Col. Sir Harinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr.

attack raised in the writ petition were accordingly not gone into being wholly unnecessary. The case, however, remained pending as the State filed a Letters Patent Appeal against this order whereas the petitioner sought Leave to Appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Even the Pepsu Land Commission was not constituted, which became an added reason for the case to remain pending. By Section 7 of the Punjab Act No.40 of 1973, a proviso was added to Section 28(2)(i) of the Punjab Act No.10 of 1973, which reads as follow:- “....and the cases pending before Pepsu Land Commission immediately before the date of commencement of the Act shall stand transferred to the Collector of the District concerned for disposal.” The matter accordingly went to the Collector as the Commission ceased to function. The grievance made by the petitioner is that Collector disallowed the production of three witnesses vide his order dated 25.4.1983 against which the CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 6 }: petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner, followed by a revision before the Financial Commissioner. Having failed, he filed Civil Writ Petition No.2952 of 1983 in which notice of motion was issued and was pending hearing, when the present writ petition was filed. During this time only, Collector, Faridkot, issued notice for taking proceedings for determining surplus area case of the petitioner under the Punjab Act and fixed the date of hearing in this case. The petitioner approached this Court with a plea that areas of the petitioner are Garmumkin and do not fall within the definition of land and as such, are not within the purview of the Punjab Act. This issue was to be considered and decided by the Collector. The main grievance in the writ petition was that the petitioner is entitled to compensation for the improvement of the land, which was made in the shape of building, structure etc. and of Shisham tree. Plea was that Section 10 of the Punjab Act made provision for payment of compensation for the land alone and there was no provision for payment of compensation to the owner of the building and structure. Accordingly, the provisions of the Act authorizing this utilization after declaring the land surplus was said to be illegal, void and ultra-virus on various grounds. What appears to have prompted the petitioner to approach this Court is an order dated 15.6.1983 passed by the District Collector, Faridkot, rejecting the application filed by the petitioner through which he had objected to the proceedings started under the Punjab Act. The plea as raised before the Collector was that proceedings under the Pepsu Act were still pending before the CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 7 }: Collector and accordingly the proceedings under the Punjab Act should not have been initiated. The Collector observed that the proceedings under the Pepsu Act had started in the year 1955 and had not been finalised till the date of passing of the order because the land owner dragged the State Government into litigation. It is also noticed that the proceedings under the old Act were nearing almost finalisation. The Collector accordingly observed that there was apparently no bar in taking simultaneous proceedings except that the orders under the Old Act were to be announced first and the case under the Punjab Act was to be decided later. Thus, while challenging the provisions of Section 10 of the Punjab Act on the ground that this provided only illusionary compensation, prayer was made for staying further proceedings before the Collector. While issuing notice of motion, the Collector was restrained from passing the final order. This order was continued and petition was admitted on 14.11.1983. It appears that applications for early hearing were moved by the State without success. The writ petition, however, was ordered to be heard in an order passed during 2002. Somehow, the same could not be taken up for hearing for all these years. In the year 2004, application was filed to amend the writ petition. This prayer was allowed on 22.2.2005. Another application for amendment of the writ petition was filed during March 2009, in which notice was issued. This amendment was allowed. The submissions as made in the amended petition have been heard. The main ground of challenge ofcourse has remained the same, which is that the land was being declared surplus without making any provisions for compensation for structure, building etc., CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 8 }: which would make the provisions of Section 10 of the Act only an illusionary compensation. The additional ground, which has now been pleaded is that through entry No.17 (a) Forest has been inserted in the concurrent list of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution through 42nd amendment. Thereafter, the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as “the Forest Act”) was passed, which was amended in 1988. Reference is made to Section 2 of this Act to say that the Act has an over-riding effect and on this basis it is pleaded that Forest Act would prevail over the Punjab Act regarding the forest land. Submission also is that the Forest Act being subsequent law will apply to all forest land and, thus, the forest land owned by the petitioner can not be adversely effected by the provisions of the Punjab Act in view of Section 2 of the Forest Act. Reference is also made to the amendment made in the Forest Act regarding restriction on de-reservation of forest or use of forest land for non-forest purposes. Section 2 of the Forest Act reads