✦ High Court of India

O&M) Moksh Lata v. Manohar Lal Sood thr LRs and Another

Case Details

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA-774-2022 (O&M) Moksh Lata . . . . Appellant Vs. Manohar Lal Sood thr LRs and Another . . . . Respondents **** Reserved on: 04.12.2025 Pronounced on: 12.12.2025 Pronounced fully/opera6ve part: Fully **** CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued by:- Mr. K.S. Dadwal, Advocate and Ms. Neha Jain, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, Senior Advocate with Mr. Vishal Pundir, Advocate for respondent No.1. DEEPAK GUPTA, J. **** The present second appeal arises from a long-standing dispute within a family partnership. The appellant before this Court, Smt. Moksh Lata, was defendant No.1 in the suit ins+tuted by her brother-in-law - the plain+ff, namely, late Shri Manohar Lal Sood. The li+ga+on revolves around the dissolu- +on of the partnership firm M/s Shankar Dass & Sons, and the consequen+al rights of the partners over the proper+es and accounts of that firm. 2. Photocopy of the Trial Court report has been received and per- used with the able assistance provided by counsel from both the sides. In order to avoid confusion, par+es shall be referred as per their status before the Trial Court. NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-774-2022 (O&M) 3.1 Plain(cid:6)ff’s Case: According to the plain+ff, the firm, which dealt in van and baggage material, operated from two premises in Hoshiarpur. A formal partnership deed had been executed on 01.04.2002, cons+tu+ng the plain+ff, defendant No.1 (the present appellant), and defendant No.2 Sunita Devi as equal partners. The firm owned considerable immovable property, including land measuring 6 kanal 14 marla, comprising shops, sheds and courtyards. The plain+ff asserted that due to advancing age, he had entrusted day-to-day man- agement with the appellant, even providing her with some blank signed cheques for business use. However, rela+ons soured in August 2008. The plain+ff alleged that the appellant, along with her son, misused the blank cheques, fabricated transac+ons, caused their dishonour, and then ins+tuted false complaints under Sec+on 138 of the Nego+able Instruments Act. He fur- ther alleged that they a8empted to manipulate the firm structure, including ob- taining VAT registra+on for a fic++ous concern using the firm’s premises. 3.2 Feeling compelled to terminate the business rela+onship, the plain+ff served a no+ce on 22.08.2008, in+ma+ng that he would not con+nue the partnership beyond 30.09.2008, and demanding se8lement of his share. The appellant, however, did not render accounts despite controlling the finan- cial records. 3.3 With these broad averments, plain+ff filed the suit for claiming the following reliefs: (i)

Facts

Declara+on to the effect that firm M/s Shankar Dass Sood and Sons, Pahari Gate as well as Bhairvani Road, Hoshiarpur stands dissolved. (ii) Mandatory injunc+on by direc+ng defendant No.1-appellant to se8le the accounts w.e.f. 01.04.2009. (iii) Permanent injunc+on to restrain defendant Moksh Lata and Sunita Devi from changing their nature of the property owned by the firm. (iv) Separa+on of the share of the plain+ff in the firm. NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 2 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) 4. Stand of Defendant N: 1 : The appellant (defendant N: 1) con- tested the suit, contending that the firm was actually part of an older joint fam- ily business that had been opera+ng for decades, and that several other unre- gistered firms existed within the family structure. She asserted that the 2002 partnership deed was only a paper arrangement, and that aCer her husband’s death, it was the plain+ff, who monopolised the business and financial affairs. She objected that the suit was not maintainable because the firm was unre- gistered under Sec+on 69 of the Partnership Act; that the suit suffered from non-joinder of necessary par+es, and that the partnership deed contained an arbitra+on clause that barred the civil court’s jurisdic+on. 5. Stand of Defendant N: 1(cid:1) (cid:2)(cid:1) Defendant No.2, however, supported the plain+ff’s claim and confirmed that the appellant (defendant N: 1) had mis- used the firm’s documents and obstructed se8lement of accounts. 6. Findings of the Court’s below: Upon evalua+ng the pleadings and evidence, the Trial Court concluded that although the plain+ff’s no+ce did not by itself operate as a dissolu+on no+ce, but the filing of the suit clearly demon- strated the plain+ff’s inten+on to dissolve the partnership. Since the partner- ship was one “at will”, the Court held that the firm stood dissolved from the date the defendants received no+ce of the suit. The Court also held that the suit was maintainable despite the firm being unregistered, because Sec+on 69(3)(a) of the Partnership Act expressly exempts suits for dissolu+on and rendi+on of accounts from the bar applicable to unregistered firms. The arbitra+on clause was also found to be no impediment, as the deed itself was unregistered and an earlier a8empt at arbitra+on had already failed. Consequently, the Trial Court decreed the suit, declaring dissolu+on, direc+ng rendi+on of accounts, restrain- ing aliena+on of firm property, and recognising the plain+ff’s one-third share. A preliminary decree was drawn accordingly. 