Supreme Court
Case Details
(cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:9) (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8) (cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:9) 109(cid:1) (cid:24)(cid:25)(cid:9)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:28)(cid:9)(cid:27)(cid:24)(cid:29)(cid:27)(cid:9)(cid:1)(cid:21)(cid:30)(cid:2)(cid:26)(cid:9)(cid:21)(cid:31)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:30)(cid:25) (cid:5)(cid:26)(cid:9)(cid:1)(cid:27)(cid:5)(cid:25)"(cid:24) (cid:9) (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8) Date of decisi (cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:9) decision: 12.09.2025(cid:9) (cid:30)(cid:25) (cid:5)!(cid:9)(cid:5)(cid:25)"(cid:9)(cid:27)(cid:5)(cid:2)#(cid:5)(cid:25)(cid:5)(cid:9)(cid:9) "(cid:24)(cid:29)(cid:5)(cid:2)(cid:27)(cid:9) ANOKH SIN SINGH MANDHIR S IR SINGH (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) VS. (cid:1) (cid:2).. APPLICANT(cid:1) (cid:2).. RESPONDENT(cid:1) CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJ RAJESH BHARDWAJ(cid:1) (cid:9) (cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:12)(cid:14)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:9)(cid:9) (cid:25)$(cid:14)(cid:12)%(cid:9) *****(cid:1) ******(cid:1) Rajesh Bhard Bhardwaj, J. (Oral)(cid:1) 1. The applicant has filed the pres ction e present application under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C Cr.P.C. for grant of leave to file an gned ile an appeal against the impugned order dated 10 10.07.2018 passed by the learned Tarn arned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tarn Taran whereb hereby the trial Court has acquitted in a quitted the respondent-accused in a complaint file nt filed under Section 138 of the Ne (for the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, ‘the Act he Act’).(cid:1) 2. Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. s. A. M/s. Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekara ekaran Etc., 2025(3) RCR (Crim rable (Criminal) 208, after considerable discussion and on and comparative interpretation of ) of ion of Sections 372 and 378(4) of POONAM SHARMA 2025.09.16 14:53 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document 1 (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8) (cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:9) (cid:1) Cr.P.C., conclu concluded that the victim has a right ction right to file an appeal under Section 372 of Cr.P.C Cr.P.C. before the Court of Session said essions. Relevant para of the said judgment is as t is as under:-(cid:1) “7.12 Th .12 The reasons for the above distinc can distinction are not far to see and can be elabo elaborated as follows:(cid:1)
Legal Reasoning
Firstly, the victim of a crime m Fi ht to ime must have an absolute right to prefer an appeal which canno pr any cannot be circumscribed by any condition precedent. In the instan co ction instant case, a victim under Section 138 of the Act, i.e., a payee or the 13 rson or the holder of a cheque is a person who has suffered the impact of w by a act of the offence committed by a person who is charged of the o pe used, the offence, namely, the accused, whose cheque has been dishonour w onoured. (cid:1) Secondly, the right of a victim of Se n par tim of a crime must be placed on par with the right of an accused who h w who, who has suffered a conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an as 4 of efer an appeal under Section 374 of the Cr.P.C.. A person convicted th ht to victed of a crime has the right to prefer an appeal under Section 37 pr d not tion 374 as a matter of right and not being subjected to any conditio be of a onditions. Similarly, a victim of a crime, whatever be the nature o cr nally ature of the crime, unconditionally must have a right to prefer an appe m n appeal. (cid:1) Thirdly, it is for this reason that t Th fit to that the Parliament thought it fit to insert the proviso to sub-section in any section 372 without mandating any condition precedent to be fulfilled co ence, ulfilled by the victim of an offence, which expression also includes w of a ludes the legal representatives of a deceased victim who can prefer an de efer an appeal. (cid:1) On the contrary, as against an O tate, st an order of acquittal, the State, through the Public Prosecutor ca th f the tor can prefer an appeal even if the complainant does not prefer such co urse er such an appeal, though of course such an appeal is with the leave o su s not leave of the court. However, it is not POONAM SHARMA 2025.09.16 14:53 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document 2 (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8) (cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:9) (cid:1) always necessary for the State o al r an tate or a complainant to prefer an appeal. But when it comes to a vic ap peal, to a victim's right to prefer an appeal, the insistence on seeking special th High pecial leave to appeal from the High Court under Section 378(4) of the C ry to of the Cr.P.C. would be contrary to what has been intended by the P w f the the Parliament by insertion of the proviso to Section 372 of the Cr pr ment the Cr.P.C. Fourthly, the Parliament has not amended Section 378 to c ha right 78 to circumscribe the victim's right to prefer an appeal just as it has w to nt or t has with regard to a complainant or the State filing an appeal. On the th t has n the other hand, the Parliament has inserted the proviso to Section 37 in erior tion 372 so as to envisage a superior right for the victim of an offenc rig the offence to prefer an appeal on the grounds mentioned therein as com gr as compared to a complainant.