as under:- “2. Restriction on the de-reservation of forests or use of forest land for non-forest purpose:- Notwithstanding anything contained in ay other law for the time being in force in a State, no State government or other authority shall make, except with the prior approval of the Central Government, any order direction:- (i) that any reserved forest (within the meaning of the expression “reserved forest” in any law for the time being in force in that State) or any portion thereof, shall cease to be reserved; CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 9 }: (ii)that any forest land or any portion thereof may be used for any non-forest purpose, (iii)that any forest land or any portion thereof may be assigned by way of lease or otherwise to any private person or to any authority, corporation, agency or any other organisation not owned, managed or controlled by Government; (iv)that any forest land or any portion thereof may be cleared of trees which have grown naturally in that land or portion, for the purpose of using it for reforestation. Explanation: For the purpose of this section “non-forest purpose” means the breaking up or clearing of any forest land or portion thereof for- (a) the cultivation of tea, coffee, spices, rubber, palms, oil bearing plants, horticulture, crops or medicinal plants; (b) any purpose other than reafforestation. But does not include any work relating to ancillary to conservation, development and management of forest and wild-life, namely, the establishment of check-posts, fire lines, wireless communications and construction of fencing, bridges and culverts, dams, water holes, trench marks, boundary marks, pipelines or other like purposes.” Taking support from these provisions, the petitioner would plead that there admittedly is an existing forest, as can be seen from the notification issued by His Excellency the Governor under Section CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 10 }: 38 for applying the provisions of Sections 32, 33, 34 and 68 to Patiala Forest Act to the said land of the petitioner. Reference is also made to the notification regarding the land in question for conservation of forest and declaring the land as forest. Reference is also made to all these notifications, collectively annexed as Annexure P-20. The submission in short is that the forest or forest land is not envisaged within the term `land' as defined under Section 3(5) of the Punjab Act or the provisions of the Punjab Utilization of Surplus Area Scheme, 1973. In response, the State has not only raised various preliminary submissions but has opposed the line of submission of the petitioner tooth and nail. The State has first highlighted that this writ petition is pending since 1983 and, thus, the stay on passing the final order continues. The petitioner is attributed with a motive that the present application to amend the writ petition has been filed to delay the disposal of the writ petition. It is pointed out that the plea as now being raised to challenge the provisions of Section 10 of the Punjab Act, in view of the ratio of law laid down in the case of I.R.Coeho (Dead) by L.Rs Vs. State of Tamilnadu, 2007 (2) Supreme Court Cases 1, is a meaningless reiteration of the pleas which have already been raised in the petition filed in the year 1983. Reference is then made to the Full Bench decision of this Court reported as Sucha Singh Bajwa Vs. The State of Punjab through the Revenue Secretary to Govt. of Punjab, AIR 1974 Punjab and Haryana 162, where it has been viewed that the Punjab Act is immune from the attack on the ground that its provision take away or CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 11 }: abridge any fundamental rights. As per the stand in the reply, this view has further been reiterated in Bal Raj Ahuja Vs. State of Punjab and another, 1989 (1) All India Land Law Reporters 144. On merits, it is pleaded that the Pepsu Act has been repealed by the Punjab Act specifically. It is stated that the Garmumkin land can not be presumed to be out of the scope of the Act. By making reference to the definition of the `land', it is stated that the land includes land and building and structure. As per the State counsel, even the banjar land falls within the definition of `land' and that the Garmumkin land is also such land, which is not cultivable and lies in the water course, roads, building, abadi etc., which can not be excluded from the purview of the Punjab Act. Responding to the plea of compensation in terms of Section 10, it is stated that the petitioner has to be awarded compensation of land and this will include sites, buildings and other structures. It is stated that the Act is protected under Article 31-A of the Constitution and no challenge can be made to the provisions of this Section on the ground that the compensation is not adequate or illusionary as per the ratio of law laid down in Sucha Singh's case (supra). It is also pointed out that the payment of compensation for structure has to be determined by the Collector and, thus, it would be premature at this stage to urge that the petitioner would not be getting compensation for the structures etc. The plea of the petitioner that the Punjab Act can not be made applicable to the forest land is also denied and so also the assertion that the Forest Act would have over-riding effect over the Punjab Act. As per the reply, the land under the Forest Act has also CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 12 }: to be taken into account while determining the surplus area and it can not be excluded on the ground with reference to Forest Act. It is further stated that the forest area has to be protected but so far