Cs No. 437 of 2016 · Punjab And Haryana High Court · 2026

defendant No.1 and that the membership of the Coopera(cid:24)ve House Building Society stood duly transferred in his favour. In the wri; en statement, defendant No.1 pleaded that although the plot had ini(cid:24)ally been transferred in favour of the Page No. 1 of Total 7 Pages CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) plain(cid:24)ff, the plain(cid:24)ff had, on the very same day i.e. 11.01.2013, executed an agreement in favour of defendant No.1 in respect of one-half share of the plot measuring 81 square yards, pursuant where to possession had also been delivered.

#3. A>er issues were framed, the plain(cid:24)ff led his evidence. Two witnesses were examined and the plain(cid:24)ff's oral evidence was closed. Therea>er, despite availing opportuni(cid:24)es, the plain(cid:24)ff failed to produce documentary evidence and consequently, his evidence stood closed by order dated 15.09.2017.

#4. It was only therea>er that the present applica(cid:24)on under Order VI Rule 17 CPC came to be filed seeking amendment of the plaint by introducing averments that the agreement dated 11.01.2013 relied upon by defendant No.1 was illegal, void, without considera(cid:24)on, the result of fraud and misrepresenta(cid:24)on and liable to be set aside, besides seeking corresponding amendment in the prayer clause. The explana(cid:24)on furnished by the pe(cid:24)(cid:24)oner was that a>er engaging a new counsel and while preparing the case, it came to his no(cid:24)ce that the previous counsel had inadvertently omi; ed to challenge the aforesaid agreement and, therefore, the amendment had become necessary for effec(cid:24)ve adjudica(cid:24)on of the controversy.

#5. The learned Trial Court declined the prayer holding that the trial had already commenced and, in fact, the plain(cid:24)ff had concluded his evidence; that the agreement sought to be challenged was admi; edly within the plain(cid:24)ff's knowledge from the incep(cid:24)on of the li(cid:24)ga(cid:24)on; and permiBng the amendment at such belated stage would prejudice the defendants and reopen the trial.

#6. Assailing the aforesaid order, learned counsel for the pe(cid:24)(cid:24)oner contends that the learned Trial Court has adopted an unduly technical approach. It is argued that the proposed amendment is necessary for determining the real controversy between the par(cid:24)es and that mere delay cannot cons(cid:24)tute a ground to reject an amendment. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corpora(cid:16)on of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1128, to contend that amendments ought Page No. 2 of Total 7 Pages CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) ordinarily to be permi; ed, if they facilitate complete adjudica(cid:24)on of the dispute and avoid mul(cid:24)plicity of proceedings and that delay in itself cannot be ground to decline the amendment.

#7. Having heard learned counsel for the par(cid:24)es and having perused the record with their assistance, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdic(cid:24)onal error warran(cid:24)ng interference under Ar(cid:24)cle 227 of the Cons(cid:24)tu(cid:24)on.

#8. The controversy lies within a narrow compass. The ques(cid:24)on is not whether the amendment proposed by the plain(cid:24)ff may ul(cid:24)mately facilitate a complete adjudica(cid:24)on of the dispute. The real ques(cid:24)on is whether, a>er commencement of trial and a>er conclusion of the plain(cid:24)ff's evidence, the statutory condi(cid:24)ons contained in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC stood sa(cid:24)sfied so as to enable the Trial Court to exercise its discre(cid:24)on in favour of the plain(cid:24)ff.

#9. The answer, in the opinion of this Court, has necessarily to be in the nega(cid:24)ve. The agreement dated 11.01.2013, which the plain(cid:24)ff now seeks to challenge by incorpora(cid:24)ng an addi(cid:24)onal declaratory relief, is admi; edly not a document discovered subsequently. It is a document allegedly executed by the plain(cid:24)ff himself. More importantly, defendant No.1 had specifically founded his defence upon the said agreement in the wri; en statement filed immediately a>er ins(cid:24)tu(cid:24)on of the suit. The plain(cid:24)ff was, therefore, fully conscious not merely of the existence of the agreement but also of the fact that the defendants intended to rely upon it in resis(cid:24)ng the suit.

