Raghuveer Singh v. State of U.P. and others) precisely on the ground that earlier Writ C No

1. Heard Shri Kalyan Singh, learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner, Shri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents and Shri S.C. Dwivedi, learned counsel for Agra Development Authority (ADA).

2. The instant review application is preferred to review the order dated 30.09.2024 passed by this Court in Writ-C No.32772 of 2024 (Raghuveer Singh v. State of U.P. and others) precisely on the ground that earlier Writ C No.797 of 2024 was preferred with the grievance that the allotment had been cancelled on the ground that the petitioner had failed to deposit the instalments alongwith interest and the liability shown against the petitioner as on 31.12.2023 was Rs.35,29,789.93.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the said proceeding, the petitioner had already deposited Rs.28 lacs and had also given an undertaking to deposit the entire outstanding amount, if some breathing time is accorded to him. He further states that while disposing of the said writ petition on 12.02.2024, the leave was accorded by the Division Bench to the petitioner to approach the respondent development authority by making a request for restoration of allotment on the condition that the entire defaulted amount shall be deposited by the petitioner and the Court has directed to the petitioner to deposit Rs.10 lacs alongwith copy of the said order before the Vice Chairman of the development authority within three weeks.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that as the said amount had been deposited well within time but in arbitrary manner, the Incharge (Property), Authority, Agra had issued the sale out notice/proposal dated 04.09.2024, which was challenged in Writ C No.32772 of 2024. While passing the order dated 30.09.2024, the Court has not appreciated the correct facts and the claim of the petitioner was negated in terms of the regulations governing the registration and allotment of residential buildings/plots. He has vehemently submitted that while passing the order dated 30.09.2024, the Court has not assigned any reason in respect to the relevant matters regarding Paragraph 46 (a) and 46 (b) of the Regulations and as such, the order dated 30.09.2024 is liable to be reviewed.

5. Per contra, Sri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing Counsel and Sri D.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the ADA vehemently opposed the review application and submit that while passing the order dated 12.02.2024 in previous round of litigation the petitioner had given a categorical undertaking to the Court that the petitioner is inclined to deposit the outstanding amount, if breathing time is given. In response to the said leave, the petitioner had deposited only Rs. 10 lakhs and again the demand was raised in the light of the regulations towards the restoration of the plot, which could only be restored on deposit of Rs.35,29,789.93. On one hand, the petitioner had taken leave vide order dated 12.02.2024 passed in Writ-C No.797 of 2024 to deposit the outstanding amount and on the other hand, he had filed another writ petition being Writ-C No.32772 of 2024 challenging the sale notice/proposal dated 04.09.2024. Admittedly, the petitioner had not deposited the amount in question as per demand letter dated wherein the authority raised demand of 31.12.2024, Rs.35,29,789.93 from the petitioner. There is no infirmity or illegality in the order dated 30.09.2024. Lastly, it is contended that this application cannot be treated to be an opportunity to argue the case on merits afresh.

6. Heard rival submissions and perused the record.

7. Having gone through the grounds taken in the review application, we find that admittedly, the said amount had not been deposited by the petitioner towards the restoration charges and the authority had no discretion whatsoever to take a contrary view against the regulations. Again he had challenged the subsequent demand/sale out notice dated 04.09.2024 in Writ-C No.32772 of 2024 and while considering the claim set up by the petitioner, the Court had also taken note of paragraph 46 (a) of the regulations governing the registration and allotment of residential buildings/plots, wherein the restoration of plots can only be considered upon payment of 75% of the market rate prevailing current value of the scheme and consequently, the said writ petition was dismissed on 30.09.2024. Nothing is brought on record to indicate that the petitioner had ever shown any inclination to deposit the amount for restoration of the plot. The entire endeavour of the applicant is to show that the Court has not properly appreciated the matter and the judgment is not correct. Virtually, there is an attempt to review the matter, which is not permissible under a review application.

8. It is settled law that an application for review cannot be treated to be an opportunity to argue the case on merits afresh. The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. The error contemplated under the rule must be such, which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error, which has to be searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. A court of review has only a limited jurisdiction and it can allow a review on the grounds; (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence, which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order was made; (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or (iii) for any other sufficient reason.

9. In the case of Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, Hon'ble Apex Court took the view that there is nothing under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which precludes High Court from exercising the power of review, which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. It was held that the power of review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in reviewing its own orders, every Court including High Court inheres plenary jurisdiction, to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it.

10. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of A.P. Sharma v. A.P. Sharma, 1979 (4) SCC 389, has cautioned that power of review of the High Court is not the same as appellate powers and review on the ground that certain documents have not been considered, which formed the record, cannot be ground of review. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Meera Bhanja v. Nirmla K. Chaudhary, 1995 (1) SCC 170, has taken the view that review must be confined to error apparent on the face of record, error must be such as would be apparent on mere looking without any long drawn process of reasoning, and reappraisal of evidence on record for finding out error would amount to exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which is not at all permissible.