as the determination of surplus area is concerned, it is beyond the scope of the Forest Act. It is accordingly pleaded that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. To substantiate his challenge, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would first refer to the statement of object and reasons of the Punjab Act, which is to consolidate and amend the laws relating to ceiling of land holdings, acquisition of proprietaries rights by tenant and other ancillary matters. He would then refer to the definition of term `land' as given in Section 3(5). As per this Section, land means:- “land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or a village and is occupied or has been let for agriculture purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture and includes: a) the sites of building and other structures on such lands b) banjar land.” The submission appears to be that the land which is a forest land can not be said to be such a land which is used for agriculture purpose or purposes subservient to agriculture. Counsel contends that this is also to be seen in the background that after declaring this land as surplus, it may not be possible to put this land to utilization under the Surplus Area Scheme. In this regard, the counsel would refer to various provisions of the Surplus Area CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 13 }: Scheme to plead that there would be no purpose achieved by declaring the forest land as surplus, if it can not be utilised under the Utilization Scheme. Having made reference to the definition of the `land', permissible area and vesting of unutlised surplus land and after highlighting the purpose, the counsel submits that the provisions of the statutes are required to be interpreted by assigning a literal meaning as the plain words of the statute are unambiguous and lead to no unintelligible results. In support, reference is made out Raghunath Rai Bareja Vs. Punjab National Bank, (2007) 2 SCC

230. It is accordingly pleaded that the purpose and the Scheme of the Act is to distribute the land amongst the land-less for the agriculture purposes. Thus, the plain reading of the Act would not provide for acquisition of forest land as the same is not envisaged within the meaning of the Act and the Scheme in any manner. It is highlighted that the forest land by its very nature and in terms of the provisions of the Forest Act can not be utilised for agriculture purposes. It is accordingly prayed that the proceedings initiated for acquisition of forest land are without jurisdiction and ought to be quashed. Proceeding further, the counsel would submit that even if it is assumed that the forest land was covered by the Act and the Scheme for the sake of arguments, then the provisions of the Forest Act having an over-riding effect over the provisions of the Punjab Act, would, as necessity, require permission of the Central Government before any action is taken to deal with the forest land. The submission on these lines is made on the ground that there is an CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 14 }: existing forest as is seen from Annexure P-20. Accordingly, this land being a forest land can not be used for any non-forest purposes, as per the provisions of the Forest Act. Plea is that the use of this land for the purpose of agriculture, therefore, would be prohibited without the prior consent of the Central Government. Reference is then made to the decision in the cases of T.N.Godavarman Vs. Union of India, 1997 (2) SCC 267, B.L.Wadehra Vs. Union of India, 2002 (9) SCC 108 and Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra Vs. State of U.P., 1989 Supp. (1) SCC 504 to urge that the forest land has to be protected as a forest land in view of the law laid down in these cases and, thus, this land would not come within the purview of the Act and can not be utilized under the Punjab Act. During the course of arguments, it was put to the learned counsel for the petitioner as to why all these pleas can not be raised before the Collector who is dealing with the case. In response, the learned senior counsel would plead that writ of prohibition would lie when the proceedings are without jurisdiction. Plea is that forest land can not be dealt with under the Punjab Act and hence, any proceeding initiated pertaining thereto, would be without jurisdiction and hence, writ would lie in such a situation without even raising this issue before the Collector. In support, reference is made to Calcutta Discount Co. Vs. L.T.Officer, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 372 to say that action without jurisdiction can be prevented by the High Court at the stage of initiation of such action itself. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are as under:- “It is well settled however that though the writ of prohibition or certiorari will not issue against an executive CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 15 }: authority, the High Courts have power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. Where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts, it is well settled with issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences.” Reference is also made to Coca Cola Export Corporation Vs. ITO & Anr., (1998) 4 SCC 166 in this regard. