Allahabad High Court

pendency of the writ petition, the Fourth Amendment Rules, 2021 came into effect on 16.12.2021 and thereunder, the petitioner is entitled for regularization of his services, having being appointed before 31.12.2001, the cut off date, and having completed three years of continuous service on

16.12.2021. The relevant finding in the judgment of learned Single Judge are as follows: "28. In view of the said fact, both Ravindra Kumar Gupta and the petitioner had not continuously worked. The length of break in service is immaterial, as break in service of even a single day is break in service. Thus on the ground that in services of the petitioner, there is break of about 6 months and rejection of claim of the petitioner for regularization on this ground is also arbitrary, especially when the services of Ravindra Kumar Gupta despite break in service has been regularized. 3 SPLAD No. 1004 of 2025

29. Apart from break in service, neither Ravindra Kumar Gupta nor the petitioner were covered under the Rules of 1979, but in case of Ravindra Kumar Gupta the cabinet has relaxed the condition with regard to the date of appointment as well as break in service but on other hand, the case of the petitioner for regularization has not been considered by the cabinet. This inaction is also arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The respondents themselves have admitted in their counter affidavit that now the services of Tax Officer are outside the purview of Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission. Once the post of Tax Officer is outside the purview of Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission, the petitioner is entitled for benefit of Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Adhoc Appointment (On Post Outside the Purview of Public Service Commission) (Fourth Amendment), Rules 2021.

30. It is admitted by respondent that the petitioner is working as Tax Officer on the date of promulgation of Fourth Amendment Rules of 2021, i.e. 16.12.2021 and on the said date, he had completed more than 3 years continuous service and was also appointed before 31.12.2001. In the entire counter affidavit, there is no averment to the effect that the work and conduct of the petitioner had not been satisfactory or any disciplinary proceedings have ever been initiated against the petitioner. In paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit it is also admitted that the post of Tax Officer is vacant for which requisition has been made to Subordinate Service Selection Commission. Thus, it is established that the petitioner is fully entitled for regularization of his services as Tax Officer. He fulfills all the criteria mentioned in Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Adhoc Appointment (On Post Outside the Purview of Public Service Commission) (Fourth Amendment), Rules 2021.

31. Normally the Court should not issue mandamus to regularize the services, but in the present case, the act of the respondent had been discriminatory and arbitrary. The case of petititoner has not been placed before the cabinet along with Ravindra Kumar Gupta & Jagan Singh for regularization. Even before passing the impugned order in the present writ petition, the matter was not 4 SPLAD No. 1004 of 2025 placed before the cabinet, as has been done in case of Ravindra Kumar Gupta and Jagan Singh.

32. In view of the aforesaid facts that the petitioner has been grossly discriminated and the act of the respondent had been in violation of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India, hence the impugned order dated 10.11.2019 passed by the respondent no.1/Chief Secretary, Panchayati Raj U.P. Government Lucknow is hereby quashed. The respondent no. 1 is directed to regularize the services of the petitioner most expeditiously and preferably within a period of four weeks from the date of production of certified copy of this order before him."

4. The explanation given in the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application is that delay occurred as considerable time got consumed in obtaining permissions from Panchayati Raj Department, the Karmik Department, the Finance Department and the Advocate General for filing the appeal. In various paragraphs, it has been disclosed that how the file has been sent from one department to the other department.

5. It is noteworthy that admittedly, copy of the order was received in the office of Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj Department, U.P., Lucknow on

27.08.2024. The limitation for filing the appeal is 30 days as per Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court. Despite the same, it appears that the officials kept pushing the file from one department to the other department, wholly oblivious of the limitation prescribed for filing the appeal. It also appears that initially the file was sent by the Panchayati Raj Department to the Zila Panchayat Prayagraj seeking comments, thereafter, to the Law Department. The Law Department again asked the Panchayati Raj Department to give certain clarification and state whether the department is ready to contest the case or not. The Panchayati Raj Department on

