State v. Sanjay and Others), arising out of Case Crime No
Case Details
Cited in this judgment
Heard learned counsel for applicants as well as learned A.G.A. for State and perused the record. The present 528 BNSS application has been filed to quash the charge sheet dated 12.01.2024 along with order dated 12.12.2024 vide which charges have been framed against the applicants by Additional District & Session Judge, Room No.11, Saharanpur, in Session Trial No.1994 of 2024 (State vs. Sanjay and Others), arising out of Case Crime No.220 of 2023, under Section 308 I.P.C., Police Station- Bargaon, District- Saharanpur, pending in the court of Additional District & Session Judge, Room No.11, Saharanpur. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the present FIR was lodged on 13.11.2023 at about 9:30 hours under Sections 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. however, charge sheet has been submitted including Section 308 I.P.C. An objection was raised by the applicants at the time of framing of charge stating therein that as per the medical, no offence under Section 308 I.P.C. is made out against the applicants, therefore, the order dated 12.12.2024 vide which charges have been framed under Section 308 I.P.C. may be quashed. Learned A.G.A. for the State on the other hand submits that the application cannot be entertained at this stage in view of the law laid down in the case of Bhawna Bai Vs. Ghanshyam and others, reported in 2020 (2) SCC 217, wherein the three Judges Bench of Apex Court has held as follows in paragraphs: "15. Considering the scope of Sections 227 and 228 Crl.P.C., in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and another (2012) 9 SCC 460, the Supreme Court held as under:- "17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the case" and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. ........ …
19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well-settled law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39: (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) "4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If ''the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing', as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, ''the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which -- ... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused', as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227."
16. After referring to Amit Kapoor, in Dinesh Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2014) 13 SCC 137, the Supreme Court held that for framing charge under Section 228 Crl.P.C., the judge is not required to record detailed reasons as to why such charge is framed. On perusal of record and hearing of parties, if the judge is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence triable by the Court of Session, he shall frame the charge against the accused for such offence." Even otherwise, from the medical report wherein the injury no.1 is caused on vital part and projective vomiting has been mentioned, the offence under Section 308 I.P.C. is made out against the applicants. He further submits that the statement of the doctor has not been annexed by learned counsel for the applicants, therefore, on this very ground, the application may be dismissed as misconceived. The aforesaid view has also been held in case of Ravindra Pratap Shahi @ Pappu Shahi vs. State of U.P. and Another, reported in 2021 SCC Online ALL 778. Learned counsel for the applicants could not dispute the aforesaid proposition of law. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court does not find any error in the order impugned, accordingly the application under section 528 BNSS is dismissed. The Court below is directed to proceed in accordance with law. Order Date :- 28.4.2025 Kalp Nath Singh
Heard learned counsel for applicants as well as learned A.G.A. for State and perused the record. The present 528 BNSS application has been filed to quash the charge sheet dated 12.01.2024 along with order dated 12.12.2024 vide which charges have been framed against the applicants by Additional District & Session Judge, Room No.11, Saharanpur, in Session Trial No.1994 of 2024 (State vs. Sanjay and Others), arising out of Case Crime No.220 of 2023, under Section 308 I.P.C., Police Station- Bargaon, District- Saharanpur, pending in the court of Additional District & Session Judge, Room No.11, Saharanpur. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the present FIR was lodged on 13.11.2023 at about 9:30 hours under Sections 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. however, charge sheet has been submitted including Section 308 I.P.C. An objection was raised by the applicants at the time of framing of charge stating therein that as per the medical, no offence under Section 308 I.P.C. is made out against the applicants, therefore, the order dated 12.12.2024 vide which charges have been framed under Section 308 I.P.C. may be quashed. Learned A.G.A. for the State on the other hand submits that the application cannot be entertained at this stage in view of the law laid down in the case of Bhawna Bai Vs. Ghanshyam and others, reported in 2020 (2) SCC 217, wherein the three Judges Bench of Apex Court has held as follows in paragraphs: "15. Considering the scope of Sections 227 and 228 Crl.P.C., in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and another (2012) 9 SCC 460, the Supreme Court held as under:- "17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the case" and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. ........ …
19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well-settled law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39: (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) "4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If ''the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing', as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, ''the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which -- ... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused', as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227."
16. After referring to Amit Kapoor, in Dinesh Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2014) 13 SCC 137, the Supreme Court held that for framing charge under Section 228 Crl.P.C., the judge is not required to record detailed reasons as to why such charge is framed. On perusal of record and hearing of parties, if the judge is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence triable by the Court of Session, he shall frame the charge against the accused for such offence." Even otherwise, from the medical report wherein the injury no.1 is caused on vital part and projective vomiting has been mentioned, the offence under Section 308 I.P.C. is made out against the applicants. He further submits that the statement of the doctor has not been annexed by learned counsel for the applicants, therefore, on this very ground, the application may be dismissed as misconceived. The aforesaid view has also been held in case of Ravindra Pratap Shahi @ Pappu Shahi vs. State of U.P. and Another, reported in 2021 SCC Online ALL 778. Learned counsel for the applicants could not dispute the aforesaid proposition of law. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court does not find any error in the order impugned, accordingly the application under section 528 BNSS is dismissed. The Court below is directed to proceed in accordance with law. Order Date :- 28.4.2025 Kalp Nath Singh