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. It is first to be seen whether the prayer of the petitioner to invoke the writ jurisdiction without having raised these points and making these submissions before the Collector can be entertained or not. The counsel has placed reliance on Calcutta Discount Co. (supra) to urge that action without jurisdiction can be prevented by the High Court at the stage of initiation itself. There can not be any doubt in regard to this proposition of law. Undoubtedly, the High Court would have a jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere in an order, which is found to be without jurisdiction. It is required to be appreciated in this case that the present one is not a case of total lack of jurisdiction on the part of Collector. It is not even the plea advanced to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. What is being urged is that the Collector would not have jurisdiction to deal with the forest land under the CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 16 }: provisions of the Punjab Act. This argument is also raised on the basis of interpretation of various provisions. There is no express bar or a total prohibition contained in any law or statute which would dis- entitle the Collector to consider the submission that the forest land is excluded from the purview of the Punjab Act. It is to be appreciated that the Collector has the jurisdiction to deal with the case to consider the surplus case of the petitioner under the Punjab Act. It is only in regard to the part of land regarding which his power is being objected to. There is no specific prohibition to debar the Collector from considering this aspect. As such, this case can not be equated with a case where there is total lack of jurisdiction. The reference made to the case of Ahmedabad Mfg. And Calico Printing Co.Ltd. Vs. Union of India, , 1993 (63) E.L.T 601 (S.C.) to say that writ jurisdiction can be invoked at the show cause notice in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings when the petition is pending since many years. This again would not strictly get attracted to the facts of the present case. It was conceded before me that the petitioner had to go before the Collector in regard to the proceedings pending under the Punjab Act and it is only qua the forest land that this plea of jurisdiction is being raised for decision through a writ petition. Since the petitioner ultimately would have to go before the Collector, the exercise of writ jurisdiction may not be justified on the ground that it would avoid multiplication of litigation. Reference to the case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, (1998) 8 Supreme Court Cases 1 would also not help the petitioner. What all has been held in this case is that the power to issue prerogative writ is plenary CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 17 }: in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. It is observed that the High Court has discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. At the same time, it is also observed that the High Court has imposed on itself certain restrictions, one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. Such alternative remedy is not to operate as a bar at least in those cases where the writ is filed for enforcement of fundamental rights or where there is a violation of principles of natural justice or where proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of the Act is challenged. Perhaps it is only in those cases where the threat of prejudicial action is wholly without jurisdiction. A person may not be asked to wait for injury to be caused before he seeks Court's protection. On the other hand, where if there is a power with the authority to deal with the issue or the case, then it would not be open for the person to approach the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and writ petition would be pre-mature. It is not a case where the Collector is lacking in jurisdiction wholly. As already noticed, the present one is not a case where the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. The writ petition is not being dismissed without examining the issue whether it is a case of total lack of jurisdiction to attract the ratio of law laid down in Whirlpool Corporation's case (Supra). In Coca Cola Export Corporation 's case (supra), it was observed that non-exercise of writ jurisdiction was improper and accordingly direction to remand the case to the I.T.O was held not proper. In this case, this position is not seen to be existing. Accordingly, the ratio of these cases as urged by the counsel would not strictly apply and it CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 18 }: will not be possible to say that the issue needs to be adjudicated in the writ petition without considering the alternative of sending the case to the Collector. In the judgments referred to by the counsel in support of the submission that the Forest Act would stand in the way of the Government to utilize this land may now be considered. In T.N.Godavarman (Supra), it is observed that the Forest Act was enacted to check further deforestation. It is also observed that the provisions of this Act must apply clearly to all forests. The non-forest activity may not be permitted within the area of forest as per the Act and the law laid down but still, it is to be noted that the exemption can be granted by the Central Government on a request made in this regard by the State Government. In B.L.Wadehra's case (Supra), the Supreme Court itself dealt with the power of the Panchayat to make use of Shamlat Deh land through someone else by leasing out the site in accordance with the Rules. Thus, the ratio of law in this case may not be of much help to the petitioner. A Division Bench of this Court in Punjab Urban Development Authority and others Vs. Dashmesh Educational Society (Regd.) and other, 2005 (3) RCR (Civil) 245 has taken a view that except with the prior approval of the Central Government, forest land could not be permitted to be used for