Kaushal Kishore and others … v. Deputy Director of Consolidation / Chief Revenue Officer, Gonda and others

Judgment

1. EXORDIUM:- This Full Bench endeavors to answer seminal questions of importance relating to the scope and exercise of powers under Section 48 (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Act’) by the Authorities empowered under the Act and whether such powers can be exercised after de- notification of the village from the consolidation operations in terms of Section 52(1) and (2) of the Act.

2. A large number of petitions involving the aforesaid questions flood this Court and more often than not, keep engaging the attention of this Court. In one such case, in WRIT-B No.757 of 2024 - Kaushal Kishore and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation / Chief Revenue Officer, Gonda and others, a learned Single Judge of this Court noticing the divergent opinions on the issue rendered by the different Single Judges and different Division Benches of this Court, found it appropriate to refer the matter to a Larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement.

3. The reference order dated 20.12.2024 noticed a string of judgments which propagated the view that the consolidation authorities do not loose their jurisdiction even after de-notification of the village under Section 52(1) and (2) of the Act, rather they retain the powers to correct the records.

4. The judgments approving the aforesaid view are (i) Ram Bahadur v. DDC and others, 1974 RD 53 (DB); (ii) Brij Bir Singh and another v. DDC, Meerut Camp of Muzaffarnagar and others, 1987 RD 66; (iii) Mukhtar v. DDC, Azamgarh and others, 1993 RD 457 (DB); (iv) Ram Pati v. DDC, Banda and others, 1999 RJ 926; (v) Abdul Sami and others v. DDC and others, 2015 (1) ADJ 214 and (vi) Shiv Shankar and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2018 RD (138) 297.

5. The other set of decisions, which propagate the view that after de- notification of the village, the consolidation authorities are denuded of 3 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 their jurisdiction, except in cases where the proceedings are saved in terms of Section 52(2) of the Act, are (i) Ghafoor v. Additional Commissioner, 1979 RD 76 (DB); (ii) Raja Ram and others v. DDC, Lucknow, 1986 RD 387 (DB); (iii) Hari Ram v. DDC, Azamgarh and others, 1989 RD 281 (DB); (iv) Nanhki v. DDC, Pratapgarh and others, 1995 (13) LCD 1; (v) Ram Narain and others v. DDC Barabanki, 2020 (147) RD 185; (vi) Smt. Malti Devi v. State of U.P. and others, 2021 (151) RD 3; (vii) Sri Pal and others v. DDC, Raebareli and others, MANU/UP/2145/2017; (viii) Raj Karan Singh v. Chief Revenue Officer, MANU/UP/3069/2019 and (ix) Smt. Jagrani @ Ram Jiyayi v. DDC, Shrawasti and others, 2024 (164) RD

6. Looking into the gravity of the questions involved and its impact on a large number of petitions, this Court invited the Members of the Bar to address this Court on the questions referred, for a threadbare consideration of the law relating to the questions to be resolved by this Full Bench.

7. Primarily, on behalf of the petitioners Shri U.S. Sahai, learned counsel supported the view that after de-notification of the village under Section 52(1) of the Act, the consolidation authorities lose their jurisdiction, except where the proceedings are saved in terms of Section 52(2) of the Act.

8. Members of the Bar, who addressed the Court were led by Dr. R.S. Pandey, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Ankit Pandey, who also advanced his submissions in favour of the view that Consolidation Authorities after the de-notification lose their jurisdiction, including to entertain a reference, except where the proceedings are saved under Section 52(2) of the Act.

9. Per contra, Shri Pritish Kumar, learned Additional Advocate General for the State of U.P. assisted by Shri Nishant Shukla, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel along with Shri Vishwas Saraswat, Shri Amal Rastogi and Shri Utkash Srivastava, contended that the 4 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 authorities retain power after de-notification, including the power to entertain and decide a reference. This view was also subscribed by the other learned Members of the Bar, who made submissions, namely, Shri Arun Kumar, Shri Saurabh Yadav and Shri Ishan Kumar Gupta. II QUESTIONS REFERRED:-

10. The questions referred to this Full Bench are as under: - (i) What is the true scope of powers vested with the Deputy Director of Consolidation in terms of Section 48(3) of the Act i.e. to say whether it is corrective in nature or adjudicatory; (ii) Whether the power of reference can be exercised by the Deputy Director of Consolidation after a notification is issued in terms of Section 52(1) of the Act; (iii) Whether the reference proceedings can be said to be saved in terms of Section 52(2) of the Act. III SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS: -

11. Dr. R.S. Pandey, learned Senior Counsel and Shri U.S. Sahai, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the power of reference as per Section 48(3) of the Act, as envisaged in the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953, was not a part of the original legislative scheme. The said provision came to be incorporated in the Act by an amendment which came into effect on 02.03.1963. By virtue of the amendment, the power of reference was introduced and bestowed on Deputy Director of Consolidation (in short, ‘the DDC’), who is the highest authority in the hierarchy of adjudicating authorities under the Act.

12. It was contended that the consolidation operations begin in the village by notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and the same are concluded by de-notifying the village by issuing a notification under Section 52(1) of the Act. Between these two notifications, the 5 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 consolidation authorities continue to exercise their powers as conferred under the Act.

13. It was submitted that only such proceedings under the Act are saved which fall within the ambit of Section 52(2) of the Act. Such proceedings are the ones which on the date of such notification made under Section 52(1) of the Act are pending before the Constitutional Courts or any of the Consolidation Authorities and any such other proceedings which require the orders passed, by the Constitutional Courts and other Consolidation Authorities, after the de-notification in terms of Section 52(1) of the Act to be implemented and given effect to.

14. It was also urged that powers of reference can be exercised only by the DDC, however, such powers cannot be exercised suo motu which is in contrast to the powers of revision conferred on the DDC in terms of Section 48(1) of the Act. The revisional powers can be exercised by the DDC even suo motu, but the same is not true insofar as the powers of reference is concerned, which necessarily has to originate before the Consolidation Officer (hereinafter referred to as ‘CO’) or the Settlement Officer of Consolidation (hereinafter referred to as ‘SOC’).

15. It was, thus, urged that where the power of reference emanates at the core level i.e. before the CO and the SOC and in terms of Section 52(1) of the Act, when the village is de-notified and the CO and SOC loose their jurisdiction, it cannot be gainfully urged or contended that the same CO or SOC can retain their jurisdiction for the purpose of making a reference to the DDC under Section 48(3) of the Act, as this would be an incongruous proposition.

16. It was further submitted that the manner in which Section 48(3) of the Act has been worded, would indicate that invocation of power of

reference is bifurcated in two parts. First, when a matter comes before the CO or the SOC as the case may be, in course of discharge of their respective duties and he finds that certain issues or some matter requires attention and otherwise the matter or issue has already crossed a certain stage of the consolidation operations and it is not within their domain to 6 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 look into it, then they can refer such issue or matter by reference to the DDC. However, prior to making such a reference, the CO and the SOC are required to afford an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. Second, the other part of that Section provides that once the DDC takes note of such a reference then he too is obliged to decide the same after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned.

17. Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act further states that while deciding a reference, the DDC could exercise all the power provided in sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Act, which necessarily is the power of revision. Therefore, it was urged that in terms of Section 52(1) of the Act, upon de-notification, if the CO, SOC and DDC loose their jurisdiction then there can be no occasion for empowering the authorities to retain any jurisdiction through the window of reference and if it was so envisaged then it could have very well been incorporated in the Act itself, which has not been done explicitly.

18. It was urged that detailed procedure is prescribed for conducting the consolidation operations, as shall be evident from a perusal of the Act and the Rules. Moreover, there are certain executive instructions issued from time to time which have been complied and are known as the U.P. Consolidation Manual. It is from these three sources that the entire consolidation operations are carried out.

19. The Scheme of the Act envisages that once the consolidation operations are complete only then the recommendation is made for issuing a notification under Section 52 (1) of the Act. Accordingly, when by and large, the consolidation operations have achieved their objective only then the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act is issued and its consequence is that the Consolidation Authorities are denuded of their jurisdiction as the village stands de-notified.

20. If such is the consequence of de-notification then there can be no reason to leave some residuary powers with the CO/SOC/DDC as the case may be, in the garb of reference proceedings as that would run counter to the Act as then no proceedings would attain finality and it 7 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 would also create a source of manipulation as whichever matter, though otherwise had attained finality, could be reopened by taking recourse to the powers of reference, which cannot be the intention of the Act.

21. It was also submitted that Section 27 of the Act clearly provides that after the new records are prepared in terms of the Act, the same attain presumptive value and after the de-notification, if at all, there is any discrepancy or any right is claimed contrary to the said entries, then such claims can be adjudicated and if required the entries can be rectified by the revenue authorities, but not by the consolidation authorities.

22. It was also urged, illustratively, that there may be a situation where some proceedings may have been decided (prior to the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act). However, the Consolidation Authorities while preparing the records discover some discrepancy, then in such circumstances, the CO and the SOC, if find that any order has attained finality and by giving effect to the said order, some right of another person is affected, or some discrepancy is discovered which may not fall within the ambit of Section 42-A of the Act then in such circumstances, the CO or the SOC can make a reference to the DDC, who may adjudicate , after putting the parties to notice and after hearing them. Any proceeding of this nature which is in aid of proper conduct of consolidation operations, maintenance of the records and entries contained in such consolidation record, has a sanctity attached and is binding on parties.

23. Submission was that in such circumstances, the powers of reference can be exercised and by subscribing to such a view, the provisions of the Act can be harmoniously construed. Nevertheless, it cannot be gainfully proposed that this power can be exercised post the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act as such proceedings cannot be termed to be saved in terms of Section 52(2) of the Act. The proceedings which are saved in terms of Section 52(2) of the Act are the ones which remain pending either before the Consolidation Officer, the 8 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Appellate or the Revisional authorities under the Act or pending before the Constitutional Courts, at the time of issuance of notification under Section 52(1) of the Act.

24. It was thus submitted that the powers under Section 48(3) of the Act are adjudicatory but such adjudication has to take place prior to the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act and it cannot be initiated after the de-notification nor such a reference is saved in terms of Section 52(2) of the Act.

25. Dr. Pandey, learned Senior Counsel while assisting the Court on the questions before it, specifically urged that the provisions of the Act and the Rules must be seen in context with certain provisions contained in the U.P. Consolidation Manual and he has specifically referred to Regulation 201(Ga), 236(Ga) and 240(Ga) contained in Chapter-X under the Heading ‘Correction of Records’. He urged that Regulations 602(4) and 606 in Chapter XII of the U.P. Consolidation Manual indicate that such powers of correction can be exercised only prior to notification under Section 52(1) of the Act.

26. It was urged that the basic object of the Act is to allot compact area in lieu of scattered plots to the tenure holders to facilitate large scale cultivation. The Act does not deal with the substantive rights, which are primarily governed by the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and now after it has been repealed, by the U.P. Revenue Code,

2006. The U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 in that context is only a procedural Act and it lays special emphasis on the consolidation of plots for the tenure holders for giving encouragement to agriculture.

27. According to Dr. Pandey there are clear indications in the Act that the powers of reference in terms of Section 48(3) of the Act can only be exercised for the purposes of ensuring that the orders passed during the consolidation operations prior to notification issued under Section 52(1) of the Act are given effect to and while doing so or while preparing the records if any discrepancy is noticed and by correcting such record, the right of some tenure holder is affected or in order to give effect to an 9 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 order passed in favour of one tenure holder some other tenure holder is affected then in such circumstances, the CO or SOC may find it difficult to settle such a matter and to avoid any overlapping of jurisdiction or to avoid any error of exercise of jurisdiction, which may vitiate the proceedings, hence, in such circumstances, a reference can be made and the DDC has been conferred with the powers to decide the same after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties in terms of Section 48(1) of the Act with the ultimate object that the final records be prepared, error free, so that upon de-notification of the village under Section 52(1) of the Act, the final records can be handed over to the revenue authorities and necessarily such powers can be exercised only prior to de-notification of the village.

28. It was submitted that in the Act, against an order passed under Section 9-A of the Act, an appeal is provided before the SOC prescribing a limitation of 21 days. However, there is no limitation for filing a revision under Section 48(1) or 48(3) of the Act. Thus, where timelines have been prescribed and there is no timeline prescribed in terms of Section 48(3) of the Act even then some reasonable timeline has to be read into it. What would be a reasonable period can be seen on the basis of the scheme and objects of the Act but it cannot be left without any control as that would lead to an anomaly, leaving a window open for manipulation and it may result in doing more mischief than what the Act in the first place tries to curtail. Actually, this very concern was voiced in the DO dated 6th November, 2023 issued by the Consolidation Commissioner, as noticed in the reference order.

29. Moreover, in certain circumstances where a party has any grievance and some discrepancy is noticed after the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act and if he is permitted to get such right or discrepancy rectified through adjudication by Consolidation Authorities then it will have the impact of diluting the bar of Section 11-C of the Act and it will also rob the orders and records prepared of its sanctity and finality. 10 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

30. Learned counsel for the petitioners Shri U.S. Sahai and Dr. Pandey, learned Senior Counsel while canvassing the above noted propositions and in support of their contentions have referred to the decisions of this Court in Ghafoor (supra); Raja Ram (supra); Hari Ram (supra); Nanhki (supra); Ram Narain (supra); Smt. Malti Devi (supra) and Smt. Jagrani @ Ram Jiyayi (supra).

31. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of the Apex Court in Babu Verghese and others v. Bar Council of Kerala and others, (1999) 3 SCC 422 and a decision of this Court in Krishna v. State of U.P., 2014 (123) LCD 754 (DB) to contend that if the Act prescribes something to do in a particular manner then it should be done in that manner alone and not otherwise. Decision of this Court in Mohd. Kallu v. D.D.C. and others, 2002 (93) RD 206 and Ram Pujan and others v. D.D.C., Gazipur and others, 2000 (91) RD 433 has been referred to indicate the scope of powers conferred on the DDC. IV SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF STATE AND RESPONDENTS: -

32. Shri Pritish Kumar, learned Additional Advocate Government for the State of U.P., leading the submissions on behalf of the State and the private respondents has structured his submissions to proffer that the powers of reference in terms of Section 48(3) of the Act is in the nature of inherent power which is available with the DDC to do complete justice between the parties but is to be exercised in extraordinary cases where manifest injustice has been occasioned.

33. It was further urged that the powers to initiate a reference is necessarily vested with an authority subordinate to the DDC that is by a CO or the SOC but the inbuilt mechanism is such that before a reference is actually made to the DDC, first it must pass the scrutiny of referring authority, that is the CO or the SOC, who is obliged to confer a right of hearing to the parties concerned and only if it finds that the matter 11 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 requires the attention of the highest authority, that is the DDC, only then it would make such a reference.

34. When the reference reaches the DDC, he examines the reference and the DDC is also obliged to afford an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. If he comes to the conclusion that it requires some indulgence then the DDC would pass the necessary orders. Section 48(2) of the Act clearly provides that the DDC while exercising its powers of reference would be entitled to exercise all such powers as are vested in him in terms of Section 48(1) of the Act. Needless to say, such powers are very wide and this goes on to indicate that such powers would be used to ensure that any gross injustice or any patent illegality, if occurred, may not be perpetuated.

35. Since, the powers under Section 48(3) of the Act are deep and pervasive and akin to inherent powers, hence they are to be exercised with caution, but at the same time, it also must be noticed that the powers under Section 48(3) are not circumscribed by any condition or limitation, giving a clear indication that such powers have been conferred to meet any unexpected contingency.

36. Elaborating his submissions, the learned Additional Advocate General submitted that certain errors which may not be clerical or arithmetical so as to fall within the ambit of Section 42-A of the Act but if required to be corrected, can be done in terms of Section 48(3) of the Act. It was also urged that certain matters which may be pending before the consolidation authorities at any stage, that is to say before the CO or SOC in appeal or before the DDC in revision and then orders are passed subsequent to the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act, then to carry out or implement such orders, the power of reference can be utilized. Even in cases, where the consolidation authorities for some reason have failed to incorporate an order passed during the consolidation operations which was necessary to be done, hence, to meet such situation, the powers of reference can be invoked. 12 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

37. Learned Additional Advocate General further urged that the manner in which the aforesaid Section 48 of the Act came to be amended in the year 1962 and power of reference was conferred along with the power of revision, indicates that while exercising the power of reference, the DDC could use its revisional powers, this is a clear indicator that in matters where certain discrepancies may have occurred during consolidation operations and requires correction then even post de- notification, in order to meet such contingencies the powers of reference can be used to correct, adjudicate and also re-examine any finding, either of law or of fact which may have been recorded either by the CO or the SOC, in order to do the complete justice between the parties.

38. This power is so conferred and can be exercised without any fetter of even Section 52(1) of the Act as it is born out of necessity, otherwise if an error which may have occurred while the consolidation operations were in progress and it was not discovered or rectified during the consolidation operations, then post de-notification such errors would continue to be reflected in the records and it may not be amenable for rectification/correction/adjudication as then the bar of Section 49 of the Act would operate and the Civil and the Revenue Courts would not be in a position to undo the wrong. It is for the aforesaid reason that the power under Section 48(3) is saved and can be exercised by the authority post the de-notification under Section 52(1) of the Act.

39. It has further been urged that departmental order dated 06.11.2023 mentioned in the reference order passed by the learned Single Judge in Kaushal Kishore (supra), is merely advisory and it cannot be said to have an overbearing effect on the statutory provisions. In support of his submissions, learned Additional Advocate General has referred to the decisions of this Court in Sidh Narain v. D.D.C.: 2008 (1) AWC 219 and another decision of Parag Memorial Education Institution v. Gram Panchayat Sarehri and others: 2024:AHC-LKO:21919.

40. The crux of the entire submissions on behalf of the respondents State and some other Members of the Bar namely, Shri Saurabh Yadav, 13 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Shri Arun Kumar and Shri Ishan Kumar Gupta, who adopted the line of reasoning proposed by the learned Additional Advocate General, is that the power under Section 48(3) of the Act is adjudicatory and is not merely corrective as the DDC has wide powers which are akin to inherent powers and can be exercised to do complete justice between the parties or to meet any unexpected contingency and such powers can be invoked even after the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act. Since the powers are extraordinary, hence they are to be used sparingly and no straight-jacket formula for universal applicability can be laid down, rather exercise of powers under Section 48(3) of the Act will have to be tested on case to case basis. V BIRDS EYE VIEW OF THE ACT:-

41. At the outset, it will be appropriate to consider the entire scheme and nature of the Act to ascertain the nature of the powers exercised by the Authorities and for a better understanding of the Act. For this the Court would delve into the Act of 1953, Rules of 1954 and certain Forms which are appended to the Act and are prepared by the Consolidation Authorities which are of significance and also refer to certain provisions contained in the U.P. Consolidation Manual for a comprehensive understanding.

42. The Act of 1953 was enacted primarily to consolidate the agricultural holdings in the State of Uttar Pradesh with the larger object of giving impetus and development to agriculture. It will be worthwhile to keep in mind that soon after independence, major steps were taken to boost agriculture and to achieve the aforesaid, a very important piece of legislation was introduced in the State of Uttar Pradesh namely the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1950). The Act of 1950 abolished the complicated and numerous categories of tenure holders, both proprietary and cultivatory and also introduced several provisions for securing the rights of the tenure holders and this apart, the Act of 1950 introduced 14 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 reforms for the benefit of landless persons and persons belonging to marginalized sections.

43. Having secured that, the State took the next step to consolidate the land holdings so that all the land held by a tenure-holder could be in a Block which was beneficial for promoting large scale agricultural activities making it more viable and productive, apart from the fact that it would result in substantially reducing the boundary disputes and would also make it feasible for irrigation, help in controlling pests and insects, insulating the crops, thereby increasing the yields.

44. This led to the advent of the U.P. C.H. Act of 1953 and it repealed the earlier C.H. Act of 1939. The Apex Court in Attar Singh v. State of U.P. and others :1959 RD 149 (SC), considered the scope and object of the Act and the relevant portion reads as under: - “3. Before we take these points seriatim, it is useful to refer to the background of this legislation. As far back as 1939, the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 8 of 1939, was passed. It was, however, of little effect, because it could only be applied when more than one- third of the proprietors of the cultivated area of a village applied for an order of consolidation of the village. It was, therefore, felt that some kind of compulsion would be necessary in order to achieve consolidation of holdings in villages. That consolidation would result in improving agricultural production goes without saying and it was with the object of encouraging the development of agriculture that consolidation schemes with a compulsory character were taken up in various States, after the recommendation of The Famine Inquiry Commission 1944, in its Final Report; (See p. 263). The State Bombay was the first to pass an Act called the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, (Bom 62 of 1947). This was followed by the impugned Act in Uttar Pradesh. The object of the Act is to allot a compact area in lieu of scattered plots to tenure- holders so that large scale cultivation may be possible with all its attendant advantages. Thus, by the reduction of boundary-lines saving of land takes place and the number of boundary-disputes is reduced. There is saving of time in the management of fields inasmuch as the farmer is saved from travelling from field to field, which may be at considerable distances from each other. Proper barriers such as fences, hedges and ditches can be erected around a compact area to prevent trespassing and thieving. It would further be easier to control irrigation and drainage and disputes over water would be reduced considerably where compact areas are allotted to tenure-holders. Lastly, the control 15 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 of pests, insects and plant-disease is made easier where farmers have compact areas under cultivation. These advantages resulting from consolidation of holdings are intended to encourage the development of agriculture and larger production of food grains, which is the necessity of the day.

4. With these objects in mind, the Act was passed by the U.P. Legislature in 1953 and received the assent of the President on March 4, 1954. It was published in the gazette on March 8, 1954, and declarations under Section 4 were made for the major part of the State of Uttar Pradesh, including the petitioners' village, in July, 1954.

5. The scheme of the Act is as follows:— When consolidation of a village is taken up, the first thing that is done is to correct the revenue records, and Sections 7 to 12 deal with that. Then comes the second stage of preparing what are called statements of principles; (see Sections 14 to 18). Objections to these principles are entertained and decided and thereafter the principles are confirmed under Section 18. Then comes the third stage (vide Sections 19 to 23), which deals with the preparation of the statement of proposals. Objections to this are also invited and disposed of, and then proposals are confirmed under Section 23. After the proposals have been confirmed, we come to the last stage in which the confirmed proposals are enforced; (see Sections 24 onwards). It will be clear therefore from the objects of the Act and the advantages that accrue from its implementation that it is a piece of legislation, which should be a boon to the tenure-holders in a village and should also lead to the development of agriculture and increase of food production. ...”

45. This Court in Moolchand v. DDC and others; 2007 (103) RD 469 considered the scope and the object of the Act in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 and the same reads as under: - “10. The U.P.C.H. Act does not deal with the grant of substantive rights to be given to the tenure holders. Therefore, it is clear that substantive rights are to be governed by the provisions contained in the U.P. Act, No. 1 of 1951. The U.P.C.H. Act is only procedural with regard to the consolidation of holdings.

11. After start of consolidation proceedings the Revenue Court or the Civil Court cannot decide claims to land and such pending proceedings are to abate in view of section 5 of the U.P.C.H. Act. The abatement is only for adjudication of rights by the Consolidation Courts with regard to pending cases. Further bar is only that fresh institution of cases may be made before the Consolidation Courts under section 9/12 of the U.P.C.H. Act. The Revenue Court and Civil Court may not entertain 16 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 such matters during consolidation period. The U.P.C.H. Act does not provide for devolution, restriction on transfer, extinction of rights, conferment of rights, classes of tenure, etc.

12. The effect upon notification under section 4 or 4-A of the U.P.C.H. Act is given in section 5 of the U.P.C.H. Act. From a reading of these sections in particular section 5 it is clear that the effect of notification is only for maintenance of records, permission from Settlement Officer Consolidation for change of use of the holding, pending proceedings with regard to declaration of rights or interest in any land or for adjudication of rights in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under the U.P.C.H. Act, shall abate. No other effect of the start of consolidation operations is given.”

46. Now having had an idea of the object and purpose of the Act, it would be gainful to take a glance through the important provisions and ascertain how the Act unfolds.

47. The U.P.C.H. Act of 1953 is divided in 5 Chapters. Though, Chapter I comprises of 3 Sections which inter-alia primarily contains the definitions of various terms used in the Act. Chapter II commences with Section 4 up to Section 12-D and relates to revision and correction of maps and records. Chapter III relates to preparation of consolidation Scheme, while Chapter IV deals with the enforcement of scheme and Chapter V is titled as miscellaneous.

