Nand Kumar Verma v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.

Judgment

#1. Prayer in this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari, for quashing the order dated 26.12.2022 (Annexure P-3) vide which second inquiry officer was appointed.

#2. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contends that the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Professor on

02.11.2017. During the tenure of her service, the petitioner was charge- sheeted on 13.04.2021 and thereafter, the petitioner submitted the reply on 15.06.2021. An Inquiry Officer was appointed who submitted his report on 29.04.2022 and on the basis of the said report, a show-cause notice dated 18.05.2022 was served upon the petitioner along with the CWP-1615-2023 2 inquiry report. The petitioner submitted a reply to the show-cause notice on 17.06.2022, however, no final decision was taken.

2.1. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that vide impugned order dated 26.12.2022 (Annexure P-3), a second inquiry has been ordered to investigate the same charges qua which an inquiry report has already been submitted and accepted, as indicated by Annexure P-1. The competent authority, after giving careful

consideration to the report prepared by the first Inquiry Officer, has in fact concurred with the conclusion drawn therein. An opportunity of personal hearing was also provided to the petitioner. However, no final decision was taken. Further, as also stated in the reply dated 17.06.2022 (Annexure P-2) submitted by the petitioner to the show-cause notice, the Inquiry Officer has travelled beyond the statement of charges communicated to the petitioner. As such, the findings which was do not pertain to the subject-matter of the charges are wholly illegal. The petitioner had also highlighted that the Inquiry Officer has prepared a report after modifying the charges, which is beyond his purview and not permissible under law. Learned Senior counsel argues that it is a trite law that the Inquiry Officer is required to restrict his findings to the article of charges. Upon realising that the inquiry report suffers from incurable illegality, the competent authority proceeded to cure the defect by ordering a de novo inquiry against the petitioner. Learned Senior counsel further submits that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CWP-1615-2023 3 Nand Kumar Verma vs. State of Jharkhand and others, 2012(3) SCT 192 and Narinder Kumar vs. State of Punjab and others, 2009(1) SCT 521 and contends that once the Inquiry Officer has concluded the inquiry and the inquiry report has already been accepted by disciplinary authority, there is no justification for conducting a de novo inquiry on the same charges and thus, the impugned order 26.12.2022 (Annexure P-3) is liable to be set-aside.

#3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/University submits that the petitioner has submitted a reply (Annexure P-2) to the show-cause notice wherein certain defects in the inquiry proceedings were highlighted. After her objections were duly considered, a de novo inquiry was ordered vide the impugned order dated 26.12.2022 (Annexure P-3). As such, the second inquiry was ordered at the behest of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondents/University relies upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. P. Thayagarajan, 1999 AIR (SC) 449 and submits that de novo inquiry can be ordered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

#4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.

#5. From a perusal of the record, it is evident that a regular departmental inquiry was conducted pursuant to the charge-sheet dated

13.04.2021 by the Inquiry Officer duly appointed by the competent authority. Upon conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer submitted CWP-1615-2023 4 his report dated 29.04.2022. After considering the inquiry proceedings and analysing the findings recorded in the report, the disciplinary authority found no reason to differ with the conclusions drawn therein. On that basis, a show-cause notice dated 18.05.2022 was issued to the petitioner along with a copy of the inquiry report. The petitioner submitted her reply to the said show-cause notice on 17.06.2022 (Annexure P-2). Thus, the disciplinary proceedings had reached the stage where the disciplinary authority was only required to take a final decision after considering the petitioner's reply.

#6. Further, no rule or regulation has been put forth by learned counsel for the respondents/University that allows for a de novo inquiry to be conducted after accepting the report submitting upon conclusion of the first inquiry on identical . A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.R. Deb vs. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong 1971 INSC 112, speaking through Justice S.M Sikri, observed as under: “11. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the Inquiring Officer or Officers does not appeal to the disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under rule 9. CWP-1615-2023 5

#12. In our view the rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by the Collector on February 13, 1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was determined to get" some officer to report against the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the rules but was harassing to the appellant. 13. Before the Judicial commissioner the point was put slightly differently and, it was urged that the proceedings showed that the Disciplinary Authority had made up its mind to dismiss the appellant. The Judicial Commissioner held that on the facts it could not be said that the Disciplinary Authority was prejudiced against the appellant. But it seems to us that on the material on record a suspicion does arise, that the Collector was determined to get some Inquiry Officer to report against the appellant.” (emphasis added)

