✦ High Court of India

Allahabad High Court

Case Details High Court of India

Court

High Court of India

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Special

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10,078 words

Acts & Sections

A of the Companies Act 1956 Apex Court and the notifications issued by the State Government under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 Code of Criminal Procedure §169 Code of Criminal Procedure §177 Code of Criminal Procedure §185 Code of Criminal Procedure §2 Code of Criminal Procedure §482 Code of Criminal Procedure Companies Act 2013 Constitution of India Government of India Act 1935 Indian Penal Code §120 Indian Penal Code §13(1)Indian Penal Code §13(2)Indian Penal Code §211 Indian Penal Code §420 PML Act 2002

24.7.2023 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 5727 of 2023 Namrata Marketing Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi Vs. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine Alld. 247 and on Om Prakash Srivastava Vs. Union of India and another (2006) 6 Supreme Court Cases 207.

7. He further submits that in the instant case (the cause of action) offence of Money Laundering had arisen within the territory of Saharanpur District and having regard to the Notification dated 3.11.2021 issued by the Ministry of Finance the case is cognizable by the Special Court at Ghaziabad and jurisdiction with regard to any order passed in that case lies at Allahabad and not at Lucknow.

8. Shri Ayodhya Prasad Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that no doubt the properties are situated at District Saharanpur but the ECIR of the case has been filed at Lucknow the complaint has also been filed at Lucknow, and investigation is also being done from Lucknow, and the petitioner has only challenged the illegalities pertaining to freezing of his bank account which is a patent illegality in the investigation being done from Lucknow and therefore the jurisdiction lies with the High Court sitting at Lucknow. Various other submissions have been raised by Ayodhya Prasad Mishra with 4 regard to the the factual aspect of the case, in order to show that the illegal means have been used to freeze the bank accounts of the petitioner.

9. Shri Mishra has relied on the following case laws:- "(i) Navin Chandra N. Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2007)7 Supreme Court Cases 640. (ii) Shri Nasiruddin Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1975)2 Supreme Court Cases 671. (iii) Asma Mohammed Farooq and another Vs. Union of India and others, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 12800. (iv) Paritosh Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, 2[2014 (1) JIC 1 (All) (FB)".

10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties the factual matrix as is reflected from the record is that initially a complaint was filed under Sections 420, 468, 471, 120-B IPC and under Sections 211, 297, 299, 301, 678, 629 A of the Companies Act, 1956 and under Sections 129, 184, 188, 189, 447 and 448 of Companies Act, 2013 by the Authorities of Serious Fraud Investigation Office (hereinafter referred to as SFIO) and this complaint was registered on 18.9.2017. The petitioner challenged the summoning order dated 24.9.2021 passed therein before the High Court at Allahabad by moving an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the same was disposed of on 10.5.2019 by providing an opportunity to the petitioner to file discharge application before the court concerned.

11. In pursuance of the above order the discharge application was filed on

5.7.2019 and the same is still pending.

12. On the basis of complaint no. 720 of 2017 presented by the Officers of SFIO the matter was taken over by the CBI, New Delhi and a first Information Report was registered under Sections 120-B, 420 IPC and under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of the P.C. Act 1988, on

30.9.2019 at P.S. CBI SC III, New Delhi. 5

13. The Authority of the Enforcement Directorate also lodged an ECIR No. 13/LKZO/2019 on 7.11.2019 under PML Act.

14. Vide order dated 3.2.2020 the Special Secretary, Home U.P. put on debit freeze the bank account of Abdul Wahid Educational and Charitable Trust and on 5.2.2020 the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Saharanpur passed an order directing the Manager to freeze the said bank account of the University and other Colleges and vide order dated

3.3.2020 the Regional Higher Education Officer issued a letter in respect of freezing the bank account of University and these orders have been challenged by the petitioner by filing the instant writ petition.

15. It is also relevant to note here that in furtherance of the investigation undertaken by the CBI a closure report under Section 169 of the Cr.P.C. was preferred. However, the learned Special Judge, CBI, Anti Corruption Ghaziabad rejected the final / closure report filed under Section 169 Cr.P.C. and summoned the petitioner along with other trustees, vide order dated 22.3.2024. The said summoning order was challenged by the petitioner by moving application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. bearing application No. 24661/2024 and an interim order of stay appears to have been passed in favour of the petitioner on 31.7.2024, and the proceedings are still pending before the appropriate Bench at Allahabad.