48. Under the scheme of the Act, Consolidation operations commence with declaration and notification issued by the State Government under Section 4(2) of the Act in respect of an area to which the consolidation operations pertain. The effect of the notification issued under Section 4 is contained in Section 5. Relevant Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are reproduced hereinafter:- “4. Declaration and notification regarding consolidation.— (1) (a) The State Government may where it is of opinion that a district or part thereof may be brought under consolidation operations, make a declaration to that effect in the Gazette, whereupon it shall become lawful for any officer or authority who may be empowered in this behalf by the District Deputy Director of Consolidation— (i) to enter upon and survey, in connection with Rectangulation or otherwise and to take levels of any land in such area ; (ii) to fix pillars in connection with Rectangulation ; and 17 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (iii) to do all acts necessary to ascertain the suitability of the area for consolidation operations. (b) The District Deputy Director of Consolidation shall cause public notice of the declaration issued under clause (a) to be given at convenient places in the said district or part thereof. (2) (a) When the State Government decides to start consolidation operations, either in an area covered by a declaration issued under subsection (2) or in any other area, it may issue a notification to this effect. (b) Every such notification shall be published in the Gazette and in a daily newspaper having circulation in the said area and shall also be published in each unit in the said area in such manner as may be considered appropriate. “5. Effect of notification under section 4(2)— (1) Upon the publication of the notification [under sub-section (2) of section 4] in the official Gazette, the consequences as hereinafter set forth, shall subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified thereunder till the publication of notification under section 52 or subsection (1) of section 6, as the case may be, ensue in the area to which the [notification under sub-section (2) of section 4] relates, namely:– (a) the district or part thereof, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be under consolidation operations and the duty of maintain the record-of- rights and preparing the village map. The field book and the annual register of each village shall be performed by the District Deputy Director of Consolidation, who shall maintain or prepare them, as the case may be, in the manner prescribed ; (b) [* * * ] (c) notwithstanding anything contained in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, no tenureholder except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, previously obtained shall— (i) use his holding or any part thereof for purposes not connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry including pisciculture and poultry farming ;or (ii) [ **** ] Provided that a tenure holder may continue to use his holding, or any part thereof, for any purpose for which it was in used prior to the date specified in the notification issued [under sub-section (2) of section 4. 18 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (2) Upon the said publication of the notification under subsection (2) of section 4 the following further consequences shall ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely:— (a) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and preceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the, area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision shall on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated : Provided that no such order shall be passed without giving to the parties notice by post or in any other manner and after giving them an opportunity of being heard ; Provided further that on the issue of the notification under subsection (1) of section 6, in respect of the said area or part thereof every such order in relation to the land lying in such area or part, as the case may be, shall stand vacated ; (b) such abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the persons affected to agitate the right or interest in dispute in the said suits or proceedings before the appropriate consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. Explanation—For the purposes of sub-section (2), a proceeding under the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Celling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 or an uncontested proceeding under sections 134 to 137 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, shall not be deemed to be a proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land.”

49. A perusal of Section 5(2) above would reveal that any proceedings pending before any Civil or Revenue Court would stand abated and it is the Consolidation Courts which would have primacy and would be competent to decide the matters before it.

50. Sections 7 and 8 deal with revision of village maps, field book and current annual registers. Thereafter, the statement of principles is prepared in terms of Section 8-A. Section 8 and Section 8-A are being reproduced hereinafter: - 19 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 “8. Revision of the field-book and the current annual register, determination of valuations and shares in joint holdings— (1) Upon the revision of maps under section 7, the District Deputy Director of Consolidation shall subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, and in such manner as may be prescribed, cause to be— (i) revised, the field-book of the unit after field to field partal and the current annual register after its test and verification ; (ii) determined, in consultation with the Consolidation Committee, the valuation of— (a) each plots after taking into consolidation its productivity location and availability of irrigation facilities, if any ; and (b) all trees, wells and other improvements existing in the plots for the purpose of calculating compensation therefor ; (iii) ascertained the share of each owner, if there be more owners than one, out of the valuation determined under subclause (b) of clause (ii) ;and (iv) determined the shares of individual tenure-holders in joint holdings for the purpose of effecting partition to ensure proper consolidation. (2) The District Deputy Director of Consolidation shall cause to be prepared a khasra chakbandi in the form prescribed, in respect of all the plots falling in the unit as also a statement showing the mistakes [undisputed cases of succession] undisputed cases of succession and disputes discovered during the test and verification of the annual register in the course of the field-to field partal.]” “8-A Preparation of Statement of Principles— (1) The Assistant Consolidation Officer shall, in consultation with Consolidation Committee, prepare, in respect of each unit under consolidation operations, a statement in the prescribed from (hereinafter called the Statement of Principles) setting forth the principles to be followed in carrying out the consolidation operations in the unit. (2) The Statement of Principles shall also contain— (a) details of areas, as far as they can be determined at this stage, to be earmarked for extension of abadi including areas for abadi site for Harijans and landless persons in the unit and for such other public purposes as may be prescribed (b) the basis on which the tenure-holders will contribute land for extension of abadi and for other public purposes ; and 20 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (c) details of land to be earmarked for public purposes out of land vested in a Gaon Sabha or a Local Authority under section 117 or section 117-A of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. (d) the standard plots for each unit. (3) The standard plots referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (2) shall be determined by the Assistant Consolidation Officer after ascertaining from the members of the Consolidation Committee and the tenure- holders of the units the best plot or plots of the unit, regard being had to productivity, location and the existing soil class of the plot or plots.”

51. Importantly, Section 9, Section 9-A, Section 9-B, Section 9-C and Section 10 deal with the adjudicatory powers which are conferred on the consolidation officer who is the court of first instance in the hierarchy of adjudicating authorities under Act. Section 9, 9-A, 9-B, 9-C are being reproduced hereinafter: - “9. Issue of extracts from record and statements and publication of the records mentioned in sections 8 and 8-A and the issue of notices for inviting objections— (1) Upon the preparation of the records and the statements mentioned in sections 8 and 8-A the Assistant Consolidation Officer, shall— (a) correct the clerical mistakes, if any, and send or cause to be sent to the tenure-holder concerned and other persons interested, notices containing relevant extracts from the current annual register and such other record as may be prescribed showing— (i) their rights in and liabilities in relation to the land; (ii) mistakes [undisputed cases of succession] and disputes discovered under section 8 in respect thereof ; (iii) specific shares of individual tenure-holder in joint holdings for the purpose of effecting partitions, where necessary, to ensure proper consolidation ; (iv) valuations of the plots ; and (v) valuation of trees, wells and other improvements for calculating compensation there or and its Apportionment amongst owners, if there be more owners than one ; (b) publish in the unit the current khasra and the current annual register, the khasra Chakbandi, the Statement of Principles prepared under section 8-A and any other records that may be prescribed to show, inter alia, the particulars referred to in clause (a). 21 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (2) Any person to whom a notice under sub section (1) has been sent, or any other person interested, may, within twenty-one days of the receipt of notice, or of the publication under sub-section (1), as the case may be, file before the Assistant Consolidation Officer objections in Respect thereof disputing the correctness or nature of the entries in the records or in the extracts furnished therefrom, or in the Statement of Principles, or the need for partition.] 9-A. Disposal of cases relating to claims to land and partition of joint holdings— (1) The Assistant Consolidation Officer shall– (i) where objection in respect of claims to land or partition of joint holdings are filled, after hearing the parties concerned ; and (ii) where no objections are filed, after making such enquiry as he may deem necessary, settle the disputes correct the mistakes and effect partition as far as may be by conciliation between the parties appearing before him and pass orders on the basis of such conciliation : Provided that where the Assistant Consolidation Officer, after making such enquiry as he may deem necessary, is satisfied that a case of succession is undisputed, he shall dispose of the case on the basis of such enquiry. (2) All cases which are not disposed of by the Assistant Consolidation Officer under sub-section (1), all cases relating to valuation of plots and all cases relating to valuation of trees, wells or other improvements for calculating compensation therefor, and its appointment amongst, co- owners, if there be more owners than one, shall be forwarded by the Assistant Consolidation Officer to the Consolidation Officer, who shall dispose of the same in the manner prescribed. (3) The Assistant Consolidation Officer, while acting under subsection (1) and the Consolidation Officer, while acting under sub-section (2), shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction anything to the contrary contained any other law for the time being in force notwithstanding. 9-B. Disposal of objections on the Statement of Principles— (1) Where objections have been filed against the Statement of Principles under section 9, the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned and after taking into consideration the views of the Consolidation Committee, submit his report to the Consolidaiton Officer who shall dispose of the objections in the manner prescribed. (2) Where no objections have been filed against the Statement of Principles within the time provided therefor under section 9, the 22 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Consolidation Officer shall, with a view to examining the correctness, make local inspection of the unit, after giving due notice to the Consolidation Committee and may thereafter make such modification or alterations in the Statement of Principles as he may consider necessary. (3) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Consolidation Officer under sub-section (1), or sub-section (2), may within 21 days of the date of the order, file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation whose decision except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, shall be final. (4) The Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation shall before deciding an objection or an appeal make local inspection of the unit after giving due notice to the parties concerned and the Consolidation Committee. 9-C. Partition of joint holdings— (1) The Assistant Consolidaiton Officer or the Consolidation Officer may partition joint holdings under section 9-A notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in 178 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, or any other law, and may also partition the same suo moto. (2) The partition of joint holdings shall be affected on the basis of shares, provided that there the tenure-holders concerned agree, it may be affected on the basis of specific plots.

52. Any tenure holder who may face issues relating to claims regarding the land, partition of joint holdings, may file objections against the statement of principles at this stage.

53. Any adjudication made by the Consolidation Officer in terms of Section 9-A, 9-B or 9-C, is appealable in terms of Section 11 within the period of limitation i.e. 21 days from the date of the order, before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation (SOC). Section 11 reads as under: - “11. Appeals— (1) Any party to the proceedings under section 9-A aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Consolidaiton Officer or the Consolidation Officer under that section, may within 21 days of the date of the order, file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, who shall after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned give his decision thereon which except as otherwise provided by or order under this Act, shall be final and not be questioned in any court of law. 23 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (2) The Settlement Officer, Consolidation, hearing an appeal under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction, anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force notwithstanding.”

54. However, Section 11-A creates a bar which is akin to the plea of res-judicata/constructive res-judicata. Section 11-A reads as under: - “11-A. Bar on objections—No question in respect of— (i) claims to land, (ii) partition of joint-holdings, and (iii) valuation of plots, trees, wells and other improvement where the question is sought to be raised by a tenure-holder of the plot or the owner of the tree, well or other improvements recorded in the annual register under section 10, relating to the consolidation area which has been raised under section 9 or which might or ought to have been raised under that section,] but has not been so raised shall be raised or heard at any subsequent stage of the Consolidation proceedings.”

55. Section 11-A bars all objections in respect of claim to land, partition of joint holdings and valuation of lands amongst others relating to the consolidation area which had been raised under Section 9 or which might or ought to have been raised under the said Section but were not raised. By virtue of Section 11-A, such objections cannot be raised or be heard at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceedings.

56. At this stage, it will also be relevant to notice that Section 11-C grants leverage or a reprieve to certain lands which vest in the State or Gaon Sabha or with any Authority, and to extent the bar of Section 11-A does not apply to such lands. Section 11-C reads as under:- "[11-C. In course of hearing of an objection under section 9-A or an appeal under section 11 or in proceedings under section 48, the Consolidation Officer, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) or the Director of Consolidation, as the case may be, may direct that any land which vests in the State Government or the Gaon Sabha or any other local body or authority may be recorded in its name, even though no objection, appeal or revision has been filed by such Government, Gaon Sabha, body or authority.]" 24 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

57. Thus, it would be seen that the tenure holders have been conferred with a right of raising objections regarding the statement of principles, claim to land, partition of their joint holdings, valuation regarding plots, trees and other improvements including wells, to be raised at the appropriate level and time before the Consolidation Officer. Any order of the Consolidation Officer can be assailed in an appeal as per Section 11 before the SOC within the period of 21 days as prescribed. This is indicative of the fact that the proceedings are intended to be taken to its logical conclusion as quickly as possible and consolidation proceedings are not intended to go on forever.

58. The applicability of bar of Section 11-A is also indicative of the fact that a person contesting the consolidation proceedings must do so with all earnestness and responsibility as it may have a grave consequence, if not raised at the correct time and stage.

59. Section 12 relates to changes which occur during consolidation operations and which may affect the rights or interests of a tenure-holder which may have been recorded in the revised records. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 clearly provides that the provisions of Section 7 to 11 apply to the decisions made under Section 12(1) of the Act clearly indicating that the aforesaid provisions are not summary in nature rather has the import of regular proceedings which is akin to proceedings held under Section 9-A of the Act.

60. At this stage, it will also be relevant to notice that the Act envisages preparation of consolidation documents/forms which contain valid information and are integral part of the scheme of the Act. The entries and information contained in such forms which are prepared at different stages of consolidation operations, is indicative of rights, disputes, spot positions amongst many other information which can lead to finality, unless challenged and corrected, as per the Scheme of the Act.

61. In this regard, Form CH-2-A which appended to the Act and is relatable to Rules 18 to 23 of the U.P.C.H. Rules, 1954, inter alia is one 25 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 of the first forms which is issued upon commencement of consolidation operations and it is being noticed for clarity and better understanding:-

62. Similarly, The statement of principles is prepared in terms of Section 8-A and also evidenced in terms of C.H. Form-5. For ready reference CH Form-5 is being shown below: - 26 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

63. A glance at these Forms would indicate the meticulous manner in which extensive details have to be incorporated in the various Forms prepared at various stages of the consolidation operations and all such forms are for the consumption of the people of the village and tenure holders.

64. Now moving forward to Chapter III of the Act, primarily, Section 19 and Section 20 of the Act, 1953 are important and those read as under: - “19. Consolidation to be fulfilled by a consolidation scheme—(1) A Consolidation scheme shall fulfill the following conditions namely— (a) the rights and liabilities of a tenure-holder, as recorded in the annual register prepared under section 10, are subject to the deductions, if any, 27 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 made on account of contributions to public purposes under this Act, secured in the lands allotted to him ; (b) the valuation of plots allotted to a tenure-holder subject to deductions, if any, made on account of contributions to public purposes under this Act, is equal to the valuation of plots originally held by him : Provided that, except with the permission of the Director of Consolidation, the area of the holding or holdings allotted to a tenure- holder shall not differ from the area of his original holding or holdings by more than twenty five per cent of the latter ; (c) the compensation determined under the provisions of this Act, or the rules framed thereunder, is awarded— (1) to the tenure-holder— (i) for trees, wells other improvements, originally held by him and allotted to another tenure-holder; and (ii) for land contributed by him for public purposes ; (2) to the Gaon Sabha, or any other local authority as the case may be, for development, if any, effected by it in or over land belonging to it and allotted to a tenure-holder ; (d) the principles laid down in the Statement of Principles are followed; (e) every tenure-holder is, as far as possible, allotted a compact area at the place there he holds the largest part of his holding : Provided that no tenure-holder may be allotted more chaks than three except with the approval in writing of the Deputy Director of Consolidation : Provided further that no Consolidation made shall be invalid for the reason merely that the number of chaks allotted to a tenure-holder exceeds three ; 28 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (f) every tenure-holder is, as far as possible, allotted the plot on which exists his private source of irrigation or any other improvement, together with an area in the vicinity equal to the valuation of the plots originally held by him there ; and (g) every tenure-holder is, as far as possible, allotted chaks in conformity with the process of rectangulation in rectangulation units. (2) A consolidation scheme before it is made final under section 23, shall be provisionally drawn up in accordance with the provisions of section 19-A.” “20. Publication of the provisional consolidation scheme and receipt of objection thereon— (1) Upon the preparation of the provisional Consolidation scheme, the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall send or cause to be sent, to the tenure-holder concerned and persons interested, notices containing relevant extracts therefrom the provisional consolidation scheme shall thereafter, be published in the unit. (2) Subject to the provisions contained in section 11-A any person to whom notice has been sent under sub-section (1), and any other person affected by the provisional consolidation scheme disputing the propriety or correctness of the entries in the provisional Consolidation scheme, or in the extracts furnished therefrom, may within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice or of the date of the publication of the consolidation scheme, as the case may be, file an objection before the Assistant Consolidation Officer or the Consolidation Officer. (3) Any person affected or any person having any interest or right in addition to the right of public highway in or over any public land or having other interest or right which is substantially prejudiced by the declaration made under sub-section (2) of section 19-A may within fifteen days after the publication of the provisional consolidation scheme, file an objection before the Assistant Consolidation Officer or the Consolidation Officer stating the nature of such interest or right."

65. Any person aggrieved by the provisional Scheme of Consolidation, is required to file objections in terms of Section 20(2) and (3) of the Act within 15 days of such publication, which have to be 29 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 decided and disposed of in terms of Section 21. Once, the objections are so decided, the Provisional Consolidation Scheme is confirmed and thereafter the stage commences for enforcing the said scheme.

66. At this stage CH Form-21 and CH Form-23 appended to the Act assume importance and these documents reveal vital informations relating to the village containing statistical and topographical details. These CH Form-21 and CH Form-23 are prepared in parts and for ease of understanding, those are being shown hereunder: - 30 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

67. The extensive exercise undertaken during consolidation operations is with the objective to compact the land holdings and as far as the records are concerned, they are to be updated, corrected and prepared with the idea to maximize the detailed inputs so that the ultimate records 31 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 prepared are error free and such records prepared can be handed over to the Revenue Authorities in terms of Section 27 of the Act.

68. At this stage, it will be relevant to notice Section 27 of the Act which reads as under: - “27. New revenue records— [(1) As soon as may be, after the final consolidation scheme has come into force, the District Deputy Director of Consolidation shall cause to be prepared for each village a new map filed-book and record-of rights in respect of the Consolidation area, on the basis of the entries in the map, as corrected under section 7, the Khasra Chakbandi, the annual register prepared under section 10 and the allotment orders as finally made and issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 shall subject to such modification as may be prescribed, be followed in the preparation of the map and records. (2) All entries in the record-of rights prepared in accordance with the provision of sub-section (1) shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. (3) After the issue of notification under section 52, the Collector shall, instead of the map, field-book and record-of-rights previously maintained by him maintain the map, field-book and record-of rights prepared in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) [and the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, relating to the maintenance and correction of such map, field book and record-of- rights shall mutatis mutandis apply.”

69. The aforesaid provision makes it clear that all entries to the records of rights prepared during consolidation operations shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. Sub-section 3 mandates that after the issue of notification under Section 52, the Collector instead of the map, field book and record of rights previously maintained by him, shall henceforth maintain the map, field book and record of rights prepared in terms of Section 27(1) of the U.P.C.H. Act of 1953 and the provisions of Section 28 and 33 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 would be applicable for maintenance of such records and the provisions in this regard relating to maintenance and correction as provided in the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 would be squarely applicable. 32 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

70. Section 27 is followed by Section 28 which relates to delivery of possession and thereafter Sections 29, 29-A, 29-AA, 29-B, 29-C and Section 30 relate to grant of compensation which may affect a tenure holder whose standing crop is also delivered alongwith the delivery of possession. How such compensation is to be recovered and other incidental matters relating to the reduction of land revenue where a tenure holder has contributed some land for public purpose andhow compensation is to be granted for the land contributed by tenure holders and the impact and consequences which ensues upon such exchange and delivery of possession, has been considered in these provisions.

71. The entire scheme of consolidation and how it is implemented is provided alongwith complete hierarchy of courts who are the adjudicating authority, their appellate authority coupled with the fact that the orders passed during adjudication by the consolidation courts including the revisional authority, are final between the parties and unless set aside, they have binding impact and would also operate as res- judicata in subsequent proceedings attaching finality to it. This is in context with disputes which may be inter-se the tenure-holders and individuals.

72. In continuation, Chapter-V of the Act relates to miscellaneous aspects and the few important provisions to be considered to answer the questions under consideration herein would include Section 42-A, which contains the power of correction. The power of revision and reference is contained in Section 48 and then Section 49 which bars the jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts and finally Section 52 relates to close of consolidation operations.

73. In the aforesaid legislative backdrop, apart from the substantive provisions as noticed above, which are integral to the scheme of the Act and in order to give a complete robust functionality to the Act, the legislature framed Rules known as the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules 1954. Mention may be made of Rules 18 to 23, Rule 25, Rule 26, Rule 46, Rule 48-B, Rule 49, Rule 50, Rule 54-A, Rule 71, Rule 82 to 33 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 86, Rule 90, Rule 93, Rule 97 to 100 and Rule 101-A, Rule 104, Rule 109 and 109-A to understand the working and execution of the consolidation operations.

74. However, for the purpose of this reference, Rules 90, 97, 98, 99, 100 and 100-A and CH Form 41 and 45 are being reproduced hereinafter: - “90. Section 27. - (1) The Consolidator shall thereafter cause a final map to be prepared showing only the new numbers, their boundaries and, where necessary, conventional signs. It shall be checked by the Consolidator, Assistant Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer before it is signed by the Settlement Officer. Consolidation whose designation shall be mentioned below his signature. The final map, thus prepared shall after copies thereof have been traced out as laid down in sub-rule (2), be sent to the press for reproduction where such reproduction is necessary in view of the provisions of Rule 101. On being received back from the press, the final map shall be placed in the Consolidation Volume meant for the Collector's Record Room. (2) Two copies of the final map shall be traced out. In these copies the boundaries of the old plots existing within a new plot shall be indicated by dotted lines without the serial numbers of the old plots being shown there in the existing soil classes shall also be marked within thick red lines on these maps, the different soil classes being described by the suitable abbreviations written boldly in red ink over each kind of soil. The copies thus traced out shall be checked by the Consolidator, the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer before these are checked and signed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. A copy of this map shall be placed in each of the two Consolidation Volumes mentioned in Rule 100-A.

97. Section 27. - The Consolidation Lekhpal shall, with help of the Khasra Mutabiqat and other relevant records mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 27, prepare the Khatauni in C.H. Form 45 in duplicate. and the Khatauni Khasra Mutabiqat

98. The in C.H. Form 45 prepared by the Consolidation, Lekhpal shall be checked cent per cent by the Consolidator. 25 per cent of the entries of these records shall be checked by the Assistant Consolidation Officer and five per cent by the Consolidation Officer. The Khatauni in C.H. Form 45 shall then be published in the village. Section 27

99. numbers shall be entered in Column 5 of Khasra Mutabiqat. . - After the khatauni has been prepared new khata 34 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

100. All cuttings and overwritings in the Khasra Mutabiqat and the Khatauni shall be signed and dated by the person responsible for such cuttings and overwritings and also by the Assistant Consolidation Officer. There shall be no erasures anywhere. An Errata List in respect of each of the record mentioned above shall be prepared by the Consolidation Lekhpal in C.H. Form 6-B and shall be attested by the Consolidator. It shall also be signed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer. Such a list after being signed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation shall be attached to each copy of the record when it is bound. 100A. The Khasra Mutabiqat along with the final village map and the Khatauni in C.H. Form 41 shall constitute the Consolidation Volume. Two such volumes shall be prepared. One of it shall be consigned to the Collector's Record Room and the other shall be delivered to the Tahsildar for being made over to the Lekhpal. Thereafter the Director of Consolidation shall take steps to notify the village under Section 52.”

75. For ease of reference, Form-41 and Form-45 are being reproduced hereinafter: -

76. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid Scheme is not only to help comprehend how the Act operates given the legislative scheme but also, how it achieves its object and purpose. The Act, as unfolded above, would reveal that it is a Code in itself. The endevour is that the 35 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 provisions of the Act be construed in a harmonious manner to carry forward the legislative intend rather than to stultify any provision or the scheme of the Act. VI CONFLICTING DECISIONS: -

77. Now, it will be appropriate to consider the conflicting decisions of this Court which has led to this reference:-

78. Let us notice the reasoning expressed by different Benches of this Court to hold that the Consolidation Authorities do not lose jurisdiction simplicitor but retain powers to correct the records: - (i) In Ram Bahadur v. DDC and others: 1974 RD 53 (DB) the Division Bench of this Court has held as under: - “2. The issuance of the Notification does not, however affect the orders passed by the High Court the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Constitution of India or in cases or proceedings pending under this Act on the date of issue of notification under sub-section (1) and orders passed will have to be given effect to notwithstanding anything contained in the Notification. In Dilawar Singh's case, 1972 All WR (HC) 557 AIR 1973 Allahabad 411 the Division Bench observed that the term “proceedings” in Section 52 (2) has been used in the comprehensive sense of proceedings commencing from the one which is initiated before the Consolidation Officer and including that taken in the appeal Court. It was held that an appeal does not initiate a fresh proceeding. On the institution of the appeal the proceedings, which had become dormant on the decision of the trial Court revive and remain pending, the only difference being that they are now pending in a different Court, namely, the Court of appeal. It was also held that the notification under Section 52 (1) does not have the effect of destroying vested rights of the litigants. For instance, if a litigant has a right of appeal against a particular order he can exercise it notwithstanding the publication of the notification under Section 52 (1) and the moment an appeal is filed the effect in law is that the original proceedings stand revived. * * * 4. We have seen the decision of the learned Single Judge in Mohd. Saddiq v. Deputy Director, (1967 All WR (HC) 228). In that decision no reasons have been given for the view that an application for setting aside the ex parte decree does not fall within the purview of Section 52 (2) as a proceeding which involves or affects a revival of the original proceedings and from that point of view making the original 36 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 proceeding pending within the meaning of Section 52 (2). In our opinion, this decision does not lay down the law correctly.” (ii) In Brij Bir Singh and Another v. DDC, Meerut Camp of Muzaffarnagar and others: 1987 RD 66 the Court has held as under: - “5. …………... The first point which requires determination is as to, whether the effect of the order dated 8-7-64 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation which became final between the parties in all respects during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings, before the issuance of notification under Section 52(1) of the Act, can be sought to be given effect to by the successful party after the notification under Section 52(1) has been issued. The reply to this argument is not too far to seek. The relevant provisions of the Act coupled with the intetion of the legislature in enacting the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act has to be ascertained. Under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, unlike the provisions of U.P.Z.A and LR Act, when any order has been passed in favour of any party, its effect has to be given in the relevant revenue papers and in the relevant C.H. Forms by the consolidation authorities themselves. No application to give effect to that order is-required-In other words, there is no provision Under the Act for the execution of any order under the Act, unlike in a suit filed under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under the Specific Relief Act or under Section 202 or 203 of U.P.Z.A and L.R.Act. * * * 12. it is, thus, clear that the intention of the Legislature was that if an order has to be passed by a particular consolidation authority, it has to be given effect to in revenue papers and if the same has not been given effect to by either side, in that event the successful party should not suffer. There is a maxim 'Actus Curae Neminem Gravabit', which means that an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. It is, thus, clear that once an order was passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in favour of the contesting Respondents, which became final and if the consolidation authorities failed to carry out that order or to give effect in the revenue papers, it is not for the contesting Respondents to suffer. Further that order could have been given effect to during the consolidation operations by making an application for correction of papers and even after the close of the consolidation operation. The application for correction of papers, even if moved by the contesting Respondents, for which there was no limitation provided, it could not be said that application became time barred. In case the Petitioners have any grievance they could have challenged the order dated 8-7-64. But they did not do so. Now there no justification on their part to object to the application for correction of papers moved on behalf of the successful party. In case there would have been any limitation provided for application for correction of papers, the Petitioners would have been 37 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 justified in raising the objection. But as there was no limitation provided for that application, it can be moved either during the consolidation operations or after the close of consolidation operation. Even during the consolidation operation the Legislature did not require the successful party to make an application for execution for seeking effect to a particular order. It was for the consolidation authorities to carry out the effect of the order passed in favour of a party.

