State of U.P v. Laxmi and

(i). PW-1, Ramesh - this witness is the first informant of the case. He proved the carbon copy of the application given to the Superintendent of Police which was marked as Ext. Ka-1. He has further proved the application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. and also the supporting affidavit which were marked as Exts. Ka-2 and Ka-3. This witness has attempted to support the F.I.R. by giving a photo copy description of the manner of occurrence as stated in the F.I.R. However, in his examination in chief, this witness could not prove the prosecution story as unfolded in the F.I.R. as he failed to identify the author of gun shot injury alleged to have been sustained by him. (ii). PW-2, Ram Prakash who was adduced by the prosecution as a witness of fact has not supported the prosecution case in his deposition before Court below. Resultantly he was declared hostile. (iii). PW-3, Head Constable Awadhesh Kumar- This witness was posted as Head Constable, Police Station- Malwa at the relevant point of time. He has proved the check F.I.R. prepared by him which was marked as Ext. Ka-4 and the carbon copy of the G.D. entry made by him which was marked as EXt- Ka-5 . (iv). PW-4, Dr. Vikas Mishra is the Doctor who had treated the injured i.e. first informant/P.W.1 at Sharma Nursing home. This witness has detailed the treatment given to the injured and has also proved the paper No. 9A/1, which was marked as Ext. Ka-6. 4 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 (v). PW-5, Chief Pharmacist, Hubaram Singh is Chief Pharmacist in the emergency ward of District Hospital, Fatehpur. This witness has produced the copy of the emergency outdoor patient register, which was marked as Ext.Ka-7. The name of the informant is mentioned in the said register but no further details relating to the informant/appellant are mentioned therein. (vi). PW-6, Santosh Kumar Singh- was adduced by the prosecution as an eye witness of the occurrence. However, this witness has not supported the prosecution story as unfolded in the F.I.R. Therefore, he was declared hostile. (vii). P.W.7 Dhyan Singh is the real brother of informant/P.W.1. This witness is alleged to be an eye witness of the crime in question in the f.I.R. but he has not supported the prosecution story in his deposition before court below. As such he was declared hostile. (viii) P.W.8, S. I, Rambabu Mishra is the Investigating Officer of the case. He has proved the site plan of the place of occurrence prepared by him which was marked as Ext. Ka-8 and also the charge sheet prepared by him, which was marked as Ext.Ka-9. He has also detailed the manner of investigation. (ix) P.W.9, Dr. Kamalkanti is the Doctor at Nursing Home where the injured/informant/ P.W.1 was admitted for treatment. This witness has proved the document 97 B3 and 97 B4 regarding the distruction of record of patient after ten years and its publication in the news paper, which were marked as Ext. Ka-10.

11. Apart from relying upon the depositions of aforementioned prosecution witness, the prosecution also relied upon documentary evidence in proof of it's case, which is as under: (i). Ext-Ka-1, The application submitted to Superintendent of Police proved by P.W.1. (ii). Ext-Ka-2 Application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. proved by P.W.-1. (iii) Ext. Ka.-3, Affidavit proved by P.W.-1. (iv). Ext-Ka-4, Check F.I.R. proved by P.W.-3. (v). Ext-Ka-5, Carbon copy of Diary proved by P.W.-3 (vi). Ext-Ka-6, Discharge slip proved by P.W.-4. 5 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 (vii). Ext-Ka-7, Register of patient admitted in Emergency Ward of District Hospital, Fatehpur, proved by P.W.-4. (viii). Ext-Ka-8, Site Plan. proved by P.W.-8. (ix). Ext-Ka-9, Charge Sheet proved by P.W.-8. (x). Ext-Ka-10, Advertisement in News-Paper proved by P.W.-9.

12. Prosecution also relied upon material exhibit i.e. the death certificate of accused Ram Kishore Lodi, which was proved by C.W.-1, S. I., Praveen Kumar Yadav, and accordingly marked as Ext. C-1. This witness has proved the factum regarding death of accused Ram Kishore Lodhi.

13. After the prosecution evidence was over, all the adverse and incriminating circumstances were put to the accused. They denied the same. In respect of depositions of P.W.-1, P.W.3, P.W.-4, P.W.-5 and P.W.-8, it was stated by the accused that it is false. In respect of testimonies of P.W.-2, P.W.-6, P.W.-7, the accused pleaded that they have nothing to say. It was additionally stated that criminal prosecution has been launched on account of some mis-understanding and rivalry. They further denied to give defence evidence but pleaded that they are innocent. According to the accused, the have been implicated in the crime in question on account of village politics.