7. The appellant carried the ma8er in appeal, but the First Appellate Court found no infirmity in the Trial Court’s reasoning and affirmed the decree in toto. NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 3 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) 8. Appellant’s Conten(cid:6)ons: Assailing the aforesaid concurrent find- ings of the Courts below, learned advocate for the appellant-defendant No.1 has raised the following points: (cid:1) That suit was not maintainable as the firm M/s Shankar Dass Sood and sons was not joined as a party. (cid:1) That said firm is an unregistered firm and therefore, suit was not main- tainable. (cid:1) There is an arbitra+on clause in the partnership deed (Ex.P4) and without resor+ng to the arbitra+on, the suit was not maintainable. (cid:1) Suit was for declara+on and therefore, by filing the civil suit for declara- +on, it does not amount to dissolu+on of the firm as has been held by the trial Court. (cid:1) Deed dated 22.08.2008 (Ex.P4) only expressed willingness of the plain+ff to re+re and this was not a no+ce to dissolve the firm and lastly, the origi- nal partnership deed was not produced and rather only photocopy was produced and therefore, without applying for secondary evidence, (Ex.P2) was not admissible in evidence. 9. Applica(cid:6)on for Addi(cid:6)onal Evidence: During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant moved CM No.545-C of 2025 under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC seeking to place on record three documents marked Annexures A-1 to A-3. The appellant claimed that while an applica+on for passing of the final decree was pending before the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hoshiarpur, she purportedly discovered an agreement dated 20.09.2020 said to have been executed between the par+es (Annexure A-1). She further stated that in those final decree proceedings, she filed a wri8en statement (Annexure A-2) and also submi8ed an applica+on under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC seeking disposal of the ma8er in terms of the alleged agreement. The respondent’s reply to that applica+on was filed as Annexure A-3. According to the appellant, these documents are essen+al for effec+ve adjudica+on, as they allegedly bear upon NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 4 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) the resolu+on of the family property dispute, and therefore ought to be taken on record. 10. Reply to the Applica(cid:6)on : In response to the appellant’s applica- +on under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, the legal representa+ves of respondent No.1

Legal Reasoning

Conclusion : Having considered all the submissions, the concurrent findings of the Courts below are found to be based on correct apprecia+on of law and evidence, and do not suffer from any perversity. The only modifica+on warranted is with respect to the date of dissolu+on of the firm, which is held to be 30.09.2008, the date clearly indicated in the plain+ff’s no+ce (Ex. P4). Apart from this modifica+on, the decree of the Courts below stands affirmed. The ap- peal is accordingly dismissed with costs throughout. All other pending applica-

Arguments

(the original plain+ff) filed a detailed reply. They pointed out that Shri Manohar Lal Sood had passed away on 04.05.2022, and that during his life+me, no such agreement dated 20.09.2020 was ever executed or even men+oned before any Court. According to the respondents, the appellant has concocted a false nar- ra+ve by placing reliance on a fabricated document containing forged signa- tures of the deceased plain+ff. They emphasized that the alleged agreement never came into existence during the life+me of Manohar Lal Sood and was never produced either before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court. It was only in 2024, during the proceedings for prepara+on of the final decree, that the appellant for the first +me a8empted to introduce this document. On these premises, the respondents prayed for outright rejec+on of the applica+on, as- ser+ng that it lacked any founda+on and was nothing more than an a8empt to mislead the Court. 