16. It is also to be noted that after registration of ECIR by the Enforcement Directorate, Lucknow notices under Section 50 of the PMLA were issued to the petitioner and other trustees and served in District Jail Saharanpur and thereafter the Inquiry officer passed an order on 14.6.2024 under Section 5(1) of P.M.L.A. and a provisional attachment was made and a complaint under Section 5(5) of the P.M.L. Act was also presented to the Adjudicating Authority on 12.7.2024 and the Adjudicating Authority issued shows cause notice against the petitioner which was served on the petitioner and the proceedings are still pending before the Adjudicating Authority. It is in this background the petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the order of the 6 provisional attachment dated 14.6.2024 and also requesting to quash the entire proceedings pending before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8 of the P.M.L.A.

17. We are obliged at first to decide the maintainability of this petition at Lucknow in the background of preliminary objection raised regarding territorial jurisdiction by Shri Kuldeep Srivastava, learned counsel representing the Enforcement Directorate. In our considered opinion the sheet anchor of this objection is Nasiruddin Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (supra) which was decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the year 1975 and the relevant paragraphs of the same are being reproduced as under:- "(14). The United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Order, was promulgated under Section 229 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The order came into effect on the appointed day, namely, 26 July, 1948. "Existing High Courts" in the Order means the High Court referred to in Section 219 of the Government of India Act as the High Court in Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh. As from the appointed day, the High Court at Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh shall constitute one High Court by the name of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad referred to as "the new High Court?" (Paragraph 3).

15. The two crucial provisions are Paragraphs 7 and 14 in the Order. The High Court referred to the provisions of the Order as Articles but we have referred to the same as Paragraphs. Paragraph 7 is as follows:

7. (1) The new High Court shall have, in respect of the whole of the United Provinces, all such, original, appellate and other Jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, is exercisable in respect of any part of that Province by either of the existing High Courts. 7 (2) The new High Court shall also have in respect of any area outside the United Provinces all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as under the law in force immediately before the appointed day is exercisable in respect of that area by the High Court in Allahabad. Paragraph 14 is as follows:

14. The new High Court, and the judges and division courts thereof, shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint: Provided that unless the Governor of the United Provinces with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, otherwise directs, such judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice, may, from time to time nominate, shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court: Provided further that the Chief Justice may in his discretion order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas shall be heard at Allahabad.

34. The conclusion of the High Court that the areas in Oudh could be increased or decreased by the Chief Justice from time to time is set aside. It is only if Lucknow will ever cease to be a seat of the High Court when the Governor of the Uttar Pradesh with the concurrence of the Chief Justice so directs that the first proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order both with regard to sitting of Judges at Lucknow and exercising jurisdiction in respect of cases arising in areas in Oudh will cease to have any significance in relation to Lucknow.

35. The meaning of the expression "in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh" in the first proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order was answered by the High Court that with regard to applications under Article 226 the same will be "a case arising within the areas in Oudh" 8 only if the right of the petitioner in such an application arose first at a place within an area in Oudh. The implication according to the High Court is that if the right of the petitioner arose first at any place outside any area in Oudh and if the subsequent orders either in the revisional or appellate stage were passed by an authority within an area in Oudh then in such cases the Lucknow Bench would not have any jurisdiction. The factor which weighed heavily with the High Court is that in most cases where an appeal or revision would lie to the State Government, the impugned order would be made at Lucknow and on that view practically all writ petitions would arise at Lucknow.

36. The, conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High Court is incorrect. It is unsound because the expression "cause of action" in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression "cause of action" is well- known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen partly within specified 9 areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action.

37. To sum up, our conclusions are as follows. First, there is no permanent seat of the High Court at Allahabad. The seats at Allahabad and at Lucknow may be changed in accordance with the provisions of the Order. Second, the Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to increase or decrease the areas in Oudh from time to time. The areas in Oudh have been determined once by the Chief Justice and, therefore, there is no scope for changing the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has power under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that the word "heard" confers powers on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad instead of Lucknow is wrong. The word "heard" means that cases which have already been instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order be directed to be heard at Allahabad. Fourth, the expression "cause of action" with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at 10 Allahabad. Fifth, a criminal case arises where the offence has been committed or otherwise as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code. That will attract the jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some cases depending on the facts and the provision regarding jurisdiction, it may arise in either place.