14. Accused got summoned one Raj Rani, who deposed before court below as C.W.-2. This witness has proved the death of accused Ram Kishor Lodhi.

15. As accused Ram Kishore Lodhi died on 15.08.2021, consequently, court below abated the trial against him vide order dated 06.02.2024.

16. Court below thereafter examined the material on record and evaluated the evidence to find out the guilt of accused if any in the crime in question. After having undertaken the said exercise, court below came to the conclusion that the only question involved in the trial is:- Whether the prosecution has been successful in proving the guilt of accused beyond doubt or not?

17. Court below, thereafter, evaluated and examined the prosecution case in the light of evidence on record and ultimately vide judgement dated 11.09.2025 came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of accused beyond doubt (beyond reasonable doubt) and therefore, acquitted the accused i.e. opposite parties 2 and 3 of the charges framed against them on the following grounds/reasons: i. In the F.I.R. lodged by first informant/appellant Ramesh, it is alleged that 6 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 accused Laxmi fired at him with a country made 12 bore gun, on account of which, he sustained firearm injury on his chest. However, in his examination-in-chief, this witness has failed to recognized the author of the gun shot injury sustained by him. ii. P.W.-2, Ramesh was produced by the prosecution as an independent eye witness of the occurrence. This witness has identified the accused as they are the residents of his village. However, he has denied the factum of his having witnessed the occurrence in question. As such, he was declared hostile. iii. P.W.-6, Santosh Kumar Singh brother injured/informant/appellant. In the F.I.R. this witness is shown coming on a bicycle behind the injured/informant. As such, he was nominated as an eye witness. However, this witness has not supported the prosecution. According to this witness, no occurrence as alleged took place. He has further denied the fact that he and his brother took the injured i.e. informant to the Hospital after the occurrence. Resultantly, this witness was declared hostile. iv. P.W.-7, Dhyan Singh is also the brother of injured/informant/appellant. His name finds mention in the F.I.R. This witness is alleged to have witnessed the occurrence as he is alleged to be returning to the village on a bicycle and was behind the informant/appellant. However, this witness in his deposition before court below has completely denied his presence. He was thus declared hostile. v. P.W.-6 and P.W.-7, who are real brothers of the informant/appellant and alleged to be an eye witness of the occurrence have not supported the prosecution story. The same creates a doubt much less a serious doubt regarding the prosecution case. vi. Immediately after the occurrence, a report was submitted at police station concerned but against unknown person. However, the prosecution has failed to prove the same. vii. The delay in lodging the complaint has not been sufficiently explained.

18. Thus feeling aggrieved by the above judgement dated 11.09.2025 passed by court below, appellant, who is the first informant, has now approached this court by means of present criminal appeal.

19. Mr. Anjeet Singh, the learned counsel for appellant in challenge to the 7 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 impugned judgement passed by court below contends that the same is manifestly illegal. Elaborating his submission, he submits that present case is a case of direct evidence inasmuch as P.W.-1, the first informant Ramesh Lodhi is an injured eye witness. This witness had fully supported the prosecution case in his deposition before court below. Since P.W.-1 is an injured eye witness, therefore, he would submit that his deposition has higher evidentiary value than an ordinary witness. As such, the same could have been brushed aside by court below only for compelling reason. No such compelling reason emerged on record, on the basis of which, P.W.-1 could be held to be unworthy of trust and acceptance. As such, court below has erred in law in disbelieving P.W.-1, the injured eye witness. To lend legal support to his submission, he has relied upon the judgement of Supreme Court in Manjeet Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Others, 2021 SCC Online SC 632, wherein Court has observed that the deposition of an injured witness has higher evidentiary value than an ordinary witness. As such, deposition of an injured witness can be discarded only for compelling reasons and not otherwise. Following was observed by the bench in paragraph 20 of the report:- "20. Now thereafter when in the examination-in-chief the appellant herein — victim — injured eyewitness has specifically named the private respondents herein with specific role attributed to them, the learned trial court as well as the High Court ought to have summoned the private respondents herein to face the trial. At this stage it is required to be noted that so far as the appellant herein is concerned he is an injured eyewitness. As observed by this Court in State of M.P. v. Mansingh [State of M.P. v. Mansingh, (2003) 10 SCC 414 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 390] (para 9); Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. [Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1262] ; State of U.P. v. Naresh [State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 216] , the evidence of an injured eyewitness has greater evidential value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. As observed hereinabove while exercising the powers under Section 319CrPC the court has not to wait till the cross-examination and on the basis of the examination-in-chief of a witness if a case is made out, a person can be summoned to face the trial under Section 319CrPC."