11. Conten(cid:6)ons of Respondents : During arguments, learned senior counsel for the respondent reinforced these objec+ons. He submi8ed that before an appellate court can permit addi+onal evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, it must first examine whether the pleadings contain the factual basis necessary to support such evidence. In the absence of such founda+onal pleadings, any addi+onal evidence becomes legally irrelevant. He pointed out that the suit was decreed on 21.03.2016, and the first appeal was dismissed on 26.11.2021, all during the life+me of Manohar Lal Sood. Despite having full opportunity, the appellant never disclosed the existence of any such agreement. Even the present second appeal was filed when the original plain+ff was alive, yet the document was not relied upon. Its sudden appearance in 2024, two years aCer the plain+ff’s death, speaks for itself. Thus, counsel argued, the applica+on is devoid of any bona fides and must be dismissed. NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 5 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) 12.1 Turning to the merits, learned senior counsel submi8ed that the suit for dissolu+on was fully maintainable even though the firm was unregistered. He relied upon Sec+on 69(3)(a) of the Partnership Act, which expressly carves out an excep+on permiOng the enforcement of rights rela+ng to dissolu+on, rendi+on of accounts, or realiza+on of property of a dissolved firm irrespec+ve of registra+on. 12.2 He also argued that the suit was maintainable even though the firm was not impleaded as a party, and that the filing of the suit itself cons+tutes sufficient no+ce of dissolu+on, an approach recognized by judicial precedents. 12.3 Ld. Counsel referred extensively to Ex.P4, the no+ce dated 22.08.2008, sta+ng that the plain+ff had unequivocally expressed his unwillingness to con+nue the partnership with effect from 30.09.2008, and had demanded se8lement of all accounts within 15 days. When read with Clause 8 of the partnership deed (Ex.P2) and Sec+on 43 of the Partnership Act, the no+ce clearly reflected an inten+on to dissolve the firm. Even assuming otherwise, counsel submi8ed that service of summons in the suit itself brings about dissolu+on in terms of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Banarsi Das v. Kanshi Ram. 12.4 He further argued that the appellant never disputed the execu+on of the partnership deed (Ex.P2) before the Courts below and cannot now be permi8ed to raise objec+ons regarding its admissibility at this belated stage. 12.5 As regards the arbitra+on clause, Ld. counsel stressed that although the deed contained such a clause, the partnership deed itself was unregistered and the arbitra+on a8empt had already failed. Having fully par+cipated in the proceedings before the Trial Court, the appellant was now estopped from raising objec+ons based on the arbitra+on clause. 12.6 In view of the above submissions, learned senior counsel urged that there was no ground whatsoever to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below, and so, the appeal deserved dismissal. NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 6 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) 13. This Court has considered submissions of both the sides and have appraised the en+re record carefully. 14. Admissibility of Ex.P2 : On careful examina+on of the record, it is noted that the appellant had never objected to the admissibility of Ex. P2 during trial or before the First Appellate Court. In fact, the execu+on of the partnership deed dated 01.04.2002 was never disputed. In para-No.2 of the plaint, plain+ff specifically pleaded that partnership deed was executed with the plain+ff & de- fendants on 01.04.2002. In corresponding para-No.2 of the wri8en statement, though defendant No.1 pleaded that it was a paper transac+on but did not spe- cifically deny the execu+on of the said partnership deed (Ex.P2). Not only this, when during his tes+mony, plain+ff produced (Ex.P2) - partnership deed, no ob- jec+on was raised regarding its admissibility. Even before the first Appellate Court, no such objec+on was raised. 15. Therefore, the appellant-defendant No.1 cannot be allowed to raise the issue of admissibility of Ex.P-2 before this court for the first +me and so, the conten+on of learned counsel for the appellant in this regard is rejected. 16. Issue rela(cid:6)ng to Dissolu(cid:6)on of Firm : Turning to the nature of the no+ce dated 22.08.2008, Clause 8 of the partnership deed dated 01.04.2022 (Ex.P2) is as under: “That the partnership is at will. Any partner desirous of swearing his interest from the firm can do so by giving a reasonable +mely no+ce in wri+ng to the other partners………………” 17. Since the partnership in ques+on ’M/s Shankarlal Sood and Sons’ is a partnership at will, as per the aforesaid clause, the ques+on is that as to whether by serving no+ce dated 22.08.2008 (Ex.P4), plain+ff made his inten+on clear so as to dissolve the firm. As per the conten+on of learned counsel for the appellant-defendant No.1, no+ce (Ex.P4) only reflected the willingness of the plain+ff to re+re from the firm and that it did not amount to dissolving the firm and therefore, even if the plain+ff had re+red, the rest of the partners could NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 7 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) con+nue with the firm. Learned counsel refers to sec+on 32 of the Partnership Act in this regard. 18. On the other hand, conten+on of learned senior advocate for the respondent is that the language of the no+ce (Ex.P4) is quite vivid that plain+ff wanted to dissolve the firm and as such, sec+on 43 of the partnership act is ap- plicable. 