Prithivirajan v. State Rep by the Inspector of Police and Another and has referred

3. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant submits that the applicant is innocent and has falsely been implicated in the instant case. He submits that the ingredients of section 376 of IPC do not attract in the present matter as the rape has not been committed on the false pretext of marriage. He also submits that there was consensual relationship between the parties and due to some anonymity, the informant/prosecutrix lodged the first information report. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on the judgment reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 696 Prithivirajan Versus State Rep by the Inspector of Police and Another and has referred paragraph nos. 4 to 7, which are extracted hereinunder:- "4. The entire case of the prosecution is that the appellant is being charged, Inter-alia, under Section 376 of the IPC for the reason that the appellant had given false promise of marriage to the prosecutrix and thus obtained her consent for sexual relationship but later backed out of his promise, and for that reason it is a case of rape. The logic given here is that in case there is no consent then it would be rape as defined under section 375 of IPC. In order to prove that there is no consent usually reliance on section 90 of IPC is also taken. Section 90 of IPC is as follows:

90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception- A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person- If the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent of child- unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age. The prosecution would thus like to prove that because of the 'misconception', consent was given and hence it is a case of rape.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant argued that this is not a case of rape but of consensual relationship, and hence deserves to be quashed. In order to strengthen this submission, he relied upon several cases. These are: i. Sonu v. State of U.P. ii. Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand. Iii. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra iv. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra v. Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala vi. Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana vii. K.P. Thimmappa Gowda v. State of Karnataka viii. Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar ix. Uday v. State of Karnataka x. Rahul Sasi v. State of Kerala

6. This Court has time and again reiterated that only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape. For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied: first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage. [See: Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra; Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra]

7. The instant case is one of consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix. Even otherwise, it does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with. Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to Intervening circumstances. Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered. Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court. This cannot be permitted."

4. Referring the aforesaid, he submits that it has been held by the Apex Court that only because of physical relations based on promise of marriage will not amount to rape unless the same is covered with section 90 of IPC. He next submits that the criminal prosecution against the applicants is against the settled proposition of law, as such, the whole proceedings vitiates, thus, the criminal proceedings against the applicant may be quashed.

5. Learned A.G.A. appearing for the State has opposed the contentions aforesaid, but he could not dispute the settled proposition of law rendered in case of Prithvirajan(Supra).

6. Prima facie, there seems to be force in the argument of counsel for the applicant, thus, matter requires consideration.

7. Let notice be issued to opposite party no. 2, returnable at an early date.

8. Steps be taken within a week.

9. If steps are taken, office shall proceed accordingly.

10. List/put up this matter in fourth week of September, 2025.

11. In the meantime, the State as well as opposite party no. 2 may file their counter affidavits.

12. Till the next date of listing, criminal proceedings of Case Crime No. 347 of 2023 under sections- 376, 506 and 216 of IPC P.S.- Kotwali Dehat District- Sultanpur., shall remain stayed, so far as the present applicant is concerned. Order Date :- 13.8.2025 Mayank

3. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant submits that the applicant is innocent and has falsely been implicated in the instant case. He submits that the ingredients of section 376 of IPC do not attract in the present matter as the rape has not been committed on the false pretext of marriage. He also submits that there was consensual relationship between the parties and due to some anonymity, the informant/prosecutrix lodged the first information report. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on the judgment reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 696 Prithivirajan Versus State Rep by the Inspector of Police and Another and has referred paragraph nos. 4 to 7, which are extracted hereinunder:- "4. The entire case of the prosecution is that the appellant is being charged, Inter-alia, under Section 376 of the IPC for the reason that the appellant had given false promise of marriage to the prosecutrix and thus obtained her consent for sexual relationship but later backed out of his promise, and for that reason it is a case of rape. The logic given here is that in case there is no consent then it would be rape as defined under section 375 of IPC. In order to prove that there is no consent usually reliance on section 90 of IPC is also taken. Section 90 of IPC is as follows:

90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception- A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person- If the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent of child- unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age. The prosecution would thus like to prove that because of the 'misconception', consent was given and hence it is a case of rape.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant argued that this is not a case of rape but of consensual relationship, and hence deserves to be quashed. In order to strengthen this submission, he relied upon several cases. These are: i. Sonu v. State of U.P. ii. Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand. Iii. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra iv. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra v. Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala vi. Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana vii. K.P. Thimmappa Gowda v. State of Karnataka viii. Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar ix. Uday v. State of Karnataka x. Rahul Sasi v. State of Kerala

6. This Court has time and again reiterated that only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape. For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied: first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage. [See: Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra; Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra]

7. The instant case is one of consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix. Even otherwise, it does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with. Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to Intervening circumstances. Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered. Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court. This cannot be permitted."

4. Referring the aforesaid, he submits that it has been held by the Apex Court that only because of physical relations based on promise of marriage will not amount to rape unless the same is covered with section 90 of IPC. He next submits that the criminal prosecution against the applicants is against the settled proposition of law, as such, the whole proceedings vitiates, thus, the criminal proceedings against the applicant may be quashed.

5. Learned A.G.A. appearing for the State has opposed the contentions aforesaid, but he could not dispute the settled proposition of law rendered in case of Prithvirajan(Supra).

6. Prima facie, there seems to be force in the argument of counsel for the applicant, thus, matter requires consideration.

7. Let notice be issued to opposite party no. 2, returnable at an early date.

8. Steps be taken within a week.

9. If steps are taken, office shall proceed accordingly.

10. List/put up this matter in fourth week of September, 2025.

11. In the meantime, the State as well as opposite party no. 2 may file their counter affidavits.

12. Till the next date of listing, criminal proceedings of Case Crime No. 347 of 2023 under sections- 376, 506 and 216 of IPC P.S.- Kotwali Dehat District- Sultanpur., shall remain stayed, so far as the present applicant is concerned. Order Date :- 13.8.2025 Mayank