Rajendra Prasad Singh v. State Of U.P.

These two Criminal Appeals have been filed by close relatives of the victims, under Section 372 of the old Cr.P.C. (Under Section 430 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), against orders of acquittal passed by Sessions Judges in favour of the accused respondents. When they were taken up as fresh, the Learned A.G.A.-1 Shri U. C. Verma, raised an objection regarding maintainability of the appeals as they had been filed by the informant/ relatives of the victims. This Court in its order dated 19.03.2025, directed the Registry to list the matters again as fresh to enable the counsel for the appellants to file Supplementary Affidavit indicating as to how the appellant fall within the definition of Section 2 (1)(y) of the BNSS (Section 2 (wa) of Cr.P.C.).

The appellant in Criminal Appeal No.C372/16/2025 (Rajendra Prasad Singh Versus State of U.P. and others), Rajendra Prasad Singh filed a Supplementary Affidavit indicating [2] that the deceased is survived by his widow aged about 45 years, his son aged about 22 years and his two daughters aged about 19 years and 17 years, respectively. It was also informed to the Court that the mother of the deceased is also alive. The appellant reiterated his claim to prefer the appeal being the brother of the deceased and thus falling within the definition of “victim”. Oral arguments were advanced in detail and have been mentioned in the order dated 26.03.2025, which is being quoted here in below.:— “Supplementary affidavit filed today is taken on record. We have heard Sri Mahendra Pratap Singh, who has placed reliance upon the supplementary affidavit and also on certain paragraphs of the full Bench judgment of this Court rendered in Manoj Kumar Singh Vs.

Shri Umesh Chand Verma, while arguing against the maintainability of the appeal has referred to Section 372 as amended with effect from 31.12.2009, which is being quoted here in below: – “No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided – no appeal shall lie from any judgement and order of a criminal court, except as provided for by this code or by any other law for the time being in force: [4] (Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the court, acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such court .)“ A “Victim” has been defined Under Section 2 (wa) as “a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by the reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged, and the expression victim includes his or her Guardian or legal heir. “

It has been argued that by adding a proviso to Section 372 as it then existed by means of Amendment Act No.5 of 2009, the victim was given certain valuable rights against an order passed by the trial court – a) acquitting the accused or b) convicting the accused for a lesser offence or c) imposing inadequate compensation on the accused . It has been argued that out of the three categories as mentioned here in above the category of acquitting the accused is relatively simple to understand. In so far as, conviction for a lesser offence is concerned, it may happen that an accused may have been charged for commission of an offence under Section 302 I.P.C, but after appreciation of evidence in Trial, the Trial Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence and material to [5] convict the accused Under Section 302 I.P.C. It may acquit the accused under Section 302 I.P.C but may still find that there is sufficient evidence and material to establish a different charge for commission of offence like that of Section 304 I.P.C. Part I or Part II, or under Section 326, or Section 325, Section 324 etc. for which, although the accused has not been charged, the Court, may still convict the accused under such Sections. Such order/judgment is termed as conviction for lesser offence and in such a situation, the Court is obliged to record a finding of acquittal Under Section 302 IPC, which is a grave offence and at the same time record a finding for conviction of the accused for a lesser offence for which no charge was framed initially. In such a situation, the accused may challenge the order of conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, in an appeal Under Section 374 Cr.P.C. and the victim may also challenge the acquittal of the accused from the graver offence of murder and such appeal will lie to the same court, where the appeal of the accused against his conviction shall be filed.

So far as the third category – “imposing inadequate compensation“ is concerned, the word compensation is not defined in the I.P.C. separately nor it is part of the punishment as defined under Section 53 of the I.P.C. Section 53 of the I.P.C. reads as under – “53 Punishment – the punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of the Code are –

Firstly—death, secondly – imprisonment for life. [6] Thirdly– repealed Fourthly – imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely:- (1) Rigorous that is with hard labour; (2)- simple; Fifthly – forfeiture of property; Sixthly -fine It has been argued that compensation has no relevance in relation to punishment, and as such, the question of compensation does not arise even in a case where the accused is convicted for an offence and punished/sentenced as per the First Schedule appended to the Cr.P.C. 1973.

In case of acquittal of an accused for the offence charged There cannot be any scope for compensation. The word compensation and its importance can be traced to the provision Under Section 357 of the Cr.P.C. and the introduction by the Legislature of Section 357A, which provides for a “Victim Compensation Scheme” introduced by way of the same Amendment Act No.5 of 2009, with effect from 31.12.2009. Under Section 357(1), a court while imposing a sentence of fine or a sentence, including a sentence of death, of which fine forms apart, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied – a. In deferring the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution; b. In payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is in the opinion of the court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court; [7] c. When any person is convicted of any offence for having caused the death of another person or of having abetted the commission of such an offence, paying compensation to the persons who are, under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855, entitled to recover damages from the person sentenced for the loss resulting to them from such death. d.

In the State of U.P., certain amendments have been made in Section 357 in relation to compensation to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes persons which need not be referred to in this judgment as they are irrelevant to the issues raised.