13. The scope for reference has not been defined under Section 48(3). It has been left to the discretion of the Court. There is no denying the fact that where grounds have not been stated in the text the task of a court becomes heavier. In this connection it is better to quote an observation in C.K. Allen's Law. In the Making, (6th Edn.) at page 1292 as follows: “The Judge himself addresses his task in much the same way as a counsel. His decision is given in the form of a structure of logic, in which he may use any material which he considers ad rem. Even purely unofficial practice may be prayed in aid as precedent to interpret documents (or statute). If the matter is governed by the clear and unambiguous prevision of a statute, his task is simplified. In a great many cases, no statute is applicable and even if it is applicable it is frequently the reverse of clear and unambiguous. The Judge must then proceed as Bacon laid down long ago either by parity of reasoning or by use of examples or by rules of natural reason and discretion.”

14. There is no limitation provided for making application for a reference nor there is any condition laid down under Section 48(3) beyond which the reference cannot be preferred by any subordinate consolidation authorities. The only requirement of Section 48(3) of the Act was that after hearing the parties concerned a reference can be made to the Deputy Director of Consolidation regarding any order under Section 48(1) ie. to ascertain the correctness, legality or propriety of an order. In the t instant case I don't think there could be any better case for ”propriety of an order” Where an order between the parties has become final and the same was not given effect to in the revenue papers, then the intention of the Legislature Legis was that such order passed in favour of any party to be given effect to by the consolidation authorities and has there was no necessity for making any appl application for execution of that order. Under these circumstances, even if after the close of consolidation operation an application for correction of papers was moved seeking effect of the order which became final, the prayer in that application could be granted only by making a reference, particularly when the consolidation authorities were actually functioning in the area as provided under Rule 109-A. In case the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not functioning in the area or in the District, his power would then be exercised by the Assistant Collector or some other appropriate revenue authority. But as 38 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 in the instant case the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) directed the Consolidation Officer to submit a reference purporting to be a reference under Section 48(3) of the Act, I don't find that there Was any mistake or error in that order The Deputy Director of Consolidation was justified in rejecting the revision against that order preferred by the present Petitioners.

15. As regards the case of Raja Ram v. D.D.C., 1982 All LJ 871 (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, suffice it to say that in that case a suit for partition was pending between the parties at the time of application under Section 109-A was filed and in that circumstances this Court took the view that the parties can press their claim in the partition suit and Section 49 of the Act would not apply. In the instant case the application for correction of papers was correctly moved by the contesting Respondents seeking effect of the order dated 8- 7-1964 which had become final and it was the duty of consolidation authorities to have given effect to that order when the e consolidation operation was not closed in the area by issuing a notification under Section 52(1) of the Act. But as the application was made by the contesting Respondents, I am of the view that the ends of justice requires that that application should be allowed by making a reference under Section 48(3) of the Act. Further the aforesaid case of Raja Ram v. D.D.C. (supra), appears to be based on particular facts of that case and with profound regards have to say that that case law is not the whole law, but is governed by the facts of a particular case. In this connection I am reminded of an observation made by Lord Macmillan, who was a distinguished Judge of his time, in Berch v. Brown, (1931) A.C. page 631, to the effect that “precedent should be stepping stones and not halting places”. (iii) In Mukhtar v. DDC, Azamgarh and others: 1993 RD 457 (DB) the Court has held as under: - “11. From the entire scheme of the Act and the Rules framed there- under it thus becomes clear that the duty for revising the revenue records is cast on the Consolidation Authorities and it is for the Consolidation Authorities to implement the orders which are passed under the Act. The Scheme of the Act is not like the scheme which has been provided under the Code of Civil Procedure in the sense that after obtaining a judgment and decree in his favour a party has to apply for execution within a certain period of limitation prescribed to get the fruits of the decree. Here under the Act the duty is enjoined on the Consolidation Authorities themselves to implement the orders which have been passed under the Act and duty is cast on the person in whose favour the decision has been given to make an application to the authorities under the Act for implementation of that order within any 39 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 prescribed period of limitation. In our opinion, till the order passed by the Consolidation authorities on 13-5-1974 was not finally implemented by the Consolidation Authorities as contemplated under the Rules, the proceedings under the Act would be deemed to be pending. The order which has been passed in favour of the contesting respondents was to be incorporated by the Consolidation Authorities in the revenue records. The consolidation Authorities having not done so, the proceedings in respect thereof can not be said to have been concluded before de-notification of the village. The proceedings for correcting the revenue records in pursuance of the order dated 13-5- 1974 would necessarily be taken to be pending on the date of the notification issued under Section 52(1) of the Act. The Consolidation Authorities were thus bound to implement the directions contained in the final order dated 13-5-1974 under the Act even though a notification under Section 52(1) of the Act had taken place. In our opinion, the view by learned Single Judge in the case of Raja Ram (supra) does not lay down the correct law.” (iv) In Ram Pati v. DDC, Banda and others: 1999 RJ 926 the Court has held as under: - “5. From the entire scheme of the Act and the Rules framed there- under it thus becomes clear that the duty for revising the revenue records is cast on the Consolidation Authorities and it is for the Consolidation Authorities to implement the orders which are passed under the Act. The Scheme of the Act is not like the scheme which has been provided under the Code of Civil Procedure in the sense that after obtaining a judgment and decree in his favour a party has to apply for execution within a certain period of limitation prescribed to get the fruits of the decree. Here under the Act the duty is enjoined on the Consolidation Authorities themselves to implement the orders which have been passed under the Act and duty is cast on the person in whose favour the decision has been given to make an application to the authorities under the Act for implementation of that order within any prescribed period of limitation. In our opinion, till the order passed by the Consolidation authorities on 13-5-1974 was not finally implemented by the Consolidation Authorities as contemplated under the Rules, the proceedings under the Act would be deemed to be pending. The order which has been passed in favour of the contesting respondents was to be incorporated by the Consolidation Authorities in the revenue records. The consolidation Authorities having not done so, the proceedings in respect thereof can not be said to have been concluded before de-notification of the village. The proceedings for correcting the revenue records in pursuance of the order dated 13-5- 1974 would necessarily be taken to be pending on the date of the notification issued under Section 52(1) of the Act. The Consolidation 40 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Authorities were thus bound to implement the directions contained in the final order dated 13-5-1974 under the Act even though a notification under Section 52(1) of the Act had taken place. In our opinion, the view by learned Single Judge in the case of Raja Ram (supra) does not lay down the correct law.” (v) In Abdul Sami and Others v. DDC and others: 2015 (1) ADJ 214, the Court has held as under: - “8. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and upon a perusal of the record, especially the decision cited on behalf of respondents, which holds as follows: - ”From the entire scheme of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder it thus becomes clear that the duty for revising the revue records is cast on the Consolidation Authorities and it is for the Consolidation Authorities to implement the orders which are passed under the Act. The Scheme of the Act is not like the scheme which has been provided under the Code of Civil procedure in the sense that after obtaining a judgment and decree in his favour a party has to apply for execution within a certain period of limitation prescribed to get the fruits of the decree. Here under the Act the duty is enjoined on the Consolidation Authorities themselves to implement the orders which have been passed under the Act and no duty is cast on the person in whose favour the decision has been given to make an application to the authorities under the Act for implementation of that order within any prescribed period of limitation. In our opinion, till the order passed by the Consolidation authorities on 13.5.1974 was not finally implemented by the Consolidation Authorities as contemplated under the Rules, the proceedings under the Act would be deemed to be pending. The order which has been passed in favour of the contesting respondents was to be incorporated by the Consolidation Authorities in the revenue records. The Consolidation Authorities having not done so, the proceedings in respect thereof can not be said to have been concluded before de-notification of the village. The proceedings for correcting the revenue records in pursuance of the order dated 13.5.1974 would necessarily be taken to be pending on the date of the notification issued under section 52 (1) of the Act. The Consolidation Authorities were thus bound to implement the directions contained in the final order dated 13.5.1974 under the Act even though a notification under section 52 (1) of the Act had taken place. In out opinion, the view taken by learned Single Judge in the case of Raja Ram (supra) does not lay down the correct law” (vi) In Shiv Shankar and Another v. State of U.P. and others: 2018 RD (138) 297, the Court has held as under: - 41 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 “8. Rule 109-A of the Rules framed under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act casts a duty upon the consolidation authorities to give effect to the orders passed. No specific application is required for such implementation and, therefore, the question of application being barred by limitation does not arise. In Mukhtar v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh and others: 1993 RD 457, a Division Bench of this court has taken a view that the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act casts a duty on consolidation authorities to implement the orders which are passed under the Act. The Division Bench held that since duty is cast upon the consolidation authorities to implement the order passed under the Act, the proceeding to implement the order, if not already implemented, would be deemed pending on the date of notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and as such the proceedings can continue even after notification under Section 52 of the Act. This Court is therefore of the view that the objection taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner that application under Rule 109-A was not maintainable because consolidation operations had come to a close pursuant to a notification under Section 52 of the Act, is worthy of rejection and is, accordingly, rejected”

79. In short, the aforesaid decisions are based on the premise that record-keeping is the work of the Authorities and thus a person cannot be punished for the inaction of the State Authorities and the power of reference is primarily considered to be corrective in nature, contextually.

80. Now this Court deems appropriate to notice the decisions which hold that after the notification issued under Section 52(1) of the Act of 1953, the Consolidation Authorities lose their jurisdiction to adjudicate. (i) In the case of the Ghafoor v. Additional Commissioner: 1979 (RD) 76 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court has held as under: - “1. After publication of the notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the Petitioner moved an application before the Sub-Divisional Officer praying for correction of map prepared by the consolidation authorities on the ground that there was some discrepancy in the map as well as in C.H. Form 45. The application filed by the Petitioner was rejected by the Sub-Divisional Officer on the ground that because Consolidation operations were over in the village, as such the map cannot be on. The corrected under Section 28 of the Land Revenue Act or under any other section. Petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Lucknow Division and the Additional Commissioner relying on Ganga Glass Works 42 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (Private) Ltd., Balawali v. State of U.P. 1973 AWR 620 held that the map prepared by the consolidation authorities was final and the revenue authorities were incompetent to make any correction. In that case the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the provisions of Sections 42A and 27(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act held that Section 42A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act does enable the authorities to correct the size and shape of plots in the map prepared under Section 27(1) by referring to the record of rights. and Section 27(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is only for the purpose of specifying the procedure for preparation of the map and record. As such the Consolidation authorities alone were competent to make any alteration in the map prepared by the consolidation authorities. From the facts of the said case it is not clear when the cause of action arose and whether the village was still under consolidation and whether notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act had been published. There is yet another Section 27 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and a perusal of Section 27(2) shows that the entries which were made earlier were final and conclusive and a presumption of correctness was attached to them meaning thereby that the said presumption could be rebutted. Section 27(3) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act provides that after the issue of notification under Section 52, the Collector shall, instead of the map, field-book and record-of-rights previously maintained by him, maintain the map, field-book and record-of rights prepared in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901 relating to the maintenance and correction of such map, field-book and record of rights shall mutatis mutandis apply.

2. Thus after consolidation operations are over and the notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is published shed it is the Collector who is to maintain the map, field-book etc., and such a map and field-book can be corrected under the Land Revenue Act and under such circumstances the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act does not go to the extent of rendering the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act nugatory, so far as correction of map prepared during consolidation operations is concerned.

3. Our attention has been drawn to another case Mohammad Raza v. Board of Revenue 1973 AWR 621 in which it was held that a map prepared by the consolidation authorities is not necessarily final and conclusive and a map incorrectly drawn up cannot be treated as final and conclusive and can be corrected under Section 28 of the Land Revenue Act.

4. Looking to the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and the Land Revenue Act, we are in agreement with the view expressed in Mohammad Raza v Board of Revenue (supra) and we hold 43 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 that if a map is subsequently found incorrect and it is not in conformity with the document prepared by the consolidation authorities, the same can in suitable cases be e corrected subsequent under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of to the publication of the notification Holdings Act by the Collector in exercise of power under Section 28 of the Land Revenue Act. Thus we are of the view that law laid down in Ganga Glass Works (Private) Ltd., Balawali v. State of U.P. (supra) is not a good law.

5. Thus the powers of the Collector under Section 28 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act for correcting the map in suitable cases are intact notwithstanding the map has been prepared by the consolidation authorities who have adjudicated the rights and title of the parties. In case there is any discrepancy in the map and final document has been prepared by the consolidation authorities, the same can be corrected in proceedings under Section 28 of the Land Revenue Act provided the right, interest and title of the party which have been finally adjudicated or have become final are not involved.

6. In the present case after notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was published, an application was moved by the Petitioner for correction of the map and the Petitioner tendered evidence that the map was not in conformity with the entries which were made in C.H. Form 45. It was obligatory on the authorities to correct the map in case they were satisfied that there was some discrepancy between the map and the entries in C.H. Form 45 and it is on a mistaken view of law that they have refused to grant this relief to the Petitioner.” (ii) In Raja Ram and Others v. DDC, Lucknow: 1982 (RD) 387 (DB), the Court has held as under: - “8. In accordance with R. 109A read with Section 52 (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the contesting opposite parties could not approach the consolidation authorities for getting requisite entry as no case was pending on the date of denotification under Section 52 (1) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The proceeding giving rise to the present writ petition is wholly without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed. The ruling reported in 1981 Rev Dec 307: (1981 UPLT NOC 207), is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In that case no question of applicability of R. 109A was involved, hence that case does not throw any light upon the question under my consideration in the present writ petition. The revisional Court through the impugned judgment dated 29-10-1974 has tried to give effect to the order dated 23-7-1965. I think it has exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order dated 29-10-1974. without considering the question 44 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 whether the contesting opposite parties could move any application under R. 109A under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in the present case. In my opinion the contesting opposite parties could not invoke the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities under R. 109A under the Act after denotification under Section 52 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act on the facts and circumstances involved in the present” (iii) In Hari Ram v. DDC, Azamgarh and others: 1989 (RD) 281 (DB), the Division Bench of this Court has held as under: - “2. We find that on 29th October, 1987 an objection was preferred by the petitioner before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The position of law is well settled. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has no jurisdiction to exercise power under Section 48 (3) of the Act if a de notification has already taken place under Section 52 of the Act. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, therefore, will first record a finding as to whether a Notification under Section of the Act had, in fact, been issued on 13th February 1982. If he finds that such a notification exists and if he also finds that the land which is the subject matter of dispute is covered by the said Notification, he shall desist from exercising any power under Section 48 (3) of the Act. With his direction the petition is disposed of finally.” (iv) In Nanhki v. DDC, Pratapgarh and others: 1995 (13) LCD 1, the Division Bench of this Court has held as under: - “3. The order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation has been challenged only or the ground of diction. According to learned Counsel for the petitioner, after the village where the land in dispute is situate was de notified under Section 52 (1) of the Act vide notification dated 8th March, 1979, published in the gazette on 5th May, 1979, the application for correction of reconds and of the age map village on any ground whatsoever cannot be entertained by the Consolidation Authorities nor they are left with the power to pass orders on the same and, therefore, impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is illegal and llable to be quashed by the writ of certiorari.

4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on two judgments of this Court. The fest jatlipment is of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Hari Ram v. DDC, Azamgarh and others, 1989 RD 281. This Court was approached by means of a writ petition for issue of the welt of prohibition by one Hari Ram who happened to be opposite party in a case which was pending before the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 (3) of the Act. In the writ position it was alleged by him that although consolidation proceedings in the 45 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 village where the land was situate has come to an end by issue of Notification under Section 52 (1) of the Act. Deputy Director of Consolidation wrongly proceeded with the reference under Section 48 (3) of The Act. It was argued on his behalf that if a notification under Section 52 (1) of the Act has been issued, the village goes out of the consolidation and the Consolidation Authorities cease to have jusdiction to either entertain any application or pass orders for correction of papers or whatever purpose. The Division Bench of this Court while finally disposing of this writ petition at the admission stage passed the order directing the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh to fint record a finding as to whether Notification under Section 52 (1) of the Act had been ed in respect of tire land in dispute and to determine as to whether the village where land in dispute is situate, has been denotified. The direction further was that in case it was found that the land has ceased to be the subject matter of the consolidation proceedings, the Deputy Deertar of Consolidation shall not proceed with the application and shall not pass any order Dereon in as much as in such situation he lacks jurisdiction to entertain and decide the Application

5. The second judgment on which reliance has been placed by learned Counsel for the pititioner, is a single Bench judgment in the case of Raja Ram v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P., Lucknow and others, 1982 RD 387. In this case, an application for Correction of papers was made under Section 42-A of the Act for the purposes of carrying out of Consolidation an We arters passed by the Consolidation Authorities and the Deputy Director of the basis of that application exercising powers under Section 48 of the Act passed orders for The correction of of pap papers. The Court held that when the village has been de-notified under Sect 12 (1) of the Act, the Deputy Director of Consolidation loses jurisdiction to entertain the vation and pess orders under Section 42-A of the Act either in the garts of making mation or fur execution of the orders earlier passed by the Consolidation Authorities. x x x 7. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner in that case was that since the village had been denotified, the application for correction of papers was not maintainable. This contention of the petitioners made in that case was rejected by the learned Single Judge holding that for purpose of carrying out the orders earlier passed by Consolidation Authorities application was maintainable and the Consolidation. Authorities were competent to pass orders therean. This view of the learned Single Judge is in direct conflict with the view taken by another learned Single Judge in the case of Raja Ram (supra) as well as with the view taken by Division Bench in the case of Hari Ram (supra). Since the view taken by the Single Judge in the case of Raja Ram is fully supported and endorsed by the view taken by the Division Bench 46 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 in the case of Han Ram (supra), in my opinion, the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Brij Bir Singh cannot prevail and it cannot be said to be a correct view. In the normal course where the Court is faced with two conflicting views taken by coordinate benches, the case is to be referred to a larger bench. In this case, this course is not required to be adopted as the view taken by this Court in the case of Raja Ram (supra) has fully been endorsed by the Division Bench of this Court which will be deemed to have overruled the view taken by the karned single Judge in the case of Brij Bir Singh (supra).

8. Learned Counsel for the respondents has further cited another case reported in Kamta Prasad v. Board of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow and others, 1986 RD 206. This too is a case of correction of papers for carrying out orders passed by Consolidation Authorities. Here, the the learned Single Judge held that for carrying out the orders of the Consolidation Authorities after denotification of the village under Section 52 (1) of the Act, Revenue Authorities will have Jurisdiction to make necessary corrections. This judgment also supports the view taken in case of Raja Ram and the view taken by the Division Bench in Hon Ram's case. I am, therefore, of the opinion that Consolidation Authorities will have no power to entertain any application for is de- notified by issue of Notification under Section 52 (1) correction of papers after the village of the Act as thereafter land is no more subject matter of consolidation proceedings.” (v) In Ram Narain and others v. DDC, Barabanki: 2020 (147) RD 185, the Court has held as under: - “13. This Court has perused the judgment and order dated 07.08.2015 passed in the case of Pateshwan Dutt Pandey (supra). In the said case, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court considered the scope of application under Section 42-A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act after notification under Section 52 of the Act had already been issued. This Court relied upon the Division Bench judgement rendered in Gafoor v. Addl. Commissioner, Lucknow and others: 1979 RD 76 (DB). Hari Ram v. D.D.C. Azamgarh; 1989 RD 281, Ghamari v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ballia and others; 2003 94 RD 90 and Sant Lal and Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and Ors.; 2015 (1) JCLR 310, where this Court had considered the limitation of jurisdiction of consolidation authorities after section 52 notification was issued closing the consolidation operations.

14. The Co-ordinate Bench pointed out the exceptions that have been carved out by the judicial precedents for entertaining the application under Section 42-A of the Act. There were only two exceptions carved out. Firstly, the cases which are pending under Article 226 of the 47 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Constitution of India at the time of notification and were decided after de-notification, and secondly, the cases which were pending before the consolidation authorities at the time of de- notification and judgments were rendered thereafter. In all other cases, the remedy for the Tenure holder is to approach the Collector, where the records had been sent by the Consalidation Authorities after Section 52 notification is issued for correction of map to be carried out in conformity with the confirmed map prepared by the consolidation authorities and as per area of plot/chak mentioned in C.H. Form 41 and C.H. Form 45.

15. This Court has also considered the judgments rendered by Co- ordinate Bench in Pooran Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Meerut and others; 2008 (105) RD 469 and Dr. Sukhbeer Singh v. Commissioner, Meerut and others, 2014 (32) LCD 1912, and held that the aforecited two judgments were given in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases as mentioned in the said judgments, and cannot help in advancement of petitioner's case that even after Section 52 notification has been issued, application under Section 42-A of the Act can be entertained.” (vi) In Smt. Malti Devi v. State of U.P. and others: 2021 (151) RD 3, the Court relied upon the earlier judgment in One of the judgments cited before this Court, passed in Sripal and two others v. D.D.C. Raebareli & two others: 2017 (137) RD 189 wherein this Court considered the law settled by earlier Benches of this Court as well as the Board of Revenue and held that “After Notification under section 52 the only consolidation operations which continue are those referred under sub- section (2) of section 52 and any order referred therein can be given effect under Rule 109-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules

1954. The exercise of power under section 42-A is not referred in sub- section (2) of section 52.” (vii) In Sri Pal & Others v. DDC, Raebareli and others: 2017 (137) RD 189, the Court has held as under: - “18. On a conjoint reading of section 52 and 27(3) it is evident that during consolidation 1 operations and prior to its ceasing in terms of section 52, it is the Consolidation Authorities who are empowered to correct the records. The opening line of sub-section (3) of section 27 makes is amply clear that after closure of Consolidation Operations on issuance of Notification under section 52 it is the Collector who shall maintain the map, field-book and record of rights prepared in 48 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 accordance with the provisions of sub- section (1) of section 27 of the Act 1953 i.e. during consolidation operations, and the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901 relating to the maintenance and correction of such map, field-book and record of rights shall mutatis-mutandis apply in respect thereof. x x x 33. In view of the above discussion, even though no limitation is prescribed for correction under section 42-A, the Revisional Court cannot be faulted for having arrived at the conclusion, inter alia, that the proceedings under section 42-A after de- notification under section 52 were not maintainable, and the remedy, if any, was under section 28 or 33/39 of the Land Revenue Act 1901, however, in this regard the Court would like to add a caveat, as Maiku had Initiated a regular suit under section 229-B, therefore, it would have to be seen as to what was the decision rendered therein and its effect on the maintainability of subsequent proceedings under section 28 or 33/39. Subject to this condition, if the contention of the petitioner is correct i.e. without there being any order of any Consolidation Authority in favour of Jalpa or Ram Avtar for recording of their names in respect of Basic Year Khata No. 26, an entry was made in their favour in respect of the sald Khata in C.H. Form 11 which continued in C.H. Form 23, 41 and 45 then it was certainly a fundamental error which would go to the root of the matter as has also been observed by the Revisional Court and in such a situation the records would be liable to correction so as to ensure substantial justice, as, in such a factual scenario the entry would be without any basis i.e. fake entry, and in such a situation injustice cannot be allowed to be perpetrated. In such a case remedy would be under section 33/39 of the Act 1901 before the Collector who also happens to be the District Deputy Director, Consolidation in view of the above discussion and the deficiency in the material before it, especially the absence of order dated 19.12.1970 and the judgment in the suit under section 229-B as also its plaint, this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is unable to consider the pleas raised herein or Interfere with the order of the revisional Court, which it finds to be just and proper, subject of course to the above observations, therefore, the writ petition is dismissed.” (viii) In Raj Karan Singh v. Chief Revenue Officer; MANU/UP/3069/2019, the Court has held as under: - “4. Whatever be the merits of the controversy involved, one feature is striking l.e. once notification under section 52 of the Act, 1953 had been published on 10.4.1982 then there was no way that any reference could have been prepared under section 48(3) of the Act, 1953. It is settled legal position that any correction thereafter could either be under Rule 109 l.e. in the event the claimant is able to satisfy that there 49 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 was a valid order passed under any provision of the Act, 1953 during consolidation operations which was not given effect in the records prepared during consolidation or thereafter, or under section 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 (corresponding provision of section 38 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006) by virtue of section 27 of the Act, 1953 under which after closure of consolidation operations the records are remitted to the Collector who is the custodian obliged to maintain and correct the same.” (ix) In Smt. Jagrani @ Ram Jiyayi v. DDC, Shrawasti and others; 2024 (164) RD 238, this Court has held as under: - “20. It is now to well settled to be disputed that in terms of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, the consolidation operations commenced with the notification issued under Section 4 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.……….