20. It was next submitted by the learned counsel for appellant that it is the quality of evidence and not the quantity of evidence, which determines the fate of prosecution. He would therefore contend that even if P.W.-2-Ram Prakash, P.W.-6, Santosh Kumar Singh and P.W.-7, Dhyan Singh were declared hostile yet same would not negate the prosecution case as P.W.-1, Ramesh Lodhi, the first informant, who is an injured eye witness has fully supported the prosecution case. According to the learned counsel for appellant, it is well settled that conviction of an accused can be sustained on 8 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 the basis of deposition of a single eye witness. The deposition of P.W.-1 further stands corroborated from the documentary evidence on record, which clearly shows that the injured appellant was treated of gun-shot injury.

21. However, irrespective of above, court below has drawn an adverse inference against the prosecution. On basis thereof and also the minor contradictions which emerged in the deposition of P.W.-1, it came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of accused beyond doubt i.e. beyond reasonable doubt. According to the learned counsel for appellant, the deposition of a witness has to be read as a whole as held by Apex Court in (i) State of U.P. Vs. M.K. Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505, (ii) Leela Ram Vs. State of H.R (1999) 9 SCC 525 (iii) Balu Sudam Khalde Vs. State of M.H. (2023) 13 SCC 365. When the deposition of P.W.- 1 is examined as a whole, the minor contradictions appearing therein do not lead to an inference that P.W.-1 is unworthy of acceptance. To the contrary, his deposition has fully proved the guilt of accused i.e. opposite parties 2 and 3. On the edifice of aforesaid submissions, it is thus urged by the learned counsel for appellant that the impugned judgement cannot be sustained in law and fact and therefore, same is liable to be set aside by this Court.

22. Per contra, Mr. Pankaj Srivastava, the learned A.G.A. Ist alongwith Mr Prashant Kumar, the learned A.G.A. for State has vehemently opposed the present appeal. He submits that the impugned judgement passed by court below is fully sustainable in law and fact. Neither any illegality has been committed by court below in acquitting the accused i.e. opposite parties 2 and 3 of the charges framed against them, nor any perversity can be attached to the impugned judgement as court below has neither overlooked any material piece of evidence nor misconstrued any vital evidence. The finding of acquittal recorded by court below in favour of accused i.e. opposite parties 2 and 3 is based upon due appraisal and appreciation of the material evidence on record. There is nothing on record to suggest that an opinion regarding the guilt of the accused could be formed on the basis of same.

23. At this juncture, the learned A.G.A. Ist invited the attention of Court to the prosecution story which has been narrated in paragraph-3 of the impugned judgement and has also been quoted herein above. In the light of above, the learned A.G.A. Ist submits that P.W.-6 and P.W.-7, who are said to be the brothers of the injured/informant, have not supported the prosecution case, which makes the prosecution case doubtful. Furthermore, the first informant/injured in his cross-examination could not identify the accused, who had fired at him and caused gun shot injury. In view of aforesaid adverse circumstances, the inference drawn by court below that prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable 9 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 doubt cannot be said to be illegal, perverse or erroneous. On the edifice of above submissions, the learned A.G.A. Ist thus urged that the present appeal is liable to be dismissed.

24. Having heard the learned counsel for appellant, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1 and upon perusal of record, this Court finds that present case is a case of direct evidence. P.W.-Ramesh Lodhit, who is an injured witness, is also the first informant of the case. Therefore, the only question, which is required to be answered in this appeal is:- Whether court below has rightly disbelieved P.W.-1 and on basis thereof acquitted the accused i.e. opposite parties 2 and 3 of the charges framed against them.

25. Before we proceed to answer the said question, it may be noted that the manner of evaluating the deposition of an eye witness in a case based on direct evidence is no longer res-integra and has been dealt with by the Supreme Court on numerous occasions. In the regard, reference be made to the recent decision of Supreme Court in Shahaja Alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 12 SCC 558 wherein Court has observed regarding the manner in which the deposition of an eye witness is to be considered. Paragraph 29 of the said report is relevant for the controversy in hand. Accordingly, the same is extracted herein-under:- "29. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under:

29.1. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief

29.2. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details.

29.3. When eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make 10 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.

29.4. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.

29.5. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.

29.6. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen.

29.7. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.

29.8. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.

29.9. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.

29.10. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person.

29.11. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.

29.12. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness 11 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him.

