doubt that a case under Section 302 IPC or other serious offences like those under Sections 395, 307 or 304B cannot be compounded and hence proceedings in those provisions cannot be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or in writ jurisdiction on the basis of compromise. However, in some other cases, (like those akin to a civil nature) the proceedings can be quashed by the High Court if the parties have come to an amicable settlement even though the provisions are not compoundable. Where a line is to be drawn will have to be decided in some later decisions of this Court, preferably by a larger bench (so as to make it more authoritative). Some guidelines will have to be evolved in this connection and the matter cannot be left at the sole unguided discretion of Judges, otherwise there may be conflicting decisions and Criminal Misc. No. M-14168 of 2010 (3) judicial anarchy. A judicial discretion has to be exercised on some objective guiding principles and criteria, and not on the whims and fancies of individual Judges. Discretion, after all, cannot be the Chancellor's foot.

The offence under Section 307 IPC is non- compoundable. There is no scope for a Court of law permitting the compounding of such offence merely because the parties have decided to compromise the mater. It is not a case where the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code should be exercised as the quashing of FIR will not prevent the abuse of process of any Court rather it will be abuse of the provision of Section 482 of the Code itself. It is well settled principle of law “that you shall not make a trade of a felony.” The offence under Section 307 IPC is a serious offence and the offences under Section 25 of the Arms act are offences against the society at large.

In view of the facts and circumstances of this case and the law enunciated in Manoj Sharma's case (supra), there is no reason to quash the FIR on the basis of compromise. The petition is dismissed.

15.9.2011. SN (NAWAB SINGH) JUDGE