21. Similarly, Section 52 of the Act of 1953 clearly provides that upon the denotification of the village under Section 52 of the Consolidation operation come to end and thereafter no Consolidation Authorities have been conferred with the powers to entertain or deal with the matter unless as provided in Section 52 itself ………..

22. In light of the aforesaid and considering the facts which are before this Court which are apparently not disputed, are that, villages in question were denotified on 31.03.2008, accordingly no Consolidation Authorities could have entertained any application under the Act after the date of the denotification.

23. Another fact which is not disputed is that Raja Ram made his application under Section 12 of the Act on 14.07.2015 as evident from annexure no.2, hence the said application having been moved after the date of denotification was per se not maintainable and the Consolidation Officer was denuded of all jurisdictions to have passed any order thereon. Thus, the order passed by the Consolidation Officer dated 08.11.2016 was per se inherently without jurisdiction and void ab initio. Though the said order was assailed by Smt. Jagrani in an appeal before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation who allowed the appeal on 28.09.2017 but the fact remains that once the order of the Consolidation Officer after denotification were void ab initio for the same reason, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation was also denuded of jurisdiction to have passed the order. It was actually a fit case for Smt. Jagrani to have assailed the order of Consolidation Officer straight away by filing writ petition before this Court but nevertheless the said course was not adopted. x x x 50 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

30. In light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the clear view that the proceedings after denotification as initiated by Raja Ram were wholly without jurisdiction and all the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer dated 08.11.2016, the order passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 28.09.2017 and the order impugned dated 09.05.2019 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation are all without jurisdiction and void ab initio.

31. Attempt of Shyam Lal to seek a substitution on the basis of Will in proceedings under Article 226 where the impugned orders are per se without jurisdiction, hence this Court does not permit Sham Lal to be impleaded. For the aforesaid reason this Court finds that the entire proceedings initiated at the behest of Raja Ram by filing an application under Section 12 of the U.P. Consolidation Holdings Act,1953 to be without jurisdiction and are quashed and all impugned orders i.e. 08.11.2016 passed by the Consolidation Officer, 28.09.2017 passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation and 09.05.2019 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation shall also stand quashed. The parties shall be at liberty of getting their rights adjudicated before the competent revenue court who shall consider and decide the title to the estate of Bachowa on the basis of contested plea by the respective parties and for the said purpose all plea are left open for the parties to be raised and decided by the Revenue Courts. That the aforesaid decisions which primarily state that after the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act, the Consolidation Authorities lose their jurisdiction. Even they have been sited on the basic premise based on the postulate contained in Section 52(1) of the Act and there has been no indepth analysis of the Scheme and the Provisions of the Act relating to the power of reference, hence, the aforesaid decision also do not come to the aid to hold determinitatevely whether the Consolidation Authorities lose their jurisdiction after the notification under Section 52 (1) of the Act.”

81. After considering the aforesaid decisions, this Court at the outset notices that a Division Bench of Ram Bahadur (Supra) was the first case in point of time where it was held that the Consolidation Authorities would have jurisdiction after the notification is made under Section 52(1) of the Act of 1953 on the premise that Section 52 of the Act of 1953 does not destroy the rights of the parties.

82. The observations made in the said case was in a different context. It was held that if an appeal or revision is filed with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the delay is condoned, then the 51 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 appeal or revision is to be heard on merits and so it was held that in such a situation the proceedings are revived.

83. It is further relevant to notice that thereafter came the other Division Bench decision of this Court in case of Ghafoor (Supra) wherein it was held that the Consolidation Authorities lose their jurisdiction upon notification made under Section 52 (1) of the Act of

1953. The Division Bench in Ghafoor (Supra) did not consider the decision of the earlier Division Bench in case of Ram Bahadur (Supra).

84. At the same time, it would be noticed that another Division Bench in Hari Ram (Supra) held that the Consolidation Authorities do not have jurisdiction after the notification issued under Section 52 (1) of the Act of 1953. However, even the Division Bench in case of Hari Ram (Supra) did not notice the earlier Division Bench decision of Ram Bahadur (Supra). Even the later Division Bench decision of Mukhtar (supra) which held that the Consolidation Authorities do have jurisdiction, did not notice the earlier Division Bench decision of Hari Ram (Supra).

85. Thus, it would be seen that though there are two Division Bench decisions, namely Ram Bahadur (Supra) and Mukhtar (Supra), which hold that the Consolidation Authorities do not lose their jurisdiction after Section 52(1) Notification, however, there are two other Division Bench cases of Ghafoor (Supra) and Hari Ram (Supra) which hold that the Consolidation Authorities lose jurisdiction upon notification made under Section 52(1) of the Act of 1953 and in the same vein, there are several decisions of learned Single Judges who have also taken contrary views which are not in conformity with each other.

86. With due respect to the aforesaid decisions which have been given on their particular facts, many provisions have not been noticed in those judgments and thus they do not constitute binding precedents before this Larger Bench, which is examining the questions threadbare. 52 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 VII ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS OF QUESTION NO.1

87. Now the stage is set to analyze the questions referred and for the sake of expediency, question no.(1) as aforesaid is being reproduced hereinafter:- “What is the true scope of powers vested with Deputy Director of Consolidation in terms of Section 48(3) of the Act of 1953 that is to say whether it is corrective in nature or adjudicatory.”

88. At the outset, it will be trite to state that the scope of reference has not been defined in the Act. It has been left to the discretion of the Court. There is no denying the fact that where grounds have not been stated in the text, the task of a court becomes arduous. In this regard it will be apt to quote an observation of Sir Carleton Kemp Allen made in his classic work of jurisprudence, ‘Law In the Making’, (6th Edn.) at page 1292 as follows: - “The Judge himself addresses his task in much the same way as a counsel. His decision is given in the form of a structure of logic, in which he may use any material which he considers ad rem. Even purely unofficial practice may be prayed in aid as precedent to interpret documents (or statute). If the matter is governed by the clear and unambiguous provision of a statute, his task is simplified. In a great many cases, no statute is applicable and even if it is applicable it is frequently the reverse of clear and unambiguous. The Judge must then proceed as Bacon laid down long ago either by parity of reasoning or by use of examples or by rules of natural reason and discretion.”

89. It will also be relevant to recollect a latin Maxim, ‘Contemporanea exposito est optima et fortissinia in lega i.e.’ the best way to interpret a document or statute is to see how it was understood at the time it was made.

90. Keeping the observations of C.K. Allen and the maxim as a guiding beacon, this Court proceeds and at the outset notes that power of reference as provided in Section 48(3) was not a part of the original Act of 1953. This was introduced by an amendment in the Act vide the Uttar Pradesh Jot Chakbandi (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam 1962 (U.P. Act No.VIII 53 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 of 1963) which came into effect on 08.03.1963. By this amending Act large number of amendments were incorporated in the principal Act.

91. Thus, for the said reason, it will also be relevant to notice the statement, objects and reasons for introducing the said amendments. They are being reproduced hereinafter for ready reference: - ं में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने धिमला धिदया जाय धिजससे आपधित्तयां, जो अन्य र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमाज्यों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के अपेक्षाकृ त चकबन्दी अधिनियम अधि(cid:19)क ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै, “ जब धिपछली अधिनियम बार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम उ०प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम० अधि(cid:19)धि(cid:20)यम उत्तर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम चकबन्दी अधिनियम अधि(cid:19)धि(cid:20)यम, 1953 संख्या 38, 1958 त चकबन्दी अधिनियमब से यह आवश्यक समझा गया है आवश्यक समझा गया ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै द्वार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमा संश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमोधि(cid:19)त चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिकया गया था, धिक चकबन्दी अधिनियम की अधिनियम प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमधिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमया को और प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम पधिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमष्कृ त चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिकया जाय त चकबन्दी अधिनियमाधिक प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमधित चकबन्दी अधिनियम एकड़ चकबन्दी चकबन्दी अधिनियम की अधिनियम लागत चकबन्दी अधिनियम को, कम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े के उद्देश्य से चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयाओं की अधिनियम अवधि(cid:19) में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कमी अधिनियम की अधिनियम जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयाओं में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने अड़ चकबन्दीच(cid:20)े आ(cid:20)े और प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम देर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो(cid:20)े का एक सब से बड़ चकबन्दीा कार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमण यह रहा है कि विभिन्न चकबन्दी यह आवश्यक समझा गया है र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमह आवश्यक समझा गया हैा ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै धिक धिवधि4न्(cid:20) चकबन्दी अधिनियम काय5 जमा ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो गया ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने यह आवश्यक समझा गया है प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमस्त चकबन्दी अधिनियमाव ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै धिक धिवधि4न्(cid:20) प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमाधि(cid:19)काधिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के पास वाद- प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमधिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयाओं को दो वगो5 अपी अधिनियमल आधिद प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमस्त चकबन्दी अधिनियमु त चकबन्दी अधिनियम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े के प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमम कम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो जायें कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने गे और प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम इस प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमकार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम खात चकबन्दी अधिनियमेदार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है को ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो(cid:20)े वाली अधिनियम बह आवश्यक समझा गया हैु त चकबन्दी अधिनियम की अधिनियम असुधिव(cid:19)ायें कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने दूर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो जायें कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने गी अधिनियम त चकबन्दी अधिनियमथा चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयाओं की अधिनियम लागत चकबन्दी अधिनियम में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कमी अधिनियम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो जायेगी अधिनियम। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने यह आवश्यक समझा गया है 4ी अधिनियम प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमस्त चकबन्दी अधिनियमाव ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै धिक 1958 के संश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमो(cid:19)(cid:20) अधि(cid:19)धि(cid:20)यम द्वार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमा प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमचधिलत चकबन्दी अधिनियम की अधिनियम गयी अधिनियम द्धिवत चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियमय अपी अधिनियमलों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है की अधिनियम व्यवस्था समाप्त चकबन्दी अधिनियम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम दी अधिनियम जाय क्यों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक हैधिक उ(cid:20)से काय5वाधिह आवश्यक समझा गया हैयां त चकबन्दी अधिनियमो अ(cid:20)ावश्यक रूप से बढ़ जाती हैं जात चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैैं , लेधिक(cid:20) खात चकबन्दी अधिनियमेदार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है को कोई विशेष लाभ नहीं धिवश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमेष लाभ नहीं ला4 (cid:20)ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैी अधिनियमं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमा। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने खात चकबन्दी अधिनियमेदार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम द्वार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमा साव5जधि(cid:20)क प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयोज(cid:20)ों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के धिलए अप(cid:20)ी अधिनियम जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम से अंश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमदा(cid:20) कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े के पधिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमण यह रहा है कि विभिन्न चकबन्दीामस्वरूप उसकी अधिनियम मूल जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कमी अधिनियम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो जा(cid:20)े से उसके द्वार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमा देय मालगुजार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियम की अधिनियम (cid:19)(cid:20)र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमाधिश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम के समायोज(cid:20) के सम्बन्(cid:19) में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने इस समय अधि(cid:19)धि(cid:20)यम में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कोई विशेष लाभ नहीं धिवश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमेष लाभ नहीं उपबन्(cid:19) (cid:20)ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैी अधिनियमं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने चू ंधिक खात चकबन्दी अधिनियमेदार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है को इस मामले में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कु छ कधिD(cid:20)ाई विशेष लाभ नहीं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैु ई विशेष लाभ नहीं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै इसधिलये ऐसे मामलों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने मालगुजार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियम कम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े के संबं(cid:19) में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने उधिचत चकबन्दी अधिनियम उपबन्(cid:19) सधिम्मधिलत चकबन्दी अधिनियम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े का प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमस्त चकबन्दी अधिनियमाव ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयाओं की अधिनियम लागत चकबन्दी अधिनियम को वसल कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े से संबंधि(cid:19)त चकबन्दी अधिनियम उपबन्(cid:19)ों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है को संश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमोधि(cid:19)त चकबन्दी अधिनियम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)ा आवश्यक ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै क्यों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक हैधिक ला4ाधिथ5यों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के एक वग5 से लागत चकबन्दी अधिनियम वसूल कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कधिD(cid:20)ाई विशेष लाभ नहीं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैु ई विशेष लाभ नहीं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कु छ कधिD(cid:20)ाई विशेष लाभ नहीं धिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमट के उन मुकदमों में उच्च न्यायालय की आज्ञाओं को के उ(cid:20) मुकदमों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने उच्च न्यायालय की अधिनियम आज्ञाओं को काया5धिन्वत चकबन्दी अधिनियम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने 4ी अधिनियम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैु ई विशेष लाभ नहीं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै जो ऐसे क्षेत चकबन्दी अधिनियम्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के बार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमे में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने थे धिज(cid:20)के संबं(cid:19) में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने उक्त चकबन्दी अधिनियम के अ(cid:19)ी अधिनियम(cid:20) औपचाधिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमक रूप से चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयायें कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने बन्द कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े की अधिनियम अधि(cid:19)धि(cid:20)यम की अधिनियम (cid:19)ार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमा 52 धिवज्ञधिप्त चकबन्दी अधिनियमयां जार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियम की अधिनियम जा चुकी अधिनियम थी अधिनियमं, और प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम पधिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमण यह रहा है कि विभिन्न चकबन्दीामत चकबन्दी अधिनियमः चकबन्दी अधिकारियों से उन चकबन्दी अधिनियम अधि(cid:19)काधिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है से उ(cid:20) क्षेत चकबन्दी अधिनियम्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के क्षेत चकबन्दी अधिनियम्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमाधि(cid:19)कार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम ले धिलये गये थे। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने उक्त चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिवष लाभ नहींयों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के संबं(cid:19) में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने उधिचत चकबन्दी अधिनियम उपबन्(cid:19) ब(cid:20)ा(cid:20)े मोट के उन मुकदमों में उच्च न्यायालय की आज्ञाओं कोी अधिनियम त चकबन्दी अधिनियम्रुधिट के उन मुकदमों में उच्च न्यायालय की आज्ञाओं कोयां दूर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े के उद्देश्य से यह आवश्यक समझा गया है धिव(cid:19)ेयक पु र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमः चकबन्दी अधिकारियों से उनस्थाधिपत चकबन्दी अधिनियम त चकबन्दी अधिनियमथा अन्य छोट के उन मुकदमों में उच्च न्यायालय की आज्ञाओं कोी अधिनियम- धिकया जात चकबन्दी अधिनियमा ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैु कु म धिसंह आवश्यक समझा गया है धिवसे(cid:20) र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमाजस्व मंत चकबन्दी अधिनियम्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियम। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने” It will be worthwhile to mention that Section 39 of the Amending

92. Act VIII of 1963 amended Section 48 of the Principal Act, of 1953 by which the power of reference was introduced.

93. It will be apposite to notice both the unamended Section 48 and how it fared after the amendment made in 1963. Unamended Section 48: - “48. Power of Director of Consolidation to call for records and to revise orders:- The Director of Consolidation may call for the record 54 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 of any case if the Officer (other than the Arbitrator) by whom the case was decided appears to have exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him by law or to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity and may pass such orders in the case as it think fit.” Section 48 after it was amended vide amending Act VIII of 1962, reads as under: - “48. Revisions and reference—(1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings ; or as to the correctness legality or propriety of any order 5[other than an interlocutory order] passed by such authority in the case or proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. (2) Power under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub-section (3). (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidaiton may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1). Explanation [(1)—For the purposes of this section, Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officer, Assistant Consolidation Officer, Consolidators and Consolidaiton Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. Explanation (2)— For the purpose of this section the expression ‘interlocutory order’ in relation to a case or proceeding, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceedings or collateral thereto as does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding. * * * This Section 48 of the Act was further amended in the year 2002 and Explanation (3) was inserted, which is being reproduced hereinbelow : - “Explanation (3) — The power under this section to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order includes the power to Examine any finding, whether of fact or law recorded by any 55 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 subordinate authority, and also includes the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence.”

94. The impact of amendment in Section 48(1) was further enlarged by introducing the Explanation (3). This amendment of 2002 was given retrospective effect and post amendment, huge powers of revision with the Deputy Director of Consolidation got enhanced with a flavor which generally is akin to appellate powers.

95. Prior to the Amendment of 2002, the consistent view emerging from the judicial trend was that if while exercising the powers under Section 48(1) of the Act 1953, the Director of Consolidation came to a conclusion that the finding of the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, as case may be, was not in accordance with law, then being the revising authority the Director of Consolidation could only set aside the findings and remit the matter to the court below for reconsideration but could not supplement its own view, which was the role of a revising authority in the classic sense.

96. While enacting the Amending Act 2002, the legislature clearly noticed that Section 48 was being amended to clarify that the revising authority had the right to examine the correctness, legality or proprietary of any order, including the power to examine any finding whether of fact or law and it also included the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence. Thus, it would indicate that post 2002 amendment, all powers were conferred with the Director of Consolidation who being the highest adjudicating Authority under the Act, could examine all issues, both of law and fact and its power of revision was made more akin to the power exercised by an Appellate Authority, though the nomenclature continued to refer to such powers as revision.

97. The idea being, that the Consolidation Act which envisages to achieve the goal of compacting the land holdings for the benefit of tenure holders, to encourage large scale farming and agricultural activities, reduce boundary disputes and making it more viable for 56 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 agriculture, hence all issues that arise during consolidation operations may be decided within the ambit of the Act by the adjudicating authorities empowered under the Act itself, so that once the consolidation operations draw to an end, then all loose ends are taken care of. Once the new records are prepared during consolidation operation and are handed over to the revenue authorities, then they must continue to be maintained by the Collector. Such records have presumptive value and sanctity is attached to the records so prepared, making it final and binding in light of Section 27 and its effect on the tenure holders as per Section 49 of the Act and unless the contrary is proved in accordance with law.

98. In this given backdrop, the question still arises what was the purpose and scope of introducing the power of reference by the Amending Act of 1962.

99. In the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, the word ‘reference’ has not been defined. Even in the contemporaneous Act i.e. U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950, the word ‘reference’ has not been defined. However, The word ‘reference’ finds mention in Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and it reads as under:- “113. Reference to High Court.—Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, any Court may state a case and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court, and the High Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit: [Provided that where the Court is satisfied that a case pending before it involves a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation or of any provision contained in an Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, and is of opinion that such Act, Ordinance, Regulation or provision is invalid or inoperative, but has not been so declared by the High Court to which that Court is subordinate or by the Supreme Court, the Court shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons therefor, and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court. Explanation.—In this section, "Regulation" means any Regulation of the Bengal, Bombay or Madras Code or Regulation as defined in the General Clauses Act,1897, (10 of 1897) or in the General Clauses Act of a State.” 57 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

100. A perusal of the aforesaid provision would reveal that the object of Section 113 appears to enable a subordinate authority to obtain the opinion of the highest authority in a non-appealable case, on a question which has created a reasonable doubt, to avoid committing an error which may not be remedied later. Accordingly, the subordinate authority may seek the opinion of the higher authority.

101. The aforesaid power of reference as per Section 113 C.P.C. is purely discretionary and it is an enabling provision to help a subordinate authority where it may come to a cross road relating to a question of law and to avoid any error, the opinion of the superior/the highest authority may be sought. Considering, the way reference has been worded in C.P.C., it would reveal that the power of reference is apparently consultative in nature and not adjudicatory.

102. However, the power of reference in context of the Act of 1953 is somewhat different. It does not appear to be consultative in nature. Moreover, the learned Additional Advocate General has sought to urge that power of reference is akin to inherent powers.

103. Examining this proposition first, it will be relevant to ascertain how and who can exercise inherent powers. The inherent powers generally are conferred on the courts of law which are classically constituted under the Constitution whether it be the High Court and the Supreme Court who are also courts of record. The courts of original civil jurisdiction exercise inherent powers, which has been recognized by Section 151 C.P.C. Significantly, Section 151 does not confer powers, rather it recognizes the inherent powers vested with the Civil Courts

104. A judicial authority constituted under a special statute cannot be presumed to have inherent powers unless it is specifically so conferred on it by the Statute under which it is constituted.

105. This can be seen in context with the fact that the Code of Civil Procedure envisages the conferment/recognition of inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. and simultaneously, it may also be noticed that 58 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 the power of substantive review is also conferred by the Statute and it finds place in Section 114 read with Order 47 C.P.C.

106. In contrast, the U.P.C.H. Act, 1953 is a special Statute which is a Code in itself, but it does not import the provisions of the C.P.C. as a whole. Neither there is any indication that the Courts/Adjudicatory Authorities constituted under the U.P.C.H. Act of 1953 have inherent powers nor they have been conferred with the power of review

107. This aspect was noticed by a Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Anar Kali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation: 1997 (15) LCD 921 (FB), wherein the question before the Full Bench was: - “Whether it is open for the Consolidation authorities to review/recall their final orders exercising inherent powers even though the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 does not vest them any review jurisdiction?”

108. The Full Bench answered the aforesaid question in the following words: - “23. On the authoritative pronouncements made by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned decisions, the legal position which is manifest is that the Deputy Director of Consolidation while exercising the power of revision vested in him under the Consolidation Act exercises quasi judical powers and in the absence of any provision in the Consolidation Act, which expressly or by necessary implication vests in him the power of review, he cannot exercise such power. It follows that the Deputy Director of Consolidation is not competent to revive a revision proceeding disposed of by him by a final order on a review application filed by one of the parties.

24. The question that remains to be considered is whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation as a Court or Tribunal has an inherent power of review and in exercise of such power he can reconsider the previous order passed by him? A further question that arises ancillarily in this connection is whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation is a Court and, therefore, has inherent power of review? In the case of Associated Coment Company Ltd. v. P.N.Sharma and another (AIR 1965 SC 1895) the Supreme Court, construing the meaning of 'Tribunal' for the purposes of Articles 136 (1) and 227 of the Constitution, held that judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign 59 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 State, and on consideration of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to Tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between par-ties. The Court further observed that it is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the Tribunals and the Courts and features which are distinct and separate; that the basic and fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and the Tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vests in a sovereign State. In considering the question about the status of any body or authority as a Tribunal under Article 136 (1) the main test to be applied is whether the body or authority has been constituted by the State and has been clothed with the State's inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between parties and determining them on the merits fairly and objectively. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute or a statutory rule. An authority or body deriving its power of adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a private arbitrator or a tribunal acting under section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a tribunal within meaning of Article 136, It matters little that such a body or authority is vested with the trappings of a Court. The Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the trappings of a court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vests an authority acting under section 10A of the Act with many of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not tribunals. The Supreme Court further held that the word 'tribunal' in Article 227 of the Constitution also has the same meaning as in Article 136.

