Smt. Renu v. Shivpal Singh), under Sections

(Smt. Renu Vs. Shivpal Singh), under Sections 354, 323 I.P.C., Police Station- Mahila Thana, District- Auraiya, pending before the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.)/F.T.C. (C.W.C.), Auraiya.

3. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant is brother-in-law (devar) of complainant and the impugned complaint has been lodged by the opposite party no.2, making false and baseless allegations. It was pointed out that several allegations have been made in the impugned complaint but the same were not supported by the complainant in her statement recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Referring to facts of the matter, it was submitted that ingredients of offence under Section 354 IPC are not made out and that there is nothing to show that applicant has any mens rea or he has applied any force. In this connection learned counsel has referred case of Naresh Aneja @ Naresh Kumar Aneja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 2025 INSC 19. It was pointed out that husband of opposite party no.2 has passed away in the year 2017 and there is nothing to show that before impugned complaint, the complainant has made any complaint against applicant. The complainant has not sustained any injury. Learned counsel has referred statement of complainant recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and of witnesses examined under Section 202 Cr.P.C. and submitted that the statements under Section 202 Cr.P.C. are not in consonance with version of complainant. Referring to facts of the matter, it was submitted that no prima-facie case is made out against the applicant.

4. Learned A.G.A. has opposed the application and submitted that the husband of complainant/opposite party no.2 has passed away and she has made allegations that applicant used to harass and assault her and he was pressurizing her to keep her as his wife. Referring to statement of complainant and of witnesses, it was submitted that a prima-facie case is made out against the applicant. It was stated that at this stage matter is not to be examined meticulously and only it is to be seen that whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against the applicant.

5. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record.

6. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings is well- settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and material on record even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In well celebrated judgement reported in AIR 1992 SC 605 State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal, Supreme Court has carved out certain guidelines, wherein FIR or proceedings may be quashed but cautioned that the power to quash FIR or proceedings should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

7. In case of Naresh Aneja @ Naresh Kumar Aneja (supra), referring to provisions of Section 354 IPC, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Para no.12 has held as under:- "12. A bear perusal of Section 354, IPC reveals that for it to apply, the offence must be committed against a woman; criminal force must be applied against her; and such application of force must be with the intent to outrage her modesty. [See: Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra]

12.1 Criminal force is defined in Section 350 IPC11, however, what exactly does modesty means, which is an essential aspect for this Section to apply, has not been defined so as to constitute an offence u/s 354 IPC. Any discussion on this Section is incomplete without reference to Rupan Deol Bajaj (supra) wherein the Learned Judges observed: “14. Since the word ‘modesty’ has not been defined in the Penal Code, 1860 we may profitably look into its dictionary meaning. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Edn.) modesty is the quality of being modest and in relation to woman means “womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct”. The word ‘modest’ in relation to woman is defined in the above dictionary as “decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lewd; shamefast”. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines modesty as “freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for propriety in dress, speech or conduct”. In the Oxford English Dictionary (1933 Edn.) the meaning of the word ‘modesty’ is given as “womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reserve or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions”.

15. … From the above dictionary meaning of ‘modesty’ and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major Singh case [AIR 1967 SC 63 : 1967 Cri LJ 1 : 1966 Supp SCR 286] it appears to us that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman …”

12.2 While we hold the above observations as also the discussion made in Major Singh (supra) in the highest esteem and regard, it must not escape us that the observations were made in the societal context and milieu of that time and its import today should be interpreted in our present context.Reference in this regard may be made to observations by Bhat, J in Attorney General v. Satish, “66. … These require an element of application of physical force, to women. The expression “modesty” was another limitation as older decisions show that such a state was associated with decorousness [Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] of women. This added a dimension of patriarchy and class. [ Section 354 (or any other provision of IPC) does not offer a statutory definition of the term “modesty”, and over time, was interpreted broadly, contemporaneously with the developing and acknowledged role of women in society, to overcome its inherently colonial and patriarchal origins. … One cannot be unmindful of the circumstances in which these provisions were enacted by a colonial power, at a time, when women's agency itself was unacknowledged, or had limited recognition. Further, women in India were traditionally—during the time of enactment of IPC, in the mid- Nineteenth Century—subordinated to the care of their fathers, or their husbands, or other male relatives. They had no share in immovable property; notions of gender equality were unheard of, or not permitted. Women had no right to vote. Quite naturally, the dignity of women— or indeed their autonomy, was not provided for.