19. der: Sec+on 32 and 43 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 are as un- “32. Re6rement of a partner.—(1) A partner may re+re— (a) with the consent of all the other partners, (b) in accordance with an express agreement by the partners, or (c) where the partnership is at will, by giving no+ce in wri+ng to all the other partners of his inten+on to re+re. (2) A re+ring partner may be discharged from any liability to any third party for acts of the firm done before his re+rement by an agreement made by him with such third party and the partners of the recons+tuted firm, and such agree- ment may be implied by a course of dealing between such third party and the recons+tuted firm aCer he had knowledge of the re+rement. (3) Notwithstanding the re+rement of a partner from a firm, he and the part- ners con+nue to be liable as partners to third par+es for any act done by any of them which would have been an act of the firm if done before the re+rement, un+l public no+ce is given of the re+rement: Provided that a re+red partner is not liable to any third party who deals with the firm without knowing that he was a partner. (4) No+ces under sub-sec+on (3) may be given by the re+red partner or by any partner of the recons+tuted firm. 43. Dissolu6on by no6ce of partnership at will.—(1) Where the partnership is at will, the firm may be dissolved by any partner giving no+ce in wri+ng to all the other partners of his inten+on to dissolve the firm. (2) The firm is dissolved as from the date men+oned in the no+ce as the date of dissolu+on or, if no date is so men+oned, as from the date of the communica- +on of the no+ce.” NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 8 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) 20. Sec+on 32(1)(c) makes it clear that in case of a partnership at will, by giving no+ce in wri+ng to all other partners of his inten+on to re+re, a part- ner may re+re from the firm. The re+rement of a partner in itself does not amount to dissolu+on of the firm and the other partners may con+nue. On the other hand, as per Sec+on 43, where the partnership is at will, the firm may be dissolved by any partner by giving no+ce in wri+ng to all other partners of inten- +on to dissolve the firm and the firm is dissolved from the date as men+oned in the no+ce with respect to the date of dissolu+on, or if no such date is men- +oned, from the date of the communica+on of the no+ce. 21. In the present case, the perusal of the no+ce dated 22.08.2008 (Ex.P4) would reveal that aCer referring to the terms of the partnership deed dated 01.04.2002, in which plain+ff and defendants were equal partners, the plain+ff men+oned in paragraph number 4 and 5 of the no+ce as under:- “4. That due to your un-business aOtude my client is not willing to con+nue the Partnership business with both of you any more w.e.f. 30-9-2008. My client is en+tled to the share of profits and salary of working partner, interest on Capital and share in the movable and immovable proper+es and assets of the firm. The firm has the property at Banjar Bagh Hoshiarpur and my client is also en+tled to his share in said property. 5. That under these circumstances I here call upon both of you through this no- +ce to se8le the accounts of my client as stated above of the said firm with in 15 (fiCeen days) of the receipt the of this no+ce; otherwise my clients instruc- +ons are to ini+ate the legal proceedings in this regard against both of you in the Court of law.” 22. A close reading of above paragraphs of Ex.P4 show that the plain+ff did not express any wish to merely re+re; rather, he clearly stated that he was “not willing to con nue the partnership business w.e.f. 30.09.2008”. He further demanded se8lement of his en+re en+tlement in the firm’s assets, profits, and proper+es and required the defendants to se8le his accounts within 15 days, failing which legal ac+on would follow. NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 9 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) 23. These asser+ons leave no doubt that the plain+ff’s inten+on was not re+rement, but complete dissolu+on of the partnership. Consequently, the Trial Court’s finding that Ex.P4 reflected only a willingness to re+re is untenable, and the First Appellate Court too failed to examine this aspect. 24. As the defendants did not dispute receipt of the no+ce before 30.09.2008, the firm must be held to have stood dissolved from that date in terms of Sec+on 43(2). 25. Even if no+ce Ex.P4 were assumed insufficient to effect dissolu+on, dissolu+on would s+ll be deemed to have occurred upon service of summons accompanied by the plaint, as held in Banarsi Das v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1963 SC 1165, where the Supreme Court ruled that service of summons in a suit seeking dissolu+on of a partnership at will itself operates as a no+ce of dissolu+on. 26. Thus, the concurrent findings of the courts below are modified only to the extent that the partnership stood dissolved w.e.f. 30.09.2008, the date expressly men+oned in Ex.P4. 