29.13. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness." 26 Court below upon evaluation of the deposition of P.W.-1, Ramesh Lodhi has inferred that though in the F.I.R. the role of firing was assigned to accused Laxmi, however, P.W.-1 in his examination in chief failed to recognise the person, who had fired gun shot at him. As such, P.W.-1, himself could not prove the prosecution story as unfolded in the F.I.R., which is the basic prosecution case and further the F.I.R. was lodged by the informant P.W.-1, himself. Secondly, it is the admitted case of the prosecution that the brothers of informant P.W.-1 were following the informant on their bicycle. After the occurrence, his brother, Santosh Kumar and Rohini had lifted the injured informant and took him to the school. Thereafter, information was given on phone at the home of informant regarding the occurrence. Santosh Kumar brother of informant deposed before court below as P.W.-6 whereas Dyan Singh also the brother of informant deposed before court below as P.W.-7. Both the aforementioned witness have not supported the prosecution story and were therefore declared hostile. For reasons best known to the prosecution Rohini who is alleged to be an eye witness of the occurrence was not produced before court below.

27. It is thus apparent that the first informant and the prosecution witnesses, who are alleged to be an eye witness of the occurrence have themselves not supported the prosecution story as unfolded in the F.I.R. As such, the prosecution has failed to establish the very story, which it set out to prove. In view of above, it cannot be said that the only view which can be denuded from the circumstances of the case as well as the evidence on record is that the guilt of the accused is proved. Apart from above, no perversity is to be found in the impugned judgement as court below has neither ignored any evidence nor has it mis-construed any evidence. In short, the conclusion drawn by court below that prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt commensurates with the weight of evidence on record.

28. Accused opposite parties 2 and 3 were also charged for and offence under Sections 504 and 506 I.P.C. Admittedly, the first informant, who 12 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 deposed before court below as P.W.-1 has failed to prove the very story stated by him in the F.I.R., which is also the basic prosecution case. The deposition of P.W.-1 before court below is like a photocopy description of the F.I.R.

29. The provisions of Section 504 and 506 IPC have been considered by the Apex Court in the case of Mohammad Wajid and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951. Paragraphs 25, 26, 27, 29 and 30 of the said report are relevant for the controversy in hand, therefore, the same are extracted herein below;- "25. Chapter XXII IPC relates to criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance. Section 503 reads thus: "503. Criminal intimidation.—Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation."

26. Section 504 reads thus: "504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.—Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."

27. Section 506 reads thus: "506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; if threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.—and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both." 13 NC413 No. 620 of 2025

29. Section 504 IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender.

30. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504 IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant."

30. The provisions of Section 506 I.P.C. came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Manik Taneja and another Vs. State of Karnataka, (2015( 7 SCC 423, wherein following was observed by the Bench in paragraph 11 of the report:- "11. Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation. "Criminal intimidation" as defined in Section 503 IPC is as under:- "503. Criminal Intimidation.- Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section." A reading of the definition of "Criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to 14 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do." 31 Similarly, in Vikram Johar Vs. State of U.P. (2019) 14 SCC 207, the Bench reaffirmed the earlier judgement in the case of Manik Taneja (supra).

32. Admittedly, the occurrence itself could not be proved by the informant/appellant and, therefore, the commission of an offence under Section 506 I.P.C. does not arise.

33. Court below has further observed that there is delay in lodging the F.I.R. and the said delay has not been sufficiently explained. The view so taken by court below is clearly sustainable in view of the observations made by the Apex Court in P. Ramchandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578, P. Rajagopal And Ors. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2019 SC 2866/2019(5) SCC 403, Hasmukhlal D. Vora and Another Vs. State of U.P. (2022) 15 SCC 164, Sekaran Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2024) 2 SCC 176, Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur @ Banti Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, 2024 SCC Online 938 it is urged by the learned counsel for applicant that since there is unexplained delay in lodging the F.I.R. therefore, the prosecution of applicants cannot be sustained. Much emphasis was laid to the judgement of Supreme Court in Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur (supra) wherein the Court quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the accused therein as there was an unexplained delay of 39 days in lodging the F.I.R.

34. For all the reasons noted above, the inescapable conclusion is that Court below has not committed any illegality or perversity in passing the impugned judgment. We, therefore, do not find any good reason to interfere in present appeal.