38. Applications under Article 226 will similarly lie either at Lucknow or at Allahabad as the applicant will allege that the whole of cause of action or part of the cause of action arose at Lucknow within the specified areas of Oudh or part of the cause of action arose at a place outside the specified Oudh areas.

39. The answers given by the High Court to the first three questions are correct save as modified by our conclusions aforesaid.

40. The answer given by the High Court to the fourth question is set aside. The meaning of cases arising in Oudh areas will be found out by appropriate courts in the light of this judgment.

41. The answer to the fifth question is discharged. The matters are sent back to the High Court for disposal in accordance with this judgment." (Emphasis Ours)"

18. Thus Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above case has made a distinction with regard to the civil case and criminal case and for the purpose of criminal case it was observed that the same shall be deemed to have arisen where the offence has been committed or other wise as provided in the code of criminal procedure. In Nasiruddin (supra) the Supreme Court in concluding paragraph no. 38 in the 5th clause has categorically held that a criminal case arises when the offence has been committed or otherwise as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code and that will attract the jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow and in some cases depending on the facts of the case the cause of action may arise in more than one places or to say offence may be committed in more than two districts falling under the jurisdiction of both, Allahabad and Lucknow, which may provide a choice to the person to approach either Allahabad or Lucknow , as the case may be. A distinction has been made by the 11 Hon'ble Supreme Court so far as the jurisdiction of Twin Seats at Allahabad and at Lucknow is concerned with regard to the civil and criminal cases. In this regard the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. assumes importance and the same are quoted herein below for ready reference. Code of Criminal Procedure Section 2.Definitions.—

