State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy./ Upper Chief Secy. Deptt. Of Basic Education Lko v. C/M Shyam Kali Balika Vidyalaya Bhitari Faizabad Thru. Manager Namely Anandsen Yadav
Case Details
Cited in this judgment
the High Court, who must have been present when the judgement was passed in the open Court or not, if not, why so? After all, the State has a battery of lawyers to advance its cause in the High Court and in every Court, there are more than 25 counsel present but the affidavit does not dwell on this aspect. The affidavit goes on to state that on 1.12.2023, the Assistant Director of Education (Basic), Ayodhya Mandal, Ayodhya had forwarded this matter to the Director of Education, (Basic), Lucknow. There is no explanation as to what transpired between 7.11.2023 and 1.12.2023. The Director of Education (Basic), vide his letter dated 5.12.2023, sought some explanation from appellant no.4, District Basic Education Officer, Ayodhya, as to why, a proposal for filing a special appeal had not been sent to his office. The explanation was sent by appellant no.4 on 07.12.2013, stating that the private respondent had not submitted any representation before him. This is hardly an explanation to be accepted for filing the appeal, belatedly. Learned Standing Counsel, who was appearing in the matter before the High Court, must have 2 SPLAD No. 570 of 2024 made a noting on the file about the petition having been disposed of and then the C.S.C Office should have communicated the same to the concerned opposite parties/officials of the State. The affidavit is absolutely silent in this regard.
4. Ultimately, on the recommendation of the appellant no. 4, the Director of Education (Basic), vide his letter dated 12.12.2023, made a request to the office of learned Chief Standing Counsel of the High Court at Lucknow to provide legal opinion, which was provided on 19.1.2024, i.e., after more than a month after the same was requested. Then, the appellant no. 4, vide his letter dated 19.01.2024, requested the Director of Education (Basic) for taking permission to file the appeal who in turn wrote to the State Government on
31.1.2024 for granting permission and the State Government ultimately granted permission on 16.4.2024. There is absolutely no explanation, firstly for the delay between 19.01.2024 to 31.01.2024 at the level of the Director of Education (Basic), secondly, from 31.01.2024 till 16.04.2024, at the level of the State Government, which is of more than three months.
5. On the basis of the permission dated 16.04.2024, the appellant no.4 requested the Chief Standing Counsel for preparation of the appeal which was ultimately prepared and filed on 5.10.2024, i.e., after more than three months. On the basis of the permission dated 16.04.2024 the appellant no. 4 requested the Chief Standing Counsel for preparation of the appeal, which was ultimately prepared and filed on 05.10.2024, i.e., a good six months, after receiving the letter dated 16.04.2024. There is no explanation for the delay of these six months in the original affidavit filed along with the application for condonation of delay but the same has been sought to be explained by filing a supplementary affidavit which is taken on record. We have perused the said affidavit.
6. According to the said affidavit, learned Chief Standing Counsel allotted the case to the learned Standing Counsel on 27.04.2025 for preparation of the appeal. The file was made available to the learned Standing Counsel on
29.04.2024. On 01.05.2024, the learned Standing Counsel perused the file. On 04/05.05.2024, the counsel after going through the records, found that certain additional information and documents were required, details of which have been given in para-8 of the affidavit. On 13.05.2024, the pairokar of the said officials contacted the learned Standing counsel who was informed about the information/documents required. This happened a good nine days after perusal of the records. The pairokar, in turn, contacted the learned Standing Counsel on 31.05.2024 that he is still searching for the information and the documents. The affidavit then states that in the month of June, 2024, summer vacations started and the learned Standing Counsel who was allotted the case 3 SPLAD No. 570 of 2024 had to go out of station. He came in the last week of June. In July, 2024, the pairokar concerned continued to make efforts to obtain the documents, and it is only in July, 2024 that the pairokar made available certain documents to the learned Standing Counsel but other documents were not made available. It is only in the first week of August that certain more documents were made available. In the second week of August 2024, the learned Standing Counsel tried to go through the record and dictate the special appeal but he could not do so, as no stenographer was made available. Ultimately, the appeal was dictated in the third week of August, 2024 to a private typist but thereafter, the father of the typist fell ill in his parental village at Deoria, on account of which, he had to rush to his parental village. Something more has been said which is not very relevant except that ultimately on 5.10.2024, the appeal was filed. In the interregnum, the father of the typist died. The explanation offered in the supplementary affidavit is hardly one which could be accepted for condoning the delay.
7. We may in this regard, refer to the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court dated 12.09.2025 rendered in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 'Shivamma (Dead) By LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors' wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bonafide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused.
8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts 4 SPLAD No. 570 of 2024 were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. In view of this exposition of law, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.
9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.' reported in (2011) SCC Online SC 403 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) 5 SPLAD No. 570 of 2024 through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.
10. On a consideration of the facts and explanations offered for the delay of 376 days in filing the appeal, we find that the appellants have not acted with due diligence and promptness. Explanation offered by them is more in the nature of excuses. Appellants have been negligent. Explanations are not satisfactory.
11. We have also perused the judgement of the Coordinate Bench in Special Appeal (Defective) No.276 of 2024, wherein it is held that similar issues were involved. Although, the judgement is of a different date and the appeal was dismissed on the ground of delay, relying upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Postmaster General Vs. Living Media India Ltd. reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 and State of Kerala Vs. Akshaya Jewellers: Civil Appeal No.4486 of 2022, decided on 03.08.2023.