11. In the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137, Hon'ble Supreme Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record :- "An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ. In our view the aforesaid approach of the Division Bench dealing with the review proceedings clearly shows that it has overstepped its jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. By merely styling the reasoning adopted by the earlier Division Bench as suffering from a patent error. It would not become a patent error or error apparent in view of the settled legal position indicated by us earlier. In substance, the review Bench has re appreciated the entire evidence, sat almost as Court of appeal and has reversed the findings reached by the earlier Division Bench Even if the earlier Division Bench findings regarding C.S. Plot No. 74 were found to be erroneous, it would be no ground for reviewing the same, as that would be the function of an appellate Court. Learned counsel for the respondent was not in a position to point out how the reasoning adopted and conclusion reached by the Review Bench can be supported within the narrow and limited scope of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. Right or wrong, the earlier Division Bench judgment had become final so far as the High Court was concerned. It could not have been reviewed by reconsidering the entire evidence with a view to finding out the alleged apparent error for justifying the invocation of review powers. Only on that short ground, therefore, this appeal is required to be allowed. The final decision dated 8th July, 1986 of the Division Bench dismissing the appeal from appellate decree No.569 of 1973 insofar as C.S. Plot No. 74 is concerned as well as the review judgment dated 5th September, 1984 in connection with the very same plot, i.e. C.S. Plot No. 74 are set aside and the earlier judgment of the High Court dated 3rd August, 1978 allowing the Second Appeal regarding suit plot No. 74 is restored. The appeal is accordingly allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs."

12. In Parsion Devi and others v. Sumitri Devi and others, 1997 (8) J.T. SC 480, Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the view that review proceeding has to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47, and therein the two earlier judgments referred to above have been relied upon. Again in Smt. Meera Bhanja v. St. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary, 1985 (1) SCC 170, while quoting this approval a passage from Abhiram Taleshwar Sharma v. Abhiram Pishak Sharma & Ors. (1979 (4) SCC 389, Hon'ble Supreme Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

13. Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650, after considering the dictionary meaning of word "review" has taken the view that power of review can be exercised for correction of mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute, dealing with exercise of power; the review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise, and mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground of Review.

14. Hon'ble the Apex Court in Subhash Vs. State of Maharastra & another, AIR 2002 SC 2537, the Apex Court emphasized that Court should not be misguided and should not lightly entertain the review application unless there are circumstances falling within the prescribed limits. The Courts and Tribunal should not proceed to re-examine the matter as if it was an original application before it for the reason that it cannot be a scope of review. In State Haryana v. Mohinder Singh, JT 2002 (1) 197, the Apex Court disapproved the judgment of High Court, wherein earlier writ petition was disposed of by High Court being infructuous and giving some directions, and subsequent to the same, review was sought, which was allowed, same was clearly termed to be overstepping of jurisdiction, and amounting to giving of one more chance of hearing.

15. In the case of Union of India v. B. Valluvar, 2006 (8) SCC 686, Hon'ble Apex Court has again considered the parameters of review jurisdiction of High Court, that same shall be exercised within the limitations as provided under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule of C.P.C.,and without recording finding as to there existed error apparent on the face of the record, merit cannot be gone into. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and others v. M.P. Mohila, 2007 (1) SCC 457, has taken the view that in the garb of clarification application, recourse to achieve the result of review application, cannot be permitted, as what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly.

16. In Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati and others 2013 (8) SCC 320, the Apex Court said: "19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Summary of the Principles:

20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

20.1. When the review will be maintainable:- (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 526, to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors., 2013 (8) SCC 337.

22.2. When the review will not be maintainable:- (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived." (emphasis supplied)

17. On the touchstone of the dictum noted above, the review is permissible only when there is error apparent on the face of record i. e. error should be grave and palpable, and the error must be such as would be apparent on mere looking of record, without requiring any long drawn process of reasoning, and reappraisal of entire evidence for finding the error, as same would amount to exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Further, the review lies only on the grounds mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 141 CPC. The party must satisfy the Court that the matter or evidence discovered by it at a subsequent stage could not be discovered or produced at the initial stage though it had acted with due diligence. A party filing a review application on the ground of any other "sufficient reason" must satisfy that the said reason is analogous to the conditions mentioned in the said provision of C.P.C.

18. Perusal of judgment under review passed by us shows that each and every aspect of the matter has been considered and thereafter, the writ petition in question was dismissed and there appears no apparent mistake in the judgment under review. Neither review court can examine the merits of the judgment as an appellate court nor in the garb of review petition, a re-hearing of the matter be permitted by this Court.

