Yash Pal v. State of Punjab & Ors.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.N. Jindal Present: None for the petitioner. Mr. H.S. Bakshi, Advocate for the respondents. Mr. Amit Chaudhary, AAG, Punjab for the respondent-State. A.N. Jindal, J This petition has arisen out of the judgment dated 11.2.2000 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, acquitting the accused of the charges under Sections 304-B/498-A IPC. Admittedly, the State has not filed any appeal but this is the petition by the complainant Yash Pal. Learned counsel for the petitioner has turned up to argue the case, therefore, I have no option but to decide the same after examining the record and with the assistance of Mr. H.S. Bakshi, Advocate for the respondent and Mr. Amit Chaudhary, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab. At the very outset, learned counsel for the respondents has urged that the complainant-petitioner as well as the main accused namely Raman Kumar have already expired.

He has also produced on record copy of the death certificate pertaining to the accused Raman Kumar which indicates that the accused had died on 4.11.2009. As regards his argument that on account of the death of the petitioner, heir of the petitioner have lost interest in the case, the same is without any merit it cannot be so speculated. The next contention raised by the learned counsel that since the State has not filed the appeal, therefore, the revision petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable and cannot be sustained. Section 397 as well as 401 (3) refer to the petition filed by any person which include the private individual. However, this fact cannot be lost sight of that the while Criminal Revision No.656 of 2001 -2- *** examining the revision against acquittal the court has very limited powers and the evidence cannot be re-appreciated. A similar view was taken the Apex Court in case Bindeshwari Prasad Singh @ B.P.Singh and others v.

State of Bihar (Now Jharkhan) and another 2002 (4) RCR (Criminal) 61 which reads as under :- “14. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial Court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. As best the High Court thought that the prosecution witnesses were reliable while the trial court took the opposite view.

This Court has repeatedly observed that in exercise of revisional jurisdictional against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party, the Court exercises only limited jurisdiction and should not constitute itself into an appellate court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into questions of facts and law, and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction. It cannot be lost sight of that when a re-trial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused, and that itself must caution the Court exercising revisional jurisdiction. We, therefore, find no justification for the impugned order of the High Court ordering re-trial of the appellants.” Criminal Revision No.656 of 2001 -3- *** Similarly, it was observed in case Sheetla Prasad and others v. Sri Kant and another 2010 (1) RCR (Criminal) 382 as under :- “9. The High Court was exercising the revisional jurisdiction at the instance of a private complainant and, therefore, it is necessary to notice the principles on which such revisional jurisdiction can be exercised.

Sub-Section (3) of Section 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits conversion of a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Without making the categories exhaustive revisional jurisdiction can be exercised by the High Court at the instance of private complainant (1) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, (2) where the admissible evidence is wrongly brushed aside as inadmissible, (3) where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case and has still acquitted the accused, (4) where the material evidence has been over looked either by the trial court or the appellate court or the order is passed by considering irrelevant evidence and (5) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. By now, it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction, when invoked by a private complainant against n order of acquittal, cannot be exercised lightly and that it can be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice interference for correction of manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice.

In these cases, or cases of similar nature, retrial or rehearing of the appeal may be ordered. Applying the above said principles to the facts of the case in hand, the trial court, after examining the entire evidence and delving deep into the issues, appears to have reached the right conclusion that the offence under Section 304-B IPC is not proved against the accused. No defect in procedure, perversity or arbitrariness has been detected so as to dub the Criminal Revision No.656 of 2001 -4- *** judgment as illegal. The entire material evidence appears to have been taken into consideration. The parties have been given full opportunity to put forth their case. Resultantly, finding no merit in the revision petition, the same is dismissed. September 20, 2010 deepak (A.N. Jindal) Judge