29.10.2024 again sent the file through e-office system to the Karmik Department seeking guidance from it. The Karmik Department returned the file on 18.11.2024 with certain fresh queries from the Panchayati Raj Department. It is stated that on 03.12.2024, the department fulfilled the queries of the Karmik Department and sent the file through e-office system to the Karmik Department. The Karmik Department thereafter perused the inputs and again returned the file to the Panchayati Raj Department. The Panchayati Raj Department sent the file to the Finance Department. It is 5 SPLAD No. 1004 of 2025 interesting to note that in para-10 of the affidavit, it is stated that the file was sent to the Finance Department seeking guidance in respect of the order passed by learned Single Judge. We fail to understand how the Finance Department would be in position to make any comment in respect of the order passed by learned Single Judge. At best, it could have accorded financial approval for filing the appeal. In subsequent paragraphs, it has been disclosed how the file thereafter was again transmitted to Panchayati Raj Department, then to the office of Advocate General, and again to Panchayati Raj Department.

6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 has observed as under:- "7..... Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. ......."

7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its recent judgment dated 12.9.2025 passed in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 (Shivamma (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board and others) has analyzed the provision of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and has held as follows:- "40. As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the 6 SPLAD No. 1004 of 2025 purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained by demonstrating the existence of a "sufficient cause" that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act." **** "124. The burden to establish sufficient cause lies upon the party seeking condonation, and the court must be satisfied that the cause is real, bona fide, and free of negligence. Sufficiency of cause is to be determined contextually, on the totality of circumstances, with due regard to the conduct of the applicant and the prejudice caused to the opposite party. The inquiry is not mechanical but principled, resting on the dual pillars of bona fides and diligence.

125. The expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented lexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control.

126. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.

127. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, 7 SPLAD No. 1004 of 2025 and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused." **** "263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice."

8. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (dead) by L.Rs. (supra), the explanation offered by the appellants for condonation of delay in filing the instant special appeal cannot be accepted.

9. We find that the appellants have acted in a callous manner and are guilty of laches and inordinate delay.

10. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is hereby rejected. In consequence, the appeal also stands dismissed. November 25, 2025 Mukesh Kr. (Siddharth Nandan,J.) (Manoj Kumar Gupta,J.)

pendency of the writ petition, the Fourth Amendment Rules, 2021 came into effect on 16.12.2021 and thereunder, the petitioner is entitled for regularization of his services, having being appointed before 31.12.2001, the cut off date, and having completed three years of continuous service on

16.12.2021. The relevant finding in the judgment of learned Single Judge are as follows: "28. In view of the said fact, both Ravindra Kumar Gupta and the petitioner had not continuously worked. The length of break in service is immaterial, as break in service of even a single day is break in service. Thus on the ground that in services of the petitioner, there is break of about 6 months and rejection of claim of the petitioner for regularization on this ground is also arbitrary, especially when the services of Ravindra Kumar Gupta despite break in service has been regularized. 3 SPLAD No. 1004 of 2025

29. Apart from break in service, neither Ravindra Kumar Gupta nor the petitioner were covered under the Rules of 1979, but in case of Ravindra Kumar Gupta the cabinet has relaxed the condition with regard to the date of appointment as well as break in service but on other hand, the case of the petitioner for regularization has not been considered by the cabinet. This inaction is also arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The respondents themselves have admitted in their counter affidavit that now the services of Tax Officer are outside the purview of Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission. Once the post of Tax Officer is outside the purview of Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission, the petitioner is entitled for benefit of Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Adhoc Appointment (On Post Outside the Purview of Public Service Commission) (Fourth Amendment), Rules 2021.

30. It is admitted by respondent that the petitioner is working as Tax Officer on the date of promulgation of Fourth Amendment Rules of 2021, i.e. 16.12.2021 and on the said date, he had completed more than 3 years continuous service and was also appointed before 31.12.2001. In the entire counter affidavit, there is no averment to the effect that the work and conduct of the petitioner had not been satisfactory or any disciplinary proceedings have ever been initiated against the petitioner. In paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit it is also admitted that the post of Tax Officer is vacant for which requisition has been made to Subordinate Service Selection Commission. Thus, it is established that the petitioner is fully entitled for regularization of his services as Tax Officer. He fulfills all the criteria mentioned in Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Adhoc Appointment (On Post Outside the Purview of Public Service Commission) (Fourth Amendment), Rules 2021.