36. In view of the discussions made above, the present appeals fails and is liable to be dismissed.

37. It is accordingly dismissed. November 6, 2025 YK (Dr. Ajay Kumar-II,J.) (Rajeev Misra,J.)

(i). PW-1, Ramesh - this witness is the first informant of the case. He proved the carbon copy of the application given to the Superintendent of Police which was marked as Ext. Ka-1. He has further proved the application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. and also the supporting affidavit which were marked as Exts. Ka-2 and Ka-3. This witness has attempted to support the F.I.R. by giving a photo copy description of the manner of occurrence as stated in the F.I.R. However, in his examination in chief, this witness could not prove the prosecution story as unfolded in the F.I.R. as he failed to identify the author of gun shot injury alleged to have been sustained by him. (ii). PW-2, Ram Prakash who was adduced by the prosecution as a witness of fact has not supported the prosecution case in his deposition before Court below. Resultantly he was declared hostile. (iii). PW-3, Head Constable Awadhesh Kumar- This witness was posted as Head Constable, Police Station- Malwa at the relevant point of time. He has proved the check F.I.R. prepared by him which was marked as Ext. Ka-4 and the carbon copy of the G.D. entry made by him which was marked as EXt- Ka-5 . (iv). PW-4, Dr. Vikas Mishra is the Doctor who had treated the injured i.e. first informant/P.W.1 at Sharma Nursing home. This witness has detailed the treatment given to the injured and has also proved the paper No. 9A/1, which was marked as Ext. Ka-6. 4 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 (v). PW-5, Chief Pharmacist, Hubaram Singh is Chief Pharmacist in the emergency ward of District Hospital, Fatehpur. This witness has produced the copy of the emergency outdoor patient register, which was marked as Ext.Ka-7. The name of the informant is mentioned in the said register but no further details relating to the informant/appellant are mentioned therein. (vi). PW-6, Santosh Kumar Singh- was adduced by the prosecution as an eye witness of the occurrence. However, this witness has not supported the prosecution story as unfolded in the F.I.R. Therefore, he was declared hostile. (vii). P.W.7 Dhyan Singh is the real brother of informant/P.W.1. This witness is alleged to be an eye witness of the crime in question in the f.I.R. but he has not supported the prosecution story in his deposition before court below. As such he was declared hostile. (viii) P.W.8, S. I, Rambabu Mishra is the Investigating Officer of the case. He has proved the site plan of the place of occurrence prepared by him which was marked as Ext. Ka-8 and also the charge sheet prepared by him, which was marked as Ext.Ka-9. He has also detailed the manner of investigation. (ix) P.W.9, Dr. Kamalkanti is the Doctor at Nursing Home where the injured/informant/ P.W.1 was admitted for treatment. This witness has proved the document 97 B3 and 97 B4 regarding the distruction of record of patient after ten years and its publication in the news paper, which were marked as Ext. Ka-10.

11. Apart from relying upon the depositions of aforementioned prosecution witness, the prosecution also relied upon documentary evidence in proof of it's case, which is as under: (i). Ext-Ka-1, The application submitted to Superintendent of Police proved by P.W.1. (ii). Ext-Ka-2 Application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. proved by P.W.-1. (iii) Ext. Ka.-3, Affidavit proved by P.W.-1. (iv). Ext-Ka-4, Check F.I.R. proved by P.W.-3. (v). Ext-Ka-5, Carbon copy of Diary proved by P.W.-3 (vi). Ext-Ka-6, Discharge slip proved by P.W.-4. 5 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 (vii). Ext-Ka-7, Register of patient admitted in Emergency Ward of District Hospital, Fatehpur, proved by P.W.-4. (viii). Ext-Ka-8, Site Plan. proved by P.W.-8. (ix). Ext-Ka-9, Charge Sheet proved by P.W.-8. (x). Ext-Ka-10, Advertisement in News-Paper proved by P.W.-9.

12. Prosecution also relied upon material exhibit i.e. the death certificate of accused Ram Kishore Lodi, which was proved by C.W.-1, S. I., Praveen Kumar Yadav, and accordingly marked as Ext. C-1. This witness has proved the factum regarding death of accused Ram Kishore Lodhi.

13. After the prosecution evidence was over, all the adverse and incriminating circumstances were put to the accused. They denied the same. In respect of depositions of P.W.-1, P.W.3, P.W.-4, P.W.-5 and P.W.-8, it was stated by the accused that it is false. In respect of testimonies of P.W.-2, P.W.-6, P.W.-7, the accused pleaded that they have nothing to say. It was additionally stated that criminal prosecution has been launched on account of some mis-understanding and rivalry. They further denied to give defence evidence but pleaded that they are innocent. According to the accused, the have been implicated in the crime in question on account of village politics.