25. In the case of Sri Dadu Dayal Mahasabha v. Sukhdev Arya and another (1989 (15) ALR 871), a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that the position is well established that a court has inherent power to correct its own proceeding when it is satisfied that in passing a particular order it was misled by one of the parties. Referring to a decision of the Patna High Court in Sadho Saran Rai and others v. Anant Rai and others (AIR 1923 Patna 483) with approval the Court held that the principle was correctly discussed in the judgment pointing out the distinction between case of fraud practised upon the court and fraud practised upon a party. The Supreme Court held that the same principle applies where a suit is permitted to be withdrawn on the basis of prayer purported to have been made on behalf of the plaintiff. The decision was rendered by the Supreme Court in a civil appeal arising from a suit (Suit No. 116 of 1974) which was disposed of by the Additional District Judge, 60 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Jaipur. The Supreme Court considered the case in the light of section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. * * * 34. Coming to the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, it is our considered view that the consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy Director of Consolidation while deciding a revision petition exercises judicial or quasi judicial power and, therefore, his order is final subject to any power of appeal or revision vested in superior authority under the Act. The consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy director of Consolidation, is not vested with any power of review of his order and, therefore, cannot reopen any proceeding and cannot review or revise his earlier order. However, as a judicial or quasi judicial authority he has the power to correct any clerical mistake/arithmetical error, manifest error in his order in exercise of his inherent power as a tribunal. * * * 36. The question that remains to be considered relates to vesting of power of review in the Deputy Director of Consolidation by application of Section 220 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. Sri Radhey Shyam, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, strenuously urged that in view of the provisions of Section 41 of the Consolidation Act and Section 220 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act it should be held that power of review is vested in the Deputy Director of Consolidation who is the final revisional authority under the Consolidation Act. No doubt, Section 41 of the Consolidation Act makes provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act applicable to all proceedings, including appeals and applications under the former Act. Section 220, which is a part of Chapter X, vests power of review in the Board of Revenue subject to certain conditions/restrictions specified in the Section. The question is, in the absence/of any specific provision of review in the Consolidation Act, can it be said that the power of review vested in the Board of Revenue can be exercised by the consolidation authorities, particulary the Deputy Director of Consolidation? In our considered view, the question has to be answered in the negative. There is no provision in Section 41 or in any other Section of the Consolidation Act which empowers modification of any provision of the Land Revenue Act for the purposes of application to consolidation proceedings. Further Section 41, as we read it, merely provides that the procedures prescribed under Chapters IX and X of the Land Revenue Act will be applicable to all proceedings including appeals and applications under the Consolidation Act. Substantive provisions in the aforementioned Chapters of the Land Revenue Act, which have no pari material provisions in the Consolidation Act, cannot have any application to proceedings under the said Act. If a proceeding cannot be initiated under the 61 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Consolidation Act, the question of application of the provisions of Chapters IX and X of the Land Revenue Act to such a proceeding does not arise. In the absence of any specific provision vesting power of review in the authorities under the Consolidation Act, such a proceeding cannot be initiated at all. There-fore, Section 220 of the Land Revenue Act is of no assistance for the purposes of the proceedings under the Consolidation Act. Alternatively, assuming that Section 220 applies to consolidation proceedings and an analogy is drawn beteen the proceedings under the two Acts, it is the Director of Consolidation, being the highest authority under the Consolidation Act, who can inferentially be said to have a power of review as provided in Section 220 of the Land Revenue Act and not the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who is one of the revisional authorities under the Consolidation Act. This question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Qadam Singh and another v. Ganga Saran and Ram Saran (1960 (58) ALJ 836) in which this Court, construing Section 41 of the Consolidation Act, made the following observation: - “Chapter X of the Land Revenue Act includes Section 220 which confers upon the Board of Revenue the power to review its own orders in certain circumstances, and it is contended that in applying this Section to proceedings under the U.P.Consolidation of Holdings Act a power of review must be deemed to be conferred upon the Deputy Director of Consolidation who corresponds to the Board of Revenue in so far as he is the final court of Revision. In our opinion this argument in not well founded, for section 41 makes no provision for the modification, alter-ation or adaptation of any of the Sections in Chapters IX and X of the Land Revenue Act in their application to proceedings under the U.P.Consolidation of Holdings Act. Section 220 specifically confers the power to review its own decision on the Board of Revenue and on no other authority, and it is not possible for this Court to hold that under that Section read with Section 41 of the U.P.Consolidation of Holdings Act a power to review its own decision is conferred upon all Deputy Directors of Consolidation.”

109. Having noticed the dictum in Smt. Anar Kali (supra) and now taking note of Sections 38, 39, 41 of the Act, it appears that the Act does not import the provisions of C.P.C. and, therefore, the principles of ‘legislation by reference’ and ‘legislation by incorporation’ cannot be applied to the U.P.C.H. Act of 1953 to broaden the scope of the Act so as to read in the inherent powers or the power of substantive review, in proceedings governed by the U.P.C.H. Act of 1953. Moreover, this Court 62 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 does not doubt the correctness of the reasoning of another Bench of co- equal strength in Smt. Anar Kali (supra) rather this Court is in agreement with it.

110. It will be pertinent to put forward that Courts do not legislate but only interpret and this does not permit the Court to read something which is not present in the Act, unless it is a case of casus omissus, which it is not. The Apex Court in State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, (2005) 10 SCC 437 in Para 16 to 22 held as under: - “16. It is true that this Court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys a freedom which is not available in interpreting a statute and, therefore, it will be useful at this stage to reproduce what Lord Diplock said in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs [(1980) 1 All ER 529 : (1980) 1 WLR 142] (All ER at p. 542c-d): “It endangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest.”

17. Where, therefore, the “language” is clear, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. What is to be borne in mind is as to what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words, has to be avoided, unless it is covered by the rule of exception, including that of necessity, which is not the case here. [See Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests [1990 Supp SCC 785 : AIR 1990 SC 1747] (AIR at p. 1752), Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn. [AIR 1966 SC 1678 : (1966) 3 SCR 466] (AIR at p. 1682) and A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak [(1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] (SCC at pp. 518, 519).] Indeed, the court cannot reframe the legislation as it has no power to legislate. [See State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese [(1986) 4 SCC 746 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 3] (SCC at p. 749) and Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 248 : (1992) 19 ATC 219 : AIR 1992 SC 96] (AIR at p. 101).]

18. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid”, Judge Learned Hand said, “but words must be construed 63 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

reference is bifurcated in two parts. First, when a matter comes before the CO or the SOC as the case may be, in course of discharge of their respective duties and he finds that certain issues or some matter requires attention and otherwise the matter or issue has already crossed a certain stage of the consolidation operations and it is not within their domain to 6 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 look into it, then they can refer such issue or matter by reference to the DDC. However, prior to making such a reference, the CO and the SOC are required to afford an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. Second, the other part of that Section provides that once the DDC takes note of such a reference then he too is obliged to decide the same after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned.

17. Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act further states that while deciding a reference, the DDC could exercise all the power provided in sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Act, which necessarily is the power of revision. Therefore, it was urged that in terms of Section 52(1) of the Act, upon de-notification, if the CO, SOC and DDC loose their jurisdiction then there can be no occasion for empowering the authorities to retain any jurisdiction through the window of reference and if it was so envisaged then it could have very well been incorporated in the Act itself, which has not been done explicitly.

18. It was urged that detailed procedure is prescribed for conducting the consolidation operations, as shall be evident from a perusal of the Act and the Rules. Moreover, there are certain executive instructions issued from time to time which have been complied and are known as the U.P. Consolidation Manual. It is from these three sources that the entire consolidation operations are carried out.

19. The Scheme of the Act envisages that once the consolidation operations are complete only then the recommendation is made for issuing a notification under Section 52 (1) of the Act. Accordingly, when by and large, the consolidation operations have achieved their objective only then the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act is issued and its consequence is that the Consolidation Authorities are denuded of their jurisdiction as the village stands de-notified.

20. If such is the consequence of de-notification then there can be no reason to leave some residuary powers with the CO/SOC/DDC as the case may be, in the garb of reference proceedings as that would run counter to the Act as then no proceedings would attain finality and it 7 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 would also create a source of manipulation as whichever matter, though otherwise had attained finality, could be reopened by taking recourse to the powers of reference, which cannot be the intention of the Act.

21. It was also submitted that Section 27 of the Act clearly provides that after the new records are prepared in terms of the Act, the same attain presumptive value and after the de-notification, if at all, there is any discrepancy or any right is claimed contrary to the said entries, then such claims can be adjudicated and if required the entries can be rectified by the revenue authorities, but not by the consolidation authorities.

22. It was also urged, illustratively, that there may be a situation where some proceedings may have been decided (prior to the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act). However, the Consolidation Authorities while preparing the records discover some discrepancy, then in such circumstances, the CO and the SOC, if find that any order has attained finality and by giving effect to the said order, some right of another person is affected, or some discrepancy is discovered which may not fall within the ambit of Section 42-A of the Act then in such circumstances, the CO or the SOC can make a reference to the DDC, who may adjudicate , after putting the parties to notice and after hearing them. Any proceeding of this nature which is in aid of proper conduct of consolidation operations, maintenance of the records and entries contained in such consolidation record, has a sanctity attached and is binding on parties.

23. Submission was that in such circumstances, the powers of reference can be exercised and by subscribing to such a view, the provisions of the Act can be harmoniously construed. Nevertheless, it cannot be gainfully proposed that this power can be exercised post the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act as such proceedings cannot be termed to be saved in terms of Section 52(2) of the Act. The proceedings which are saved in terms of Section 52(2) of the Act are the ones which remain pending either before the Consolidation Officer, the 8 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Appellate or the Revisional authorities under the Act or pending before the Constitutional Courts, at the time of issuance of notification under Section 52(1) of the Act.

24. It was thus submitted that the powers under Section 48(3) of the Act are adjudicatory but such adjudication has to take place prior to the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act and it cannot be initiated after the de-notification nor such a reference is saved in terms of Section 52(2) of the Act.

25. Dr. Pandey, learned Senior Counsel while assisting the Court on the questions before it, specifically urged that the provisions of the Act and the Rules must be seen in context with certain provisions contained in the U.P. Consolidation Manual and he has specifically referred to Regulation 201(Ga), 236(Ga) and 240(Ga) contained in Chapter-X under the Heading ‘Correction of Records’. He urged that Regulations 602(4) and 606 in Chapter XII of the U.P. Consolidation Manual indicate that such powers of correction can be exercised only prior to notification under Section 52(1) of the Act.

26. It was urged that the basic object of the Act is to allot compact area in lieu of scattered plots to the tenure holders to facilitate large scale cultivation. The Act does not deal with the substantive rights, which are primarily governed by the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and now after it has been repealed, by the U.P. Revenue Code,

2006. The U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 in that context is only a procedural Act and it lays special emphasis on the consolidation of plots for the tenure holders for giving encouragement to agriculture.

27. According to Dr. Pandey there are clear indications in the Act that the powers of reference in terms of Section 48(3) of the Act can only be exercised for the purposes of ensuring that the orders passed during the consolidation operations prior to notification issued under Section 52(1) of the Act are given effect to and while doing so or while preparing the records if any discrepancy is noticed and by correcting such record, the right of some tenure holder is affected or in order to give effect to an 9 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 order passed in favour of one tenure holder some other tenure holder is affected then in such circumstances, the CO or SOC may find it difficult to settle such a matter and to avoid any overlapping of jurisdiction or to avoid any error of exercise of jurisdiction, which may vitiate the proceedings, hence, in such circumstances, a reference can be made and the DDC has been conferred with the powers to decide the same after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties in terms of Section 48(1) of the Act with the ultimate object that the final records be prepared, error free, so that upon de-notification of the village under Section 52(1) of the Act, the final records can be handed over to the revenue authorities and necessarily such powers can be exercised only prior to de-notification of the village.

28. It was submitted that in the Act, against an order passed under Section 9-A of the Act, an appeal is provided before the SOC prescribing a limitation of 21 days. However, there is no limitation for filing a revision under Section 48(1) or 48(3) of the Act. Thus, where timelines have been prescribed and there is no timeline prescribed in terms of Section 48(3) of the Act even then some reasonable timeline has to be read into it. What would be a reasonable period can be seen on the basis of the scheme and objects of the Act but it cannot be left without any control as that would lead to an anomaly, leaving a window open for manipulation and it may result in doing more mischief than what the Act in the first place tries to curtail. Actually, this very concern was voiced in the DO dated 6th November, 2023 issued by the Consolidation Commissioner, as noticed in the reference order.

29. Moreover, in certain circumstances where a party has any grievance and some discrepancy is noticed after the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act and if he is permitted to get such right or discrepancy rectified through adjudication by Consolidation Authorities then it will have the impact of diluting the bar of Section 11-C of the Act and it will also rob the orders and records prepared of its sanctity and finality. 10 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

30. Learned counsel for the petitioners Shri U.S. Sahai and Dr. Pandey, learned Senior Counsel while canvassing the above noted propositions and in support of their contentions have referred to the decisions of this Court in Ghafoor (supra); Raja Ram (supra); Hari Ram (supra); Nanhki (supra); Ram Narain (supra); Smt. Malti Devi (supra) and Smt. Jagrani @ Ram Jiyayi (supra).

31. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of the Apex Court in Babu Verghese and others v. Bar Council of Kerala and others, (1999) 3 SCC 422 and a decision of this Court in Krishna v. State of U.P., 2014 (123) LCD 754 (DB) to contend that if the Act prescribes something to do in a particular manner then it should be done in that manner alone and not otherwise. Decision of this Court in Mohd. Kallu v. D.D.C. and others, 2002 (93) RD 206 and Ram Pujan and others v. D.D.C., Gazipur and others, 2000 (91) RD 433 has been referred to indicate the scope of powers conferred on the DDC. IV SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF STATE AND RESPONDENTS: -

32. Shri Pritish Kumar, learned Additional Advocate Government for the State of U.P., leading the submissions on behalf of the State and the private respondents has structured his submissions to proffer that the powers of reference in terms of Section 48(3) of the Act is in the nature of inherent power which is available with the DDC to do complete justice between the parties but is to be exercised in extraordinary cases where manifest injustice has been occasioned.

33. It was further urged that the powers to initiate a reference is necessarily vested with an authority subordinate to the DDC that is by a CO or the SOC but the inbuilt mechanism is such that before a reference is actually made to the DDC, first it must pass the scrutiny of referring authority, that is the CO or the SOC, who is obliged to confer a right of hearing to the parties concerned and only if it finds that the matter 11 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 requires the attention of the highest authority, that is the DDC, only then it would make such a reference.

34. When the reference reaches the DDC, he examines the reference and the DDC is also obliged to afford an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. If he comes to the conclusion that it requires some indulgence then the DDC would pass the necessary orders. Section 48(2) of the Act clearly provides that the DDC while exercising its powers of reference would be entitled to exercise all such powers as are vested in him in terms of Section 48(1) of the Act. Needless to say, such powers are very wide and this goes on to indicate that such powers would be used to ensure that any gross injustice or any patent illegality, if occurred, may not be perpetuated.

35. Since, the powers under Section 48(3) of the Act are deep and pervasive and akin to inherent powers, hence they are to be exercised with caution, but at the same time, it also must be noticed that the powers under Section 48(3) are not circumscribed by any condition or limitation, giving a clear indication that such powers have been conferred to meet any unexpected contingency.

36. Elaborating his submissions, the learned Additional Advocate General submitted that certain errors which may not be clerical or arithmetical so as to fall within the ambit of Section 42-A of the Act but if required to be corrected, can be done in terms of Section 48(3) of the Act. It was also urged that certain matters which may be pending before the consolidation authorities at any stage, that is to say before the CO or SOC in appeal or before the DDC in revision and then orders are passed subsequent to the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act, then to carry out or implement such orders, the power of reference can be utilized. Even in cases, where the consolidation authorities for some reason have failed to incorporate an order passed during the consolidation operations which was necessary to be done, hence, to meet such situation, the powers of reference can be invoked. 12 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

37. Learned Additional Advocate General further urged that the manner in which the aforesaid Section 48 of the Act came to be amended in the year 1962 and power of reference was conferred along with the power of revision, indicates that while exercising the power of reference, the DDC could use its revisional powers, this is a clear indicator that in matters where certain discrepancies may have occurred during consolidation operations and requires correction then even post de- notification, in order to meet such contingencies the powers of reference can be used to correct, adjudicate and also re-examine any finding, either of law or of fact which may have been recorded either by the CO or the SOC, in order to do the complete justice between the parties.

38. This power is so conferred and can be exercised without any fetter of even Section 52(1) of the Act as it is born out of necessity, otherwise if an error which may have occurred while the consolidation operations were in progress and it was not discovered or rectified during the consolidation operations, then post de-notification such errors would continue to be reflected in the records and it may not be amenable for rectification/correction/adjudication as then the bar of Section 49 of the Act would operate and the Civil and the Revenue Courts would not be in a position to undo the wrong. It is for the aforesaid reason that the power under Section 48(3) is saved and can be exercised by the authority post the de-notification under Section 52(1) of the Act.

39. It has further been urged that departmental order dated 06.11.2023 mentioned in the reference order passed by the learned Single Judge in Kaushal Kishore (supra), is merely advisory and it cannot be said to have an overbearing effect on the statutory provisions. In support of his submissions, learned Additional Advocate General has referred to the decisions of this Court in Sidh Narain v. D.D.C.: 2008 (1) AWC 219 and another decision of Parag Memorial Education Institution v. Gram Panchayat Sarehri and others: 2024:AHC-LKO:21919.

40. The crux of the entire submissions on behalf of the respondents State and some other Members of the Bar namely, Shri Saurabh Yadav, 13 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Shri Arun Kumar and Shri Ishan Kumar Gupta, who adopted the line of reasoning proposed by the learned Additional Advocate General, is that the power under Section 48(3) of the Act is adjudicatory and is not merely corrective as the DDC has wide powers which are akin to inherent powers and can be exercised to do complete justice between the parties or to meet any unexpected contingency and such powers can be invoked even after the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act. Since the powers are extraordinary, hence they are to be used sparingly and no straight-jacket formula for universal applicability can be laid down, rather exercise of powers under Section 48(3) of the Act will have to be tested on case to case basis. V BIRDS EYE VIEW OF THE ACT:-

41. At the outset, it will be appropriate to consider the entire scheme and nature of the Act to ascertain the nature of the powers exercised by the Authorities and for a better understanding of the Act. For this the Court would delve into the Act of 1953, Rules of 1954 and certain Forms which are appended to the Act and are prepared by the Consolidation Authorities which are of significance and also refer to certain provisions contained in the U.P. Consolidation Manual for a comprehensive understanding.

42. The Act of 1953 was enacted primarily to consolidate the agricultural holdings in the State of Uttar Pradesh with the larger object of giving impetus and development to agriculture. It will be worthwhile to keep in mind that soon after independence, major steps were taken to boost agriculture and to achieve the aforesaid, a very important piece of legislation was introduced in the State of Uttar Pradesh namely the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1950). The Act of 1950 abolished the complicated and numerous categories of tenure holders, both proprietary and cultivatory and also introduced several provisions for securing the rights of the tenure holders and this apart, the Act of 1950 introduced 14 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 reforms for the benefit of landless persons and persons belonging to marginalized sections.

43. Having secured that, the State took the next step to consolidate the land holdings so that all the land held by a tenure-holder could be in a Block which was beneficial for promoting large scale agricultural activities making it more viable and productive, apart from the fact that it would result in substantially reducing the boundary disputes and would also make it feasible for irrigation, help in controlling pests and insects, insulating the crops, thereby increasing the yields.

44. This led to the advent of the U.P. C.H. Act of 1953 and it repealed the earlier C.H. Act of 1939. The Apex Court in Attar Singh v. State of U.P. and others :1959 RD 149 (SC), considered the scope and object of the Act and the relevant portion reads as under: - “3. Before we take these points seriatim, it is useful to refer to the background of this legislation. As far back as 1939, the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 8 of 1939, was passed. It was, however, of little effect, because it could only be applied when more than one- third of the proprietors of the cultivated area of a village applied for an order of consolidation of the village. It was, therefore, felt that some kind of compulsion would be necessary in order to achieve consolidation of holdings in villages. That consolidation would result in improving agricultural production goes without saying and it was with the object of encouraging the development of agriculture that consolidation schemes with a compulsory character were taken up in various States, after the recommendation of The Famine Inquiry Commission 1944, in its Final Report; (See p. 263). The State Bombay was the first to pass an Act called the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, (Bom 62 of 1947). This was followed by the impugned Act in Uttar Pradesh. The object of the Act is to allot a compact area in lieu of scattered plots to tenure- holders so that large scale cultivation may be possible with all its attendant advantages. Thus, by the reduction of boundary-lines saving of land takes place and the number of boundary-disputes is reduced. There is saving of time in the management of fields inasmuch as the farmer is saved from travelling from field to field, which may be at considerable distances from each other. Proper barriers such as fences, hedges and ditches can be erected around a compact area to prevent trespassing and thieving. It would further be easier to control irrigation and drainage and disputes over water would be reduced considerably where compact areas are allotted to tenure-holders. Lastly, the control 15 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 of pests, insects and plant-disease is made easier where farmers have compact areas under cultivation. These advantages resulting from consolidation of holdings are intended to encourage the development of agriculture and larger production of food grains, which is the necessity of the day.

4. With these objects in mind, the Act was passed by the U.P. Legislature in 1953 and received the assent of the President on March 4, 1954. It was published in the gazette on March 8, 1954, and declarations under Section 4 were made for the major part of the State of Uttar Pradesh, including the petitioners' village, in July, 1954.

5. The scheme of the Act is as follows:— When consolidation of a village is taken up, the first thing that is done is to correct the revenue records, and Sections 7 to 12 deal with that. Then comes the second stage of preparing what are called statements of principles; (see Sections 14 to 18). Objections to these principles are entertained and decided and thereafter the principles are confirmed under Section 18. Then comes the third stage (vide Sections 19 to 23), which deals with the preparation of the statement of proposals. Objections to this are also invited and disposed of, and then proposals are confirmed under Section 23. After the proposals have been confirmed, we come to the last stage in which the confirmed proposals are enforced; (see Sections 24 onwards). It will be clear therefore from the objects of the Act and the advantages that accrue from its implementation that it is a piece of legislation, which should be a boon to the tenure-holders in a village and should also lead to the development of agriculture and increase of food production. ...”

45. This Court in Moolchand v. DDC and others; 2007 (103) RD 469 considered the scope and the object of the Act in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 and the same reads as under: - “10. The U.P.C.H. Act does not deal with the grant of substantive rights to be given to the tenure holders. Therefore, it is clear that substantive rights are to be governed by the provisions contained in the U.P. Act, No. 1 of 1951. The U.P.C.H. Act is only procedural with regard to the consolidation of holdings.

11. After start of consolidation proceedings the Revenue Court or the Civil Court cannot decide claims to land and such pending proceedings are to abate in view of section 5 of the U.P.C.H. Act. The abatement is only for adjudication of rights by the Consolidation Courts with regard to pending cases. Further bar is only that fresh institution of cases may be made before the Consolidation Courts under section 9/12 of the U.P.C.H. Act. The Revenue Court and Civil Court may not entertain 16 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 such matters during consolidation period. The U.P.C.H. Act does not provide for devolution, restriction on transfer, extinction of rights, conferment of rights, classes of tenure, etc.

12. The effect upon notification under section 4 or 4-A of the U.P.C.H. Act is given in section 5 of the U.P.C.H. Act. From a reading of these sections in particular section 5 it is clear that the effect of notification is only for maintenance of records, permission from Settlement Officer Consolidation for change of use of the holding, pending proceedings with regard to declaration of rights or interest in any land or for adjudication of rights in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under the U.P.C.H. Act, shall abate. No other effect of the start of consolidation operations is given.”

46. Now having had an idea of the object and purpose of the Act, it would be gainful to take a glance through the important provisions and ascertain how the Act unfolds.

47. The U.P.C.H. Act of 1953 is divided in 5 Chapters. Though, Chapter I comprises of 3 Sections which inter-alia primarily contains the definitions of various terms used in the Act. Chapter II commences with Section 4 up to Section 12-D and relates to revision and correction of maps and records. Chapter III relates to preparation of consolidation Scheme, while Chapter IV deals with the enforcement of scheme and Chapter V is titled as miscellaneous.

48. Under the scheme of the Act, Consolidation operations commence with declaration and notification issued by the State Government under Section 4(2) of the Act in respect of an area to which the consolidation operations pertain. The effect of the notification issued under Section 4 is contained in Section 5. Relevant Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are reproduced hereinafter:- “4. Declaration and notification regarding consolidation.— (1) (a) The State Government may where it is of opinion that a district or part thereof may be brought under consolidation operations, make a declaration to that effect in the Gazette, whereupon it shall become lawful for any officer or authority who may be empowered in this behalf by the District Deputy Director of Consolidation— (i) to enter upon and survey, in connection with Rectangulation or otherwise and to take levels of any land in such area ; (ii) to fix pillars in connection with Rectangulation ; and 17 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (iii) to do all acts necessary to ascertain the suitability of the area for consolidation operations. (b) The District Deputy Director of Consolidation shall cause public notice of the declaration issued under clause (a) to be given at convenient places in the said district or part thereof. (2) (a) When the State Government decides to start consolidation operations, either in an area covered by a declaration issued under subsection (2) or in any other area, it may issue a notification to this effect. (b) Every such notification shall be published in the Gazette and in a daily newspaper having circulation in the said area and shall also be published in each unit in the said area in such manner as may be considered appropriate. “5. Effect of notification under section 4(2)— (1) Upon the publication of the notification [under sub-section (2) of section 4] in the official Gazette, the consequences as hereinafter set forth, shall subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified thereunder till the publication of notification under section 52 or subsection (1) of section 6, as the case may be, ensue in the area to which the [notification under sub-section (2) of section 4] relates, namely:– (a) the district or part thereof, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be under consolidation operations and the duty of maintain the record-of- rights and preparing the village map. The field book and the annual register of each village shall be performed by the District Deputy Director of Consolidation, who shall maintain or prepare them, as the case may be, in the manner prescribed ; (b) [* * * ] (c) notwithstanding anything contained in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, no tenureholder except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, previously obtained shall— (i) use his holding or any part thereof for purposes not connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry including pisciculture and poultry farming ;or (ii) [ **** ] Provided that a tenure holder may continue to use his holding, or any part thereof, for any purpose for which it was in used prior to the date specified in the notification issued [under sub-section (2) of section 4. 18 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (2) Upon the said publication of the notification under subsection (2) of section 4 the following further consequences shall ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely:— (a) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and preceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the, area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision shall on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated : Provided that no such order shall be passed without giving to the parties notice by post or in any other manner and after giving them an opportunity of being heard ; Provided further that on the issue of the notification under subsection (1) of section 6, in respect of the said area or part thereof every such order in relation to the land lying in such area or part, as the case may be, shall stand vacated ; (b) such abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the persons affected to agitate the right or interest in dispute in the said suits or proceedings before the appropriate consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. Explanation—For the purposes of sub-section (2), a proceeding under the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Celling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 or an uncontested proceeding under sections 134 to 137 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, shall not be deemed to be a proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land.”

