In Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab
Case Details
Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:121515 Court No. - 68 Case :- CRIMINAL MISC ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION U/S 438 CR.P.C. No. - 6821 of 2024 Applicant :- Chanda @ Reshma Opposite Party :- State of U.P. Counsel for Applicant :- Krishna Kumar Shukla Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. Hon'ble Krishan Pahal,J.
Legal Reasoning
1. This is the second anticipatory bail application. First application was filed on 10.4.2023 and the applicant was granted interim protection vide order dated 13.4.2023 but subsequent to it, none was present to press the anticipatory bail application on 13.7.2023, 18.9.2023, 2.1.2024, 11.1.2024, 19.1.2024 and 30.1.2024, as such, the said anticipatory bail application was dismissed as having been rendered infructuous vide order dated 30.1.2024 passed in CRIMINAL MISC ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION U/S 438 CR.P.C. No. - 4119 of 2023. The said application was filed during investigation, as such, it was rendered infructuous.
Legal Reasoning
2. Heard learned counsel for the applicant as well as Sri Pranshu Kumar, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material placed on record. 3. The present application for anticipatory bail has been filed for protection in regard to Case Crime No. 647 of 2022, U/S 306, 385, 504, 506 IPC, Police Station Kotwali, District Shahjahanpur. 4. The final report (charge sheet) was submitted against the applicant and other co- accused persons, as such, the instant anticipatory bail application has been filed. 5. The applicant has been granted interim protection in this second anticipatory bail application. Inadvertently, the applicant could not write the word "Second" in the memo of the application. Supplementary affidavit was filed on 24.6.2024 and the said defect has been removed. The fact that this application may be read as Second Anticipatory Bail finds mentioned in paragraph 4 of the supplementary affidavit. 6. Learned counsel for the applicant has not put forward any new ground for anticipatory bail except that the FIR is delayed by two months and there is no explanation of the said delay caused. The applicant has no criminal history. In case, the anticipatory bail application of the applicant is allowed, she will not misuse the liberty and shall cooperate with trial. 7. Per contra, learned A.G.A. has vehemently opposed the anticipatory bail application on the ground that there is no provision of second anticipatory bail application to be granted, as such, the applicant is not entitled for bail. The arguments tendered at Bar pertain to regular bail application and cannot be agitated u/s 438 Cr.P.C. 8. In Satpal Singh vs. State of Punjab (2018) 13 SCC 813, the Supreme Court has held that the satisfaction of the court for granting protection under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is different from the one under Section 439 Cr.P.C. while considering regular bail. In Pratibha Manchanda and another Vs. State of Haryana and another (2023) 8 SCC 181, the Supreme Court has opined that the relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tight rope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest. 9. A three Judge bench of the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.872-873 of 2020 'Dr. Naresh Kumar Mangla Vs. Smt. Anita Agarwal & others' held that: "19. It is apposite to mention here the distinction between the considerations which guide the grant of anticipatory bail and regular bail. In Pokar Ram vs. State of Rajasthan (1985) 2 SCC 597, while setting aside an order granting anticipatory bail, this Court observed: 5. Relevant considerations governing the court's decision in granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 are materially different from those when an application for bail by a person who is arrested in the course of investigation as also by a person who is convicted and his appeal is pending before the higher court and bail is sought during the pendency of the appeal. Three situations in which the question of granting or refusing to grant bail would arise, materially and substantially differ from each other and the relevant considerations on which the courts would exercise its discretion, one way or the other, are substantially different from each other. This is necessary to be stated because the learned Judge in the High Court unfortunately fell into an error in mixing up all the considerations, as if all the three become relevant in the present situation. 6. The decision of the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 clearly lays down that "the distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail is that whereas the former is granted after arrest and therefore means release from the custody of the police, the latter is granted in anticipation of arrest and is therefore effective at the very moment of arrest". Unlike a post-arrest order of bail, it is a pre-arrest legal process which directs that if the person in whose favour it is issued is thereafter arrested on the accusation in respect of which the direction is issued, he shall be released on bail. A direction under Section 438 is intended to confer conditional immunity from the touch as envisaged by Section 46(1) or confinement. In para 31, Chandrachud, C.J. clearly demarcated the distinction between the relevant considerations while examining an application for anticipatory bail and an application for bail after arrest in the course of investigation. Says the learned Chief Justice that in regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made. It was observed that "it cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides, and, equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond". Some of the relevant considerations which govern the discretion, noticed therein are "the nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and 'the larger interests of the public or the State', are some of the considerations which the court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail". A caution was voiced that "in the evaluation of the consideration whether the applicant is likely to abscond, there can be no presumption that the wealthy and the mighty will submit themselves to trial and that the humble and the poor will run away from the course of justice, any more than there can be a presumption that the former are not likely to commit a crime and the latter are more likely to commit it"." 10. The arguments advanced by learned counsel for the applicant pertain to regular bail application and cannot be agitated at this stage.
Decision
11. In view of the above, the present anticipatory bail application is found devoid of merits and is, accordingly, dismissed. Order Date :- 30.7.2024 Shalini (Justice Krishan Pahal)