Shri U.C. Verma has argued that as is evident from Sub Section (1) and Sub Section (3) of Section 357 of the Cr.P.C., the Court while imposing sentence on the accused may award compensation to a victim in two ways. Firstly, when fine forms part of the sentence, such fine may be directed to be payable to the victim and secondly, when the fine does not form the part of the sentence, the Court may direct the accused to pay compensation to a victim of an amount specified in the judgment and order. In Clause (b) and (c) of Sub Section (1) of Section 357, the Legislature has provided that the Trial Court may order for payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is in the opinion of the court recoverable by such person in a civil court, where a suit for the same may be filed.

Also, under Clause (c) when a person is convicted of any offence for having caused the death of another person or having abetted the commission of such an offence, the court may order paying compensation to such persons who are under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855, entitled to recover damages from the person sentenced for the loss resulting to them from such death. [9]

Under the Fatal Accidents Act,1855 a provision has been made to provide compensation to families for loss occasioned by the death of a person caused by actionable wrong. Section 1(a) of the Fatal Accidents Act provides that the suit for such compensation to the family of the person for loss occasioned to it, by his death shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the nature of the executor, administrator, or representative of the person deceased. Again, Section 4 of the Fatal Accident Act which relates to the interpretation clause has clarified “– – the word ‘person’ shall include Father and Mother, and Grandfather and Grandmother; and the word ‘child’ shall include Son and Daughter, Grandson, and Granddaughter, and Stepson and Stepdaughter.

It has been argued on the basis of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act that the compensation as has been envisaged under Sub Section (3) of Section 357 of the Cr.P.C. has to be given to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of action of the accused person who has been so sentenced. Referring to the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad Versus State of Maharashtra reported in 2013 Criminal Law Journal 3044 (SC), it has been argued that Section 357 confers a power coupled with the duty on the Court to apply its mind to the question of awarding compensation in every criminal case. It was observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that the power to [10] award compensation was intended to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system.

The courts should not ignore the provision of grant of compensation altogether, and they should apply their mind to the question of compensation, every time they pass a sentence on conviction. If they do not award compensation, it would defeat the very object behind the introduction of the provision.

Referring to the victim compensation scheme under Section 357A, it has been argued that in every case where there is a conviction there may or may not be any compensation awarded to the person who has suffered the loss or injury. Even where there is acquittal from a graver charge and conviction for a lesser offence, the Trial Court should consider the question of grant of compensation. Also in case of death, the only and direct sufferers of the offence is the immediate family of the deceased. that is the wife and son and daughter, and may be also the parents of the deceased. The brother of the deceased may be the informant and also a family member, but on his filing of the appeal and getting a favourable final order by the Appellate Court the question of compensation to the immediate family would still have to be considered. If this Court allowed any and every family member however distant, to be considered as victim or his/ her legal heir, and the immediate family of the deceased did not choose to file an appeal, which eventually raised a successful challenge to the order of the Trial Court then their right to due compensation will be ignored. [11]

Learned counsel for the appellant on the other hand have relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in Manoj Kumar Singh Versus State of U.P. and Others 2017, 2 U.P. LBEC1245. The Full Bench of this Court was considering the question as to “who will fall within the definition of victim as contemplated by Section 2(wa) of the Code inserted by Act Number 5 of 2009”. The Supreme Court’s decision in Satpal Singh Versus State of M.P. was considered as well as judgments of two Division Benches of this Court and of the Patna High Court respectively, namely, Edal Singh Versus State of U.P. and Others in Criminal Miscellaneous Application under Section 372 Cr.P.C. No.172 of 2014 decided by this Court on 10.04.2014; and in Parmeshwar Mandal Versus State of Bihar and Others in Criminal Appeal No.1078 of 2012, reported in 2013, SCC Online Patna 602; and judgment rendered by two Full Benches, one of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Tata Steel Limited Versus Mrs. Athma Tube Products Limited and Others reported in 2014 (1) PLR1; and the other by the Delhi High Court in Ram Phal Versus State of U.P. and Others reported in 2015 SCC Online Delhi 9802. After considering such judgments which dealt with the evolution of the right to appeal given to a victim culminating in the Amendment Act No.5 of 2009, and also issues framed by the two Division Benches, as aforesaid, of this High Court and Patna High Court, and the issues framed by the two Full Benches as aforesaid of Punjab and Haryana High Court and Delhi High Court, the Full Bench of this Court observed in paragraph 25 as follows: – [12] “25. The judgments quoted above would go to show that while analysing the definition of victim, various High Courts have taken note of various sources to find out as to what is the true meaning of victim. …,”

In respect of different approaches which could be adopted for interpreting the term ‘victim’, the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Paragraph 13 had observed as follows: –

Para 13. A survey of these High Court decisions reveals four possible approaches to the question of victim’s locus standi to maintain an appeal under the proviso to Section 372: (a), a narrow reading of the word ‘victim’ (limiting it to direct and proximate physical harm); and a narrow reading of the term ‘legal heir’ (limiting it to lines of succession and personal law). This is the approach of the Division Bench of this Court in Chhatar Singh Versus Subhash 176 (2011 ) DLT356 and of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in D. Sudhakar Versus Panapu Sreenivasulu reported in 2013, Criminal Law Journal 2764. (b) A broad reading of the word ‘victim’ (expanding it to emotional harm caused by the direct harm to someone that one is close to), and a narrow reading of the term, ‘legal heir’ (limiting it to lines of succession under personal law). This is the approach of the Patna High Court. The Guwahati High Court has also favoured a broad reading of the word ‘victim’, while returning no finding on the meaning of ‘legal heir’. (c), a narrow reading of the word ‘victim’ and a broad reading of the term ‘legal heir’. [13] (d) a broad reading of the term ‘victim’ and also of the term ‘legal heir’. This appears to be the view of Punjab and Haryana High Court, which favours abroad reading of ‘legal heir’ although it does not appear to have returned a conclusive finding on reading of the word ‘victim’.