49. A perusal of Section 5(2) above would reveal that any proceedings pending before any Civil or Revenue Court would stand abated and it is the Consolidation Courts which would have primacy and would be competent to decide the matters before it.

50. Sections 7 and 8 deal with revision of village maps, field book and current annual registers. Thereafter, the statement of principles is prepared in terms of Section 8-A. Section 8 and Section 8-A are being reproduced hereinafter: - 19 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 “8. Revision of the field-book and the current annual register, determination of valuations and shares in joint holdings— (1) Upon the revision of maps under section 7, the District Deputy Director of Consolidation shall subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, and in such manner as may be prescribed, cause to be— (i) revised, the field-book of the unit after field to field partal and the current annual register after its test and verification ; (ii) determined, in consultation with the Consolidation Committee, the valuation of— (a) each plots after taking into consolidation its productivity location and availability of irrigation facilities, if any ; and (b) all trees, wells and other improvements existing in the plots for the purpose of calculating compensation therefor ; (iii) ascertained the share of each owner, if there be more owners than one, out of the valuation determined under subclause (b) of clause (ii) ;and (iv) determined the shares of individual tenure-holders in joint holdings for the purpose of effecting partition to ensure proper consolidation. (2) The District Deputy Director of Consolidation shall cause to be prepared a khasra chakbandi in the form prescribed, in respect of all the plots falling in the unit as also a statement showing the mistakes [undisputed cases of succession] undisputed cases of succession and disputes discovered during the test and verification of the annual register in the course of the field-to field partal.]” “8-A Preparation of Statement of Principles— (1) The Assistant Consolidation Officer shall, in consultation with Consolidation Committee, prepare, in respect of each unit under consolidation operations, a statement in the prescribed from (hereinafter called the Statement of Principles) setting forth the principles to be followed in carrying out the consolidation operations in the unit. (2) The Statement of Principles shall also contain— (a) details of areas, as far as they can be determined at this stage, to be earmarked for extension of abadi including areas for abadi site for Harijans and landless persons in the unit and for such other public purposes as may be prescribed (b) the basis on which the tenure-holders will contribute land for extension of abadi and for other public purposes ; and 20 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (c) details of land to be earmarked for public purposes out of land vested in a Gaon Sabha or a Local Authority under section 117 or section 117-A of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. (d) the standard plots for each unit. (3) The standard plots referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (2) shall be determined by the Assistant Consolidation Officer after ascertaining from the members of the Consolidation Committee and the tenure- holders of the units the best plot or plots of the unit, regard being had to productivity, location and the existing soil class of the plot or plots.”

51. Importantly, Section 9, Section 9-A, Section 9-B, Section 9-C and Section 10 deal with the adjudicatory powers which are conferred on the consolidation officer who is the court of first instance in the hierarchy of adjudicating authorities under Act. Section 9, 9-A, 9-B, 9-C are being reproduced hereinafter: - “9. Issue of extracts from record and statements and publication of the records mentioned in sections 8 and 8-A and the issue of notices for inviting objections— (1) Upon the preparation of the records and the statements mentioned in sections 8 and 8-A the Assistant Consolidation Officer, shall— (a) correct the clerical mistakes, if any, and send or cause to be sent to the tenure-holder concerned and other persons interested, notices containing relevant extracts from the current annual register and such other record as may be prescribed showing— (i) their rights in and liabilities in relation to the land; (ii) mistakes [undisputed cases of succession] and disputes discovered under section 8 in respect thereof ; (iii) specific shares of individual tenure-holder in joint holdings for the purpose of effecting partitions, where necessary, to ensure proper consolidation ; (iv) valuations of the plots ; and (v) valuation of trees, wells and other improvements for calculating compensation there or and its Apportionment amongst owners, if there be more owners than one ; (b) publish in the unit the current khasra and the current annual register, the khasra Chakbandi, the Statement of Principles prepared under section 8-A and any other records that may be prescribed to show, inter alia, the particulars referred to in clause (a). 21 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (2) Any person to whom a notice under sub section (1) has been sent, or any other person interested, may, within twenty-one days of the receipt of notice, or of the publication under sub-section (1), as the case may be, file before the Assistant Consolidation Officer objections in Respect thereof disputing the correctness or nature of the entries in the records or in the extracts furnished therefrom, or in the Statement of Principles, or the need for partition.] 9-A. Disposal of cases relating to claims to land and partition of joint holdings— (1) The Assistant Consolidation Officer shall– (i) where objection in respect of claims to land or partition of joint holdings are filled, after hearing the parties concerned ; and (ii) where no objections are filed, after making such enquiry as he may deem necessary, settle the disputes correct the mistakes and effect partition as far as may be by conciliation between the parties appearing before him and pass orders on the basis of such conciliation : Provided that where the Assistant Consolidation Officer, after making such enquiry as he may deem necessary, is satisfied that a case of succession is undisputed, he shall dispose of the case on the basis of such enquiry. (2) All cases which are not disposed of by the Assistant Consolidation Officer under sub-section (1), all cases relating to valuation of plots and all cases relating to valuation of trees, wells or other improvements for calculating compensation therefor, and its appointment amongst, co- owners, if there be more owners than one, shall be forwarded by the Assistant Consolidation Officer to the Consolidation Officer, who shall dispose of the same in the manner prescribed. (3) The Assistant Consolidation Officer, while acting under subsection (1) and the Consolidation Officer, while acting under sub-section (2), shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction anything to the contrary contained any other law for the time being in force notwithstanding. 9-B. Disposal of objections on the Statement of Principles— (1) Where objections have been filed against the Statement of Principles under section 9, the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned and after taking into consideration the views of the Consolidation Committee, submit his report to the Consolidaiton Officer who shall dispose of the objections in the manner prescribed. (2) Where no objections have been filed against the Statement of Principles within the time provided therefor under section 9, the 22 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Consolidation Officer shall, with a view to examining the correctness, make local inspection of the unit, after giving due notice to the Consolidation Committee and may thereafter make such modification or alterations in the Statement of Principles as he may consider necessary. (3) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Consolidation Officer under sub-section (1), or sub-section (2), may within 21 days of the date of the order, file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation whose decision except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, shall be final. (4) The Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation shall before deciding an objection or an appeal make local inspection of the unit after giving due notice to the parties concerned and the Consolidation Committee. 9-C. Partition of joint holdings— (1) The Assistant Consolidaiton Officer or the Consolidation Officer may partition joint holdings under section 9-A notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in 178 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, or any other law, and may also partition the same suo moto. (2) The partition of joint holdings shall be affected on the basis of shares, provided that there the tenure-holders concerned agree, it may be affected on the basis of specific plots.

52. Any tenure holder who may face issues relating to claims regarding the land, partition of joint holdings, may file objections against the statement of principles at this stage.

53. Any adjudication made by the Consolidation Officer in terms of Section 9-A, 9-B or 9-C, is appealable in terms of Section 11 within the period of limitation i.e. 21 days from the date of the order, before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation (SOC). Section 11 reads as under: - “11. Appeals— (1) Any party to the proceedings under section 9-A aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Consolidaiton Officer or the Consolidation Officer under that section, may within 21 days of the date of the order, file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, who shall after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned give his decision thereon which except as otherwise provided by or order under this Act, shall be final and not be questioned in any court of law. 23 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (2) The Settlement Officer, Consolidation, hearing an appeal under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction, anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force notwithstanding.”

54. However, Section 11-A creates a bar which is akin to the plea of res-judicata/constructive res-judicata. Section 11-A reads as under: - “11-A. Bar on objections—No question in respect of— (i) claims to land, (ii) partition of joint-holdings, and (iii) valuation of plots, trees, wells and other improvement where the question is sought to be raised by a tenure-holder of the plot or the owner of the tree, well or other improvements recorded in the annual register under section 10, relating to the consolidation area which has been raised under section 9 or which might or ought to have been raised under that section,] but has not been so raised shall be raised or heard at any subsequent stage of the Consolidation proceedings.”

55. Section 11-A bars all objections in respect of claim to land, partition of joint holdings and valuation of lands amongst others relating to the consolidation area which had been raised under Section 9 or which might or ought to have been raised under the said Section but were not raised. By virtue of Section 11-A, such objections cannot be raised or be heard at any subsequent stage of the consolidation proceedings.

56. At this stage, it will also be relevant to notice that Section 11-C grants leverage or a reprieve to certain lands which vest in the State or Gaon Sabha or with any Authority, and to extent the bar of Section 11-A does not apply to such lands. Section 11-C reads as under:- "[11-C. In course of hearing of an objection under section 9-A or an appeal under section 11 or in proceedings under section 48, the Consolidation Officer, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) or the Director of Consolidation, as the case may be, may direct that any land which vests in the State Government or the Gaon Sabha or any other local body or authority may be recorded in its name, even though no objection, appeal or revision has been filed by such Government, Gaon Sabha, body or authority.]" 24 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

57. Thus, it would be seen that the tenure holders have been conferred with a right of raising objections regarding the statement of principles, claim to land, partition of their joint holdings, valuation regarding plots, trees and other improvements including wells, to be raised at the appropriate level and time before the Consolidation Officer. Any order of the Consolidation Officer can be assailed in an appeal as per Section 11 before the SOC within the period of 21 days as prescribed. This is indicative of the fact that the proceedings are intended to be taken to its logical conclusion as quickly as possible and consolidation proceedings are not intended to go on forever.

58. The applicability of bar of Section 11-A is also indicative of the fact that a person contesting the consolidation proceedings must do so with all earnestness and responsibility as it may have a grave consequence, if not raised at the correct time and stage.

59. Section 12 relates to changes which occur during consolidation operations and which may affect the rights or interests of a tenure-holder which may have been recorded in the revised records. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 clearly provides that the provisions of Section 7 to 11 apply to the decisions made under Section 12(1) of the Act clearly indicating that the aforesaid provisions are not summary in nature rather has the import of regular proceedings which is akin to proceedings held under Section 9-A of the Act.

60. At this stage, it will also be relevant to notice that the Act envisages preparation of consolidation documents/forms which contain valid information and are integral part of the scheme of the Act. The entries and information contained in such forms which are prepared at different stages of consolidation operations, is indicative of rights, disputes, spot positions amongst many other information which can lead to finality, unless challenged and corrected, as per the Scheme of the Act.

61. In this regard, Form CH-2-A which appended to the Act and is relatable to Rules 18 to 23 of the U.P.C.H. Rules, 1954, inter alia is one 25 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 of the first forms which is issued upon commencement of consolidation operations and it is being noticed for clarity and better understanding:-

62. Similarly, The statement of principles is prepared in terms of Section 8-A and also evidenced in terms of C.H. Form-5. For ready reference CH Form-5 is being shown below: - 26 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

63. A glance at these Forms would indicate the meticulous manner in which extensive details have to be incorporated in the various Forms prepared at various stages of the consolidation operations and all such forms are for the consumption of the people of the village and tenure holders.

64. Now moving forward to Chapter III of the Act, primarily, Section 19 and Section 20 of the Act, 1953 are important and those read as under: - “19. Consolidation to be fulfilled by a consolidation scheme—(1) A Consolidation scheme shall fulfill the following conditions namely— (a) the rights and liabilities of a tenure-holder, as recorded in the annual register prepared under section 10, are subject to the deductions, if any, 27 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 made on account of contributions to public purposes under this Act, secured in the lands allotted to him ; (b) the valuation of plots allotted to a tenure-holder subject to deductions, if any, made on account of contributions to public purposes under this Act, is equal to the valuation of plots originally held by him : Provided that, except with the permission of the Director of Consolidation, the area of the holding or holdings allotted to a tenure- holder shall not differ from the area of his original holding or holdings by more than twenty five per cent of the latter ; (c) the compensation determined under the provisions of this Act, or the rules framed thereunder, is awarded— (1) to the tenure-holder— (i) for trees, wells other improvements, originally held by him and allotted to another tenure-holder; and (ii) for land contributed by him for public purposes ; (2) to the Gaon Sabha, or any other local authority as the case may be, for development, if any, effected by it in or over land belonging to it and allotted to a tenure-holder ; (d) the principles laid down in the Statement of Principles are followed; (e) every tenure-holder is, as far as possible, allotted a compact area at the place there he holds the largest part of his holding : Provided that no tenure-holder may be allotted more chaks than three except with the approval in writing of the Deputy Director of Consolidation : Provided further that no Consolidation made shall be invalid for the reason merely that the number of chaks allotted to a tenure-holder exceeds three ; 28 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (f) every tenure-holder is, as far as possible, allotted the plot on which exists his private source of irrigation or any other improvement, together with an area in the vicinity equal to the valuation of the plots originally held by him there ; and (g) every tenure-holder is, as far as possible, allotted chaks in conformity with the process of rectangulation in rectangulation units. (2) A consolidation scheme before it is made final under section 23, shall be provisionally drawn up in accordance with the provisions of section 19-A.” “20. Publication of the provisional consolidation scheme and receipt of objection thereon— (1) Upon the preparation of the provisional Consolidation scheme, the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall send or cause to be sent, to the tenure-holder concerned and persons interested, notices containing relevant extracts therefrom the provisional consolidation scheme shall thereafter, be published in the unit. (2) Subject to the provisions contained in section 11-A any person to whom notice has been sent under sub-section (1), and any other person affected by the provisional consolidation scheme disputing the propriety or correctness of the entries in the provisional Consolidation scheme, or in the extracts furnished therefrom, may within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice or of the date of the publication of the consolidation scheme, as the case may be, file an objection before the Assistant Consolidation Officer or the Consolidation Officer. (3) Any person affected or any person having any interest or right in addition to the right of public highway in or over any public land or having other interest or right which is substantially prejudiced by the declaration made under sub-section (2) of section 19-A may within fifteen days after the publication of the provisional consolidation scheme, file an objection before the Assistant Consolidation Officer or the Consolidation Officer stating the nature of such interest or right."

65. Any person aggrieved by the provisional Scheme of Consolidation, is required to file objections in terms of Section 20(2) and (3) of the Act within 15 days of such publication, which have to be 29 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 decided and disposed of in terms of Section 21. Once, the objections are so decided, the Provisional Consolidation Scheme is confirmed and thereafter the stage commences for enforcing the said scheme.

66. At this stage CH Form-21 and CH Form-23 appended to the Act assume importance and these documents reveal vital informations relating to the village containing statistical and topographical details. These CH Form-21 and CH Form-23 are prepared in parts and for ease of understanding, those are being shown hereunder: - 30 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

67. The extensive exercise undertaken during consolidation operations is with the objective to compact the land holdings and as far as the records are concerned, they are to be updated, corrected and prepared with the idea to maximize the detailed inputs so that the ultimate records 31 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 prepared are error free and such records prepared can be handed over to the Revenue Authorities in terms of Section 27 of the Act.

68. At this stage, it will be relevant to notice Section 27 of the Act which reads as under: - “27. New revenue records— [(1) As soon as may be, after the final consolidation scheme has come into force, the District Deputy Director of Consolidation shall cause to be prepared for each village a new map filed-book and record-of rights in respect of the Consolidation area, on the basis of the entries in the map, as corrected under section 7, the Khasra Chakbandi, the annual register prepared under section 10 and the allotment orders as finally made and issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 shall subject to such modification as may be prescribed, be followed in the preparation of the map and records. (2) All entries in the record-of rights prepared in accordance with the provision of sub-section (1) shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. (3) After the issue of notification under section 52, the Collector shall, instead of the map, field-book and record-of-rights previously maintained by him maintain the map, field-book and record-of rights prepared in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) [and the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, relating to the maintenance and correction of such map, field book and record-of- rights shall mutatis mutandis apply.”

69. The aforesaid provision makes it clear that all entries to the records of rights prepared during consolidation operations shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. Sub-section 3 mandates that after the issue of notification under Section 52, the Collector instead of the map, field book and record of rights previously maintained by him, shall henceforth maintain the map, field book and record of rights prepared in terms of Section 27(1) of the U.P.C.H. Act of 1953 and the provisions of Section 28 and 33 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 would be applicable for maintenance of such records and the provisions in this regard relating to maintenance and correction as provided in the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 would be squarely applicable. 32 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

70. Section 27 is followed by Section 28 which relates to delivery of possession and thereafter Sections 29, 29-A, 29-AA, 29-B, 29-C and Section 30 relate to grant of compensation which may affect a tenure holder whose standing crop is also delivered alongwith the delivery of possession. How such compensation is to be recovered and other incidental matters relating to the reduction of land revenue where a tenure holder has contributed some land for public purpose andhow compensation is to be granted for the land contributed by tenure holders and the impact and consequences which ensues upon such exchange and delivery of possession, has been considered in these provisions.

71. The entire scheme of consolidation and how it is implemented is provided alongwith complete hierarchy of courts who are the adjudicating authority, their appellate authority coupled with the fact that the orders passed during adjudication by the consolidation courts including the revisional authority, are final between the parties and unless set aside, they have binding impact and would also operate as res- judicata in subsequent proceedings attaching finality to it. This is in context with disputes which may be inter-se the tenure-holders and individuals.

72. In continuation, Chapter-V of the Act relates to miscellaneous aspects and the few important provisions to be considered to answer the questions under consideration herein would include Section 42-A, which contains the power of correction. The power of revision and reference is contained in Section 48 and then Section 49 which bars the jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts and finally Section 52 relates to close of consolidation operations.

73. In the aforesaid legislative backdrop, apart from the substantive provisions as noticed above, which are integral to the scheme of the Act and in order to give a complete robust functionality to the Act, the legislature framed Rules known as the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules 1954. Mention may be made of Rules 18 to 23, Rule 25, Rule 26, Rule 46, Rule 48-B, Rule 49, Rule 50, Rule 54-A, Rule 71, Rule 82 to 33 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 86, Rule 90, Rule 93, Rule 97 to 100 and Rule 101-A, Rule 104, Rule 109 and 109-A to understand the working and execution of the consolidation operations.

74. However, for the purpose of this reference, Rules 90, 97, 98, 99, 100 and 100-A and CH Form 41 and 45 are being reproduced hereinafter: - “90. Section 27. - (1) The Consolidator shall thereafter cause a final map to be prepared showing only the new numbers, their boundaries and, where necessary, conventional signs. It shall be checked by the Consolidator, Assistant Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer before it is signed by the Settlement Officer. Consolidation whose designation shall be mentioned below his signature. The final map, thus prepared shall after copies thereof have been traced out as laid down in sub-rule (2), be sent to the press for reproduction where such reproduction is necessary in view of the provisions of Rule 101. On being received back from the press, the final map shall be placed in the Consolidation Volume meant for the Collector's Record Room. (2) Two copies of the final map shall be traced out. In these copies the boundaries of the old plots existing within a new plot shall be indicated by dotted lines without the serial numbers of the old plots being shown there in the existing soil classes shall also be marked within thick red lines on these maps, the different soil classes being described by the suitable abbreviations written boldly in red ink over each kind of soil. The copies thus traced out shall be checked by the Consolidator, the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer before these are checked and signed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. A copy of this map shall be placed in each of the two Consolidation Volumes mentioned in Rule 100-A.

97. Section 27. - The Consolidation Lekhpal shall, with help of the Khasra Mutabiqat and other relevant records mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 27, prepare the Khatauni in C.H. Form 45 in duplicate. and the Khatauni Khasra Mutabiqat

98. The in C.H. Form 45 prepared by the Consolidation, Lekhpal shall be checked cent per cent by the Consolidator. 25 per cent of the entries of these records shall be checked by the Assistant Consolidation Officer and five per cent by the Consolidation Officer. The Khatauni in C.H. Form 45 shall then be published in the village. Section 27

99. numbers shall be entered in Column 5 of Khasra Mutabiqat. . - After the khatauni has been prepared new khata 34 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

100. All cuttings and overwritings in the Khasra Mutabiqat and the Khatauni shall be signed and dated by the person responsible for such cuttings and overwritings and also by the Assistant Consolidation Officer. There shall be no erasures anywhere. An Errata List in respect of each of the record mentioned above shall be prepared by the Consolidation Lekhpal in C.H. Form 6-B and shall be attested by the Consolidator. It shall also be signed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer. Such a list after being signed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation shall be attached to each copy of the record when it is bound. 100A. The Khasra Mutabiqat along with the final village map and the Khatauni in C.H. Form 41 shall constitute the Consolidation Volume. Two such volumes shall be prepared. One of it shall be consigned to the Collector's Record Room and the other shall be delivered to the Tahsildar for being made over to the Lekhpal. Thereafter the Director of Consolidation shall take steps to notify the village under Section 52.”

75. For ease of reference, Form-41 and Form-45 are being reproduced hereinafter: -

76. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid Scheme is not only to help comprehend how the Act operates given the legislative scheme but also, how it achieves its object and purpose. The Act, as unfolded above, would reveal that it is a Code in itself. The endevour is that the 35 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 provisions of the Act be construed in a harmonious manner to carry forward the legislative intend rather than to stultify any provision or the scheme of the Act. VI CONFLICTING DECISIONS: -

77. Now, it will be appropriate to consider the conflicting decisions of this Court which has led to this reference:-

78. Let us notice the reasoning expressed by different Benches of this Court to hold that the Consolidation Authorities do not lose jurisdiction simplicitor but retain powers to correct the records: - (i) In Ram Bahadur v. DDC and others: 1974 RD 53 (DB) the Division Bench of this Court has held as under: - “2. The issuance of the Notification does not, however affect the orders passed by the High Court the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Constitution of India or in cases or proceedings pending under this Act on the date of issue of notification under sub-section (1) and orders passed will have to be given effect to notwithstanding anything contained in the Notification. In Dilawar Singh's case, 1972 All WR (HC) 557 AIR 1973 Allahabad 411 the Division Bench observed that the term “proceedings” in Section 52 (2) has been used in the comprehensive sense of proceedings commencing from the one which is initiated before the Consolidation Officer and including that taken in the appeal Court. It was held that an appeal does not initiate a fresh proceeding. On the institution of the appeal the proceedings, which had become dormant on the decision of the trial Court revive and remain pending, the only difference being that they are now pending in a different Court, namely, the Court of appeal. It was also held that the notification under Section 52 (1) does not have the effect of destroying vested rights of the litigants. For instance, if a litigant has a right of appeal against a particular order he can exercise it notwithstanding the publication of the notification under Section 52 (1) and the moment an appeal is filed the effect in law is that the original proceedings stand revived. * * * 4. We have seen the decision of the learned Single Judge in Mohd. Saddiq v. Deputy Director, (1967 All WR (HC) 228). In that decision no reasons have been given for the view that an application for setting aside the ex parte decree does not fall within the purview of Section 52 (2) as a proceeding which involves or affects a revival of the original proceedings and from that point of view making the original 36 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 proceeding pending within the meaning of Section 52 (2). In our opinion, this decision does not lay down the law correctly.” (ii) In Brij Bir Singh and Another v. DDC, Meerut Camp of Muzaffarnagar and others: 1987 RD 66 the Court has held as under: - “5. …………... The first point which requires determination is as to, whether the effect of the order dated 8-7-64 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation which became final between the parties in all respects during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings, before the issuance of notification under Section 52(1) of the Act, can be sought to be given effect to by the successful party after the notification under Section 52(1) has been issued. The reply to this argument is not too far to seek. The relevant provisions of the Act coupled with the intetion of the legislature in enacting the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act has to be ascertained. Under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, unlike the provisions of U.P.Z.A and LR Act, when any order has been passed in favour of any party, its effect has to be given in the relevant revenue papers and in the relevant C.H. Forms by the consolidation authorities themselves. No application to give effect to that order is-required-In other words, there is no provision Under the Act for the execution of any order under the Act, unlike in a suit filed under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under the Specific Relief Act or under Section 202 or 203 of U.P.Z.A and L.R.Act. * * * 12. it is, thus, clear that the intention of the Legislature was that if an order has to be passed by a particular consolidation authority, it has to be given effect to in revenue papers and if the same has not been given effect to by either side, in that event the successful party should not suffer. There is a maxim 'Actus Curae Neminem Gravabit', which means that an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. It is, thus, clear that once an order was passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in favour of the contesting Respondents, which became final and if the consolidation authorities failed to carry out that order or to give effect in the revenue papers, it is not for the contesting Respondents to suffer. Further that order could have been given effect to during the consolidation operations by making an application for correction of papers and even after the close of the consolidation operation. The application for correction of papers, even if moved by the contesting Respondents, for which there was no limitation provided, it could not be said that application became time barred. In case the Petitioners have any grievance they could have challenged the order dated 8-7-64. But they did not do so. Now there no justification on their part to object to the application for correction of papers moved on behalf of the successful party. In case there would have been any limitation provided for application for correction of papers, the Petitioners would have been 37 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 justified in raising the objection. But as there was no limitation provided for that application, it can be moved either during the consolidation operations or after the close of consolidation operation. Even during the consolidation operation the Legislature did not require the successful party to make an application for execution for seeking effect to a particular order. It was for the consolidation authorities to carry out the effect of the order passed in favour of a party.