14. Accused got summoned one Raj Rani, who deposed before court below as C.W.-2. This witness has proved the death of accused Ram Kishor Lodhi.

15. As accused Ram Kishore Lodhi died on 15.08.2021, consequently, court below abated the trial against him vide order dated 06.02.2024.

16. Court below thereafter examined the material on record and evaluated the evidence to find out the guilt of accused if any in the crime in question. After having undertaken the said exercise, court below came to the conclusion that the only question involved in the trial is:- Whether the prosecution has been successful in proving the guilt of accused beyond doubt or not?

17. Court below, thereafter, evaluated and examined the prosecution case in the light of evidence on record and ultimately vide judgement dated 11.09.2025 came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of accused beyond doubt (beyond reasonable doubt) and therefore, acquitted the accused i.e. opposite parties 2 and 3 of the charges framed against them on the following grounds/reasons: i. In the F.I.R. lodged by first informant/appellant Ramesh, it is alleged that 6 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 accused Laxmi fired at him with a country made 12 bore gun, on account of which, he sustained firearm injury on his chest. However, in his examination-in-chief, this witness has failed to recognized the author of the gun shot injury sustained by him. ii. P.W.-2, Ramesh was produced by the prosecution as an independent eye witness of the occurrence. This witness has identified the accused as they are the residents of his village. However, he has denied the factum of his having witnessed the occurrence in question. As such, he was declared hostile. iii. P.W.-6, Santosh Kumar Singh brother injured/informant/appellant. In the F.I.R. this witness is shown coming on a bicycle behind the injured/informant. As such, he was nominated as an eye witness. However, this witness has not supported the prosecution. According to this witness, no occurrence as alleged took place. He has further denied the fact that he and his brother took the injured i.e. informant to the Hospital after the occurrence. Resultantly, this witness was declared hostile. iv. P.W.-7, Dhyan Singh is also the brother of injured/informant/appellant. His name finds mention in the F.I.R. This witness is alleged to have witnessed the occurrence as he is alleged to be returning to the village on a bicycle and was behind the informant/appellant. However, this witness in his deposition before court below has completely denied his presence. He was thus declared hostile. v. P.W.-6 and P.W.-7, who are real brothers of the informant/appellant and alleged to be an eye witness of the occurrence have not supported the prosecution story. The same creates a doubt much less a serious doubt regarding the prosecution case. vi. Immediately after the occurrence, a report was submitted at police station concerned but against unknown person. However, the prosecution has failed to prove the same. vii. The delay in lodging the complaint has not been sufficiently explained.

18. Thus feeling aggrieved by the above judgement dated 11.09.2025 passed by court below, appellant, who is the first informant, has now approached this court by means of present criminal appeal.

19. Mr. Anjeet Singh, the learned counsel for appellant in challenge to the 7 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 impugned judgement passed by court below contends that the same is manifestly illegal. Elaborating his submission, he submits that present case is a case of direct evidence inasmuch as P.W.-1, the first informant Ramesh Lodhi is an injured eye witness. This witness had fully supported the prosecution case in his deposition before court below. Since P.W.-1 is an injured eye witness, therefore, he would submit that his deposition has higher evidentiary value than an ordinary witness. As such, the same could have been brushed aside by court below only for compelling reason. No such compelling reason emerged on record, on the basis of which, P.W.-1 could be held to be unworthy of trust and acceptance. As such, court below has erred in law in disbelieving P.W.-1, the injured eye witness. To lend legal support to his submission, he has relied upon the judgement of Supreme Court in Manjeet Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Others, 2021 SCC Online SC 632, wherein Court has observed that the deposition of an injured witness has higher evidentiary value than an ordinary witness. As such, deposition of an injured witness can be discarded only for compelling reasons and not otherwise. Following was observed by the bench in paragraph 20 of the report:- "20. Now thereafter when in the examination-in-chief the appellant herein — victim — injured eyewitness has specifically named the private respondents herein with specific role attributed to them, the learned trial court as well as the High Court ought to have summoned the private respondents herein to face the trial. At this stage it is required to be noted that so far as the appellant herein is concerned he is an injured eyewitness. As observed by this Court in State of M.P. v. Mansingh [State of M.P. v. Mansingh, (2003) 10 SCC 414 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 390] (para 9); Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. [Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1262] ; State of U.P. v. Naresh [State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 216] , the evidence of an injured eyewitness has greater evidential value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. As observed hereinabove while exercising the powers under Section 319CrPC the court has not to wait till the cross-examination and on the basis of the examination-in-chief of a witness if a case is made out, a person can be summoned to face the trial under Section 319CrPC."