2. In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires,— (j) “local jurisdiction”, in relation to a Court or Magistrate, means the local area within which the Court or Magistrate may exercise all or any of its or his powers under this Code; Section 7. Territorial divisions.— (1) Every State shall be a sessions division or shall consist of sessions divisions; and every sessions division shall, for the purposes of this Code, be a district or consist of districts: Provided that every metropolitan area shall, for the said purposes, be a separate sessions division and district. (2) The State Government may, after consultation with the High Court, alter the limits or the number of such divisions and districts. (3) The State Government may, after consultation with the High Court, divide any district into subdivisions and may alter the limits or the number of such sub-divisions. (4) The sessions divisions, districts and sub-divisions existing in a State at the commencement of this Code, shall be deemed to have been formed under this section. Section 9.Court of Session.— (1) The State Government shall establish a Court of Session for every sessions division. (2) Every Court of Session shall be presided over by a Judge, to be appointed by the High Court. (3) The High Court may also appoint Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges to exercise jurisdiction in a Court of Session. 12 (4) The Sessions Judge of one sessions division may be appointed by the High Court to be also an Additional Sessions Judge of another division, and in such case he may sit for the disposal of cases at such place or places in the other division as the High Court may direct. (5) Where the office of the Sessions Judge is vacant, the High Court may make arrangements for the disposal of any urgent application which is, or may be, made or pending before such Court of Session by an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge, or, if there be no Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge, by a Chief Judicial Magistrate, in the sessions division; and every such Judge or Magistrate shall have jurisdiction to deal with any such application. (6) The Court of Session shall ordinarily hold its sitting at such place or places as the High Court may, by notification, specify; but, if, in any particular case, the Court of Session is of opinion that it will tend to the general convenience of the parties and witnesses to hold its sittings at any other place in the sessions division, it may, with the consent of the prosecution and the accused, sit at that place for the disposal of the case or the examination of any witness or witnesses therein. Explanation.—For the purposes of this Code, “appointment” does not include the first appointment, posting or promotion of a person by the Government to any Service, or post in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State, where under any law, such appointment, posting or promotion is required to be made by Government. Section 11. Courts of judicial Magistrates.— (1) In every district (not being a metropolitan area), there shall be established as many Courts of Judicial Magistrates of the first class and of the second class, and at such places, as the State Government may, after consultation with the High Court, by notification, specify. (2) The presiding officers of such Courts shall be appointed by the High Court. (3) The High Court may, whenever it appears to it to be expedient or necessary, confer the powers of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class 13 or of the second class on any member of the Judicial Service of the State, functioning as a Judge in a Civil Court. Section 14. Local jurisdiction of Judicial Magistrates.— (1) Subject to the control of the High Court, the Chief Judicial Magistrate may, from time to time, define the local limits of the areas within which the Magistrates appointed under section 11 or under section 13 may exercise all or any of the powers with which they may respectively be invested under this Code. (2) Except as otherwise provided by such definition, the jurisdiction and powers of every such Magistrate shall extend throughout the district. [(3) Where the local jurisdiction of a magistrate, appointed under section 11 or section 13 or section 18, extends to an area beyond the district, or the metropolitan area, as the case may be, in which he ordinarily holds Court, any reference in this Code to the Court of Sessions, Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate shall, in relation to such Magistrate, throughout the area within his local jurisdiction, be construed, unless the context otherwise requires, as a reference to the Court of Sessions, Chief Judicial Magistrate, or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, exercising jurisdiction in relation to the said district or metropolitan area.] Section 177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.— Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Section 178. Place of inquiry or trial.— (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or, 14 (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas. it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Section 179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues. — When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. Section 180. Place of trial where act is an offence by reason of relation to other offence. — When an act is an offence by reason of its relation to any other act which is also an offence or which would be an offence if the doer were capable of committing an offence, the first-mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction either act was done. Section 181. Place of trial in case of certain offences.— (1) Any offence of being a thug, or murder committed by a thug, of dacoity, of dacoity with murder, of belonging to a gang of dacoits, or of escaping from custody, may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the accused person is found. (2) Any offence of kidnapping or abduction of a person may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the person was kidnapped or abducted or was conveyed or concealed or detained. (3) Any offence of theft, extortion or robbery may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the stolen property which is the subject of the offence was possessed by any person committing it or by any person who received or retained such property knowing or having reason to believe it to be stolen property. 15 (4) Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person. (5) Any offence which includes the possession of stolen property may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the stolen property was possessed by any person who received or retained it knowing or having reason to believe it to be stolen property. Section 182. Offences committed by letters, etc.— (1) Any offence which includes cheating may, if the deception is practiced by means of letters or telecommunication messages, be inquired into or tried by any Court within whose local jurisdiction such letters or messages were sent or were received; and any offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the property was delivered by the person deceived or was received by the accused person. (2) Any offence punishable under section 494 or section 495 of the Penal Code, 1860 may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the offender last resided with his or her spouse by the first marriage. Section 183. Offence committed on journey or voyage.— When an offence is committed whilst the person by or against whom, or the thing in respect of which, the offence is committed is in the course of performing a journey or voyage, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court through or into whose local jurisdiction that person or thing passed in the course of that journey or voyage. Section 284. Place of trial for offences triable together.—Where— 16 (a) the offences committed by any person are such that he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, each such offence by virtue of the provisions of section 219, section 220 or section 221, or (b) the offence or offences committed by several persons are such that they may be charged with and tried together by virtue of the provisions of section 223, the offences may be inquired into or tried by any Court competent to inquire into or try any of the offences. Section 185. Power to order cases to be tried in different sessions divisions.— Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding provisions of this Chapter, the State Government may direct that any cases or class of cases committed for trial in any district may be tried in any sessions division: Provided that such direction is not repugnant to any direction previously issued by the High Court or the Supreme Court under the Constitution, or under this Code or any other law for the time being in force. Above placed provisions of the CrPC would clearly provide the territorial jurisdiction of the courts for the purpose of enquiry and trial.

19. In Paritosh Kumar Vs. Union of India and others (supra) while considering the similar issue as a result of conflicting decisions of two Division Benches of this Court following observations has been made by the Full Bench of this Court and relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are being reproduced as under:- "39. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dr. Balram Dutt Sharma was dealing with the question whether the bail application on behalf of on accused against whom charge-sheet was submitted before the Special Court, C.B.I. at Lucknow was maintainable before the Principal Bench at Allahabad or at Lucknow Bench in view of the fact that the alleged offence of misappropriation, forgery and cheating was committed by him in the district of Meerut, which falls under the jurisdiction of Allahabad. The Division Bench after referring to the judgment of Nasiruddin (supra) and the First proviso to Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, 1948 and the provisions of Sections-437 and 438 Cr. P.C. held that the cause of action for bail might be differentiated from as cause of action for writ petition and cause of action for bail may only arise after the 17 accused is detained and arrested in connection with the F.I.R. and charge-sheet and since in the case of Dr. Balram Dutt Sharma, the parent F.I.R. was lodged at Lucknow, although the F.I.R. against Dr. Balram Dutt Sharma was also registered at Meerut but he was arrested pursuant to the basic parent F.I.R. filed at Lucknow and charge-sheet was also laid before the Special Court, C.B.I. at Lucknow, the Division Bench was of the view that the cause of action for filing the bail application arose within the jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court alone and the Judges at the Principal seat had no jurisdiction to entertain the bail application.