31. Normally the Court should not issue mandamus to regularize the services, but in the present case, the act of the respondent had been discriminatory and arbitrary. The case of petititoner has not been placed before the cabinet along with Ravindra Kumar Gupta & Jagan Singh for regularization. Even before passing the impugned order in the present writ petition, the matter was not 4 SPLAD No. 1004 of 2025 placed before the cabinet, as has been done in case of Ravindra Kumar Gupta and Jagan Singh.

32. In view of the aforesaid facts that the petitioner has been grossly discriminated and the act of the respondent had been in violation of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India, hence the impugned order dated 10.11.2019 passed by the respondent no.1/Chief Secretary, Panchayati Raj U.P. Government Lucknow is hereby quashed. The respondent no. 1 is directed to regularize the services of the petitioner most expeditiously and preferably within a period of four weeks from the date of production of certified copy of this order before him."

4. The explanation given in the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application is that delay occurred as considerable time got consumed in obtaining permissions from Panchayati Raj Department, the Karmik Department, the Finance Department and the Advocate General for filing the appeal. In various paragraphs, it has been disclosed that how the file has been sent from one department to the other department.

5. It is noteworthy that admittedly, copy of the order was received in the office of Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj Department, U.P., Lucknow on

27.08.2024. The limitation for filing the appeal is 30 days as per Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court. Despite the same, it appears that the officials kept pushing the file from one department to the other department, wholly oblivious of the limitation prescribed for filing the appeal. It also appears that initially the file was sent by the Panchayati Raj Department to the Zila Panchayat Prayagraj seeking comments, thereafter, to the Law Department. The Law Department again asked the Panchayati Raj Department to give certain clarification and state whether the department is ready to contest the case or not. The Panchayati Raj Department on

29.10.2024 again sent the file through e-office system to the Karmik Department seeking guidance from it. The Karmik Department returned the file on 18.11.2024 with certain fresh queries from the Panchayati Raj Department. It is stated that on 03.12.2024, the department fulfilled the queries of the Karmik Department and sent the file through e-office system to the Karmik Department. The Karmik Department thereafter perused the inputs and again returned the file to the Panchayati Raj Department. The Panchayati Raj Department sent the file to the Finance Department. It is 5 SPLAD No. 1004 of 2025 interesting to note that in para-10 of the affidavit, it is stated that the file was sent to the Finance Department seeking guidance in respect of the order passed by learned Single Judge. We fail to understand how the Finance Department would be in position to make any comment in respect of the order passed by learned Single Judge. At best, it could have accorded financial approval for filing the appeal. In subsequent paragraphs, it has been disclosed how the file thereafter was again transmitted to Panchayati Raj Department, then to the office of Advocate General, and again to Panchayati Raj Department.

6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 has observed as under:- "7..... Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. ......."

7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its recent judgment dated 12.9.2025 passed in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 (Shivamma (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board and others) has analyzed the provision of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and has held as follows:- "40. As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the 6 SPLAD No. 1004 of 2025 purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained by demonstrating the existence of a "sufficient cause" that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act." **** "124. The burden to establish sufficient cause lies upon the party seeking condonation, and the court must be satisfied that the cause is real, bona fide, and free of negligence. Sufficiency of cause is to be determined contextually, on the totality of circumstances, with due regard to the conduct of the applicant and the prejudice caused to the opposite party. The inquiry is not mechanical but principled, resting on the dual pillars of bona fides and diligence.

125. The expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented lexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control.

126. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.

127. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, 7 SPLAD No. 1004 of 2025 and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused." **** "263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice."

8. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (dead) by L.Rs. (supra), the explanation offered by the appellants for condonation of delay in filing the instant special appeal cannot be accepted.

9. We find that the appellants have acted in a callous manner and are guilty of laches and inordinate delay.

10. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is hereby rejected. In consequence, the appeal also stands dismissed. November 25, 2025 Mukesh Kr. (Siddharth Nandan,J.) (Manoj Kumar Gupta,J.)