State of Punjab v. Jaswant Singh

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJIT SINGH Present: Ms. Ambika Luthra, AAG, Punjab for the appellant. None for the respondent. RANJIT SINGH J. Jaswant Singh (respondent-plaintiff), who was working as Conductor in the Punjab Roadways Batala, District Gurdaspur had filed this suit to impugn the orders, whereby the punishment of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect were passed on different dates. The appellant had impugned the following orders:- i) Order No. 8836-39/ECC dt. 23.12.71 (One increment stopped with cumulative effect) ii) Order No. 8772-76/ECC dt. 22.1.71 iii)Order No. 4500-4503/ECC dt. 9.8.72 -do- -do- iv)Order No. 439/TA dt. 24.10.73 Three increments v) Order No. 12532-36/TA dt. 1.1.75 (Four increments -do-) vi)Order No. 1291/ST/GM dt. 3.10.75 one increment -do- vii)Order No. 7173/TA dt. 14.12.81 -do- -do- viii)Order No. 1210/TA dt. 5.4.82 Two increments -do- ix)Order No. 3581/ECC dt. 21.5.82 -do- -do- Regular Second Appeal No. 3434 of 1986 2 It was stated in the plaint that the respondent-plaintiff had joined the services in July 1970 at Amritsar depot and was transferred to Batala. In the year 1980, the pay and allowances of the Conductor were revised w.e.f. 01.01.1978. Many juniors of the respondent-plaintiff were fixed in higher pay scale and when he made inquiries about this, he was apprised that this is because of stoppage of increment through various orders. The respondent-plaintiff pleads that these orders were never communicated to him and accordingly filed the suit on the ground that these were illegal null and void, ineffective and unconstitutional. His plea further was that no inquiry was held and even the procedure for imposing the minor penalty was not followed. It was also complained that no show cause notice was issued to him before awarding these punishments, which according to him are the major punishments and could have only been awarded after following the procedure as prescribed in this regard. The appellant-State contested the suit by urging that punishments of stoppage of increment were imposed on the respondent-plaintiff, after observing due procedure as prescribed in the Punjab Civil Services (Appeal and Punishment) Rules, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules'). In addition, plea of bar to file the suit was also raised. On the basis of pleading, the following issues were framed:-

1. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD.

2. Whether the suit is time barred?OPD.

3. Whether the orders mentioned in the plaint are illegal and incorrect? OPP. Regular Second Appeal No. 3434 of 1986 3

4. Relief. The trial Judge found that orders at serial No. 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 were illegal as no regular inquiry was conducted before passing these orders. The Court, however, found orders at serial No. 4 and 9 to be legal and order at serial No. 8 to be illegal. Ultimately, relief was given with regard to orders at serial No. 7 and 8 and the relief was refused in regard to serial No. 4 and 9 on the ground that order at serial No. 4 was on the basis of confession whereas order at serial No. 9 was passed after proper inquiry. The prayer was refused on the ground that the orders at serial No. 1 to 6 were barred by limitation. Aggrieved against the same, the respondent-plaintiff filed an appeal. The appellate-State also filed another appeal praying that the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff be dismissed in its entirety and these appeals were heard together and disposed of together. The First Appellate Court considered the documents of each and every order passed in this case to consider whether the punishments awarded were valid or not. The statement, which was taken as confession statement to uphold the order dated 23.12.1971 was taken note of by the First Appellate Court. Infact the respondent- plaintiff had only replied to the show cause notice by stating that his explanation to the report made by the traffic clerk may be considered as his reply to the charge. In this statement, it was pleaded that the respondent-plaintiff had realized sum of Rs. 133 from 9 passengers but could not deposit the same and the cash fell from his bag. He, accordingly, sought permission to deposit the cash. The First Appellate Court observed that this statement could not be termed as confession. Similarly, other orders passed in this regard were also Regular Second Appeal No. 3434 of 1986 4 considered and ultimately the view was taken that the impugned orders at serial Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 were illegal void and ineffective and not binding on the respondent-plaintiff. Declaration to this effect was accordingly made. The orders mentioned at serial No. 5 and 9, however, were held to be valid and the suit qua these orders was dismissed. It is to be noticed that all the orders in these cases were for stopping the increment with cumulative effect. These orders thus were major penalties and the procedure under Rule 8 of the rules was required to be followed. In short such orders, which were major penalties could have been passed only after holding an inquiry. The view taken by the First Appellate Court that there would be no limitation to challenge the void order, however, may not be sustainable. But the fact that the respondent-plaintiff pleaded that he was never apprised of these orders can be made out from the facts as pleaded. Some of the orders were passed even without serving a show cause notice. It could thus be assumed that all the orders passed were without holding an inquiry. It may thus be for consideration whether the limitation would run from the date of orders or from the date these orders came to the knowledge of the respondent-plaintiff. The orders at serial No. 5 and 9 were, however, upheld on the ground that respondent-plaintiff had pleaded guilty to order at serial No. 5 and order at serial No. 9 was passed after holding a proper inquiry. Thus, the view taken by the First Appellate Court in regard to all the impugned order is justified in law and would not call for interference. The substantial question of law need not be gone Regular Second Appeal No. 3434 of 1986 5 into in the background that the orders of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect being a major penalty could be awarded only after holding an inquiry which concededly was not done, except in orders at serial No. 5 and 9. I am thus not inclined to interfere in the view taken by the First Appellate Court. In this view of the matter, the RSA stands dismissed. March 29, 2010 ( RANJIT SINGH ) JUDGE