27. Whether Firm a necessary Party : The conten+on that the firm was a necessary party deserves to be rejected. This Court has previously held, in Mohinder Singh v. Ram Nath (1991 (2) PLR 60), that a suit for dissolu+on and rendi+on of accounts is maintainable without impleading the firm itself, since a partnership firm is not a juris+c en+ty separate from its partners. 28. Effect of Non-registra(cid:6)on : The objec+on raised regarding the maintainability of the suit due to non-registra+on of the firm is equally unten- able. Sec+on 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 reads as under: “69. Effect of non-registra6on.—(1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be ins+tutes in any Court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm. NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 10 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) (2) No suit to enforce a +ght arising from a contract shall be ins+tuted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is regis- tered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm. (3) The provisions of sub-sec+ons (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set- off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect— (a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolu+on of a firm or for ac- counts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dis- solved firm, or (b) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (4) xxxxxxxxxxx.” 29. The perusal of the aforesaid provision would reveal that ordinarily no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be ins+tuted in any court by or on behalf of the firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the person suing or have been shown in the register of the firm as partner of the firm. However, there are certain excep+ons to the said rule. Sub-Sec+on 3 of sec+on 69 makes out such excep+ons and one of the excep+on is when the suit is for enforcement of any right to sue for dissolu+on of a firm or for ac- counts of a dissolved firm or any right or power to realize the property of a dis- solved firm. 30. In view of the said specific provision contained in Sec+on 69(3)(a), it is clear that courts below have rightly held the suit to be maintainable. Reliance in this regard can also be placed upon “Kamalji Singh v. Jarnail Singh”, 2002 (2) RCR (Civil) 79, wherein this court referred to “Hem Lata vs. M/s Ishar Dass Chamanlal and Others”, 1995 (2) 314; and “Bhartesh Chandra Jain vs. Shoaib Ullah and Others, (2004), 13 SCC 358 and held that it cannot be disputed that for enforcement of any right to sue for dissolu+on of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, the firm need not be registered. As such, the conten+on of counsel for the appellant in this regard is rejected. NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 11 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) 31. Issue of Arbitra(cid:6)on Clause : Although Clause 9 of the partnership deed contains an arbitra+on clause, the deed is admi8edly unregistered. As ex- plained by the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das Goyal v. Pyare Krishan Aggar- wal, 2019 (5) RCR (Civil) 345, relying on Krishna Motor Service v. H.B. Vitala Kamath, (1996) 10 SCC 88, it was held that an arbitrator cannot be appointed under an arbitra+on clause contained in an unregistered partnership deed. Therefore, the arbitra+on clause cannot bar the maintainability of the civil suit. 32. Moreover, as pleaded by the plain+ff and not denied by the de- fendant, the par+es had in fact a8empted arbitra+on earlier but without suc- cess. Hence, the existence of the clause does not operate as a bar to the juris- dic+on of the Civil Court. 33. The decisions in “Hindustan Petroleum Corpora(cid:6)on Limited vs. M/s Pink City Midway Petroleum”, 2003, AIR (Supreme Court) 2881; “V. H. Patel & Co. vs. Heru Bhai, Hima Bhai Patel, 2000, (4), SCC 368, “Rajendra Prashad Goyal vs. Royal Orchid Company and others”, 2011, (3) PLR 266(cid:1)do not assist the appellant, as those cases did not concern an unregistered partnership deed. 34. Consequently, the findings of the Courts below are upheld and the suit is correctly held to be maintainable notwithstanding the arbitra+on clause. 35. Applica(cid:6)on for Addi(cid:6)onal Evidence : Lastly, coming to the applica+on under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, as per the conten+on of Ld. counsel for the applicant-appellant, an agreement inter se the par+es was executed on 20.09.2020 (copy Annexure A-2) and based upon that agreement, applica+on was moved before Ld. Civil Judge to decide the applica+on of passing of the final decree based upon the same. Applica+on (Annexure A-2) was also moved to dispose of the final decree applica+on in terms of Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC and wri8en statement was also moved by the appellant, which is Annexure A-3. 