The Full Bench of this Court in Manoj Kumar Singh (Supra) went on to observe ..

What we find from a reading of the judgments of the various High Courts is that while interpreting the word ‘victim’, the High Court have given elaborate meaning to the word ‘victim’. In this background, as to whether the term victim has rightly been understood, is an issue to be answered by us

.

The Full Bench of this Court, thereafter observed that a perusal of the judgments of various High Courts

….show that they dealt with the definition of victim in respect of an offence of murder without considering the impact of the nature of an offence of which one is a victim. There are various forms of offences provided under Indian Penal Code as well as other special laws. An offence may be against body, mind, property, etc. In that context injury caused by the offence would vary. Further, there may be a crime against society, which can be termed as a victimless crime because there is no victim in particular. None of these judgments consider the above aspect. In this background, we proceed to consider the case in hand…

It was observed by the Full Bench in Manoj Kumar Singh (Supra) that Chapter 29 of the Code provides for appeal against [14] conviction as an unrestricted right given to the accused (Section 374), whereas the appeal against acquittal is a restricted right given initially to the Government and the complainant of a case (Section 378) and now to the victim also under the proviso of Section 372.

The Full Bench of this Court in Manoj Kumar Singh initially dealt with the nature and scope of the remedy of appeal as is provided Under Section 372 proviso Cr.P.C., and thereafter from Paragraph 43 onwards proceeded to deal with the word ‘victim’ as used in Section 2(wa) for the purpose of maintenance of appeal Under Section 372 of the Code. It examined the context in which the word ‘victim’ has been used in the Code and observed that the victim has been given the right to engage an Advocate to assist the prosecution with permission of the Court, (Section 24); the right to prefer appeal against acquittal (proviso to Section 372); the statutory arrangement to compensate victim or his dependent through victims compensation scheme (Section 35, 7A, 35 7B, 35 7C); The manner in which the statement of a victim in relation to an offence of rape is to be recorded during investigation that is by giving facility of recording of statement at residence or at a place of her choice by a woman police officer in presence of parents or guardians etc. (Section 157).

The Full Bench in Manoj Kumar Singh thereafter considered the principles of interpretation used in various judgments of the Supreme Court and of Coordinate Benches of the Delhi High Court and Punjab and Haryana High Court and [15] noticed that the definition of ‘victim’ as ‘means X and includes ‘Y’ has been discussed and relying upon observations made by the Supreme Court in Black Diamond Beverages Versus Commercial Tax Officer reported in 1998 (1) SCC 458, in the context of use of words “means and includes” and has held that the first part of the phrase” means X “usually refers to the ordinary and natural meaning, but with an extension of the second part that is includes Y, the first part of the definition should be given its ordinary, popular or natural meaning, and the second part which includes certain others will not prevent the main provision from receiving its natural meaning.

Referring to “loss” or injury as mentioned in the definition of ‘victim’ under Section 2(wa), it was observed that loss or injury have been used as synonyms to each other and Section 44 of the IPC postulates the word injury to denote any harm whatsoever illegally caused to any person, in body, in mind, reputation or property. There can be four types of harm which may be illegally caused to any person as per this definition in respect of body, mind, reputation, and property and an offence may inflict upon a person, a combination of one or more types of harm as mentioned under Section 44 of the IPC. Any emotional harm or injury, however grave it may be, caused to any person, not being the direct sufferer, especially when emotional harm or injury is neither ingredient of the offence nor is the fact in issue in the trial of the accused, cannot grant status of ‘victim’ to such other person, not being the direct sufferer of offence, or receiver of harm caused by the offence, and no person, other than actual [16] receiver can be treated as ‘victim’ of offence so as to provide him/her right to prefer appeal under the proviso of Section 372. In absence of the direct sufferer or in a case where the direct victim suffers a disability, his or her legal heir or Guardian would qualify as a victim.