40. The question which now arises is whether the fifth conclusion of Nasiruddin (supra) which lays down the principles for determining the jurisdiction of criminal cases has been correctly interpreted in Dr. Balram Dutt Sharma. The Apex Court has categorically held in Nasiruddin's case that a criminal case arises where the offence has been committed or as otherwise provided in Cr. P.C. The Division Bench in Dr. Balram Dutt Sharma (supra) erred in observing that the cause of action for moving the bail application arose at the place where the basic F.I.R. was lodged in connection with which the accused was arrested and detained and the place where the Special Court before which charge-sheet was filed, is situate. In the case of Dr. Balram Dutt Sharma (supra) there was no ambiguity with regard to the place where offence was committed and thus not only the district Meerut was the place of the origin of the case but also part of the cause of action had arisen within the district Meerut, which is subject to territorial jurisdiction of Principal Bench and hence it was incorrectly concluded in Dr. Balram Dutt Sharma's case that the Lucknow Bench alone had jurisdiction to entertain the bail application on a wholly erroneous premise.

41. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid observations, we have no hesitation in holding that the issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Principal Bench at Allahabad and the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court to entertain a bail application in a case where the offence was committed at Meerut which was within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Bench at Allahabad and the F.I.R. was also filed at Meerut but parent F.I.R. was lodged at Lucknow and charge- sheet was also submitted at Lucknow, was incorrectly decided by the Division Bench without applying the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of Nasiruddin (supra) correctly.

43. In our opinion, the reasons given by the Division Bench in Sanjay Somani in support of its conclusion and for distinguishing the law laid down by the Apex Court in Nasiruddin's case do not appear to be sound. 18

44. The Division Bench of this Court in Sanjay Somani has not correctly construed the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Nasiruddin's case and more particularly its fifth conclusion by referring to the same as one made “in a general manner”. In the light of the facts noticed herein above, it cannot be said that the fifth conclusion was either a stray observation or one made in a cursory manner by the Four Judge Bench. The Division Bench failed to notice that the Apex Court in Nasiruddin's case apart from hearing the two civil appeals arising out of the orders passed in writ petitions was also hearing a criminal appeal which arose out of a judgment passed by the revisional Court and it was not a case where the Apex Court was not conscious of a case where the trial was held at Raebareli within the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench and the subsequent proceedings. The fifth conclusion was recorded by the Apex Court fully conscious of the legal position and the same was binding and conclusive.

45. The Division Bench has further totally misconstructed the fourth conclusion of the Apex Court in Nasiruddin's case in holding that the interpretation of the expression “cases arising in such areas in Oudh” as propounded by the Full Bench of this Court in Nirmal Dass Khathura (supra) that a case would be said to be first arising within the areas of Oudh, with regard to the writ petitions, only if the right of the petitioner in such an application arose first in a place within the areas in Oudh, was overruled in Nasiruddin's case and further in observing that when the Court used the words “or otherwise as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code” in Nasiruddin's case, it obviously meant the place, where the Criminal Court will have jurisdiction to hold enquiry or trial having regard to Chapter XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

47. In our view, there is nothing in Chapter XIII of the Criminal Procedure Code, which may lend support to the theory advanced by the Division Bench that it is the location of the Court which is determinative of the fact whether challenge to the orders passed by it can be entertained by the principal seat at Allahabad or Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The inherent fallacy in the reasoning of the Division Bench is apparent from the following:

48. A careful reading of Clause 2 of the Amalgamation Order, 1948 along with its proviso unequivocally indicates that the extent of the jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench and the Principal seat at Allahabad can be governed and decided only on the strength of the provisions contained in the Constitution of India and the Amalgamation Order, 1948 which stands saved by virtue of Article 225 of the Constitution of India and no notification or order made under the P.C. Act or the Cr. P.C. can eclipse, abridge or modify the distribution of the territories of the 19 two seats of the High Court. In the present case there is no dispute that the offence was committed outside the Oudh area in Allahabad.