36. The alleged agreement dated 20.09.2020, is purported to have been executed between appellant-defendant No.1 Smt. Moksh Lata and plain- NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 12 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) +ff-respondent No.1, namely Shri Manohar Lal Sood. As rightly pointed out by counsel for respondent-plain+ff that though the suit was decreed by the trial Court on 21.03.2016, but the appeal was disposed of by the first Appellate Court on 26.11.2021. In case any such agreement dated 20.09.2020, as is al- leged by the appellant, had come into existence, the same must have been re- ferred by the appellant before the first Appellate Court during the pendency of the first appeal decided on 26.11.2021. 37. Besides above, though the applica+on for passing of the final de- cree was moved by plain+ff/decree-holder namely Manohar Lal Sood on 02.09.2022 as evident from the covering page of Annexure A-1, the applica+on so as to decide the final decree applica+on on the basis of the alleged agree- ment was moved by the appellant/defendant No.1 on 29.10.2024, as evident from Annexure A-2. In the mean+me, Manohar Lal Sood had expired on 04.05.2022. During his life+me, no such agreement allegedly executed on 20.09.2020 was even referred by the appellant/defendant No.1. 38. It is further important to no+ce the contents of the alleged agree- ment dated 20.09.2020, which reads as under: “AGREEMENT This agreement, dated 20-09-2020, is wri8en today in the presence of re- spectable persons and family members between Manohar Lal, son of Shankar Das, resident of House No. 423, New Abadi, Hoshiarpur (First Party), and Moksha Lata, wife of Late Shri Ravinder Kumar, resident of House No. 426, New Abadi, Hoshiarpur (Second Party), at District Courts, Hoshiarpur, under the terms and condi+ons men- +oned below: 1. That approximately 35-40 years ago, our ancestral firm M/s Shankardas Sood and Sons was running at Pahari Gate, Hoshiarpur. The partners of this firm were the First Party Manohar Dass, the Second Party Moksha Lata Sood, and the third partner Sunita Devi. A partnership deed was executed between the First Party, Second Party, and Sunita Devi on 01-04-2002. 2. That from the aforemen+oned firm, the First Party set up two +mber trade busi- NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 13 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) nesses for his two sons, Rajneesh Sood and Rajiv Sood, namely Ganesh Dharam Kanda at Mughalpura, Hoshiarpur, and Gur Kripa Dharam Kanda at Bhikhowal village, Hoshiarpur. In addi+on, the First Party built a house, House No. 423, New Abadi, Hoshiarpur, and acquired other immovable proper+es from this firm. Furthermore, the First Party, Manohar Lal, performed the marriage of his four children with great pomp and sent his elder son Munish Sood to America, all with resources from this firm. 3. That the younger brother of the First Party and the husband of the Second Party, Ravinder Kumar Sood, passed away on 30-01-1998. Consequently, the responsibility of the younger brother's household came on the shoulder of First Party. 4. That due to some misunderstandings, the First Party filed a civil suit under pressure from his children against his widowed sister-in-law, the Second Party, for claiming his 1/3rd share in the land and accounts of the said firm. The case was +tled "Manohar Lal Sood vs. Moksha Lal Sood, etc." I deeply regret this ac+on. 5. That, in accordance with the spirit of the aforemen+oned agreement, I, the First Party, wish to state that I, the First Party, do not want any share of the land or ac- counts from the firm M/s Shankar Das Sood and Sons. None of my heirs shall have any objec+ons to this. Furthermore, from today onwards, neither I nor any of my heirs shall have any right, claim, or interest in the movable or immovable property of the said firm M/s Shankar Das Sood and Sons, located at Bazar Bagh and Pahari Gate, Dis- trict Hoshiarpur. The aforemen+oned civil suit shall stand dismissed aCer the death of the First Party because the First Party cannot withdraw the said suit during his life+me due to fear that if he does so, his children may become displeased with him and might not take care of him in his old age. 6. This agreement has been entered into between both par+es without any fear or pressure, and aCer being read and understood, both par+es have signed it in the presence of witnesses to confirm its validity. This agreement shall come into effect aCer the death of the First Party, and the aforemen+oned civil suit shall be dismissed aCer my death.” NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 14 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) 39. First of all, bare perusal of the vernacular copy of Annexure A-1 would reveal that on the leC side of the purported signature of Manohar Lal, there is a +ck mark. Said +ck mark is normally men+oned, when a person is given a blank document and asked to sign the same near the +cked place. De- spite specific query put to counsel for the appellant, he was at loss of words re- garding the presence of this +ck mark on the side of the signature of Manohar Lal, clearly indica+ng that these signatures were obtained from Manohar Lal on a blank paper. 