In so far as the expression legal heir is concerned, the Full Bench of this Court in Manoj Kumar Singh considered the conclusion drawn by the Full Benches of Delhi High Court and Punjab and High Court observed that the expression ‘legal heir’ is required to be read in a sense different from what it is for the purpose of civil rights, wherein the degree of legal heirs have been categorized as Class I, Class II and so on. Both the Full Bench decisions give a liberal interpretation to the term ‘victim’. The Court considered the dictionary meaning of the word ‘legal heir’ and in all such definitions and found that the common thread is that the person who is entitled to receive property of any person when such person dies, is termed as heir. The use of the word “legal” as a prefix to the word “heir” denotes that the status of such person as heir must be recognized by law. It is only then he can be termed as legal. Succession and inheritance can be of two kinds – testamentary or intestate. The law on intestate succession for different communities in India is governed by different rules applicable for that particular community. Broadly speaking, succession is either under the Hindu Succession Act or the Indian Succession Act or the Muslim Shariyat laws. With the exception of Muslims, the Indian Succession Act 1925 has a common set of rules for persons of [17] all religions. In civil law, pertaining to Hindu community, the legal heirs of Class I category in order of preference would oust the legal heirs of Class II category, but Class II legal heirs are nevertheless legal heirs. This preferential right has been recognized under Civil laws by way of statutory arrangements. But in the Code of Criminal Procedure, no such statutory arrangement is available to provide for classes of legal heirs or a preferential order amongst them. Hence, in the context of Code of Criminal Procedure, the expression, “legal heir” cannot be construed to create categories of legal heirs unless it requires determination of civil rights of the person claiming to be legal heir of the deceased.

The Full Bench of this Court thereafter observed in paragraph 69 and 70 as follows: – “69. From the discussions that have been made above, it is clear that the proviso of Section 372 is an exception to the general law and the same confer on a victim, the right to appeal against the acquittal , which is subject to the grant of leave by the court. The first part of the definition ‘victim’ as given under Section 2(wa) (that is, victim means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged), is required to be construed in its literal sense and no liberal interpretation is required. Accordingly, only such person would be treated as victim who is the subject matter of trial being the direct sufferer of the crime in terms of loss or injury caused to his own body, mind, reputation, and property, and such loss or injury is one of the [18] ingredients of the offence for which the accused person has been charged, and therefore any other person cannot be accepted as victim within the first part of Section 2 for the purpose of maintaining appeal. The second part that is “includes his or her guardians or legal heir “ , would come into play when the actual Sufferer is absent or suffers disability.

70. In other words, ‘victim’ means the actual sufferer of offence (receiver of harm caused by the accused ), no person, other than actual receiver of harm can be treated as victim of offence, so as to provide him/her right to prefer appeal under proviso of Section 372, though, in his or her absence or disability, his legal heir, or guardian would qualify as victim and have a right to appeal. A person who claims himself to be a legal heir of actual victim (Direct sufferer), would be able to maintain appeal provided he establishes his claim as such before the court in his application by disclosing his particulars; relationship with the victim; and the ground on which such claim of being legal heir or guardian is based….

The Full Bench of this Court Manoj Kumar Singh (Supra) however had observed in Paragraph 26 as follows: – “26. The Full Bench of Delhi High Court and the Division Bench of Patna High Court and the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court arrived at a unanimous conclusion that the proviso of Section 372 is not an exception but confers an independent statutory right of appeal to a victim, hence, no leave to appeal is required as provided under section 378 of the Code. This particular conclusion, that has been arrived at has been specifically overruled by the Apex Court in the case of Satyapal Singh Versus [19] State of Madhya Pradesh and Others reported in 2015 Cr.L.J. 4929 (Supreme Court) by holding that the proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. must be read along with its main enactment, that is, Section 372 should be read together with sub Section (3) of Section 378 of the Code otherwise the substantive provision of Section 372 of the Code would be rendered nugatory, as it clearly provides that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court, except as provided by the Court.

The Full Bench taking into account the law as settled by the Supreme Court in Satpal Singh Versus State of Madhya Pradesh and Others 2015, Criminal Journal 4929 (Supreme Court); observed that as per statutory arrangement under the Code, the victim has been conferred right to prefer appeal against acquittal with the leave of the Court.

This observation made by the Full Bench in Manoj Kumar Singh (Supra) no longer can be said to be a binding precedent in view of law settled by a larger bench of the Supreme Court in Mallikarjun Kodagali (dead) through Legal Representatives V. State of Karnataka and Others reported in 2019 (2) SCC 752; where the Supreme Court by a majority judgment delivered by Hon’ble Justice Lokur, approved the observation of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ram Phal Versus State reported in 2015 SCC Online Delhi 9802; and of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Tata Steel Limited Versus M/s [21] Aatma Tube Products Limited reported in 2013 SCC Online, Punjab and Haryana 5834, and the observation made by Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Parmeshwar Mandal Versus State of Bihar reported in 2013 SCC Online Patna 602, and overruled the observations made by the Division Bench in Satpal Singh Versus State of M.P. reported in 2015 (15) SCC 613 on the point; and observed that several High Courts have taken a consistent view to the effect that the victim of an offence has a right of appeal Under Section 372 proviso Cr.P.C. and have also taken the view that the date of the alleged offence has no relevance to the right of the appeal. The significant date is the date of the order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The cause of action arises in favour of the victim of an offence only when an order of acquittal is passed and if that happens after 31.12.2009, the victim has a right to challenge the acquittal through an appeal. Indeed, the right not only extends to challenging the order of acquittal but also challenging the conviction of the accused for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation. The language of Section 372 proviso Cr.P.C. is quite explicit and the court should not read nuances that do not exist in the proviso.