13. The scope for reference has not been defined under Section 48(3). It has been left to the discretion of the Court. There is no denying the fact that where grounds have not been stated in the text the task of a court becomes heavier. In this connection it is better to quote an observation in C.K. Allen's Law. In the Making, (6th Edn.) at page 1292 as follows: “The Judge himself addresses his task in much the same way as a counsel. His decision is given in the form of a structure of logic, in which he may use any material which he considers ad rem. Even purely unofficial practice may be prayed in aid as precedent to interpret documents (or statute). If the matter is governed by the clear and unambiguous prevision of a statute, his task is simplified. In a great many cases, no statute is applicable and even if it is applicable it is frequently the reverse of clear and unambiguous. The Judge must then proceed as Bacon laid down long ago either by parity of reasoning or by use of examples or by rules of natural reason and discretion.”

14. There is no limitation provided for making application for a reference nor there is any condition laid down under Section 48(3) beyond which the reference cannot be preferred by any subordinate consolidation authorities. The only requirement of Section 48(3) of the Act was that after hearing the parties concerned a reference can be made to the Deputy Director of Consolidation regarding any order under Section 48(1) ie. to ascertain the correctness, legality or propriety of an order. In the t instant case I don't think there could be any better case for ”propriety of an order” Where an order between the parties has become final and the same was not given effect to in the revenue papers, then the intention of the Legislature Legis was that such order passed in favour of any party to be given effect to by the consolidation authorities and has there was no necessity for making any appl application for execution of that order. Under these circumstances, even if after the close of consolidation operation an application for correction of papers was moved seeking effect of the order which became final, the prayer in that application could be granted only by making a reference, particularly when the consolidation authorities were actually functioning in the area as provided under Rule 109-A. In case the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not functioning in the area or in the District, his power would then be exercised by the Assistant Collector or some other appropriate revenue authority. But as 38 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 in the instant case the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) directed the Consolidation Officer to submit a reference purporting to be a reference under Section 48(3) of the Act, I don't find that there Was any mistake or error in that order The Deputy Director of Consolidation was justified in rejecting the revision against that order preferred by the present Petitioners.

15. As regards the case of Raja Ram v. D.D.C., 1982 All LJ 871 (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, suffice it to say that in that case a suit for partition was pending between the parties at the time of application under Section 109-A was filed and in that circumstances this Court took the view that the parties can press their claim in the partition suit and Section 49 of the Act would not apply. In the instant case the application for correction of papers was correctly moved by the contesting Respondents seeking effect of the order dated 8- 7-1964 which had become final and it was the duty of consolidation authorities to have given effect to that order when the e consolidation operation was not closed in the area by issuing a notification under Section 52(1) of the Act. But as the application was made by the contesting Respondents, I am of the view that the ends of justice requires that that application should be allowed by making a reference under Section 48(3) of the Act. Further the aforesaid case of Raja Ram v. D.D.C. (supra), appears to be based on particular facts of that case and with profound regards have to say that that case law is not the whole law, but is governed by the facts of a particular case. In this connection I am reminded of an observation made by Lord Macmillan, who was a distinguished Judge of his time, in Berch v. Brown, (1931) A.C. page 631, to the effect that “precedent should be stepping stones and not halting places”. (iii) In Mukhtar v. DDC, Azamgarh and others: 1993 RD 457 (DB) the Court has held as under: - “11. From the entire scheme of the Act and the Rules framed there- under it thus becomes clear that the duty for revising the revenue records is cast on the Consolidation Authorities and it is for the Consolidation Authorities to implement the orders which are passed under the Act. The Scheme of the Act is not like the scheme which has been provided under the Code of Civil Procedure in the sense that after obtaining a judgment and decree in his favour a party has to apply for execution within a certain period of limitation prescribed to get the fruits of the decree. Here under the Act the duty is enjoined on the Consolidation Authorities themselves to implement the orders which have been passed under the Act and duty is cast on the person in whose favour the decision has been given to make an application to the authorities under the Act for implementation of that order within any 39 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 prescribed period of limitation. In our opinion, till the order passed by the Consolidation authorities on 13-5-1974 was not finally implemented by the Consolidation Authorities as contemplated under the Rules, the proceedings under the Act would be deemed to be pending. The order which has been passed in favour of the contesting respondents was to be incorporated by the Consolidation Authorities in the revenue records. The consolidation Authorities having not done so, the proceedings in respect thereof can not be said to have been concluded before de-notification of the village. The proceedings for correcting the revenue records in pursuance of the order dated 13-5- 1974 would necessarily be taken to be pending on the date of the notification issued under Section 52(1) of the Act. The Consolidation Authorities were thus bound to implement the directions contained in the final order dated 13-5-1974 under the Act even though a notification under Section 52(1) of the Act had taken place. In our opinion, the view by learned Single Judge in the case of Raja Ram (supra) does not lay down the correct law.” (iv) In Ram Pati v. DDC, Banda and others: 1999 RJ 926 the Court has held as under: - “5. From the entire scheme of the Act and the Rules framed there- under it thus becomes clear that the duty for revising the revenue records is cast on the Consolidation Authorities and it is for the Consolidation Authorities to implement the orders which are passed under the Act. The Scheme of the Act is not like the scheme which has been provided under the Code of Civil Procedure in the sense that after obtaining a judgment and decree in his favour a party has to apply for execution within a certain period of limitation prescribed to get the fruits of the decree. Here under the Act the duty is enjoined on the Consolidation Authorities themselves to implement the orders which have been passed under the Act and duty is cast on the person in whose favour the decision has been given to make an application to the authorities under the Act for implementation of that order within any prescribed period of limitation. In our opinion, till the order passed by the Consolidation authorities on 13-5-1974 was not finally implemented by the Consolidation Authorities as contemplated under the Rules, the proceedings under the Act would be deemed to be pending. The order which has been passed in favour of the contesting respondents was to be incorporated by the Consolidation Authorities in the revenue records. The consolidation Authorities having not done so, the proceedings in respect thereof can not be said to have been concluded before de-notification of the village. The proceedings for correcting the revenue records in pursuance of the order dated 13-5- 1974 would necessarily be taken to be pending on the date of the notification issued under Section 52(1) of the Act. The Consolidation 40 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Authorities were thus bound to implement the directions contained in the final order dated 13-5-1974 under the Act even though a notification under Section 52(1) of the Act had taken place. In our opinion, the view by learned Single Judge in the case of Raja Ram (supra) does not lay down the correct law.” (v) In Abdul Sami and Others v. DDC and others: 2015 (1) ADJ 214, the Court has held as under: - “8. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and upon a perusal of the record, especially the decision cited on behalf of respondents, which holds as follows: - ”From the entire scheme of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder it thus becomes clear that the duty for revising the revue records is cast on the Consolidation Authorities and it is for the Consolidation Authorities to implement the orders which are passed under the Act. The Scheme of the Act is not like the scheme which has been provided under the Code of Civil procedure in the sense that after obtaining a judgment and decree in his favour a party has to apply for execution within a certain period of limitation prescribed to get the fruits of the decree. Here under the Act the duty is enjoined on the Consolidation Authorities themselves to implement the orders which have been passed under the Act and no duty is cast on the person in whose favour the decision has been given to make an application to the authorities under the Act for implementation of that order within any prescribed period of limitation. In our opinion, till the order passed by the Consolidation authorities on 13.5.1974 was not finally implemented by the Consolidation Authorities as contemplated under the Rules, the proceedings under the Act would be deemed to be pending. The order which has been passed in favour of the contesting respondents was to be incorporated by the Consolidation Authorities in the revenue records. The Consolidation Authorities having not done so, the proceedings in respect thereof can not be said to have been concluded before de-notification of the village. The proceedings for correcting the revenue records in pursuance of the order dated 13.5.1974 would necessarily be taken to be pending on the date of the notification issued under section 52 (1) of the Act. The Consolidation Authorities were thus bound to implement the directions contained in the final order dated 13.5.1974 under the Act even though a notification under section 52 (1) of the Act had taken place. In out opinion, the view taken by learned Single Judge in the case of Raja Ram (supra) does not lay down the correct law” (vi) In Shiv Shankar and Another v. State of U.P. and others: 2018 RD (138) 297, the Court has held as under: - 41 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 “8. Rule 109-A of the Rules framed under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act casts a duty upon the consolidation authorities to give effect to the orders passed. No specific application is required for such implementation and, therefore, the question of application being barred by limitation does not arise. In Mukhtar v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh and others: 1993 RD 457, a Division Bench of this court has taken a view that the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act casts a duty on consolidation authorities to implement the orders which are passed under the Act. The Division Bench held that since duty is cast upon the consolidation authorities to implement the order passed under the Act, the proceeding to implement the order, if not already implemented, would be deemed pending on the date of notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and as such the proceedings can continue even after notification under Section 52 of the Act. This Court is therefore of the view that the objection taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner that application under Rule 109-A was not maintainable because consolidation operations had come to a close pursuant to a notification under Section 52 of the Act, is worthy of rejection and is, accordingly, rejected”

79. In short, the aforesaid decisions are based on the premise that record-keeping is the work of the Authorities and thus a person cannot be punished for the inaction of the State Authorities and the power of reference is primarily considered to be corrective in nature, contextually.

80. Now this Court deems appropriate to notice the decisions which hold that after the notification issued under Section 52(1) of the Act of 1953, the Consolidation Authorities lose their jurisdiction to adjudicate. (i) In the case of the Ghafoor v. Additional Commissioner: 1979 (RD) 76 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court has held as under: - “1. After publication of the notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the Petitioner moved an application before the Sub-Divisional Officer praying for correction of map prepared by the consolidation authorities on the ground that there was some discrepancy in the map as well as in C.H. Form 45. The application filed by the Petitioner was rejected by the Sub-Divisional Officer on the ground that because Consolidation operations were over in the village, as such the map cannot be on. The corrected under Section 28 of the Land Revenue Act or under any other section. Petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Lucknow Division and the Additional Commissioner relying on Ganga Glass Works 42 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 (Private) Ltd., Balawali v. State of U.P. 1973 AWR 620 held that the map prepared by the consolidation authorities was final and the revenue authorities were incompetent to make any correction. In that case the learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the provisions of Sections 42A and 27(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act held that Section 42A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act does enable the authorities to correct the size and shape of plots in the map prepared under Section 27(1) by referring to the record of rights. and Section 27(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is only for the purpose of specifying the procedure for preparation of the map and record. As such the Consolidation authorities alone were competent to make any alteration in the map prepared by the consolidation authorities. From the facts of the said case it is not clear when the cause of action arose and whether the village was still under consolidation and whether notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act had been published. There is yet another Section 27 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and a perusal of Section 27(2) shows that the entries which were made earlier were final and conclusive and a presumption of correctness was attached to them meaning thereby that the said presumption could be rebutted. Section 27(3) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act provides that after the issue of notification under Section 52, the Collector shall, instead of the map, field-book and record-of-rights previously maintained by him, maintain the map, field-book and record-of rights prepared in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901 relating to the maintenance and correction of such map, field-book and record of rights shall mutatis mutandis apply.

2. Thus after consolidation operations are over and the notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is published shed it is the Collector who is to maintain the map, field-book etc., and such a map and field-book can be corrected under the Land Revenue Act and under such circumstances the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act does not go to the extent of rendering the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act nugatory, so far as correction of map prepared during consolidation operations is concerned.

3. Our attention has been drawn to another case Mohammad Raza v. Board of Revenue 1973 AWR 621 in which it was held that a map prepared by the consolidation authorities is not necessarily final and conclusive and a map incorrectly drawn up cannot be treated as final and conclusive and can be corrected under Section 28 of the Land Revenue Act.

4. Looking to the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and the Land Revenue Act, we are in agreement with the view expressed in Mohammad Raza v Board of Revenue (supra) and we hold 43 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 that if a map is subsequently found incorrect and it is not in conformity with the document prepared by the consolidation authorities, the same can in suitable cases be e corrected subsequent under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of to the publication of the notification Holdings Act by the Collector in exercise of power under Section 28 of the Land Revenue Act. Thus we are of the view that law laid down in Ganga Glass Works (Private) Ltd., Balawali v. State of U.P. (supra) is not a good law.

5. Thus the powers of the Collector under Section 28 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act for correcting the map in suitable cases are intact notwithstanding the map has been prepared by the consolidation authorities who have adjudicated the rights and title of the parties. In case there is any discrepancy in the map and final document has been prepared by the consolidation authorities, the same can be corrected in proceedings under Section 28 of the Land Revenue Act provided the right, interest and title of the party which have been finally adjudicated or have become final are not involved.

6. In the present case after notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was published, an application was moved by the Petitioner for correction of the map and the Petitioner tendered evidence that the map was not in conformity with the entries which were made in C.H. Form 45. It was obligatory on the authorities to correct the map in case they were satisfied that there was some discrepancy between the map and the entries in C.H. Form 45 and it is on a mistaken view of law that they have refused to grant this relief to the Petitioner.” (ii) In Raja Ram and Others v. DDC, Lucknow: 1982 (RD) 387 (DB), the Court has held as under: - “8. In accordance with R. 109A read with Section 52 (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act the contesting opposite parties could not approach the consolidation authorities for getting requisite entry as no case was pending on the date of denotification under Section 52 (1) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The proceeding giving rise to the present writ petition is wholly without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed. The ruling reported in 1981 Rev Dec 307: (1981 UPLT NOC 207), is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In that case no question of applicability of R. 109A was involved, hence that case does not throw any light upon the question under my consideration in the present writ petition. The revisional Court through the impugned judgment dated 29-10-1974 has tried to give effect to the order dated 23-7-1965. I think it has exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order dated 29-10-1974. without considering the question 44 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 whether the contesting opposite parties could move any application under R. 109A under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in the present case. In my opinion the contesting opposite parties could not invoke the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities under R. 109A under the Act after denotification under Section 52 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act on the facts and circumstances involved in the present” (iii) In Hari Ram v. DDC, Azamgarh and others: 1989 (RD) 281 (DB), the Division Bench of this Court has held as under: - “2. We find that on 29th October, 1987 an objection was preferred by the petitioner before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The position of law is well settled. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has no jurisdiction to exercise power under Section 48 (3) of the Act if a de notification has already taken place under Section 52 of the Act. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, therefore, will first record a finding as to whether a Notification under Section of the Act had, in fact, been issued on 13th February 1982. If he finds that such a notification exists and if he also finds that the land which is the subject matter of dispute is covered by the said Notification, he shall desist from exercising any power under Section 48 (3) of the Act. With his direction the petition is disposed of finally.” (iv) In Nanhki v. DDC, Pratapgarh and others: 1995 (13) LCD 1, the Division Bench of this Court has held as under: - “3. The order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation has been challenged only or the ground of diction. According to learned Counsel for the petitioner, after the village where the land in dispute is situate was de notified under Section 52 (1) of the Act vide notification dated 8th March, 1979, published in the gazette on 5th May, 1979, the application for correction of reconds and of the age map village on any ground whatsoever cannot be entertained by the Consolidation Authorities nor they are left with the power to pass orders on the same and, therefore, impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is illegal and llable to be quashed by the writ of certiorari.

4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on two judgments of this Court. The fest jatlipment is of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Hari Ram v. DDC, Azamgarh and others, 1989 RD 281. This Court was approached by means of a writ petition for issue of the welt of prohibition by one Hari Ram who happened to be opposite party in a case which was pending before the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 (3) of the Act. In the writ position it was alleged by him that although consolidation proceedings in the 45 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 village where the land was situate has come to an end by issue of Notification under Section 52 (1) of the Act. Deputy Director of Consolidation wrongly proceeded with the reference under Section 48 (3) of The Act. It was argued on his behalf that if a notification under Section 52 (1) of the Act has been issued, the village goes out of the consolidation and the Consolidation Authorities cease to have jusdiction to either entertain any application or pass orders for correction of papers or whatever purpose. The Division Bench of this Court while finally disposing of this writ petition at the admission stage passed the order directing the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh to fint record a finding as to whether Notification under Section 52 (1) of the Act had been ed in respect of tire land in dispute and to determine as to whether the village where land in dispute is situate, has been denotified. The direction further was that in case it was found that the land has ceased to be the subject matter of the consolidation proceedings, the Deputy Deertar of Consolidation shall not proceed with the application and shall not pass any order Dereon in as much as in such situation he lacks jurisdiction to entertain and decide the Application

5. The second judgment on which reliance has been placed by learned Counsel for the pititioner, is a single Bench judgment in the case of Raja Ram v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P., Lucknow and others, 1982 RD 387. In this case, an application for Correction of papers was made under Section 42-A of the Act for the purposes of carrying out of Consolidation an We arters passed by the Consolidation Authorities and the Deputy Director of the basis of that application exercising powers under Section 48 of the Act passed orders for The correction of of pap papers. The Court held that when the village has been de-notified under Sect 12 (1) of the Act, the Deputy Director of Consolidation loses jurisdiction to entertain the vation and pess orders under Section 42-A of the Act either in the garts of making mation or fur execution of the orders earlier passed by the Consolidation Authorities. x x x 7. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner in that case was that since the village had been denotified, the application for correction of papers was not maintainable. This contention of the petitioners made in that case was rejected by the learned Single Judge holding that for purpose of carrying out the orders earlier passed by Consolidation Authorities application was maintainable and the Consolidation. Authorities were competent to pass orders therean. This view of the learned Single Judge is in direct conflict with the view taken by another learned Single Judge in the case of Raja Ram (supra) as well as with the view taken by Division Bench in the case of Hari Ram (supra). Since the view taken by the Single Judge in the case of Raja Ram is fully supported and endorsed by the view taken by the Division Bench 46 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 in the case of Han Ram (supra), in my opinion, the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Brij Bir Singh cannot prevail and it cannot be said to be a correct view. In the normal course where the Court is faced with two conflicting views taken by coordinate benches, the case is to be referred to a larger bench. In this case, this course is not required to be adopted as the view taken by this Court in the case of Raja Ram (supra) has fully been endorsed by the Division Bench of this Court which will be deemed to have overruled the view taken by the karned single Judge in the case of Brij Bir Singh (supra).

8. Learned Counsel for the respondents has further cited another case reported in Kamta Prasad v. Board of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow and others, 1986 RD 206. This too is a case of correction of papers for carrying out orders passed by Consolidation Authorities. Here, the the learned Single Judge held that for carrying out the orders of the Consolidation Authorities after denotification of the village under Section 52 (1) of the Act, Revenue Authorities will have Jurisdiction to make necessary corrections. This judgment also supports the view taken in case of Raja Ram and the view taken by the Division Bench in Hon Ram's case. I am, therefore, of the opinion that Consolidation Authorities will have no power to entertain any application for is de- notified by issue of Notification under Section 52 (1) correction of papers after the village of the Act as thereafter land is no more subject matter of consolidation proceedings.” (v) In Ram Narain and others v. DDC, Barabanki: 2020 (147) RD 185, the Court has held as under: - “13. This Court has perused the judgment and order dated 07.08.2015 passed in the case of Pateshwan Dutt Pandey (supra). In the said case, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court considered the scope of application under Section 42-A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act after notification under Section 52 of the Act had already been issued. This Court relied upon the Division Bench judgement rendered in Gafoor v. Addl. Commissioner, Lucknow and others: 1979 RD 76 (DB). Hari Ram v. D.D.C. Azamgarh; 1989 RD 281, Ghamari v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ballia and others; 2003 94 RD 90 and Sant Lal and Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and Ors.; 2015 (1) JCLR 310, where this Court had considered the limitation of jurisdiction of consolidation authorities after section 52 notification was issued closing the consolidation operations.

14. The Co-ordinate Bench pointed out the exceptions that have been carved out by the judicial precedents for entertaining the application under Section 42-A of the Act. There were only two exceptions carved out. Firstly, the cases which are pending under Article 226 of the 47 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Constitution of India at the time of notification and were decided after de-notification, and secondly, the cases which were pending before the consolidation authorities at the time of de- notification and judgments were rendered thereafter. In all other cases, the remedy for the Tenure holder is to approach the Collector, where the records had been sent by the Consalidation Authorities after Section 52 notification is issued for correction of map to be carried out in conformity with the confirmed map prepared by the consolidation authorities and as per area of plot/chak mentioned in C.H. Form 41 and C.H. Form 45.

15. This Court has also considered the judgments rendered by Co- ordinate Bench in Pooran Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Meerut and others; 2008 (105) RD 469 and Dr. Sukhbeer Singh v. Commissioner, Meerut and others, 2014 (32) LCD 1912, and held that the aforecited two judgments were given in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases as mentioned in the said judgments, and cannot help in advancement of petitioner's case that even after Section 52 notification has been issued, application under Section 42-A of the Act can be entertained.” (vi) In Smt. Malti Devi v. State of U.P. and others: 2021 (151) RD 3, the Court relied upon the earlier judgment in One of the judgments cited before this Court, passed in Sripal and two others v. D.D.C. Raebareli & two others: 2017 (137) RD 189 wherein this Court considered the law settled by earlier Benches of this Court as well as the Board of Revenue and held that “After Notification under section 52 the only consolidation operations which continue are those referred under sub- section (2) of section 52 and any order referred therein can be given effect under Rule 109-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules

1954. The exercise of power under section 42-A is not referred in sub- section (2) of section 52.” (vii) In Sri Pal & Others v. DDC, Raebareli and others: 2017 (137) RD 189, the Court has held as under: - “18. On a conjoint reading of section 52 and 27(3) it is evident that during consolidation 1 operations and prior to its ceasing in terms of section 52, it is the Consolidation Authorities who are empowered to correct the records. The opening line of sub-section (3) of section 27 makes is amply clear that after closure of Consolidation Operations on issuance of Notification under section 52 it is the Collector who shall maintain the map, field-book and record of rights prepared in 48 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 accordance with the provisions of sub- section (1) of section 27 of the Act 1953 i.e. during consolidation operations, and the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901 relating to the maintenance and correction of such map, field-book and record of rights shall mutatis-mutandis apply in respect thereof. x x x 33. In view of the above discussion, even though no limitation is prescribed for correction under section 42-A, the Revisional Court cannot be faulted for having arrived at the conclusion, inter alia, that the proceedings under section 42-A after de- notification under section 52 were not maintainable, and the remedy, if any, was under section 28 or 33/39 of the Land Revenue Act 1901, however, in this regard the Court would like to add a caveat, as Maiku had Initiated a regular suit under section 229-B, therefore, it would have to be seen as to what was the decision rendered therein and its effect on the maintainability of subsequent proceedings under section 28 or 33/39. Subject to this condition, if the contention of the petitioner is correct i.e. without there being any order of any Consolidation Authority in favour of Jalpa or Ram Avtar for recording of their names in respect of Basic Year Khata No. 26, an entry was made in their favour in respect of the sald Khata in C.H. Form 11 which continued in C.H. Form 23, 41 and 45 then it was certainly a fundamental error which would go to the root of the matter as has also been observed by the Revisional Court and in such a situation the records would be liable to correction so as to ensure substantial justice, as, in such a factual scenario the entry would be without any basis i.e. fake entry, and in such a situation injustice cannot be allowed to be perpetrated. In such a case remedy would be under section 33/39 of the Act 1901 before the Collector who also happens to be the District Deputy Director, Consolidation in view of the above discussion and the deficiency in the material before it, especially the absence of order dated 19.12.1970 and the judgment in the suit under section 229-B as also its plaint, this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is unable to consider the pleas raised herein or Interfere with the order of the revisional Court, which it finds to be just and proper, subject of course to the above observations, therefore, the writ petition is dismissed.” (viii) In Raj Karan Singh v. Chief Revenue Officer; MANU/UP/3069/2019, the Court has held as under: - “4. Whatever be the merits of the controversy involved, one feature is striking l.e. once notification under section 52 of the Act, 1953 had been published on 10.4.1982 then there was no way that any reference could have been prepared under section 48(3) of the Act, 1953. It is settled legal position that any correction thereafter could either be under Rule 109 l.e. in the event the claimant is able to satisfy that there 49 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 was a valid order passed under any provision of the Act, 1953 during consolidation operations which was not given effect in the records prepared during consolidation or thereafter, or under section 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 (corresponding provision of section 38 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006) by virtue of section 27 of the Act, 1953 under which after closure of consolidation operations the records are remitted to the Collector who is the custodian obliged to maintain and correct the same.” (ix) In Smt. Jagrani @ Ram Jiyayi v. DDC, Shrawasti and others; 2024 (164) RD 238, this Court has held as under: - “20. It is now to well settled to be disputed that in terms of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, the consolidation operations commenced with the notification issued under Section 4 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.……….

21. Similarly, Section 52 of the Act of 1953 clearly provides that upon the denotification of the village under Section 52 of the Consolidation operation come to end and thereafter no Consolidation Authorities have been conferred with the powers to entertain or deal with the matter unless as provided in Section 52 itself ………..

22. In light of the aforesaid and considering the facts which are before this Court which are apparently not disputed, are that, villages in question were denotified on 31.03.2008, accordingly no Consolidation Authorities could have entertained any application under the Act after the date of the denotification.

23. Another fact which is not disputed is that Raja Ram made his application under Section 12 of the Act on 14.07.2015 as evident from annexure no.2, hence the said application having been moved after the date of denotification was per se not maintainable and the Consolidation Officer was denuded of all jurisdictions to have passed any order thereon. Thus, the order passed by the Consolidation Officer dated 08.11.2016 was per se inherently without jurisdiction and void ab initio. Though the said order was assailed by Smt. Jagrani in an appeal before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation who allowed the appeal on 28.09.2017 but the fact remains that once the order of the Consolidation Officer after denotification were void ab initio for the same reason, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation was also denuded of jurisdiction to have passed the order. It was actually a fit case for Smt. Jagrani to have assailed the order of Consolidation Officer straight away by filing writ petition before this Court but nevertheless the said course was not adopted. x x x 50 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

30. In light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the clear view that the proceedings after denotification as initiated by Raja Ram were wholly without jurisdiction and all the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer dated 08.11.2016, the order passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 28.09.2017 and the order impugned dated 09.05.2019 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation are all without jurisdiction and void ab initio.