non-forest purposes. Thus, there is no total bar for use of forest land for any non-forest purposes and the only requirement is to seek permission of the Central Government. Coming to the challenge of vires of Section 10 of the Punjab Act, the submission by the State counsel that the Full Bench decision in the case of Sucha Singh Bajwa (supra) can not be CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 19 }: ignored has a substance. This was subsequently followed by Division Bench of this Court in Bal Raj Ahuja's case (supra). Rather, in this case, the precise argument as is raised before me was considered and dealt with as can be seen from the following:- “It was then contended by the learned counsel that it is a case of non-payment of compensation in respect of super-structures and trees and to that extent section 10 is ultra vires. In this connection, he referred to the definition of “land” in section 2(5) which reads as follows:- “`land' means land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for pasture, and includes- (a) the sites of buildings, and other structures on such land; and (b) banjar land.” The argument is, the definition of “land” does not include buildings or other superstructures on such land or the trees attached to the earth and the compensation provided under the Act by section 10 is only in respect of land and, therefore, deprivation of the buildings and trees without payment of compensation is invalid. Before going into the merits of this contention, we may say that if this contention were to be accepted, then the buildings and the trees had not vested in the Government and since the land has vested in the Government, it is open to the CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 20 }: petitioner to remove the buildings or the trees but he cannot claim compensation for that which has not vested in the Government. However, we are unable to agree that the Act deals with only the land and not the buildings or other superstructures on such land. The definition of the word `land' extracted above would show that it includes “sites of buildings and other structures on such land”. In the context in which clause (a) appears in section 2(5) and in view of the fact that there is a comma after the words “sites of buildings” we are of the view that the words “sites” in clause (a) does not qualify the words “other structures on such land”. It should be interpreted as including other structures on such land as also sites of buildings. Further, normally the word “land” would include the rights in or over the land and thus construed, all that is standing on the land would also be taken as included in the definition. In providing the principles for the determination of the amount to be paid for the land which has vested in the Government under section 8, the Act provides for the determination of the amount in terms of multiples of fair rent. If the surplus area lands in which there are fruit-bearing trees or there are any super- structures, it could not be stated that the “fair rent” would be only for the land and would not take note of the super- structures or the fruit bearing trees. If any fair rent is determined that could only be with reference to the totality of the interest of the owner and not with reference to CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 21 }: distinct rights of the owner in the property. The explanation to section 10(1) states that the fair rent shall mean the value of one fifth of the gross produce of the land determined in the prescribed manner by the Collector or the officer authorised in this behalf by the State Government. The gross produce is determined in terms of money. The gross produce thus will have to be determined first in terms of money which where there are fruit bearing trees will include the income therefrom and will also take note of any other super-structures as amenities provided therein. In any case when the Act has provided principles for the determination of the amount to be paid it should be taken that principles are for determination of the entire value of the land and not to leave out any interest of the owner in the same.” In this case, it was clearly held that Section 10 can not be challenged on the ground that the compensation paid for surplus area acquired is not adequate or illusionary in view of protection by Article 31A of the Constitution. The submission that this view may require re-consideration in terms of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in I.R.Coelho (Dead) by L.Rs Vs. State of T.N., (2007) 2 Supreme Court Cases 1 would have to be examined in the light of observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case. It is held that if the validity of the 9th Schedule law has already been upheld by the Supreme Court, it would not be open to challenge such law again on principle declared by this judgment. However, if a law held to be violative of any rights in Part III is CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 22 }: subsequently incorporated in the 9th Schedule after 24.4.1973, such a violation/infraction shall be open to challenge on the ground that it destroys or damages the basic structure as indicated in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19 etc. and the principle underlying therein. There would, thus, may not be need once again to go into the vires of Section 10 of the Punjab Act at this stage, specially so when compensation is yet to be determined. My attention was drawn to some of the judgments to urge that right of property is not only to be considered a constitutional right but also a human right. The right to property while ceasing to be a fundamental right would, however, is given express recognition as a legal right, provision being made that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law. For reference see, Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran Vs. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. And others, (2007) 8 Supreme Court Cases 705,. Reference is then made to M.Naga Venkata Lakshmi Vs. Visakhapatnam Municipal Corpn. And another, (2007) 8 Supreme Court Cases 748 to emphasis that no one can be deprived of right to property without payment of any compensation. In this case, the appellant before the Supreme Court had purchased a plot in un- approved lay out, which was subsequently approved. The plots of other persons were regularised but that allotted to the appellant was ear marked as an open space without giving opportunity of hearing to him. Challenge to the legality was rejected by the High Court. When the matter came to the Supreme Court, it was observed that if the development authority concerned wanted to deprive the appellant of her right to property, the question should have been decided as to CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 23 }: whether the authority concerned should have acquired the property or not, when there was no provision in terms whereof the appellant could be deprived of her right to property without payment of any compensation. The present one is not a case where deprivation is without paying any compensation. In the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai and others, (2005) 7 Supreme Court Cases 627, wherein it is observed that having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of eminent domain may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but it must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation thereof must be paid. There is no scope of any doubt in regard to this general proposition but the provision of compensation has apparently been made and it is yet to be decided whether any compensation is ultimately paid or not which can be said to be inadequate. Learned counsel also referred to State of Bihar and others Vs. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and others, (2006) 2 Supreme Court Cases 545 and Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar and others Vs. State of Gujarat and another, 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 596 in regard to the nature and scope of eminent domain, which was held to be comprising two parts i.e. acquisition of property in public interest and payment of reasonable compensation. In this case, only right to manage an Institution was held to be a right to property. Conceded position is that the issue regarding the forest land being covered under the purview of Punjab Act has not so far been raised before the Collector. It will first have to be determined CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 24 }: whether the forest land would be covered under the definition of the land as given in the Punjab Act. Apparently, this definition is too wide a definition. It appears to be a definition, which is inclusive as well. The definition also excludes some part of the land which otherwise may have been a land. No doubt, the primary meaning, as would emerge from the definition, is that it is such land which is let out for agriculture purpose or for purposes subservient to the agriculture. It would, thus, have to be seen whether a forest could be held to be a purpose which is subservient to agriculture or not. Though meaning of the word `subservient' was pressed into to say that it would mean to sub-serve as useful in an inferior capacity; subordinate. It will have to be seen if forest will serve purpose subordinate to agriculture. The definition of land does not end here only with this. It will also include that land which is used for pasture. The word `pasture' has also literal meaning. A place where cattle may feed. As per Section 26 of the Forest Act, it means to feed on growing grass or herbage. This also includes sites of building and other structure and is inclusive of banjar land. If we see the definition of banjar land as given in Section 3(2) of the Punjab Act, it means land which has remained uncultivated for a continuous period of not less then 4 years immediately preceding the date on which the question whether such land is banjar or not arises. Forest land is also a land which is not put to cultivation may be for a continuous period of number of years. As to whether forest can be pasture would also have to be gone into. The reason and purpose for including a banjar land in the definition of land may appear significant. It will give an indication that CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 25 }: a land which is even not used for agriculture purposes would also come within the definition of land for the purpose of Punjab Act. Reference is made by the learned counsel to the permissible area as given in Section 4 of the Punjab Act. The permissible area not only means a land under assured irrigation but also includes barani land and also land of other classes including banjar land. Unless, the proper basis are provided in this regard, it would not be possible to hold that forest land would not be covered under the definition of `land'. It would require determination whether forest is a purpose which could be termed as an agriculture purpose. It may also have to be seen whether forest could be said to be serving a purpose which is subservient to agriculture. Still further, it may also have to be seen whether the forest would be covered under definition of `pasture'. All these issues can not appropriately be gone into in exercise of jurisdiction. The parties