It was observed further by the Supreme Court in Mallikarjun (Supra) that Section 372 proviso Cr.P.C. must also be given a meaning that is realistic, liberal, progressive, and beneficial to the victim of an offence. There is a historical reason for this, beginning with the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, adopted by the [22] General Assembly of the United Nations in the 96 th Planetary Session on 29.11.1985. The Declaration is sometimes referred to as the Magna Carta of the rights of victims. One of the significant Declaration made was in relation to access to Justice for the victim of an offence through Justice delivery mechanisms, both formal and informal. Putting the declaration to practise, it is quite obvious that the victim of an offence is entitled to a variety of rights. Access to mechanisms of Justice and redress through formal procedures as provided for in National Legislation, must include the right to file an appeal against an order of acquittal. Specifically overruling the Gujarat High Court decision of Full Bench in Dinesh Bhai Makwana Versus State of Gujarat reported in 2012 SCC Online Gujarat 5764; it was observed by the Supreme Court that the Gujarat High Court made an artificial and unnecessary distinction between a victim as a victim and a victim as a complainant in respect of filing an appeal against an order of acquittal . The proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. does not introduce or incorporate any such distinction. As far as the question of grant of special leave is concerned, the language of Section 372 proviso Cr.P.C. is quite clear, particularly when it is contrasted with the language of Section 378 (4) Cr.P.C. The text of this provision is quite clear and it is confined to an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a complaint. The word complaint has been defined in Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. and refers to any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate. This has nothing to do with the lodging or registration of FIR, and [23] therefore it is not at all necessary to consider the effect of a victim being the complainant as far as Section 372 proviso Cr.P.C. is concerned.

Hon’ble Justice Deepak Gupta in Mallikarjun (Supra) took a dissenting view and observed that though proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. does give a right to the victim to file an appeal, this proviso cannot be read in isolation. It has to be given a meaning which fulfills the intention of the legislature. The proviso does not lay down the procedure as to how, in what manner, and within which time the appeal has to be filed. An appeal, being a creature of the statute, it is also necessary to prescribe the limitation and procedure for filing an appeal and the right of the victim to file an appeal is not taken away or in any manner weakened only because he has to seek leave to appeal. If Section 378 (3), 378 (4) and 372 Cr.P.C. are read together; it is clear that the victim is also required to apply for leave to appeal before his appeal can be entertained.

Since the Supreme Court in its judgment rendered in Mallikarjun (Supra) has affirmed the view taken by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ram Phal Versus State, it would be appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Delhi High Court in some detail. The Full Bench in Ram Phal (Supra) was considering the ‘locus standi’ of parties to maintain appeals by virtue of the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. The Court overruled its previous view taken in Chhatar Singh Versus Subhash reported in 2011 SCC Online, Delhi 81; wherein it was held that [24] the appellants being a Class II heir would not inherit anything from deceased, thus, he would not fall within the expression legal heir in the light of Section 2(wa) and hence he was not entitled to prefer an appeal by virtue of the proviso attached to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. While adjudicating this matter, two questions arose for the Full Bench to consider by virtue of the order of reference. Firstly, whether the term ‘victim’ which includes ‘legal heir’ means persons entitled to property of the victim under the law applicable of inheritance, or would embrace any person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by crime/ offence for which the accused person has been charged, and secondly, whether the Appellate remedy given under proviso of Section 372 Cr.P.C. is available with respect to only such offences which were committed as on the date when the right was conferred by law, or the Appellate right could be available with respect to the date of the decision or the remedies would be available without any reference of these two points, that is, the date when the offence was committed or when the trial court delivered its judgment.

We are not concerned here with the date of applicability of the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. We are more concerned with the findings recorded by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court regarding the first question which relates to the definition of ‘victim’ as provided in Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. The Court held that the definition of victim includes legal heir, and therefore it cannot exclude those who actually fall within the definition of victim by virtue of emotional harm suffered by them. The laws of [25] inheritance which decide one’s legal heirs are not intended to be solely determinative of the entitlement to exercise rights of the victim, in criminal trial/appeal on his/her death. The Delhi High Court applied the Heydon’s Rule that is the Mischief Rule, and expanded the scope of the term by saying that it is impermissible for an Appellate Court to shut out an appeal by legal heir based on his/her, not being an immediate heir , or being lower down in the hierarchy vis-a-vis his entitlement to the crime victim’s estate.

We think it appropriate to quote, Paragraphs 52, 53 and 54 of the judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court in Ramphal versus State and Others. The Delhi High Court observed as under: – “52. As has been discussed above, Section 2(wa), in its definition of victim, uses the phrase “means X and includes Y”, while Chattar Singh reasoned that ‘includes Y’ extends the ordinary meaning of the” ‘Means X’ to cover things that would not otherwise be covered by every day meaning of X, it interpreted the two parts of the definition to include non-overlapping and mutually exclusive categories; injury being limited to the most direct and proximate sufferer of physical harm, and legal heir as covering the heirs entitled to succeed in personal law. A broader meaning of the word ‘victim’, encompassing sufferer of emotional harm, would have necessitated an overlap between the two categories, since it is possible that legal heir would also be a victim, in the sense of having suffered proximate mental injury as a result of the crime. This Court, therefore, does not agree with [26] the decision in Chhatar Singh that a Class II heir can be excluded by Class I heir as a Class II heir may well have suffered injury emotional/mental, thus bringing him/her within the definition of victim itself. To permit such a victim to be excluded by Class I heir would amount to letting those included within the definition, exclude those falling within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word defined. The Court therefore cannot agree with the analysis in Chhattar Singh that treats the hierarchy of legal heirs in personal law as Solely determinative of who may qualify as a victim simpliciter , in the absence of which, a victim by inclusion. Subject to this, we are in agreement with the submissions of the learned amicus, and with the judgement of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, that the meaning of legal heir refers to all heirs designated as such by the relevant personal law, irrespective of whether or not, they are excluded by lines of succession at any given time.