40. Not only above, the contents of alleged agreement dated 20.09.2020 would reveal that it is absolutely not clear as to whether it is a ‘Will’ of Manohar Lal, or whether it is a relinquishment deed of his 1/3 share in the partnership firm. In case, it is considered to be a relinquishment deed, then it was required to be registered; and in case, it is considered to be a Will, as it was to come into effect aCer the death of Manohar Lal Sood, then it was required to be a8ested by at least two a8es+ng witnesses, but it is not the case. 41. Besides, it is absolutely beyond any reasons or logic, as to why Manohar Lal Sood, who bi8erly fought the li+ga+on against appellant/defen- dant No.1 Smt. Moksh Lata during his life+me, will relinquish his 1/3 share in the firm, merely by sta+ng that he was afraid of his children and so, had filed the suit for dissolu+on of the firm. Such an applica+on under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC without pleading any of the founda+onal facts is absolutely not permissible. 42. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon “Iqbal Ahmed (dead) by LRs. vs. Abdul Shukoor” 2025 INSC 1027, wherein it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court as under: “In our opinion, before undertaking the exercise of considering whether a party is en+tled to lead addi+onal evidence under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the Code, it would be first necessary to examine the pleadings of such party to gather if the case sought to be set up is pleaded so as to support the addi+onal evidence that is proposed to be brought on record. In absence of necessary pleadings in that regard, permiOng a party to lead addi+onal evidence would result in an NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 15 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) unnecessary exercise and such evidence, if led, would be of no consequence as it may not be permissible to take such evidence into considera+on. Useful ref- erence in this regard can be made to the decisions in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and Anr., AIR 2009 SC 1103 and Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and Anr., (2012) 8 SCC 148. Thus, besides the requirements prescribed by Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the Code being fulfilled, it would also be necessary for the Appel- late Court to consider the pleadings of the party seeking to lead such addi+onal evidence. It is only thereaCer on being sa+sfied that a case as contemplated by the provisions of Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the Code has been made out that such permission can be granted. In absence of such exercise being undertaken by the High Court in the present case, we are of the view that it commi8ed an error in allowing the applica+on moved by the defendant for leading addi+onal evi- dence.” 43. Apart from above, in “N. Kamlalam v. Ayyaswami” 2001 AIR (Supreme Court) 2802, it has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that Court should be cau+ous while dealing with the claim for addi+onal evidence at the appellate stage aCer a long lapse of +me. 44. The conten+on of Ld. counsel for the appellant to the effect that as the said applica+on was also moved before the Trial Court, where the appli- ca+on for passing of the final decree is pending and so, the same can be consid- ered by the Trial Court is concerned, it also has no merit because the appellant moved the present applica+on under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC before this Court so as to take it into considera+on the documents i.e. Annexures A1 to A3. 45. It is thus clear that appellant wants to introduce documents includ- ing an alleged agreement of 20.09.2020, which surfaced only aCer death of plain+ff and which bears suspicious features, including a +ck mark next to the plain+ff’s signatures, sugges+ve of signatures obtained on a blank paper. The plain+ff had contested the case vigorously throughout his life+me but never re- ferred to any such agreement. Besides, the document do not sa+sfy the re- quirements of either a relinquishment deed, which must be registered; or a valid Will, which requires two a8es+ng witnesses under Sec+on 63 of the Suc- NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 16 of 17 RSA-774-2022 (O&M) cession Act. The addi+onal evidence cannot be received unless the founda+onal facts are pleaded. 46. Having regard to the aforesaid factual matrix and the legal posi- +on, it is held that the applica+on under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is absolutely not permissible and so, the same is hereby rejected. 47.

Decision

+ons, if any, stands disposed of. (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE 12.12.2025 Nee ka Tuteja Whether speaking/reasoned? Whether reportable? Yes Yes Uploaded on.: 12.12.2025 NEETIKA TUTEJA 2025.12.12 15:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 17 of 17

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