12. In view of the above discussion, as not only the delay is inordinate, the same has not been satisfactorily explained. We see no reason to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is rejected. Consequently, the appeal is also rejected. October 30, 2025 DiVYa (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.)
the High Court, who must have been present when the judgement was passed in the open Court or not, if not, why so? After all, the State has a battery of lawyers to advance its cause in the High Court and in every Court, there are more than 25 counsel present but the affidavit does not dwell on this aspect. The affidavit goes on to state that on 1.12.2023, the Assistant Director of Education (Basic), Ayodhya Mandal, Ayodhya had forwarded this matter to the Director of Education, (Basic), Lucknow. There is no explanation as to what transpired between 7.11.2023 and 1.12.2023. The Director of Education (Basic), vide his letter dated 5.12.2023, sought some explanation from appellant no.4, District Basic Education Officer, Ayodhya, as to why, a proposal for filing a special appeal had not been sent to his office. The explanation was sent by appellant no.4 on 07.12.2013, stating that the private respondent had not submitted any representation before him. This is hardly an explanation to be accepted for filing the appeal, belatedly. Learned Standing Counsel, who was appearing in the matter before the High Court, must have 2 SPLAD No. 570 of 2024 made a noting on the file about the petition having been disposed of and then the C.S.C Office should have communicated the same to the concerned opposite parties/officials of the State. The affidavit is absolutely silent in this regard.
4. Ultimately, on the recommendation of the appellant no. 4, the Director of Education (Basic), vide his letter dated 12.12.2023, made a request to the office of learned Chief Standing Counsel of the High Court at Lucknow to provide legal opinion, which was provided on 19.1.2024, i.e., after more than a month after the same was requested. Then, the appellant no. 4, vide his letter dated 19.01.2024, requested the Director of Education (Basic) for taking permission to file the appeal who in turn wrote to the State Government on
31.1.2024 for granting permission and the State Government ultimately granted permission on 16.4.2024. There is absolutely no explanation, firstly for the delay between 19.01.2024 to 31.01.2024 at the level of the Director of Education (Basic), secondly, from 31.01.2024 till 16.04.2024, at the level of the State Government, which is of more than three months.
5. On the basis of the permission dated 16.04.2024, the appellant no.4 requested the Chief Standing Counsel for preparation of the appeal which was ultimately prepared and filed on 5.10.2024, i.e., after more than three months. On the basis of the permission dated 16.04.2024 the appellant no. 4 requested the Chief Standing Counsel for preparation of the appeal, which was ultimately prepared and filed on 05.10.2024, i.e., a good six months, after receiving the letter dated 16.04.2024. There is no explanation for the delay of these six months in the original affidavit filed along with the application for condonation of delay but the same has been sought to be explained by filing a supplementary affidavit which is taken on record. We have perused the said affidavit.
6. According to the said affidavit, learned Chief Standing Counsel allotted the case to the learned Standing Counsel on 27.04.2025 for preparation of the appeal. The file was made available to the learned Standing Counsel on
29.04.2024. On 01.05.2024, the learned Standing Counsel perused the file. On 04/05.05.2024, the counsel after going through the records, found that certain additional information and documents were required, details of which have been given in para-8 of the affidavit. On 13.05.2024, the pairokar of the said officials contacted the learned Standing counsel who was informed about the information/documents required. This happened a good nine days after perusal of the records. The pairokar, in turn, contacted the learned Standing Counsel on 31.05.2024 that he is still searching for the information and the documents. The affidavit then states that in the month of June, 2024, summer vacations started and the learned Standing Counsel who was allotted the case 3 SPLAD No. 570 of 2024 had to go out of station. He came in the last week of June. In July, 2024, the pairokar concerned continued to make efforts to obtain the documents, and it is only in July, 2024 that the pairokar made available certain documents to the learned Standing Counsel but other documents were not made available. It is only in the first week of August that certain more documents were made available. In the second week of August 2024, the learned Standing Counsel tried to go through the record and dictate the special appeal but he could not do so, as no stenographer was made available. Ultimately, the appeal was dictated in the third week of August, 2024 to a private typist but thereafter, the father of the typist fell ill in his parental village at Deoria, on account of which, he had to rush to his parental village. Something more has been said which is not very relevant except that ultimately on 5.10.2024, the appeal was filed. In the interregnum, the father of the typist died. The explanation offered in the supplementary affidavit is hardly one which could be accepted for condoning the delay.
7. We may in this regard, refer to the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court dated 12.09.2025 rendered in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 'Shivamma (Dead) By LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors' wherein the law with regard to condonation of delay and ancillary issues have been elucidated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bonafide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused.
8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts 4 SPLAD No. 570 of 2024 were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. In view of this exposition of law, we cannot consider the merits of the matter at this stage.
9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P.' reported in (2011) SCC Online SC 403 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) 5 SPLAD No. 570 of 2024 through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.
10. On a consideration of the facts and explanations offered for the delay of 376 days in filing the appeal, we find that the appellants have not acted with due diligence and promptness. Explanation offered by them is more in the nature of excuses. Appellants have been negligent. Explanations are not satisfactory.
11. We have also perused the judgement of the Coordinate Bench in Special Appeal (Defective) No.276 of 2024, wherein it is held that similar issues were involved. Although, the judgement is of a different date and the appeal was dismissed on the ground of delay, relying upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Postmaster General Vs. Living Media India Ltd. reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 and State of Kerala Vs. Akshaya Jewellers: Civil Appeal No.4486 of 2022, decided on 03.08.2023.
12. In view of the above discussion, as not only the delay is inordinate, the same has not been satisfactorily explained. We see no reason to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is rejected. Consequently, the appeal is also rejected. October 30, 2025 DiVYa (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.)