must have a chance to raise such pleas before the Collector and an opportunity to establish their assertion on the basis of relevant material. Sufficient material has not been placed on record in this regard even. It may also not be appropriate to decide this in writ proceedings. There may be something in what the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that what would be the use and purpose of dealing with this land if it can not be utilized. But it is to be seen if the forest land can or can not be utilised. No doubt, the scheme and purpose of the Act is to ultimately utilize this land for agriculture purpose but with the permission of the Central Government, the forest land can, if required, be put to use for non-forest purposes. It may have to be seen if the Forest Act has made any prohibitory CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 26 }: provision for putting the forest land to any other use or the Forest Act makes a provision for exercise of such power to de-reserve the forest with the prior approval of the Central Government. Apparently, this in itself does not mean that the forest land can not be dealt with at all, restriction being only that de-reservation could be done by the State Government but with the prior approval of the Central Government. Section 2 of the Forest Act otherwise entitles the State Government to pass an order directing that any reserved forest shall cease to be reserved and also pass an order that any forest land or portion thereof may be used for any non-forest purpose. The Section even provides that any forest land or portion thereof may be assigned by way of lease or otherwise to any private person or to any authority, corporation, agency or any other organization not owned, managed or controlled by the Government. Finally, Section 2(iv) also makes a provision that any forest land or any portion thereof may be cleared of trees which have grown naturally on that land or portion for the purpose of using it for reafforestation. `Non-forest purposes' have also been explained to mean the breaking up or clearing of any forest land or portion thereof for cultivating of tea, coffee, spices, rubber, palms, oil bearing plants, horticulture crops or medicinal plants and also any purpose other then reafforestation. It is one thing to say that the forest land can not be utilised for any other purpose but quite another that this can be done only with the prior approval of the Central Government. The proposition that forest land would be immune from being dealt with under the Punjab Act either on the ground that it does not fall within the definition of land or that it can not be dealt CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 27 }: with under the Punjab Act as it is not open to be utilized, may need to be examined in the background that if there was any such legislative intent, it could have been so clearly provided. The Forest Act is a subsequent legislation and the aspect of preservation of forest could not have been visualized by enacting Punjab Act to say that forest land is excluded from the purview of the Punjab Act. To me, it also appears that the purpose of the Forest Act was with a view to check further the de-forestation as this was causing ecological imbalance, which was leading to environmental deterioration. With that aim in mind, the provision was made that no State Government or other authority shall make any order, directing the use of forest land for non-forest purposes except with the prior approval of the Central Government. This purpose is not in any manner apparent conflict with the object and reasons of the Punjab Act. If we see the history of the Land Reforms Laws, it would be noticed that agrarian reforms were put to top priority by the Government. The ceiling limit to suitably reduce the land holdings was introduced being necessary in the interest of social justice. A provision was made for vesting the entire surplus area in the State Government and the criteria of eligibility for allotment was also made broad base. How this purpose and object of land reforms law would come in any conflict with the Forest Act can not be easily explained. Both the Acts seems to be operating in different fields. When this is viewed in the background that there is no complete ban for utilising forest land for other purpose, the different field of both the Acts would further become clear. In the afore-mentioned background, it would be CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4540 OF 1983 :{ 28 }: appropriate to relegate the petitioner to first raise all these pleas before the Collector where the case is pending since long. The State would also be at liberty to raise all these objections and respond to the pleas made on behalf of the petitioner before the Collector. State Government may explain how this land after having been declared surplus would be utilised if this land is Forest. To leave such a big chunk of land on the ground that there is a forest and the same can not be utilized, may, to an extent, amount to doing injustice to the provisions of the Punjab Act. It would be for the authorities to consider whether this land can be utilized if declared surplus without directing deforestation. Since number of such issues are arising in this case, it would be appropriate to permit the petitioner to first raise all these issues before the Collector. Accordingly, the present writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to first raise all these pleas before the Collector for him to decide. The parties would be at liberty to challenge any order passed by the Collector in accordance with law. February 24 ,2010 khurmi ( RANJIT SINGH ) JUDGE