To summarise, the conclusions from the above discussion are: (i) victim, in Section 2 (wa) by virtue of being defined as a person who has suffered any loss or injury must include a person who has suffered harm caused to the mind, given that Section 2(y) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, incorporated the definition of ‘injury’ in Section 44 of the IPC into the Code. (ii) the “means X and includes Y” clause in Section 2(wa) cannot be interpreted so as to result in the included meaning Y excluding the actual meaning X of the term being defined; thus legal heirs who are [27] included within the definition of the term victim cannot exclude those who actually fall within the definition of victim by virtue of emotional harm suffered, such as the father or the sibling of deceased, victim, or other categories of persons based on proximity noted previously. (iii) the laws of inheritance, which decide ones legal heirs are not intended to be solely determinative of the entitlement to exercise the rights of the victim, in the criminal trial/appeal, on his/her death, application of Heydon’s mischief rule, given that the object of the 2008 Amendment Act was to ensure the involvement of the victim, who has a presumably personal interest in the fair and efficient prosecution of the trial/appeal. Resultantly, it is impermissible for an Appellate Court to shut out an appeal by legal heir based only on her/his not being an immediate heir, or being lower down in the hierarchy vis a vis entitlement to the crime victims’ estate.

As a concluding remark on the spectre of uncertainty (of defending multiple appeals) which would possibly, however, weighdown those acquitted of offences, this Court is in agreement with the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, that all such victims’ or legal heirs’ appeals would be heard together, and the issue can be resolved by proper docket management. The Court is reminded of the view in Pakala Narayana Swamy Versus Emperor reported in AIR 1930 9PC 47 that “– – in truth, when the meaning of words is plain, it is not the duty of the court to busy themselves with supposed intentions“– and one may add in the context, imagined difficulties.

Relying upon observations made by the Delhi High Court in its judgment in Ram Phal, one of us ( Hon’ble Shree Prakash [28] Singh J) in an application Under Section 482 No.6853 of 2023 decided on 28.07.2023, Parmanand Sirumal Tahal Ramani Versus State of U.P. and Others; has observed that the definition of victim includes individuals who have suffered emotional or mental harm due to the offence and the Applicant no.1 who was the uncle of the deceased was held to be a victim as he suffered mental agony, due to the murder of his niece and her child. Such harm qualified as injury Under Section 44 of the IPC and the right to participate in the trial proceedings by the uncle of the deceased was upheld by the Court.

In a more recent decision rendered by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court in M/s Celestium Financial V. Gnanasekaran 2025 Live Law, Supreme Court 666; while addressing the question whether the complainant in an application Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act is a person who has suffered loss and can be regarded as a victim within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. and whether an appeal would be maintainable under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1973, against an order of acquittal in a case filed upon private complaint Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 by treating the complainant in such proceeding as a victim within the meaning ascribed to the term Under Section 2(wa) the Cr.P.C. It has observed thus: –

In the context of offences under the Act, particularly Under Section 138 of the Act, the complainant is clearly the aggrieved party and has suffered [29] economic loss and injury due to the default in payment by the accused due to the dishonour of the cheque, which is deemed to be an offence under that provision. In such circumstances, it would be just, reasonable, and in consonance with the spirit of the Cr.P.C. to hold that the complainant under the Act also qualifies as a victim within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of Cr.P.C. Consequently, such a complainant ought to be extended the benefit of the proviso to Section 372, thereby enabling him to maintain an appeal against the order of acquittal in his own right without having to seek special leave Under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C.

The Court noted that proviso to Section 372 creates an absolute right to file an appeal without any conditions . Justice Nagarathna, while delivering the judgment in Celestium Financial (supra); has referred to the opinion of Justice Lokur in Mallikarjun and also observed in Paragraph 5.4 thus: –

5.4 in the said judgement, Deepak Gupta J was in complete agreement with Lokur J on the fact that victims must be permitted to access justice because it is sometimes found that the Investigating and Prosecuting Agency do not follow up cases with zeal which is required and therefore Proviso to Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. must be given a meaning, which is realistic, liberal, progressive, and beneficial to the victim of the offence. However, Deepak Gupta J was of opinion that one cannot ignore the rights of the accused and the procedure prescribed by law. Hence, he disagreed with Lokur J’s view that a victim can file an appeal [30] in the High Court without seeking leave to appeal in terms of Section 378 (3) of the Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court in Celestium observed: “5.5. The only difference of opinion was with regard to whether the victim is required to seek leave of the High Court, even in an appeal filed in the High Court.

