High Court

1. Petitioner, who has already served as a Home Guard Volunteer with the respondent establishment, is aggrieved by the decision of the authority concerned in rejecting his claim to be reinstated taking his date of birth as 4th July, 1966 in place of 12th January, 1965 as recorded.

2. Learned Standing Counsel submits that since petitioner's date of birth has continued to be recorded since the very beginning in the service records of the establishment as 12th January, 1965, the same could not have been changed at the fag end of service career.

3. It is submitted that the principles as enshrined in the relevant provisions of U.P. Recruitment to Services (Determination of Date of Birth) Rules, 1974 have to be attracted and they do not warrant any change date of birth originally recorded in service records.

4. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the records, I find that the petitioner does not dispute that initially his date of birth in service record was recorded as 12th January, 1965 on which date he has been made to retire upon attaining the age of 60 years and now he has come up with the case that his date of birth should be corrected as 4th July, 1966 on the basis of his High School mark-sheet. Petitioner admittedly passed out high school in the year 1983 and he came into service on 1st December, 1984 and, therefore, it was open for the petitioner to have got his date of birth changed.

5. Learned Standing Counsel is right in contending that date of birth cannot be permitted to be changed in the official records of service at fag end of the service career.

6. The legal position is well settled in a number of decisions of this Court as well as Supreme Court in the case of General Manager, Barsua Iron Ore Mines v. Vice President United Mines Mazdoor Union and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 491 in which the Supreme Court vide paragraph 20. 11(iii) has held thus: "20. 11.(iii) application can be rejected on the ground of delay and laches also more particularly when it is made at the fag-end of service and/or when the employee is about to retire on attaining the age of superannuation."

7. Again in the case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd and others v. Shyam Kishore Singh (2020) 3 SCC 411, in which the Supreme Court vide paragraph 9 has held thus: "9. This Court has consistently held that the request for change of the date of birth in the service records at the fag end of service is not sustainable. The learned Additional Solicitor General has in that regard relied on the decision in State of Maharashtra v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble [State of Maharashtra v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble, (2010) 14 SCC 423 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 582] wherein a series of the earlier decisions of this Court were taken note and was held as hereunder : (SCC pp. 428-29, paras 16-17 & 19) "16. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Raj Kumar Agnihotri [U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Raj Kumar Agnihotri, (2005) 11 SCC 465 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 96] . In this case, this Court has considered a number of judgments of this Court and observed that the grievance as to the date of birth in the service record should not be permitted at the fag end of the service career.

17. In another judgment in State of Uttaranchal v. Pitamber Dutt Semwal [State of Uttaranchal v. Pitamber Dutt Semwal, (2005) 11 SCC 477 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 106] relief was denied to the government employee on the ground that he sought correction in the service record after nearly 30 years of service. While setting aside the judgment [Pitamber Dutt Semwal v. State of U.P., 1999 SCC OnLine All 1610 : 2000 All LJ 2341] of the High Court, this Court observed that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the decision after almost three decades.

19. These decisions lead to a different dimension of the case that correction at the fag end would be at the cost of a large number of employees, therefore, any correction at the fag end must be discouraged by the Court. The relevant portion of the judgment in Home Deptt. v. R. Kirubakaran [Home Deptt. v. R. Kirubakaran, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 449] reads as under : (SCC pp. 158-59, para 7) '7. An application for correction of the date of birth [by a public servant cannot be entertained at the fag end of his service]. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotions forever. … According to us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or the tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case, on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. … the onus is on the applicant, to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book."

8. In such above view of the matter, therefore, I do not find any manifest error in the order of 31st December, 2024 rejecting the claim of the petitioner raised in his representation.

9. Petition is held to be devoid of merits and is, accordingly, dismissed. Order Date :- 5.4.2025 Atmesh

1. Petitioner, who has already served as a Home Guard Volunteer with the respondent establishment, is aggrieved by the decision of the authority concerned in rejecting his claim to be reinstated taking his date of birth as 4th July, 1966 in place of 12th January, 1965 as recorded.

2. Learned Standing Counsel submits that since petitioner's date of birth has continued to be recorded since the very beginning in the service records of the establishment as 12th January, 1965, the same could not have been changed at the fag end of service career.

3. It is submitted that the principles as enshrined in the relevant provisions of U.P. Recruitment to Services (Determination of Date of Birth) Rules, 1974 have to be attracted and they do not warrant any change date of birth originally recorded in service records.

4. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the records, I find that the petitioner does not dispute that initially his date of birth in service record was recorded as 12th January, 1965 on which date he has been made to retire upon attaining the age of 60 years and now he has come up with the case that his date of birth should be corrected as 4th July, 1966 on the basis of his High School mark-sheet. Petitioner admittedly passed out high school in the year 1983 and he came into service on 1st December, 1984 and, therefore, it was open for the petitioner to have got his date of birth changed.

5. Learned Standing Counsel is right in contending that date of birth cannot be permitted to be changed in the official records of service at fag end of the service career.

6. The legal position is well settled in a number of decisions of this Court as well as Supreme Court in the case of General Manager, Barsua Iron Ore Mines v. Vice President United Mines Mazdoor Union and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 491 in which the Supreme Court vide paragraph 20. 11(iii) has held thus: "20. 11.(iii) application can be rejected on the ground of delay and laches also more particularly when it is made at the fag-end of service and/or when the employee is about to retire on attaining the age of superannuation."

7. Again in the case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd and others v. Shyam Kishore Singh (2020) 3 SCC 411, in which the Supreme Court vide paragraph 9 has held thus: "9. This Court has consistently held that the request for change of the date of birth in the service records at the fag end of service is not sustainable. The learned Additional Solicitor General has in that regard relied on the decision in State of Maharashtra v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble [State of Maharashtra v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble, (2010) 14 SCC 423 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 582] wherein a series of the earlier decisions of this Court were taken note and was held as hereunder : (SCC pp. 428-29, paras 16-17 & 19) "16. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Raj Kumar Agnihotri [U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Raj Kumar Agnihotri, (2005) 11 SCC 465 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 96] . In this case, this Court has considered a number of judgments of this Court and observed that the grievance as to the date of birth in the service record should not be permitted at the fag end of the service career.

17. In another judgment in State of Uttaranchal v. Pitamber Dutt Semwal [State of Uttaranchal v. Pitamber Dutt Semwal, (2005) 11 SCC 477 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 106] relief was denied to the government employee on the ground that he sought correction in the service record after nearly 30 years of service. While setting aside the judgment [Pitamber Dutt Semwal v. State of U.P., 1999 SCC OnLine All 1610 : 2000 All LJ 2341] of the High Court, this Court observed that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the decision after almost three decades.

19. These decisions lead to a different dimension of the case that correction at the fag end would be at the cost of a large number of employees, therefore, any correction at the fag end must be discouraged by the Court. The relevant portion of the judgment in Home Deptt. v. R. Kirubakaran [Home Deptt. v. R. Kirubakaran, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 449] reads as under : (SCC pp. 158-59, para 7) '7. An application for correction of the date of birth [by a public servant cannot be entertained at the fag end of his service]. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotions forever. … According to us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or the tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case, on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. … the onus is on the applicant, to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book."

8. In such above view of the matter, therefore, I do not find any manifest error in the order of 31st December, 2024 rejecting the claim of the petitioner raised in his representation.

9. Petition is held to be devoid of merits and is, accordingly, dismissed. Order Date :- 5.4.2025 Atmesh