48. There is also no dispute about the fact that a writ petition challenging the first information report registered against the applicant was maintainable at Allahabad and merely because the offence complained happens to be one under the Prevention of Corruption Act which was investigated by the C.B.I. and charge-sheet was submitted before the Special Judge, C.B.I., Lucknow which has been conferred the jurisdiction to try the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act committed in certain districts of U.P. mentioned in the relevant notification including Allahabad, it cannot be said that either no part of cause of action arose within Allahabad or Allahabad ceased to be the place from where the case arose and the Principal Bench at Allahabad had no jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 482 Cr. P.C. challenging the order passed by the C.B.I. Court at Lucknow.

49. Regard may further be had to the fact that when the Code of Criminal Procedure refers to the local jurisdiction, it sets out the territories over which the Court of Sessions and Magistrate would exercise jurisdiction. In so far as the High Court is concerned, it defines to mean the High Court of the State. Neither the Cr. P.C. nor the Prevention of Corruption Act touch or modify the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. No notification issued by the State Government directing that any case or class of cases committed for trial in any district be tried in any Sessions Division by a Special Court, can have the effect of increasing or decreasing the territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench which stands finally determined under Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, 1948. This embargo on the power of the State Government in this regard is also borne out from the proviso to section 185 Cr.P.C. which clearly provides that the power under section 185 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the State Government subject to the condition that any notification or direction issued under the aforesaid section is not repugnant to any direction previously issued by the High Court either under the Constitution or the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force.

50. From the above, it is apparent that although the State Government may for certain reasons direct that a class of cases otherwise triable in a particular Sessions division, may be transferred to any other Sessions Division such exercise of power would not be liable to be read in any manner contrary to any direction of the High Court or any other law for the time being in force. There is no dispute that the Amalgamation Order, 1948 was a law for the time being in force at the time of the commencement of the Constitution. The Division Bench in Sanjay 20 Somani holding that the context in which the words “case arising” has been used in Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, would mean a subject on which the judicial power is capable of acting and which has been submitted to it by a party in the forums required by law and that “definition of ‘case’ is wider than that of a ‘suit’ or ‘criminal prosecution’ or a ‘proceedings in rem,’ although in law it usually applies to one of them.” and therefore, if any order is passed in any proceedings by a criminal Court situate within the area of Oudh and the same is challenged before the High Court, it is the Lucknow Bench of High Court alone, which will have jurisdiction in the matter and not the Principal Seat of High Court at Allahabad, has totally misread the fourth conclusion of Nasiruddin's case which clearly states that the place of origin of a criminal case, will be the place where the offence has been committed and if the interpretation of the expression “case arising” mentioned in Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, 1948 as propounded in Sanjay Somani (supra) is accepted to be correct, the same would amount to enlarging the territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench. The Apex Court in Nasiruddin's case has recorded that if the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction and if the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench will have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter and if the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh, it would be open to the litigant who is dominus litis to have his forum conveniens.

54. Thus, it would be a misnomer to hold that the Lucknow Bench of this Court alone will have jurisdiction to entertain a petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. or Criminal Revision or appeal filed against the judgment and order of conviction or acquittal passed by the Special Court, C.B.I. constituted at Lucknow irrespective of the place of origin of the case, i.e. where the offence was committed. Any such interpretation of first proviso to Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, 1948 as well as the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Nasiruddin (supra).