#10. Despite such knowledge, the plain(cid:24)ff chose to proceed with the suit on the original pleadings. He neither sought amendment before se; lement of issues nor at any stage before commencement of evidence. He examined his witnesses, concluded his oral evidence and therea>er also availed opportuni(cid:24)es for producing documentary evidence. It is only a>er his evidence stood concluded that the present applica(cid:24)on under Order VI Rule 17 CPC came to be ins(cid:24)tuted. Page No. 3 of Total 7 Pages CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M)

#11. It is also important to take note of the pleadings contained in the amendment applica(cid:24)on itself. A careful reading thereof shows that the plain(cid:24)ff has nowhere pleaded discovery of any new fact or subsequent event. There is no averment indica(cid:24)ng when the alleged omission in the plaint came to his knowledge. The applica(cid:24)on is conspicuously silent regarding the steps taken by him a>er filing of the wri; en statement or the circumstances which prevented him from seeking amendment before commencement of trial. The en(cid:24)re explana(cid:24)on is confined to a bald asser(cid:24)on that a>er engaging another counsel, it was no(cid:24)ced that the previous counsel had inadvertently failed to challenge the agreement dated 11.01.2013.

#12. In the considered opinion of this Court, such pleadings do not sa(cid:24)sfy the statutory requirement of due diligence. The proviso appended to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, marks a conscious departure from the unqualified discre(cid:24)on, which earlier existed in the ma; er of amendment of pleadings. The object behind the amendment was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Associa(cid:16)on, Tamil Nadu (II) v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344, wherein it was observed that the proviso was introduced to discourage belated amendments a>er commencement of trial and to ensure expedi(cid:24)ous disposal of civil proceedings.

#13. The mandatory character of the proviso was therea>er authorita(cid:24)vely recognised in Vidyabai and others v. Padmalatha and another, (2009) 2 SCC 409, wherein it was held that once the trial has commenced, the Court cannot exercise jurisdic(cid:24)on under Order VI Rule 17 CPC unless it first records sa(cid:24)sfac(cid:24)on that despite exercise of due diligence, the applicant could not have raised the ma; er before commencement of trial. The requirement of due diligence is, therefore, not procedural but jurisdic(cid:24)onal.

#14. The expression "due diligence" has itself been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117, wherein it was held that due diligence means the diligence reasonably expected from a prudent person ac(cid:24)ng in the conduct of his own affairs. The same principle was reiterated in J. Samuel and others v. Ga6u Mahesh and Page No. 4 of Total 7 Pages CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) others, (2012) 2 SCC 300, wherein it was held that negligence, inadvertence or omission cannot be equated with due diligence. Where the material facts were always within the knowledge of the party, subsequent realisa(cid:24)on that the pleadings were inadequate does not sa(cid:24)sfy the statutory requirement.

#15. Judged on the aforesaid touchstone, the explana(cid:24)on furnished by the pe(cid:24)(cid:24)oner does not inspire acceptance. The omission a;ributed to the previous counsel cannot, by itself, cons(cid:24)tute due diligence within the meaning of the proviso. A li(cid:24)gant is undoubtedly en(cid:24)tled to engage counsel of his choice and may in appropriate cases seek relief against the consequences of bona fide mistakes commi; ed by counsel. However, the statutory requirement under the proviso is of a different character. The Court is required to ascertain whether the party itself acted with reasonable diligence before the commencement of trial. If every omission on the part of an advocate were to be accepted as sufficient compliance with the proviso, the legisla(cid:24)ve restric(cid:24)on enacted by Parliament would become wholly ineffec(cid:24)ve, for every delayed amendment could therea>er be jus(cid:24)fied by a;ribu(cid:24)ng blame to the previous counsel.