67. The advent of the Constitution of India revolutionised—at least in law, all that. Regardless of gender, race, caste, religion or region, or all of the acknowledged sectarian and discrimination enabling barriers, everyone enjoyed equality of law, and equal protection of law (Article 14). Further, the provision in Article 15(1) proscribed discrimination by the State (in all its forms) on various grounds, including gender. Article 15(3) enabled the State to enact special provisions for women and children.”

8. Coming to facts of the present matter, perusal of record shows that the opposite party no.2 has lodged impugned complaint alleging that she was married with brother of applicant in the year 2007 but her husband has passed away on

20.04.2017. After that she was harassed by applicant and his family members and that applicant used to pressurize her to keep her with him as his wife. She has further alleged that applicant has tried to establish physical relations with her and outraged her modesty. It is correct that in her statement recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C., she has not made a detail statement but she has stated that applicant used to assault her and he was pressurizing her to keep her as his wife and that he has also assaulted her with cylinder rod. The version of complainant is supported by statements of witnesses examined under Section 202 Cr.P.C. Learned Magistrate has considered facts of the matter and statements of witnesses and summoned the applicant by impugned order. In view of specific allegations and material on record, the aforesaid case of Naresh Aneja (supra) does not provide any help to the applicant. It is well-settled that at this stage, matter is not to be examined meticulously. The submissions raised by learned counsel for the applicant call for determination on questions of fact, which may adequately be discerned/adjudicated only by the trial court. Even the submissions made on point of law can also be more appropriately gone into by the trial court. Adjudication of questions of facts and appreciation of evidence or examining the reliability and credibility of the version, does not fall within the arena of jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS.

9. After considering arguments raised by learned counsel for the parties and perusing the impugned complaint and the materials in support of the same, this Court does not find it to be a case which can be determined or gone into in an application under Section 528 BNSS. Accordingly, the prayer as made above is hereby refused.

10. However, it is directed that in case applicant moves an application for discharge before the trial court concerned within a period of three weeks from today, the same shall be considered and decided expeditiously in accordance with law by the court concerned. It is further directed that for a period of three weeks from today and in case such an application for discharge is filed within the aforesaid period, till the disposal of discharge application, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicant, provided the applicant cooperates in early disposal of discharge application.

11. The application under Section 528 BNSS is disposed of in above terms. Order Date :- 15.4.2025 'SP'/-

(Smt. Renu Vs. Shivpal Singh), under Sections 354, 323 I.P.C., Police Station- Mahila Thana, District- Auraiya, pending before the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.)/F.T.C. (C.W.C.), Auraiya.

3. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant is brother-in-law (devar) of complainant and the impugned complaint has been lodged by the opposite party no.2, making false and baseless allegations. It was pointed out that several allegations have been made in the impugned complaint but the same were not supported by the complainant in her statement recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Referring to facts of the matter, it was submitted that ingredients of offence under Section 354 IPC are not made out and that there is nothing to show that applicant has any mens rea or he has applied any force. In this connection learned counsel has referred case of Naresh Aneja @ Naresh Kumar Aneja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 2025 INSC 19. It was pointed out that husband of opposite party no.2 has passed away in the year 2017 and there is nothing to show that before impugned complaint, the complainant has made any complaint against applicant. The complainant has not sustained any injury. Learned counsel has referred statement of complainant recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and of witnesses examined under Section 202 Cr.P.C. and submitted that the statements under Section 202 Cr.P.C. are not in consonance with version of complainant. Referring to facts of the matter, it was submitted that no prima-facie case is made out against the applicant.

4. Learned A.G.A. has opposed the application and submitted that the husband of complainant/opposite party no.2 has passed away and she has made allegations that applicant used to harass and assault her and he was pressurizing her to keep her as his wife. Referring to statement of complainant and of witnesses, it was submitted that a prima-facie case is made out against the applicant. It was stated that at this stage matter is not to be examined meticulously and only it is to be seen that whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against the applicant.

5. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record.

6. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings is well- settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and material on record even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In well celebrated judgement reported in AIR 1992 SC 605 State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal, Supreme Court has carved out certain guidelines, wherein FIR or proceedings may be quashed but cautioned that the power to quash FIR or proceedings should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

7. In case of Naresh Aneja @ Naresh Kumar Aneja (supra), referring to provisions of Section 354 IPC, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Para no.12 has held as under:- "12. A bear perusal of Section 354, IPC reveals that for it to apply, the offence must be committed against a woman; criminal force must be applied against her; and such application of force must be with the intent to outrage her modesty. [See: Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra]

12.1 Criminal force is defined in Section 350 IPC11, however, what exactly does modesty means, which is an essential aspect for this Section to apply, has not been defined so as to constitute an offence u/s 354 IPC. Any discussion on this Section is incomplete without reference to Rupan Deol Bajaj (supra) wherein the Learned Judges observed: “14. Since the word ‘modesty’ has not been defined in the Penal Code, 1860 we may profitably look into its dictionary meaning. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Edn.) modesty is the quality of being modest and in relation to woman means “womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct”. The word ‘modest’ in relation to woman is defined in the above dictionary as “decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lewd; shamefast”. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines modesty as “freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for propriety in dress, speech or conduct”. In the Oxford English Dictionary (1933 Edn.) the meaning of the word ‘modesty’ is given as “womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reserve or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions”.

15. … From the above dictionary meaning of ‘modesty’ and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major Singh case [AIR 1967 SC 63 : 1967 Cri LJ 1 : 1966 Supp SCR 286] it appears to us that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman …”

12.2 While we hold the above observations as also the discussion made in Major Singh (supra) in the highest esteem and regard, it must not escape us that the observations were made in the societal context and milieu of that time and its import today should be interpreted in our present context.Reference in this regard may be made to observations by Bhat, J in Attorney General v. Satish, “66. … These require an element of application of physical force, to women. The expression “modesty” was another limitation as older decisions show that such a state was associated with decorousness [Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] of women. This added a dimension of patriarchy and class. [ Section 354 (or any other provision of IPC) does not offer a statutory definition of the term “modesty”, and over time, was interpreted broadly, contemporaneously with the developing and acknowledged role of women in society, to overcome its inherently colonial and patriarchal origins. … One cannot be unmindful of the circumstances in which these provisions were enacted by a colonial power, at a time, when women's agency itself was unacknowledged, or had limited recognition. Further, women in India were traditionally—during the time of enactment of IPC, in the mid- Nineteenth Century—subordinated to the care of their fathers, or their husbands, or other male relatives. They had no share in immovable property; notions of gender equality were unheard of, or not permitted. Women had no right to vote. Quite naturally, the dignity of women— or indeed their autonomy, was not provided for.

67. The advent of the Constitution of India revolutionised—at least in law, all that. Regardless of gender, race, caste, religion or region, or all of the acknowledged sectarian and discrimination enabling barriers, everyone enjoyed equality of law, and equal protection of law (Article 14). Further, the provision in Article 15(1) proscribed discrimination by the State (in all its forms) on various grounds, including gender. Article 15(3) enabled the State to enact special provisions for women and children.”

8. Coming to facts of the present matter, perusal of record shows that the opposite party no.2 has lodged impugned complaint alleging that she was married with brother of applicant in the year 2007 but her husband has passed away on

20.04.2017. After that she was harassed by applicant and his family members and that applicant used to pressurize her to keep her with him as his wife. She has further alleged that applicant has tried to establish physical relations with her and outraged her modesty. It is correct that in her statement recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C., she has not made a detail statement but she has stated that applicant used to assault her and he was pressurizing her to keep her as his wife and that he has also assaulted her with cylinder rod. The version of complainant is supported by statements of witnesses examined under Section 202 Cr.P.C. Learned Magistrate has considered facts of the matter and statements of witnesses and summoned the applicant by impugned order. In view of specific allegations and material on record, the aforesaid case of Naresh Aneja (supra) does not provide any help to the applicant. It is well-settled that at this stage, matter is not to be examined meticulously. The submissions raised by learned counsel for the applicant call for determination on questions of fact, which may adequately be discerned/adjudicated only by the trial court. Even the submissions made on point of law can also be more appropriately gone into by the trial court. Adjudication of questions of facts and appreciation of evidence or examining the reliability and credibility of the version, does not fall within the arena of jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS.

9. After considering arguments raised by learned counsel for the parties and perusing the impugned complaint and the materials in support of the same, this Court does not find it to be a case which can be determined or gone into in an application under Section 528 BNSS. Accordingly, the prayer as made above is hereby refused.

10. However, it is directed that in case applicant moves an application for discharge before the trial court concerned within a period of three weeks from today, the same shall be considered and decided expeditiously in accordance with law by the court concerned. It is further directed that for a period of three weeks from today and in case such an application for discharge is filed within the aforesaid period, till the disposal of discharge application, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicant, provided the applicant cooperates in early disposal of discharge application.

11. The application under Section 528 BNSS is disposed of in above terms. Order Date :- 15.4.2025 'SP'/-