55. Thus, what emerges from the foregoing discussion, is that the conclusions drawn by the two Division Benches in Dr. Balram Dutt Sharma and Sanjay Somani (supra) while interpreting the words “cases arising in such areas in Oudh”, are against the judgment of the Apex Court in Nasiruddin's case. It would be worthwhile to take note of the fact that the Apex Court had clearly ruled that the question whether the Lucknow Bench or the Principal seat at Allahabad would have jurisdiction, would depend upon the “cause of action” of the matter before the Court and in so far as the criminal matters are concerned, the Bench 21 specifically held that it would depend on the place where the offence was committed or as otherwise provided in the Cr.P.C. In so far as the Cr.P.C. is concerned, the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts is provided for in Chapter XIII. Section 177 of the Cr.P.C. provides that the offence is ordinarily to be tried within the local jurisdiction of the Court where it is committed. Sections 179 to 185 provide for various contingencies to decide where the trial of the offence maybe held. The aforesaid provisions far from extinguishing or restricting the basic principle enshrined in section 177 expand it to cover Courts where a part of the offence may have been committed or where a part of cause of action relating to the crime may accrue. From the above, it is clear that the jurisdiction of two seats of the High Court would depend upon the cause of action relating to the crime committed. If a part of the cause of action of the crime namely its commission arises in a district within one of the two seats, then the said seat would certainly retain jurisdiction to consider an appeal or revision or a petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. in respect of the same. In case the crime is triable before a Special Judge, whose Court may be located within the jurisdiction of one of the seats of the High Court, as is factual position in the present case, that would not be sufficient ground to denude the other seat of its jurisdiction. In a case such as the case in hand where admittedly the offence was committed in Allahabad and the F.I.R. was also lodged at Allahabad, which is within the territorial limits of the Principal Bench of Allahabad High Court, it goes without saying that part of the cause of action had accrued within the territorial limits of Allahabad district, notwithstanding the fact that the impugned order was passed by the Special C.B.I. Court located at Lucknow, which has been conferred with the exclusive jurisdiction to try the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, it would be incorrect to hold that the Principal Bench has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition under section 482 Cr.P.C., a criminal appeal or a criminal revision against the order passed by such Special Court at Lucknow and such an interpretation would be m-in direct conflict with the judgment of the Apex Court in Nasiruddin's case. The contrary view expressed by the Division Bench in para 12 of the judgment of this Court in Sanjay Smonai (supra), is thus palpably incorrect.

56. Our answers to the two questions referred to us are as follows: (1) The territorial jurisdiction of the two Benches of the Allahabad High Court has to be decided in view of the first proviso to Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, 1948 as interpreted in the case of Nasiruddin (supra) by the Apex Court and the notifications issued by the State Government under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 appointing 22 Special Judges to hold trial in respect of certain class of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act or any other Special Act while sitting at any place either within or outside the territorial jurisdiction of High Court or its Bench, such exercise of power by the State Government cannot in any manner be read contrary to any direction of the High Court or any other law for the time being in force including the Amalgamation Order, 1948 by which the respective territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Bench and the Lucknow Bench of this Court have been determined. (2) The principle of law enunciated by the two Division Benches of this Court in the case of Dr. Balram Dutt Sharma and Sanjay Somani that for deciding the territorial jurisdiction, it is the location of the Court which has passed the impugned order or where the proceedings are pending, which shall be the determinative factor is totally against the provisions and object of the Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, 1943 and the judgment of the Apex Court in Nasiruddin (supra) and para 14 of U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow (supra). " (emphasis supplied by us)

20. Thus it was held that that the place of origin of a criminal case, will be the place where the offence has been committed and it would depend on the place where the offence has been committed or as otherwise provided in the Cr.P.C. In Cr.P.C.. The territorial jurisdiction of the Courts is provided in Chapter XIII. Section 177 of the Cr.P.C., provides that the offence is ordinarily to be tried within the local jurisdiction of the Court where it is committed. Subsequent Sections of this Chapter has taken care of certain contingencies to determine the place of trial of the offence. The subsequent provisions placed after 177 of the Crpc has expanded the basic principle contained in section177 of the Crpc to cover Courts where a part of the offence may have been committed or where a part of cause of action relating to the crime may accrue. It is thus made clear that the jurisdiction of two seats of the High Court would depend upon the cause of action relating to the crime committed. In case the crime is triable before a Special Judge, whose Court may be located within the jurisdiction of one of the seats of the High Court that would not be sufficient to denude the other seat of its jurisdiction. A conjoint reading of Shri 23 Nasiruddin and Paritosh Kumar (supra) would reveal that in criminal matters it would be the place of commission of the offence which will decide the jurisdiction of the High Court sitting either at Allahabad or at Lucknow and not the place of the High Court seized of the matter which would not be a relevant factor for the same.