#16. Another circumstance, which cannot be ignored is the stage at which the amendment has been sought. The proposed amendment is not confined to amplifica(cid:24)on of exis(cid:24)ng pleadings. By the amendment, the plain(cid:24)ff seeks to introduce allega(cid:24)ons of fraud, want of considera(cid:24)on and invalidity of the agreement dated 11.01.2013 and simultaneously seeks an addi(cid:24)onal declara(cid:24)on that the said agreement is illegal, void and liable to be set aside. Such pleadings necessarily require evidence. If the amendment were permi; ed a>er the plain(cid:24)ff had already concluded his evidence, the inevitable consequence would be reopening of the en(cid:24)re eviden(cid:24)ary exercise, recall or re-examina(cid:24)on of witnesses and corresponding opportunity to the defendants to amend their defence and lead further evidence. The prejudice, therefore, is not merely one of delay. It strikes at the orderly progress of the trial a>er the plain(cid:24)ff had already exhausted the opportunity available to him under law.

#17. The reliance placed upon Life Insurance Corpora(cid:16)on of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited (supra) is equally misplaced. The said judgment Page No. 5 of Total 7 Pages CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) undoubtedly reiterates that amendments necessary for determining the real controversy should ordinarily be allowed and that delay by itself ought not to defeat substan(cid:24)al jus(cid:24)ce. At the same (cid:24)me, the Supreme Court did not dilute the statutory embargo created by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. On the contrary, while summarising the governing principles, the Court reaffirmed that amendments sought a>er commencement of trial remain subject to the requirement of due diligence and the Court must also examine the prejudice likely to be caused to the opposite party.

#18. The present case does not turn upon delay alone. The applica(cid:24)on has failed because the pe(cid:24)(cid:24)oner has not laid even the basic factual founda(cid:24)on necessary for recording sa(cid:24)sfac(cid:24)on regarding due diligence. The dis(cid:24)nc(cid:24)on between delay and absence of due diligence is fundamental. While delay may in an appropriate case be compensated by costs, absence of due diligence strikes at the very jurisdic(cid:24)on of the Court to exercise discre(cid:24)on a>er commencement of trial.

#19. Before par(cid:24)ng with the merits of the controversy, it is considered appropriate to clarify that this Court has not examined the legality, validity or enforceability of the agreement dated 11.01.2013. Those ques(cid:24)ons do not arise for considera(cid:24)on in the present proceedings. The observa(cid:24)ons recorded herein are confined exclusively to examining the correctness of the order refusing amendment and shall not prejudice adjudica(cid:24)on of the suit on its own merits.

#20. The scope of interference under Ar(cid:24)cle 227 of the Cons(cid:24)tu(cid:24)on is also well se; led. Supervisory jurisdic(cid:24)on is intended to ensure that subordinate Courts act within the bounds of their authority. It is neither an appellate nor a revisional jurisdic(cid:24)on enabling the High Court to subs(cid:24)tute its own discre(cid:24)on merely because another view may also be possible. Unless the order impugned is shown to be patently perverse, contrary to se; led principles of law or suffering from jurisdic(cid:24)onal infirmity, interference would be unwarranted.

#21. The impugned order, viewed in the light of the principles no(cid:24)ced above, reflects a proper exercise of judicial discre(cid:24)on. The learned Trial Court has Page No. 6 of Total 7 Pages CR No. 144 of 2023 (O&M) correctly appreciated the scope of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, has recorded cogent reasons for holding that the pe(cid:24)(cid:24)oner failed to establish due diligence and has declined the amendment keeping in view the stage of the proceedings and the prejudice likely to be caused to the defendants. No perversity, arbitrariness or jurisdic(cid:24)onal error is discernible so as to warrant interference by this Court.

#22. Accordingly, the present revision pe(cid:24)(cid:24)on, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applica(cid:24)on(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. July 23, 2026 Sarita (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned? Whether reportable? : : Yes/No Yes/No Uploaded on: July 23, 2026 Page No. 7 of Total 7 Pages