Nitin Gupta v. Mohd. Asif Raja), under Section
Case Details
Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:158169 Court No. - 81 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 483 No. - 1212 of 2024 Applicant :- Nitin Gupta Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Dharmendra Kumar Tripathi,Shashank Tripathi Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. Hon'ble Manoj Bajaj,J. Applicant has approached this Court through this application under Section 483 Code of Criminal Procedure for issuance of directions to Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division)-II, Court No. 2, Kanpur Nagar to expeditiously conclude the proceedings of Complaint No. 142263 of 2023 (Nitin Gupta vs. Mohd. Asif Raja), under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Police Station-Anwarganj, District Kanpur Nagar, in a stipulated period. Concededly, pursuant to the summoning order dated 22.01.2024, the accused has been released on regular bail vide order dated 18.03.2024. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to issue any directions for expediting the pending trial.
Legal Reasoning
At this stage, Sri Dharmendra Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the applicant refers to Section 143(3) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 to point out that the statute itself provides for six months period for conclusion of the trial, which is summary in nature, and prays for indulgence by this Court. This Court does not find any merit in the sole argument advanced by learned counsel, keeping in view the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of High Court Bar Association, Allahabad vs. State of U.P. and others, passed in (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 13284-13289 of 2023, wherein it has been observed that constitutional courts should refrain from fixing a time frame for conclusion of trial. The relevant observations reads as under:- "31. The situation in Trial and district Courts is even worse. In 2002, in the case of All India Judges' Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2002) 4 SCC 247, this Court passed an order directing that the judge-to- population ratio within twenty years should be 50 per million. Even as of today, we are not able to reach the ratio of even 25 per million. The directions issued in the case of Imtiyaz Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2017) 3 SCC 658 have not been complied with by the States by increasing the Judge strength of the Trial and District Courts. The figures of pendency of cases in our trial Courts are staggering. There are different categories of cases which, by their very nature, are required to be given utmost priority, such as the cases of the accused in jail and the cases of senior citizens. For example, there are many legislations like the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 etc which prescribe specific time limits for the disposal of cases. However, due to the huge filing and pendency, our Courts cannot conclude the trials within the time provided by the statutes. There is a provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in the form of Section 309, which requires criminal cases to be heard on a day-to-day basis once the recording of evidence commences. The same Section provides that in case of certain serious offences against women, the cases must be decided within two months of filing the charge sheet. Unfortunately, our Criminal Courts are not in a position to implement the said provision. Apart from dealing with huge arrears, our Trial Courts face the challenge of dealing with a large number of cases made time-bound by our constitutional Courts. Therefore, in the ordinary course, the constitutional Courts should not exercise the power to direct the disposal of a case before any District or Trial Court within a time span. In many cases, while rejecting a bail petition, a time limit is fixed for disposal of trial on the ground that the petitioner has undergone incarceration for a long time without realising that the concerned trial Court may have many pending cases where the accused are in jail for a longer period. The same logic will apply to the cases pending before the High Courts. When we exercise such power of directing High Courts to decide cases in a time-bound manner, we are not aware of the exact position of pendency of old cases in the said Courts, which require priority to be given. Bail petitions remain pending for a long time. There are appeals against conviction pending where the appellants have been denied bail. 32. Therefore, constitutional Courts should not normally fix a time-bound schedule for disposal of cases pending in any Court. The pattern of pendency of various categories of cases pending in every Court, including High Courts, is different. The situation at the grassroots level is better known to the judges of the concerned Courts. Therefore, the issue of giving out-of- turn priority to certain cases should be best left to the concerned Courts. The orders fixing the outer limit for the disposal of cases should be passed only in exceptional circumstances to meet extraordinary situations. 33. There is another important reason for adopting the said approach. Not every litigant can easily afford to file proceedings in the constitutional Courts. Those litigants who can afford to approach the constitutional Courts cannot be allowed to take undue advantage by getting an order directing out- of-turn disposal of their cases while all other litigants patiently wait in the queue for their turn to come. The Courts, superior in the judicial hierarchy, cannot interfere with the day-to-day functioning of the other Courts by directing that only certain cases should be decided out of turn within a time frame…...xxxxxx….." Resultantly, no ground is made out for issuing the directions for expeditious disposal of the case. At this juncture, Sri D.K. Tripathi, learned counsel for the applicant prays that the complainant may be granted liberty to move an application before the trial court for concluding the pending trial within the statutory period provided under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Keeping in view the fact that the accused has been released on bail on 18.03.2024, this Court is not even inclined to grant the liberty as prayed for. The application fails and is hereby dismissed. Order Date :- 26.9.2024 #Vik/-