While dealing with this issue, it was observed by Deepak Gupta J that prior to the insertion of the proviso to Section 372 of the Cr.P.C., the victim had no right to file an appeal unless he was also a complainant. This was because the State represented the victim of the crime. Therefore, the question whether the victim, while filing in appeal against the acquittal of an accused under proviso to Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. in the High Court, is required to seek leave Under Section 378(3) of the Cr.P.C. was answered in the affirmative. In this regard, reference was made to Sub Section 4 of Section 378, which deals with an appeal filed by the complainant against the order of a Court in a case instituted upon a complaint. In such a case, an appeal has to be filed in the High Court. Such an appeal cannot be entertained unless the High Court grants leave to appeal from the order of a court. Sub Section (5) provides the limitation period for filing the petition for grant of special leave to appeal in terms of Sub Section (4).

Sub Section (6) lays down that in case the application for special leave to appeal filed by the complainant under Sub Section (4) is refused, then no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under Sub Section (1) or under Sub Section (2). Thus, in a complaint case, complainant can file an appeal only by seeking Special Leave to [31] Appeal in case of appeal before the High Court. It was further noted that an appeal against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of cognizable and non-bailable offences would lie to the court and no leave to appeal is required. However, an appeal with respect to offences which are non-cognizable or bailable would lie to the High Court. In such cases, leave to appeal is a prerequisite. The remaining kind of appeals are those appeals which lie to the High Court against the judgment of the Session Court. These are serious criminal matters relating to graver offences.

Even appeals against acquittal filed before the High Court must be scrutinized with great care. As opposed to Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C., where a complainant would file an appeal against an order of acquittal he would require special leave to appeal being obtained, in case of an appeal filed by a victim under the Proviso to Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. no such leave to appeal is required. Then the question raised was, whether a victim is to be placed on a higher pedestal than the complainant, although in certain cases, the victim and the complainant may be one and the same person. Deepak Gupta J. considered a situation where there are two victims in a case and one of the victims files a complaint and the wheel of Justice moves accordingly and the case is tried as a complaint case and the accused is acquitted. In such a case, the complainant would have to seek Special Leave to Appeal, whereas the victim who had not even approached the Court at the initial stage would be entitled to file an appeal without seeking leave to appeal.

While considering this [32] situation, Deepak Gupta, J observed that while expanding the rights of victim to file an appeal, such right must be balanced with the rights of the accused. Hence, it was the view of the Deepak Gupta J. that even in a case when an appeal is filed by a victim, there has to be scrutiny and special leave to appeal must be obtained as the victim cannot be placed on a higher pedestal than the State or the complainant. It was his view that by this condition being imposed, the right of the victim to file an appeal is not taken away or in any way diluted. Thus, according to his view, Section 378 (3), 378 (4) and 372 of the Cr.P.C. have to be read together and victim is also required to apply for leave to appeal before his appeal can be entertained. Therefore, Deepak Gupta J. concluded that the right to file an appeal in the victim cannot be higher than the right of filing an appeal which inheres in the State and the complainant in a complaint case. Thus, if a victim files an appeal against the acquittal in the High Court, he has to seek leave to appeal Under Section 378 (3) of the Cr.P.C.

The Supreme Court in Celestium Financial observed in Paragraph 5.10 that

in the light of two opposite views expressed in the above judgment of this Court, it is necessary to discuss certain provisions of the Cr.P.C. and arrive at our own conclusions on the point for consideration. We observe that we are inclined to follow the view taken by Lokur J. in so far as the right of victim of a crime to file an appeal is concerned.

[33]

The Supreme Court thereafter undertook an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. It considered the definition clause and Chapter 15, which deals with complaints to Magistrates and Chapter 29, which deals with appeals. It went on to observe that Section 372 is a preface to the Chapter on Appeals, which, in substance states that appeal can be filed only in accordance with what has been stated in the provisions to follow Section 372. The proviso was introduced to Section 372 by the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 2008 Act 5 of 2009, which came into effect from 31.12.2009. By virtue of this amendment, limited right of appeal has been conferred upon the victim of an offence. On reading of the proviso to Section 372, it is apparent that a victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against: 1) any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or 2) convicting for a lesser offence or 3) imposing inadequate compensation. Further, with effect from

31.12.2009, Sections 357A and 357B were inserted in the Cr.P.C. in the form of Victim Compensation Scheme for providing compensation to the victim or his dependents who have suffered loss or injury as a result of crime and who require rehabilitation.

The Supreme Court in Celestium Financial thereafter considered the definition of ‘victim’ as given under section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. and also the definition of ‘injury’ as given in Section 44 of the Indian Penal Code, together with the definition of injury given in Black’s Law Dictionary where injury has been defined as – “any harm whatsoever illegally caused to any [34] person, in body, mind, reputation of property.” Additionally, the Court also considered the United Nations General Assembly’s Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of crime and abuse of 1985, where Article-1 defined ‘victims’ as ‘persons who individually or collectively, have suffered through the acts or omission, which involve physical or mental injury, emotional distress, economic loss, or substantial impairment of the fundamental rights”. Article 2 further extends the definition of victim to include immediate family members, dependents or those who have intervened to assist the victim in crisis.