#7. A two-Judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nand Kumar Verma (supra) wherein the following was opined: “27. After accepting his explanation, the High Court was still of the view that disciplinary proceedings requires to be initiated against the appellant for his alleged omission and commission of granting bail indiscriminately even in heinous crimes. The Charge Memo was replied by the appellant and in that he had, specifically, contended that the Standing Committee of the High Court, after accepting the explanation, had informed him that his explanation is accepted and all the allegations made against him are closed. This aspect of the matter, though noticed by the Inquiry Officer, he does not give any finding. He, however, has observed that the charges alleged against the appellant are proved. Based on this, the High Court has passed the order of reversion whereby the appellant was reverted from the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate to that of Munsif and the same was notified by the State Government also. In our opinion, having accepted the explanations and having communicated the same to the appellant, the High Court could not have proceeded to pass the order of initiating CWP-1615-2023 6 departmental proceedings and reverting the appellant from the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate to the post of Munsif. On General Principles, there can be only one enquiry in respect of a charge for a particular misconduct and that is also what the rules usually provide. If, for some technical or other good ground, procedural or otherwise, the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law, there is no principle that a second enquiry cannot be initiated. Therefore, when a completed enquiry proceedings is set aside by a competent forum on a technical or on the ground of procedural infirmity, fresh proceedings on the same charges is permissible. In the present case, a charge memo was issued and served on the appellant. A reading of the charge memo does not contain any reference to the proceedings of the Standing Committee at all. It is also not found as to whether the earlier proceedings has been revived in accordance with the procedure prescribed. In fact, after receipt of the charge memo, the appellant, in his reply statement, had brought to the notice of the enquiry officer that on the same set of charges, a notice had been issued earlier and after receipt of his explanation dated 21.12.1994, the Standing Committee, after accepting his explanation had dropped the entire proceedings and the same had been communicated to him by the Registrar General of the High Court by his letter dated 02.02.1995. In spite of his explanation in the reply statement filed, the enquiry officer has proceeded with the enquiry proceedings and after completion of the same, has submitted his report which has been accepted by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, in these circumstances, there is no justification for conducting a second enquiry on the very charges, which have been dropped earlier. Even through the principles of double jeopardy is not applicable, the law permits only disciplinary proceedings and not harassment. Allowing such practice is not in the interest of public service. In the circumstance, we cannot sustain the impugned order reverting the appellant to the lower post.” CWP-1615-2023 7

7.1. Reliance in this regard can also be placed on the judgment rendered by this Court in Sushil Gupta vs. The Punjab State Cooperative Supply And Marketing Federation Ltd and Another in CWP No.978 of 2024 decided on 07.05.2026.

#8. The grievance raised by the petitioner in her reply to the show-cause notice was that the inquiry officer had travelled beyond the articles of charge while recording certain findings. If the disciplinary authority was of the view that the inquiry report suffered from any legal infirmity or any findings recorded therein were beyond the scope of the charge-sheet, it was always open to it to disregard such findings or otherwise pass an appropriate order, in accordance with law. However, merely because certain objections were raised by the petitioner to the inquiry report, the disciplinary authority could not have directed a fresh or de novo inquiry by appointing another Inquiry Officer to inquire into the very same charges. Such a course is neither contemplated under the applicable service rules nor can it be adopted to fill up perceived lacunae or rectify defects in an inquiry already concluded.

#9. Further still, reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondents/University on P. Thayagrajan (supra) is unfounded as the disciplinary authority did not express dissatisfaction with the inquiry report at any juncture. Rather, the same has been categorically accepted leading to issuance of a show cause notice. Had this appraoch been taken before accepting the inquiry report, an argument could be made based on the decsion in P. Thayagrajan (supra), however, since the CWP-1615-2023 8 factual matrix indicates otherwise, it would be imporper to allow the competent authority to disregard the first inquiry in order to cover up the lacunae, which were only discovered upon perusal of the reply filed by the petitioner.

#10. Additionally, it is pertinent that the charges levelled on the delinquent employee are clearly communicated to him/her so as to provide them with an adequate opportunity to defend himself/herself. A Three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surath Chandra Chakrabarty vs. State of West Bengal 1970 INSC 249, while speaking through Justice A.N Grover, observed as under: “4...........It is incomprehensible how the details as to date, time, place and person etc. would not have made the charges more definite as appears to have been the opinion of the Division Bench. We are unable to agree that the details without which a delinquent servant cannot properly defend himself are a matter of evidence. In this connection reference may be made to Fundamental Rule 55 which provides, inter alia, that without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Enquiry Act 1850 no order of dismissal removal or reduction shall be passed on a member of service unless he is informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed, to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This rule embodies a CWP-1615-2023 9 principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him...” As such, the act and conduct of the Inquiry Officer in venturing beyond his jurisdiction and returning findings on charges that were never communicated to the petitioner falls foul of the settled law.

#11. In view of foregoing reasons, the present writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 26.12.2022 (Annexure P-3) is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to proceed further from the stage of consideration of the inquiry report dated 29.04.2022 and the petitioner's reply to the show-cause notice dated 17.06.2022 (Annexure P-2), and thereafter pass a well-reasoned final order, in accordance with law, expeditiously preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.

#12. Pending miscellaneous application, if any, also stands disposed of.

02.07.2026 (HARPREET SINGH BRAR) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned: Whether reportable: Yes/No Yes/No