20. It was next submitted by the learned counsel for appellant that it is the quality of evidence and not the quantity of evidence, which determines the fate of prosecution. He would therefore contend that even if P.W.-2-Ram Prakash, P.W.-6, Santosh Kumar Singh and P.W.-7, Dhyan Singh were declared hostile yet same would not negate the prosecution case as P.W.-1, Ramesh Lodhi, the first informant, who is an injured eye witness has fully supported the prosecution case. According to the learned counsel for appellant, it is well settled that conviction of an accused can be sustained on 8 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 the basis of deposition of a single eye witness. The deposition of P.W.-1 further stands corroborated from the documentary evidence on record, which clearly shows that the injured appellant was treated of gun-shot injury.

21. However, irrespective of above, court below has drawn an adverse inference against the prosecution. On basis thereof and also the minor contradictions which emerged in the deposition of P.W.-1, it came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of accused beyond doubt i.e. beyond reasonable doubt. According to the learned counsel for appellant, the deposition of a witness has to be read as a whole as held by Apex Court in (i) State of U.P. Vs. M.K. Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505, (ii) Leela Ram Vs. State of H.R (1999) 9 SCC 525 (iii) Balu Sudam Khalde Vs. State of M.H. (2023) 13 SCC 365. When the deposition of P.W.- 1 is examined as a whole, the minor contradictions appearing therein do not lead to an inference that P.W.-1 is unworthy of acceptance. To the contrary, his deposition has fully proved the guilt of accused i.e. opposite parties 2 and 3. On the edifice of aforesaid submissions, it is thus urged by the learned counsel for appellant that the impugned judgement cannot be sustained in law and fact and therefore, same is liable to be set aside by this Court.

22. Per contra, Mr. Pankaj Srivastava, the learned A.G.A. Ist alongwith Mr Prashant Kumar, the learned A.G.A. for State has vehemently opposed the present appeal. He submits that the impugned judgement passed by court below is fully sustainable in law and fact. Neither any illegality has been committed by court below in acquitting the accused i.e. opposite parties 2 and 3 of the charges framed against them, nor any perversity can be attached to the impugned judgement as court below has neither overlooked any material piece of evidence nor misconstrued any vital evidence. The finding of acquittal recorded by court below in favour of accused i.e. opposite parties 2 and 3 is based upon due appraisal and appreciation of the material evidence on record. There is nothing on record to suggest that an opinion regarding the guilt of the accused could be formed on the basis of same.

23. At this juncture, the learned A.G.A. Ist invited the attention of Court to the prosecution story which has been narrated in paragraph-3 of the impugned judgement and has also been quoted herein above. In the light of above, the learned A.G.A. Ist submits that P.W.-6 and P.W.-7, who are said to be the brothers of the injured/informant, have not supported the prosecution case, which makes the prosecution case doubtful. Furthermore, the first informant/injured in his cross-examination could not identify the accused, who had fired at him and caused gun shot injury. In view of aforesaid adverse circumstances, the inference drawn by court below that prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable 9 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 doubt cannot be said to be illegal, perverse or erroneous. On the edifice of above submissions, the learned A.G.A. Ist thus urged that the present appeal is liable to be dismissed.

24. Having heard the learned counsel for appellant, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1 and upon perusal of record, this Court finds that present case is a case of direct evidence. P.W.-Ramesh Lodhit, who is an injured witness, is also the first informant of the case. Therefore, the only question, which is required to be answered in this appeal is:- Whether court below has rightly disbelieved P.W.-1 and on basis thereof acquitted the accused i.e. opposite parties 2 and 3 of the charges framed against them.

25. Before we proceed to answer the said question, it may be noted that the manner of evaluating the deposition of an eye witness in a case based on direct evidence is no longer res-integra and has been dealt with by the Supreme Court on numerous occasions. In the regard, reference be made to the recent decision of Supreme Court in Shahaja Alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 12 SCC 558 wherein Court has observed regarding the manner in which the deposition of an eye witness is to be considered. Paragraph 29 of the said report is relevant for the controversy in hand. Accordingly, the same is extracted herein-under:- "29. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under:

29.1. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief

29.2. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details.

29.3. When eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make 10 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.

29.4. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.

29.5. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.

29.6. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen.

29.7. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.

29.8. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.

29.9. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.

29.10. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person.

29.11. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.

29.12. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness 11 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him.