19. The review application has no merit and the same is dismissed, accordingly Order Date :- 6.1.2025 S.P./RKP

1. Heard Shri Kalyan Singh, learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner, Shri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents and Shri S.C. Dwivedi, learned counsel for Agra Development Authority (ADA).

2. The instant review application is preferred to review the order dated 30.09.2024 passed by this Court in Writ-C No.32772 of 2024 (Raghuveer Singh v. State of U.P. and others) precisely on the ground that earlier Writ C No.797 of 2024 was preferred with the grievance that the allotment had been cancelled on the ground that the petitioner had failed to deposit the instalments alongwith interest and the liability shown against the petitioner as on 31.12.2023 was Rs.35,29,789.93.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the said proceeding, the petitioner had already deposited Rs.28 lacs and had also given an undertaking to deposit the entire outstanding amount, if some breathing time is accorded to him. He further states that while disposing of the said writ petition on 12.02.2024, the leave was accorded by the Division Bench to the petitioner to approach the respondent development authority by making a request for restoration of allotment on the condition that the entire defaulted amount shall be deposited by the petitioner and the Court has directed to the petitioner to deposit Rs.10 lacs alongwith copy of the said order before the Vice Chairman of the development authority within three weeks.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that as the said amount had been deposited well within time but in arbitrary manner, the Incharge (Property), Authority, Agra had issued the sale out notice/proposal dated 04.09.2024, which was challenged in Writ C No.32772 of 2024. While passing the order dated 30.09.2024, the Court has not appreciated the correct facts and the claim of the petitioner was negated in terms of the regulations governing the registration and allotment of residential buildings/plots. He has vehemently submitted that while passing the order dated 30.09.2024, the Court has not assigned any reason in respect to the relevant matters regarding Paragraph 46 (a) and 46 (b) of the Regulations and as such, the order dated 30.09.2024 is liable to be reviewed.

5. Per contra, Sri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing Counsel and Sri D.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the ADA vehemently opposed the review application and submit that while passing the order dated 12.02.2024 in previous round of litigation the petitioner had given a categorical undertaking to the Court that the petitioner is inclined to deposit the outstanding amount, if breathing time is given. In response to the said leave, the petitioner had deposited only Rs. 10 lakhs and again the demand was raised in the light of the regulations towards the restoration of the plot, which could only be restored on deposit of Rs.35,29,789.93. On one hand, the petitioner had taken leave vide order dated 12.02.2024 passed in Writ-C No.797 of 2024 to deposit the outstanding amount and on the other hand, he had filed another writ petition being Writ-C No.32772 of 2024 challenging the sale notice/proposal dated 04.09.2024. Admittedly, the petitioner had not deposited the amount in question as per demand letter dated wherein the authority raised demand of 31.12.2024, Rs.35,29,789.93 from the petitioner. There is no infirmity or illegality in the order dated 30.09.2024. Lastly, it is contended that this application cannot be treated to be an opportunity to argue the case on merits afresh.

6. Heard rival submissions and perused the record.

7. Having gone through the grounds taken in the review application, we find that admittedly, the said amount had not been deposited by the petitioner towards the restoration charges and the authority had no discretion whatsoever to take a contrary view against the regulations. Again he had challenged the subsequent demand/sale out notice dated 04.09.2024 in Writ-C No.32772 of 2024 and while considering the claim set up by the petitioner, the Court had also taken note of paragraph 46 (a) of the regulations governing the registration and allotment of residential buildings/plots, wherein the restoration of plots can only be considered upon payment of 75% of the market rate prevailing current value of the scheme and consequently, the said writ petition was dismissed on 30.09.2024. Nothing is brought on record to indicate that the petitioner had ever shown any inclination to deposit the amount for restoration of the plot. The entire endeavour of the applicant is to show that the Court has not properly appreciated the matter and the judgment is not correct. Virtually, there is an attempt to review the matter, which is not permissible under a review application.

8. It is settled law that an application for review cannot be treated to be an opportunity to argue the case on merits afresh. The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. The error contemplated under the rule must be such, which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error, which has to be searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. A court of review has only a limited jurisdiction and it can allow a review on the grounds; (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence, which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order was made; (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or (iii) for any other sufficient reason.

9. In the case of Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, Hon'ble Apex Court took the view that there is nothing under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which precludes High Court from exercising the power of review, which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. It was held that the power of review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in reviewing its own orders, every Court including High Court inheres plenary jurisdiction, to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it.

10. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of A.P. Sharma v. A.P. Sharma, 1979 (4) SCC 389, has cautioned that power of review of the High Court is not the same as appellate powers and review on the ground that certain documents have not been considered, which formed the record, cannot be ground of review. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Meera Bhanja v. Nirmla K. Chaudhary, 1995 (1) SCC 170, has taken the view that review must be confined to error apparent on the face of record, error must be such as would be apparent on mere looking without any long drawn process of reasoning, and reappraisal of evidence on record for finding out error would amount to exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which is not at all permissible.