(cid:1) Fifthly, the involvement of the S Fi ence f the State in respect of an offence under Section 138 of the Act is co un This t is conspicuous by its absence. This is because the complaint filed u is the filed under that provision is in the nature of a private complaint as p na C. nt as per Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 143 of the Act by an an rates by an express intention incorporates the provisions of the Cr.P.C. in th ch a .C. in the matter of trial of such a deemed offence tried as a crim de , the a criminal offence. Therefore, the complainant, who is the victim o co must ctim of a dishonour of cheque must be construed to be victim in terms be 372 terms of the proviso to Section 372 read with the definition of victim re f the victim under Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C.”(cid:1) C (cid:1) (cid:1) 3. Further, applying the doctrine ling, octrine of prospective overruling, Hon’ble Supre Supreme Court in Directorate of R Raj e of Revenue Intelligence vs. Raj Kumar Aror Arora in Criminal Appeal No. 13 inal No. 1319 Of 2013 with Criminal Appeal No. 2 No. 272 of 2014 decided on 17.0 that 17.04.2025, while clarifying that judgments sha ts shall be applicable retrospectively, ively, has held as under:- (cid:1) POONAM SHARMA 2025.09.16 14:53 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document 3 (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8) (cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:9) (cid:1) “91. The 1. The declaration of a statute dealing y the ealing with substantive rights, by the legislatu gislature, is considered to be prospecti or by ospective unless it is expressly or by necessar cessary implication made to have retr legal ve retrospective operation. The legal maxim axim "Nova Constitutio Futuris Fo Non ris Forman Imponere Debet, Non Praeterit aeteritis" indicating that a new law is to law ought to regulate what is to follow a llow and not the past, carries with it a tivity ith it a presumption of prospectivity and this d this presumption is generally said to ry is said to operate unless the contrary is shown b own by an express provision in the sta s the statute or if the retrospectivity is otherwis herwise discernible through necessary ause cessary implication. This is because such sta ch statutes would have the consequen ghts, sequence of affecting vested rights, impose n pose new burdens or impair existing en a isting obligations. However, when a decision cision rendering an opinion as regard enal regards the interpretation of a penal provisio ovision is subsequently overruled by t nch, ed by the decision of a larger bench, the cons e consequence of the overruling is sta fault, g is starkly different and by default, retrospe trospective. This is because it is settl ared s settled law that the law declared by this this Court is retrospective and is the nd is normally assumed to be the law from w from the inception.(cid:1) 92. The . The operation of a newly enacted t be nacted statute or rule must not be confused nfused with the effect of a judgme ision dgment. A judgment or decision which hich interprets a statute or prov the provision thereof declares the meaning eaning of the statute as it should be te of uld be construed from the date of its enac enactment. In other words, the j the the judgment declares what the legislatu gislature had said at the time whe ated e when the law was promulgated and the d therefore, it has retrospective ef s the ive effect. On the contrary, it is the statute atute or the rule which is presum nless resumed to be prospective unless expressl pressly made retrospective. What fol hat a hat follows from the same, is that a decision cision or judgment enunciating a princ to all a principle of law is applicable to all cases irr ses irrespective of the stage of pend rums f pendency before different forums since w nce what has been enunciated is the hich is the meaning of the law which existed f isted from the inception of the concer hat concerned statute or provision. What has been s been declared to be the law of th have of the land must be held to have always b ways been the law of the land. This c the is conclusion also stems from the POONAM SHARMA 2025.09.16 14:53 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document 4 (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8) (cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:8)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:4)(cid:6)(cid:17)(cid:18)(cid:19)(cid:9)(cid:20)(cid:21)(cid:22)(cid:3)(cid:23)(cid:9) rationale tionale that the duty of the court is no but t is not to "pronounce a new law but to maint maintain and expound the old one". (e ne". (emphasis added)(cid:1) 4. Therefore, in view of the judgm n’ble judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Cour e Court in Celestium Financial (supra enue (supra) and Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (supra), learned Sessions Judge, treat udge, concerned, is directed to treat the present lea ent leave to appeal as an appeal filed .P.C. l filed under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. and entrust the ust the same to the appropriate Court f ourt for its disposal on merits.(cid:1) 5. Registry is directed to send the the d the complete paperbook and the record of the c f the case to learned Sessions Judge, c dge, concerned, forthwith.(cid:1) 6. Disposed of, accordingly. Pendi also Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed sposed of.(cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:4)(cid:3)(cid:5)(cid:3)(cid:7)(cid:1)(cid:1) Poonam Sharma (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:14)(cid:1)(cid:15)(cid:14)(cid:10)(cid:9)(cid:16)(cid:17)(cid:10)(cid:11)(cid:18)(cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:11)(cid:19)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:12)(cid:1) Whether Speaking/Reasoned : Yes/N Yes/No(cid:1) Whether Reportable : Yes/No (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) POONAM SHARMA 2025.09.16 14:53 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document 5