It was thereafter observed in para 6.4 :-

that on reading of definition of ‘victim’, it is clear that the said expression is initially exhaustive and thereafter inclusive. The expression ‘victim’ means a person who has suffered any loss or injury. The loss or injury could be either physical, mental or financial loss or injury. The expression injury could also be construed as a legal injury in a wider sense and not just a physical or mental injury. The loss or injury must be caused by reason of an act or omission for which the accused person has been charged i.e. it can be both by a positive act or negatively by omission, which is at the instance of the accused and for which such accused has been charged. Further, the expression victim also includes his/her guardian or legal heir in case of demise of the victim.

After considering the definition of victim, Supreme Court observed in paragraph 6.5 as follows: – [35] “6.5. Thus, the expression ‘victim’ has been couched in a broad manner so as to include a person who has suffered any loss or injury. The expression ‘loss’ or ‘injury’ themselves are of very broad import, which expressions also enlarge the scope of the expression ‘victim’. Further, the expression victim includes not only the person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of any act or omission for which the accused person has been charged, but also includes his or her guardian or legal heir, which means that the definition of victim is inclusive in nature.

The Supreme Court went on to observe in paragraph 6.6.1 as under: –

6.6 .1, the word ‘victim’ is derived from the latin word ‘victima’ originally contained the concept of sacrifice. In more contemporary times, the term victim has been expanded to imply a victim of war, an accident, a scam, et cetera. As a scientific concept, according to criminologist, B Mendelsohn (1976), the definition of a victim may be viewed as containing four fundamental criteria, which are as follows: • The nature of the determinant that causes the suffering. The suffering may be physical, psychological, or both, depending on the type of injurious act. • The social character of the suffering. This suffering originates in the victims’ and others reaction to the event • the nature of the social factor. The social implications of the dangerous act can have [36] a greater impact, sometimes, more than the physical or psychological impact. • the origin of the inferiority complex. This term, suggested by Mendelsohn , manifest itself as a feeling of submission that may be followed by a feeling of revolt. The victim generally attributes his injury to the culpability of another person.

Victimology is thus a social structural way of viewing crime and the law and the criminal and a victim. In so far as the injury is concerned, apart from their being short term and long term, physical injuries, there could also be economic or financial loss, which are also injuries within the meaning and definition of victim under clause (wa) of Section 2 of the Cr.P.C.”

While dealing with the meaning of the words “accused” and “charge”, the Supreme Court observed that the expression “accused of any offence “ would include within it only a person against whom formal accusation relating to commission of offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in his prosecution. Accusation /charge is a formal complaint made in a legal manner, either of omission or commission by the person charged of crime.

The Court then had considered Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and observed that an accused is charged of an offence Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act only when a complaint is filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.. Chapter XXI of the Cr.P.C. deals with Summary Trials and said Chapter has to be read in conjunction with [37] Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which states that all offences under Chapter XVII of the Act, including an offence under section 138 (dishonour of cheque for insufficiency of funds etc in the account) shall be tried by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or by Metropolitan Magistrate and the provision of Section 262 to 265 of the Cr.P.C. (both inclusive) shall as far as may be applied to such trial. The Negotiable Instruments Act does not have any provision for filing an appeal. It is a special enactment. In the circumstances, the Cr.P.C., which is general in nature would have to be resorted to.

The court while coming to the conclusion as aforesaid gave reasons in paragraph 7. 12 as follows: – “The victim of a crime must have an absolute right to prefer an appeal which cannot be circumscribed by any condition precedent. In the instant case, a victim under Section 138 of the Act that is a Payee or holder of a cheque is a person who has suffered the impact of the offence committed by a person who is charged of the offence, namely the accused whose cheque has been dishonoured . -Secondly, the right of a victim of a crime must be placed on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a conviction, who as a matter of right can prefer an appeal under section 374 of the Cr.P.C.. A person convicted of a crime has the right to prefer an appeal under section 374 as a matter of right and not being subjected to any conditions. Similarly , a victim of a crime, whatever be the nature of the crime, unconditionally must have a right to prefer in an appeal. -Thirdly, it is for this reason that the Parliament thought it fit to insert the proviso to sub section 372 without mandating any condition precedent to be fulfilled by the victim of an offence, which expression also includes representatives of a deceased victim who can prefer an appeal.

To conclude, the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 observed that the right to prefer an appeal is no doubt a statutory right and [41] right to prefer an appeal by an accused against a conviction is not only a statutory right but can also be considered to be a fundamental right under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution. If that is so, then the right of a victim of an offence to prefer an appeal cannot be equated with the right of the State or the complainant to prefer an appeal. Hence, the statutory bar for filing of an appeal by the State or by a complainant against an order of acquittal cannot be read into the proviso to section 372 of the Cr.P.C. so as to restrict the right of a victim to file an appeal on the grounds mentioned therein, when none exist. The observations made by the Supreme Court in Mallikarjun Kodagali and in Celestium Financial (Supra) make it amply clear that injury or loss can be more than just physical in nature and mental, emotional loss as well as monetary loss also can be considered for the purpose of defining ‘injury’ and a victim who suffers such loss may approach the Court under Proviso to Section 372 without seeking Special Leave to Appeal.