The General Rubber Company Private Limited v. State of Haryana & Ors.

He has referred to the plans attached with the writ petition to elaborate and support his contentions. He submits that the notification under Section 4 dated 01.10.1973 could not be acted upon and lapsed due to heavy rush of work with the Land Acquisition Collector at that time and no prejudice was caused to the petitioner by issuance of the said notification. He contends that notice under Section 9 of the Act was duly issued to the petitioner and in any case, non-compliance of Section 9 of the Act would not vitiate the acquisition proceedings or the Award passed on 18.11.1982. He, on the basis of the above submissions, prays that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. We have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the land of the petitioner-company was earlier de-notified vide letter dated 31.12.1965 and, therefore, could not be acquired thereafter, cannot be accepted as it does not bar the acquisition of the land subsequently. The lapse of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act dated 01.10.1973 has not prejudiced the rights of the petitioner in any manner. A reasonable justification has been submitted by the respondents for not completing the acquisition proceedings by stating that because of heavy rush of work with the Land Acquisition Collector at that time, the proceedings could not be completed despite issuance of notice under Section 4 on 01.10.1973. CWP No. 1835 of 1984 7 The notification under challenge in the present writ petition issued under Section 4 of the Act dated 04.11.1977 (Annexure P-3) is for the development and utilization of the land as residential area in Sectors 31, 32, 35 and 36 of the Faridabad-Ballabgarh controlled area under the Haryana Development Authority Act, 1977, which is the public purpose. The notification was published in accordance with law. The objections were preferred by the land owners under Section 5-A of the Act. On consideration of the same, built up area, wherever it would possible, was not included in the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Some vacant area was also left out which could not be adjusted in the plan and could not be utilized for any purpose. Following that policy uniformly, the land of the petitioner, on which the factory of the petitioner was built, was left out of the acquisition. No specific instances have been given where factories similar to the petitioner having large chunk of vacant land, have been left out of the acquisition. An explanation has been given with regard to the open areas left out of the acquisition by the respondents by stating that it could not be adjusted in the plan and could not be utilized. This fact has not been contradicted or disputed by the petitioner in the replication preferred by it. Therefore, the allegation of discrimination, as made by the petitioner, cannot be accepted as the same is unsubstantiated. It would not be out of way to mention here that although the counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the factory of the petitioner has obtained license under the Explosives Act but has not placed any material on the record nor has referred to any rules and regulations which would be violated by acquiring the open land of the petitioners. The specifications, as prescribed by the Chief Inspector of Explosives, have also not been placed on record nor has it been pleaded by the petitioner CWP No. 1835 of 1984 8 that by the acquisition of the open land of the petitioner, the said specifications would stand violated, therefore, no benefit can be derived by the petitioner on this score. It has been specifically pleaded by the respondents that the land of the petitioner, which has been acquired, can be adjusted in the planning and will be utilized for the purpose, for which the acquisition has been made. A portion of the acquired land of the petitioner is required for widening of the roads, which is a public purpose. The maps attached with the writ petition have been perused by us and we are in agreement with the contention raised by the counsel for the respondents that the acquired land can be used for the purpose the land is being acquired. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner that notice has not been served on them as mandated under Section 9 of the Act and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings stood vitiated, has factually been denied by the respondents. However, non-compliance of the provisions of Section 9 of the Act would not be fatal as far as the proceedings of Land Acquisition Act are concerned. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamilnadu vs. Mahaluxmi Ammal, (1996) 7 SCC 269 that in the absence of notice under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act or failure to serve such notice does not invalidate the Award passed under Section 11 of the Act. This preposition has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Nasik Municipal Corporation vs. Harbans Lal Laikwant Raipal, (1997) 4 SCC 199 and Union of India vs. Parmod Gupta, (2005) 12 SCC 1 while dealing with Section 9 of the Act where it was contended that the Award would be vitiated for non-compliance of the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. CWP No. 1835 of 1984 9 In any case, there is an inordinate delay by the petitioner in approaching this Court by way of present writ petition. The notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 04.11.1977, notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 01.11.1980 and thereafter, the Award was passed on 18.11.1982 and the present writ petition has been filed on

23.04.1984. There is a delay of about 6 ½ years in approaching this Court when taken from the date of issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act, delay of about 3 ½ years from the date of issuance of notification under Section 6 of the Act and about 1 ½ years from the date of announcement of the Award. In the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Industrial Development and Investment Company (P) Limited (supra), Municipal Council, Ahmednagar vs. Shah Hyder Beig (supra), C.Padma vs. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu, (supra), Star Wire (India) Ltd. vs. State of Haryana (supra) and M/s Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), the present writ petition is not maintainable. In view of the above, the present writ petition fails and the same stands dismissed. ( JASBIR SINGH ) JUDGE ( AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ) JUDGE July 21, 2010