29.13. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness." 26 Court below upon evaluation of the deposition of P.W.-1, Ramesh Lodhi has inferred that though in the F.I.R. the role of firing was assigned to accused Laxmi, however, P.W.-1 in his examination in chief failed to recognise the person, who had fired gun shot at him. As such, P.W.-1, himself could not prove the prosecution story as unfolded in the F.I.R., which is the basic prosecution case and further the F.I.R. was lodged by the informant P.W.-1, himself. Secondly, it is the admitted case of the prosecution that the brothers of informant P.W.-1 were following the informant on their bicycle. After the occurrence, his brother, Santosh Kumar and Rohini had lifted the injured informant and took him to the school. Thereafter, information was given on phone at the home of informant regarding the occurrence. Santosh Kumar brother of informant deposed before court below as P.W.-6 whereas Dyan Singh also the brother of informant deposed before court below as P.W.-7. Both the aforementioned witness have not supported the prosecution story and were therefore declared hostile. For reasons best known to the prosecution Rohini who is alleged to be an eye witness of the occurrence was not produced before court below.

27. It is thus apparent that the first informant and the prosecution witnesses, who are alleged to be an eye witness of the occurrence have themselves not supported the prosecution story as unfolded in the F.I.R. As such, the prosecution has failed to establish the very story, which it set out to prove. In view of above, it cannot be said that the only view which can be denuded from the circumstances of the case as well as the evidence on record is that the guilt of the accused is proved. Apart from above, no perversity is to be found in the impugned judgement as court below has neither ignored any evidence nor has it mis-construed any evidence. In short, the conclusion drawn by court below that prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt commensurates with the weight of evidence on record.

28. Accused opposite parties 2 and 3 were also charged for and offence under Sections 504 and 506 I.P.C. Admittedly, the first informant, who 12 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 deposed before court below as P.W.-1 has failed to prove the very story stated by him in the F.I.R., which is also the basic prosecution case. The deposition of P.W.-1 before court below is like a photocopy description of the F.I.R.

29. The provisions of Section 504 and 506 IPC have been considered by the Apex Court in the case of Mohammad Wajid and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951. Paragraphs 25, 26, 27, 29 and 30 of the said report are relevant for the controversy in hand, therefore, the same are extracted herein below;- "25. Chapter XXII IPC relates to criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance. Section 503 reads thus: "503. Criminal intimidation.—Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation."

26. Section 504 reads thus: "504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.—Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."

27. Section 506 reads thus: "506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; if threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.—and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both." 13 NC413 No. 620 of 2025

29. Section 504 IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender.

30. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504 IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant."

30. The provisions of Section 506 I.P.C. came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Manik Taneja and another Vs. State of Karnataka, (2015( 7 SCC 423, wherein following was observed by the Bench in paragraph 11 of the report:- "11. Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation. "Criminal intimidation" as defined in Section 503 IPC is as under:- "503. Criminal Intimidation.- Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section." A reading of the definition of "Criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to 14 NC413 No. 620 of 2025 do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do." 31 Similarly, in Vikram Johar Vs. State of U.P. (2019) 14 SCC 207, the Bench reaffirmed the earlier judgement in the case of Manik Taneja (supra).

32. Admittedly, the occurrence itself could not be proved by the informant/appellant and, therefore, the commission of an offence under Section 506 I.P.C. does not arise.

33. Court below has further observed that there is delay in lodging the F.I.R. and the said delay has not been sufficiently explained. The view so taken by court below is clearly sustainable in view of the observations made by the Apex Court in P. Ramchandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578, P. Rajagopal And Ors. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2019 SC 2866/2019(5) SCC 403, Hasmukhlal D. Vora and Another Vs. State of U.P. (2022) 15 SCC 164, Sekaran Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2024) 2 SCC 176, Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur @ Banti Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, 2024 SCC Online 938 it is urged by the learned counsel for applicant that since there is unexplained delay in lodging the F.I.R. therefore, the prosecution of applicants cannot be sustained. Much emphasis was laid to the judgement of Supreme Court in Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur (supra) wherein the Court quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the accused therein as there was an unexplained delay of 39 days in lodging the F.I.R.

34. For all the reasons noted above, the inescapable conclusion is that Court below has not committed any illegality or perversity in passing the impugned judgment. We, therefore, do not find any good reason to interfere in present appeal.

36. In view of the discussions made above, the present appeals fails and is liable to be dismissed.

37. It is accordingly dismissed. November 6, 2025 YK (Dr. Ajay Kumar-II,J.) (Rajeev Misra,J.)