11. In the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137, Hon'ble Supreme Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record :- "An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ. In our view the aforesaid approach of the Division Bench dealing with the review proceedings clearly shows that it has overstepped its jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. By merely styling the reasoning adopted by the earlier Division Bench as suffering from a patent error. It would not become a patent error or error apparent in view of the settled legal position indicated by us earlier. In substance, the review Bench has re appreciated the entire evidence, sat almost as Court of appeal and has reversed the findings reached by the earlier Division Bench Even if the earlier Division Bench findings regarding C.S. Plot No. 74 were found to be erroneous, it would be no ground for reviewing the same, as that would be the function of an appellate Court. Learned counsel for the respondent was not in a position to point out how the reasoning adopted and conclusion reached by the Review Bench can be supported within the narrow and limited scope of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. Right or wrong, the earlier Division Bench judgment had become final so far as the High Court was concerned. It could not have been reviewed by reconsidering the entire evidence with a view to finding out the alleged apparent error for justifying the invocation of review powers. Only on that short ground, therefore, this appeal is required to be allowed. The final decision dated 8th July, 1986 of the Division Bench dismissing the appeal from appellate decree No.569 of 1973 insofar as C.S. Plot No. 74 is concerned as well as the review judgment dated 5th September, 1984 in connection with the very same plot, i.e. C.S. Plot No. 74 are set aside and the earlier judgment of the High Court dated 3rd August, 1978 allowing the Second Appeal regarding suit plot No. 74 is restored. The appeal is accordingly allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs."

12. In Parsion Devi and others v. Sumitri Devi and others, 1997 (8) J.T. SC 480, Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the view that review proceeding has to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47, and therein the two earlier judgments referred to above have been relied upon. Again in Smt. Meera Bhanja v. St. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary, 1985 (1) SCC 170, while quoting this approval a passage from Abhiram Taleshwar Sharma v. Abhiram Pishak Sharma & Ors. (1979 (4) SCC 389, Hon'ble Supreme Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

13. Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650, after considering the dictionary meaning of word "review" has taken the view that power of review can be exercised for correction of mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute, dealing with exercise of power; the review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise, and mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground of Review.

14. Hon'ble the Apex Court in Subhash Vs. State of Maharastra & another, AIR 2002 SC 2537, the Apex Court emphasized that Court should not be misguided and should not lightly entertain the review application unless there are circumstances falling within the prescribed limits. The Courts and Tribunal should not proceed to re-examine the matter as if it was an original application before it for the reason that it cannot be a scope of review. In State Haryana v. Mohinder Singh, JT 2002 (1) 197, the Apex Court disapproved the judgment of High Court, wherein earlier writ petition was disposed of by High Court being infructuous and giving some directions, and subsequent to the same, review was sought, which was allowed, same was clearly termed to be overstepping of jurisdiction, and amounting to giving of one more chance of hearing.

15. In the case of Union of India v. B. Valluvar, 2006 (8) SCC 686, Hon'ble Apex Court has again considered the parameters of review jurisdiction of High Court, that same shall be exercised within the limitations as provided under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule of C.P.C.,and without recording finding as to there existed error apparent on the face of the record, merit cannot be gone into. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and others v. M.P. Mohila, 2007 (1) SCC 457, has taken the view that in the garb of clarification application, recourse to achieve the result of review application, cannot be permitted, as what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly.

16. In Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati and others 2013 (8) SCC 320, the Apex Court said: "19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Summary of the Principles:

20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

20.1. When the review will be maintainable:- (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 526, to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors., 2013 (8) SCC 337.

22.2. When the review will not be maintainable:- (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived." (emphasis supplied)

17. On the touchstone of the dictum noted above, the review is permissible only when there is error apparent on the face of record i. e. error should be grave and palpable, and the error must be such as would be apparent on mere looking of record, without requiring any long drawn process of reasoning, and reappraisal of entire evidence for finding the error, as same would amount to exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Further, the review lies only on the grounds mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 141 CPC. The party must satisfy the Court that the matter or evidence discovered by it at a subsequent stage could not be discovered or produced at the initial stage though it had acted with due diligence. A party filing a review application on the ground of any other "sufficient reason" must satisfy that the said reason is analogous to the conditions mentioned in the said provision of C.P.C.

18. Perusal of judgment under review passed by us shows that each and every aspect of the matter has been considered and thereafter, the writ petition in question was dismissed and there appears no apparent mistake in the judgment under review. Neither review court can examine the merits of the judgment as an appellate court nor in the garb of review petition, a re-hearing of the matter be permitted by this Court.

19. The review application has no merit and the same is dismissed, accordingly Order Date :- 6.1.2025 S.P./RKP