21. Much emphasis has been given by Shri A.P. Mishra on Navin Chandra N. Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, (2007)7 Supreme Court Cases 640, specially on paragraphs no.16 on ward which for the sake of convenience are being reproduced as under:- "16. Article 226 of the Constitution of India which provides the power to High Courts to issue certain writs reads as follows:

226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.--(1)withstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have power, throughout the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement, or any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seal of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3)x x x (4)x x x

17. From the provision in Clause (2) of Article 226 it is clear that the maintainability or otherwise of the writ petition in the High Court depends on whether the cause of action for filing the same arose, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court.

18. In legal parlance the expression 'cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a Court or a Tribunal, a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles ...one person to obtain a remedy in Court from another person (Black's Law Dictionary).

19. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a 'cause of action' is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, 24 which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In 'Words and Phrases' (fourth edition) the meaning attributed to the phrase 'cause of action' in common legal parlance is existence of those facts which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.

20. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors. MANU/SC/0759/1994 : (1994)4SCC711 , considered at length the question of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Some of the relevant observations made in the Judgment are extracted hereunder: Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause - notwithstanding anything in Article 32 and provides that every High Court shall have power "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction", to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, "within those territories" directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under Clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by Clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had. arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such parson is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding 'that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. That is at best its case in the writ petition. It is well settled that the expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh Lord Watson said: . . .the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. 25 Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the averments made in Paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court." "So far as the question of territorial jurisdiction with reference to a criminal offence is concerned the main factor to be considered is the place where the alleged offence was committed. "23. Tested in the light of the principles laid down in the cases noted above the judgment of the High Court under challenge is unsustainable. The High Court failed to consider all the relevant facts necessary to arrive at a proper decision on the question of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Court based its decision on the sole consideration that the complaint had filed the complaint at Shillong in the State of Meghalaya and the petitioner had prayed for quashing the said complaint. The High Court did not also consider the alternative prayer made in the writ petition that a writ of mandamus be issued to the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police. The High Court also did not take note of the averments in the writ petition that filing of the complaint at Shillong was a mala fide move on the part of the complainant to harass and pressurise the petitioners to reverse the transaction for transfer of shares. The relief sought in the writ petition may be one of the relevant criteria for consideration of the question but cannot be the sole consideration in the matter. On the averments made in the writ petition gist of which 26 has been noted earlier it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action for filing the writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Bombay High Court."

22. Shri A.P. Mishra appears to have not considered the ratio propounded in Nasiruddin and Paritosh Kuamar (supra) in right perspective, as a fine distinction has been made in both these cases between the civil and criminal cases and for criminal cases the test to determine territorial jurisdiction has been made the place of commission of the offence and if the offence has been committed in part in a District which falls under the jurisdiction of the seat at Lucknow and partly in a District which falls under the jurisdiction of the Allahabad then it would be on the choice of the petitioner to chose his forum either at Lucknow or at Allahabad, as the case may be.

23. In Navin Chandra N. Majithia (supra) (case relied on by Shri A.P. Mishra) all the offences were committed within the territory of Bombay and only a complaint was made in the territory of Meghalaya and the Bombay High Court has dismissed the petition filed by a party on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, only on the ground that the complaint has been filed in Meghalaya and it is in this backdrop the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that main factor to be considered for determination of territorial jurisdiction with reference to a criminal offence is the place where the alleged offence has been committed. The paragraphs of Navin Chandra N. Majithia (supra), placed above would clearly reveal that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in so many words has stated that it would be the place of commission of offence which would decide the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court and not the place where any proceeding has been initiated or filed.

24. In the instant case the cause of action has admittedly arisen in District Saharanpur and as per the notification issued by the State Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of this Court, a special court at Ghaziabad has been constituted , which is empowered to take cognizance of the offences under the PMLA. The adjudicating Authority is sitting 27 in New Delhi and only on the basis that an ECIR has been registered by the E.D. at Lucknow and the investigation by the Enforcement Directorate is being controlled from Lucknow, the same alone may not confer the territorial jurisdiction on this ourt sitting at Lucknow in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shri Nasiruddin and Paritosh Kumar (supra).

25. Thus, for the reasons mentioned herein before we do not find the instant petition maintainable at Lucknow, as the same is maintainable only at Allahabad.

26. Hence the instant writ petition is returned for being filed at Allahabad Order Date :- 22.01.2025 Muk