31. Attempt of Shyam Lal to seek a substitution on the basis of Will in proceedings under Article 226 where the impugned orders are per se without jurisdiction, hence this Court does not permit Sham Lal to be impleaded. For the aforesaid reason this Court finds that the entire proceedings initiated at the behest of Raja Ram by filing an application under Section 12 of the U.P. Consolidation Holdings Act,1953 to be without jurisdiction and are quashed and all impugned orders i.e. 08.11.2016 passed by the Consolidation Officer, 28.09.2017 passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation and 09.05.2019 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation shall also stand quashed. The parties shall be at liberty of getting their rights adjudicated before the competent revenue court who shall consider and decide the title to the estate of Bachowa on the basis of contested plea by the respective parties and for the said purpose all plea are left open for the parties to be raised and decided by the Revenue Courts. That the aforesaid decisions which primarily state that after the notification under Section 52(1) of the Act, the Consolidation Authorities lose their jurisdiction. Even they have been sited on the basic premise based on the postulate contained in Section 52(1) of the Act and there has been no indepth analysis of the Scheme and the Provisions of the Act relating to the power of reference, hence, the aforesaid decision also do not come to the aid to hold determinitatevely whether the Consolidation Authorities lose their jurisdiction after the notification under Section 52 (1) of the Act.”

81. After considering the aforesaid decisions, this Court at the outset notices that a Division Bench of Ram Bahadur (Supra) was the first case in point of time where it was held that the Consolidation Authorities would have jurisdiction after the notification is made under Section 52(1) of the Act of 1953 on the premise that Section 52 of the Act of 1953 does not destroy the rights of the parties.

82. The observations made in the said case was in a different context. It was held that if an appeal or revision is filed with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the delay is condoned, then the 51 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 appeal or revision is to be heard on merits and so it was held that in such a situation the proceedings are revived.

83. It is further relevant to notice that thereafter came the other Division Bench decision of this Court in case of Ghafoor (Supra) wherein it was held that the Consolidation Authorities lose their jurisdiction upon notification made under Section 52 (1) of the Act of

1953. The Division Bench in Ghafoor (Supra) did not consider the decision of the earlier Division Bench in case of Ram Bahadur (Supra).

84. At the same time, it would be noticed that another Division Bench in Hari Ram (Supra) held that the Consolidation Authorities do not have jurisdiction after the notification issued under Section 52 (1) of the Act of 1953. However, even the Division Bench in case of Hari Ram (Supra) did not notice the earlier Division Bench decision of Ram Bahadur (Supra). Even the later Division Bench decision of Mukhtar (supra) which held that the Consolidation Authorities do have jurisdiction, did not notice the earlier Division Bench decision of Hari Ram (Supra).

85. Thus, it would be seen that though there are two Division Bench decisions, namely Ram Bahadur (Supra) and Mukhtar (Supra), which hold that the Consolidation Authorities do not lose their jurisdiction after Section 52(1) Notification, however, there are two other Division Bench cases of Ghafoor (Supra) and Hari Ram (Supra) which hold that the Consolidation Authorities lose jurisdiction upon notification made under Section 52(1) of the Act of 1953 and in the same vein, there are several decisions of learned Single Judges who have also taken contrary views which are not in conformity with each other.

86. With due respect to the aforesaid decisions which have been given on their particular facts, many provisions have not been noticed in those judgments and thus they do not constitute binding precedents before this Larger Bench, which is examining the questions threadbare. 52 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 VII ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS OF QUESTION NO.1

87. Now the stage is set to analyze the questions referred and for the sake of expediency, question no.(1) as aforesaid is being reproduced hereinafter:- “What is the true scope of powers vested with Deputy Director of Consolidation in terms of Section 48(3) of the Act of 1953 that is to say whether it is corrective in nature or adjudicatory.”

88. At the outset, it will be trite to state that the scope of reference has not been defined in the Act. It has been left to the discretion of the Court. There is no denying the fact that where grounds have not been stated in the text, the task of a court becomes arduous. In this regard it will be apt to quote an observation of Sir Carleton Kemp Allen made in his classic work of jurisprudence, ‘Law In the Making’, (6th Edn.) at page 1292 as follows: - “The Judge himself addresses his task in much the same way as a counsel. His decision is given in the form of a structure of logic, in which he may use any material which he considers ad rem. Even purely unofficial practice may be prayed in aid as precedent to interpret documents (or statute). If the matter is governed by the clear and unambiguous provision of a statute, his task is simplified. In a great many cases, no statute is applicable and even if it is applicable it is frequently the reverse of clear and unambiguous. The Judge must then proceed as Bacon laid down long ago either by parity of reasoning or by use of examples or by rules of natural reason and discretion.”

89. It will also be relevant to recollect a latin Maxim, ‘Contemporanea exposito est optima et fortissinia in lega i.e.’ the best way to interpret a document or statute is to see how it was understood at the time it was made.

90. Keeping the observations of C.K. Allen and the maxim as a guiding beacon, this Court proceeds and at the outset notes that power of reference as provided in Section 48(3) was not a part of the original Act of 1953. This was introduced by an amendment in the Act vide the Uttar Pradesh Jot Chakbandi (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam 1962 (U.P. Act No.VIII 53 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 of 1963) which came into effect on 08.03.1963. By this amending Act large number of amendments were incorporated in the principal Act.

91. Thus, for the said reason, it will also be relevant to notice the statement, objects and reasons for introducing the said amendments. They are being reproduced hereinafter for ready reference: - ं में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने धिमला धिदया जाय धिजससे आपधित्तयां, जो अन्य र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमाज्यों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के अपेक्षाकृ त चकबन्दी अधिनियम अधि(cid:19)क ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै, “ जब धिपछली अधिनियम बार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम उ०प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम० अधि(cid:19)धि(cid:20)यम उत्तर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम चकबन्दी अधिनियम अधि(cid:19)धि(cid:20)यम, 1953 संख्या 38, 1958 त चकबन्दी अधिनियमब से यह आवश्यक समझा गया है आवश्यक समझा गया ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै द्वार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमा संश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमोधि(cid:19)त चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिकया गया था, धिक चकबन्दी अधिनियम की अधिनियम प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमधिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमया को और प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम पधिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमष्कृ त चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिकया जाय त चकबन्दी अधिनियमाधिक प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमधित चकबन्दी अधिनियम एकड़ चकबन्दी चकबन्दी अधिनियम की अधिनियम लागत चकबन्दी अधिनियम को, कम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े के उद्देश्य से चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयाओं की अधिनियम अवधि(cid:19) में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कमी अधिनियम की अधिनियम जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयाओं में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने अड़ चकबन्दीच(cid:20)े आ(cid:20)े और प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम देर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो(cid:20)े का एक सब से बड़ चकबन्दीा कार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमण यह रहा है कि विभिन्न चकबन्दी यह आवश्यक समझा गया है र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमह आवश्यक समझा गया हैा ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै धिक धिवधि4न्(cid:20) चकबन्दी अधिनियम काय5 जमा ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो गया ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने यह आवश्यक समझा गया है प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमस्त चकबन्दी अधिनियमाव ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै धिक धिवधि4न्(cid:20) प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमाधि(cid:19)काधिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के पास वाद- प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमधिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयाओं को दो वगो5 अपी अधिनियमल आधिद प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमस्त चकबन्दी अधिनियमु त चकबन्दी अधिनियम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े के प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमम कम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो जायें कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने गे और प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम इस प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमकार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम खात चकबन्दी अधिनियमेदार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है को ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो(cid:20)े वाली अधिनियम बह आवश्यक समझा गया हैु त चकबन्दी अधिनियम की अधिनियम असुधिव(cid:19)ायें कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने दूर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो जायें कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने गी अधिनियम त चकबन्दी अधिनियमथा चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयाओं की अधिनियम लागत चकबन्दी अधिनियम में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कमी अधिनियम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो जायेगी अधिनियम। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने यह आवश्यक समझा गया है 4ी अधिनियम प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमस्त चकबन्दी अधिनियमाव ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै धिक 1958 के संश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमो(cid:19)(cid:20) अधि(cid:19)धि(cid:20)यम द्वार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमा प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमचधिलत चकबन्दी अधिनियम की अधिनियम गयी अधिनियम द्धिवत चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियमय अपी अधिनियमलों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है की अधिनियम व्यवस्था समाप्त चकबन्दी अधिनियम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम दी अधिनियम जाय क्यों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक हैधिक उ(cid:20)से काय5वाधिह आवश्यक समझा गया हैयां त चकबन्दी अधिनियमो अ(cid:20)ावश्यक रूप से बढ़ जाती हैं जात चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैैं , लेधिक(cid:20) खात चकबन्दी अधिनियमेदार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है को कोई विशेष लाभ नहीं धिवश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमेष लाभ नहीं ला4 (cid:20)ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैी अधिनियमं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमा। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने खात चकबन्दी अधिनियमेदार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम द्वार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमा साव5जधि(cid:20)क प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयोज(cid:20)ों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के धिलए अप(cid:20)ी अधिनियम जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम से अंश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमदा(cid:20) कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े के पधिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमण यह रहा है कि विभिन्न चकबन्दीामस्वरूप उसकी अधिनियम मूल जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कमी अधिनियम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैो जा(cid:20)े से उसके द्वार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमा देय मालगुजार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियम की अधिनियम (cid:19)(cid:20)र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमाधिश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम के समायोज(cid:20) के सम्बन्(cid:19) में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने इस समय अधि(cid:19)धि(cid:20)यम में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कोई विशेष लाभ नहीं धिवश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमेष लाभ नहीं उपबन्(cid:19) (cid:20)ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैी अधिनियमं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने चू ंधिक खात चकबन्दी अधिनियमेदार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है को इस मामले में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कु छ कधिD(cid:20)ाई विशेष लाभ नहीं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैु ई विशेष लाभ नहीं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै इसधिलये ऐसे मामलों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने मालगुजार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियम कम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े के संबं(cid:19) में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने उधिचत चकबन्दी अधिनियम उपबन्(cid:19) सधिम्मधिलत चकबन्दी अधिनियम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े का प्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमस्त चकबन्दी अधिनियमाव ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयाओं की अधिनियम लागत चकबन्दी अधिनियम को वसल कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े से संबंधि(cid:19)त चकबन्दी अधिनियम उपबन्(cid:19)ों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है को संश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमोधि(cid:19)त चकबन्दी अधिनियम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)ा आवश्यक ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै क्यों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक हैधिक ला4ाधिथ5यों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के एक वग5 से लागत चकबन्दी अधिनियम वसूल कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कधिD(cid:20)ाई विशेष लाभ नहीं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैु ई विशेष लाभ नहीं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने कु छ कधिD(cid:20)ाई विशेष लाभ नहीं धिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमट के उन मुकदमों में उच्च न्यायालय की आज्ञाओं को के उ(cid:20) मुकदमों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने उच्च न्यायालय की अधिनियम आज्ञाओं को काया5धिन्वत चकबन्दी अधिनियम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने 4ी अधिनियम ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैु ई विशेष लाभ नहीं ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै जो ऐसे क्षेत चकबन्दी अधिनियम्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के बार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमे में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने थे धिज(cid:20)के संबं(cid:19) में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने उक्त चकबन्दी अधिनियम के अ(cid:19)ी अधिनियम(cid:20) औपचाधिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमक रूप से चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिक् र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयायें कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने बन्द कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े की अधिनियम अधि(cid:19)धि(cid:20)यम की अधिनियम (cid:19)ार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमा 52 धिवज्ञधिप्त चकबन्दी अधिनियमयां जार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियम की अधिनियम जा चुकी अधिनियम थी अधिनियमं, और प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम पधिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमण यह रहा है कि विभिन्न चकबन्दीामत चकबन्दी अधिनियमः चकबन्दी अधिकारियों से उन चकबन्दी अधिनियम अधि(cid:19)काधिर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमयों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है से उ(cid:20) क्षेत चकबन्दी अधिनियम्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के क्षेत चकबन्दी अधिनियम्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमाधि(cid:19)कार प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम ले धिलये गये थे। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने उक्त चकबन्दी अधिनियम धिवष लाभ नहींयों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक है के संबं(cid:19) में कमी की जाय। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने उधिचत चकबन्दी अधिनियम उपबन्(cid:19) ब(cid:20)ा(cid:20)े मोट के उन मुकदमों में उच्च न्यायालय की आज्ञाओं कोी अधिनियम त चकबन्दी अधिनियम्रुधिट के उन मुकदमों में उच्च न्यायालय की आज्ञाओं कोयां दूर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम कर प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियम(cid:20)े के उद्देश्य से यह आवश्यक समझा गया है धिव(cid:19)ेयक पु र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमः चकबन्दी अधिकारियों से उनस्थाधिपत चकबन्दी अधिनियम त चकबन्दी अधिनियमथा अन्य छोट के उन मुकदमों में उच्च न्यायालय की आज्ञाओं कोी अधिनियम- धिकया जात चकबन्दी अधिनियमा ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैै। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने ह आवश्यक समझा गया हैु कु म धिसंह आवश्यक समझा गया है धिवसे(cid:20) र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमाजस्व मंत चकबन्दी अधिनियम्र प्रदेश जोत चकबन्दी अधिनियमी अधिनियम। चकबन्दी क्रियाओं में अड़चने आने” It will be worthwhile to mention that Section 39 of the Amending

92. Act VIII of 1963 amended Section 48 of the Principal Act, of 1953 by which the power of reference was introduced.

93. It will be apposite to notice both the unamended Section 48 and how it fared after the amendment made in 1963. Unamended Section 48: - “48. Power of Director of Consolidation to call for records and to revise orders:- The Director of Consolidation may call for the record 54 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 of any case if the Officer (other than the Arbitrator) by whom the case was decided appears to have exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him by law or to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity and may pass such orders in the case as it think fit.” Section 48 after it was amended vide amending Act VIII of 1962, reads as under: - “48. Revisions and reference—(1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings ; or as to the correctness legality or propriety of any order 5[other than an interlocutory order] passed by such authority in the case or proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. (2) Power under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub-section (3). (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidaiton may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1). Explanation [(1)—For the purposes of this section, Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Consolidation Officer, Assistant Consolidation Officer, Consolidators and Consolidaiton Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. Explanation (2)— For the purpose of this section the expression ‘interlocutory order’ in relation to a case or proceeding, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceedings or collateral thereto as does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding. * * * This Section 48 of the Act was further amended in the year 2002 and Explanation (3) was inserted, which is being reproduced hereinbelow : - “Explanation (3) — The power under this section to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order includes the power to Examine any finding, whether of fact or law recorded by any 55 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 subordinate authority, and also includes the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence.”

94. The impact of amendment in Section 48(1) was further enlarged by introducing the Explanation (3). This amendment of 2002 was given retrospective effect and post amendment, huge powers of revision with the Deputy Director of Consolidation got enhanced with a flavor which generally is akin to appellate powers.

95. Prior to the Amendment of 2002, the consistent view emerging from the judicial trend was that if while exercising the powers under Section 48(1) of the Act 1953, the Director of Consolidation came to a conclusion that the finding of the Consolidation Officer or the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, as case may be, was not in accordance with law, then being the revising authority the Director of Consolidation could only set aside the findings and remit the matter to the court below for reconsideration but could not supplement its own view, which was the role of a revising authority in the classic sense.

96. While enacting the Amending Act 2002, the legislature clearly noticed that Section 48 was being amended to clarify that the revising authority had the right to examine the correctness, legality or proprietary of any order, including the power to examine any finding whether of fact or law and it also included the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence. Thus, it would indicate that post 2002 amendment, all powers were conferred with the Director of Consolidation who being the highest adjudicating Authority under the Act, could examine all issues, both of law and fact and its power of revision was made more akin to the power exercised by an Appellate Authority, though the nomenclature continued to refer to such powers as revision.

97. The idea being, that the Consolidation Act which envisages to achieve the goal of compacting the land holdings for the benefit of tenure holders, to encourage large scale farming and agricultural activities, reduce boundary disputes and making it more viable for 56 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 agriculture, hence all issues that arise during consolidation operations may be decided within the ambit of the Act by the adjudicating authorities empowered under the Act itself, so that once the consolidation operations draw to an end, then all loose ends are taken care of. Once the new records are prepared during consolidation operation and are handed over to the revenue authorities, then they must continue to be maintained by the Collector. Such records have presumptive value and sanctity is attached to the records so prepared, making it final and binding in light of Section 27 and its effect on the tenure holders as per Section 49 of the Act and unless the contrary is proved in accordance with law.

98. In this given backdrop, the question still arises what was the purpose and scope of introducing the power of reference by the Amending Act of 1962.

99. In the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, the word ‘reference’ has not been defined. Even in the contemporaneous Act i.e. U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950, the word ‘reference’ has not been defined. However, The word ‘reference’ finds mention in Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and it reads as under:- “113. Reference to High Court.—Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, any Court may state a case and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court, and the High Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit: [Provided that where the Court is satisfied that a case pending before it involves a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation or of any provision contained in an Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, and is of opinion that such Act, Ordinance, Regulation or provision is invalid or inoperative, but has not been so declared by the High Court to which that Court is subordinate or by the Supreme Court, the Court shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons therefor, and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court. Explanation.—In this section, "Regulation" means any Regulation of the Bengal, Bombay or Madras Code or Regulation as defined in the General Clauses Act,1897, (10 of 1897) or in the General Clauses Act of a State.” 57 WRIB No. 757 of 2024

100. A perusal of the aforesaid provision would reveal that the object of Section 113 appears to enable a subordinate authority to obtain the opinion of the highest authority in a non-appealable case, on a question which has created a reasonable doubt, to avoid committing an error which may not be remedied later. Accordingly, the subordinate authority may seek the opinion of the higher authority.

101. The aforesaid power of reference as per Section 113 C.P.C. is purely discretionary and it is an enabling provision to help a subordinate authority where it may come to a cross road relating to a question of law and to avoid any error, the opinion of the superior/the highest authority may be sought. Considering, the way reference has been worded in C.P.C., it would reveal that the power of reference is apparently consultative in nature and not adjudicatory.

102. However, the power of reference in context of the Act of 1953 is somewhat different. It does not appear to be consultative in nature. Moreover, the learned Additional Advocate General has sought to urge that power of reference is akin to inherent powers.

103. Examining this proposition first, it will be relevant to ascertain how and who can exercise inherent powers. The inherent powers generally are conferred on the courts of law which are classically constituted under the Constitution whether it be the High Court and the Supreme Court who are also courts of record. The courts of original civil jurisdiction exercise inherent powers, which has been recognized by Section 151 C.P.C. Significantly, Section 151 does not confer powers, rather it recognizes the inherent powers vested with the Civil Courts

104. A judicial authority constituted under a special statute cannot be presumed to have inherent powers unless it is specifically so conferred on it by the Statute under which it is constituted.

105. This can be seen in context with the fact that the Code of Civil Procedure envisages the conferment/recognition of inherent powers under Section 151 C.P.C. and simultaneously, it may also be noticed that 58 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 the power of substantive review is also conferred by the Statute and it finds place in Section 114 read with Order 47 C.P.C.

106. In contrast, the U.P.C.H. Act, 1953 is a special Statute which is a Code in itself, but it does not import the provisions of the C.P.C. as a whole. Neither there is any indication that the Courts/Adjudicatory Authorities constituted under the U.P.C.H. Act of 1953 have inherent powers nor they have been conferred with the power of review

107. This aspect was noticed by a Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Anar Kali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation: 1997 (15) LCD 921 (FB), wherein the question before the Full Bench was: - “Whether it is open for the Consolidation authorities to review/recall their final orders exercising inherent powers even though the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 does not vest them any review jurisdiction?”

108. The Full Bench answered the aforesaid question in the following words: - “23. On the authoritative pronouncements made by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned decisions, the legal position which is manifest is that the Deputy Director of Consolidation while exercising the power of revision vested in him under the Consolidation Act exercises quasi judical powers and in the absence of any provision in the Consolidation Act, which expressly or by necessary implication vests in him the power of review, he cannot exercise such power. It follows that the Deputy Director of Consolidation is not competent to revive a revision proceeding disposed of by him by a final order on a review application filed by one of the parties.

24. The question that remains to be considered is whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation as a Court or Tribunal has an inherent power of review and in exercise of such power he can reconsider the previous order passed by him? A further question that arises ancillarily in this connection is whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation is a Court and, therefore, has inherent power of review? In the case of Associated Coment Company Ltd. v. P.N.Sharma and another (AIR 1965 SC 1895) the Supreme Court, construing the meaning of 'Tribunal' for the purposes of Articles 136 (1) and 227 of the Constitution, held that judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign 59 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 State, and on consideration of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to Tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between par-ties. The Court further observed that it is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the Tribunals and the Courts and features which are distinct and separate; that the basic and fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and the Tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vests in a sovereign State. In considering the question about the status of any body or authority as a Tribunal under Article 136 (1) the main test to be applied is whether the body or authority has been constituted by the State and has been clothed with the State's inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between parties and determining them on the merits fairly and objectively. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute or a statutory rule. An authority or body deriving its power of adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a private arbitrator or a tribunal acting under section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a tribunal within meaning of Article 136, It matters little that such a body or authority is vested with the trappings of a Court. The Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the trappings of a court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vests an authority acting under section 10A of the Act with many of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not tribunals. The Supreme Court further held that the word 'tribunal' in Article 227 of the Constitution also has the same meaning as in Article 136.

25. In the case of Sri Dadu Dayal Mahasabha v. Sukhdev Arya and another (1989 (15) ALR 871), a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that the position is well established that a court has inherent power to correct its own proceeding when it is satisfied that in passing a particular order it was misled by one of the parties. Referring to a decision of the Patna High Court in Sadho Saran Rai and others v. Anant Rai and others (AIR 1923 Patna 483) with approval the Court held that the principle was correctly discussed in the judgment pointing out the distinction between case of fraud practised upon the court and fraud practised upon a party. The Supreme Court held that the same principle applies where a suit is permitted to be withdrawn on the basis of prayer purported to have been made on behalf of the plaintiff. The decision was rendered by the Supreme Court in a civil appeal arising from a suit (Suit No. 116 of 1974) which was disposed of by the Additional District Judge, 60 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Jaipur. The Supreme Court considered the case in the light of section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. * * * 34. Coming to the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, it is our considered view that the consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy Director of Consolidation while deciding a revision petition exercises judicial or quasi judicial power and, therefore, his order is final subject to any power of appeal or revision vested in superior authority under the Act. The consolidation authorities, particularly the Deputy director of Consolidation, is not vested with any power of review of his order and, therefore, cannot reopen any proceeding and cannot review or revise his earlier order. However, as a judicial or quasi judicial authority he has the power to correct any clerical mistake/arithmetical error, manifest error in his order in exercise of his inherent power as a tribunal. * * * 36. The question that remains to be considered relates to vesting of power of review in the Deputy Director of Consolidation by application of Section 220 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. Sri Radhey Shyam, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, strenuously urged that in view of the provisions of Section 41 of the Consolidation Act and Section 220 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act it should be held that power of review is vested in the Deputy Director of Consolidation who is the final revisional authority under the Consolidation Act. No doubt, Section 41 of the Consolidation Act makes provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act applicable to all proceedings, including appeals and applications under the former Act. Section 220, which is a part of Chapter X, vests power of review in the Board of Revenue subject to certain conditions/restrictions specified in the Section. The question is, in the absence/of any specific provision of review in the Consolidation Act, can it be said that the power of review vested in the Board of Revenue can be exercised by the consolidation authorities, particulary the Deputy Director of Consolidation? In our considered view, the question has to be answered in the negative. There is no provision in Section 41 or in any other Section of the Consolidation Act which empowers modification of any provision of the Land Revenue Act for the purposes of application to consolidation proceedings. Further Section 41, as we read it, merely provides that the procedures prescribed under Chapters IX and X of the Land Revenue Act will be applicable to all proceedings including appeals and applications under the Consolidation Act. Substantive provisions in the aforementioned Chapters of the Land Revenue Act, which have no pari material provisions in the Consolidation Act, cannot have any application to proceedings under the said Act. If a proceeding cannot be initiated under the 61 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 Consolidation Act, the question of application of the provisions of Chapters IX and X of the Land Revenue Act to such a proceeding does not arise. In the absence of any specific provision vesting power of review in the authorities under the Consolidation Act, such a proceeding cannot be initiated at all. There-fore, Section 220 of the Land Revenue Act is of no assistance for the purposes of the proceedings under the Consolidation Act. Alternatively, assuming that Section 220 applies to consolidation proceedings and an analogy is drawn beteen the proceedings under the two Acts, it is the Director of Consolidation, being the highest authority under the Consolidation Act, who can inferentially be said to have a power of review as provided in Section 220 of the Land Revenue Act and not the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who is one of the revisional authorities under the Consolidation Act. This question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Qadam Singh and another v. Ganga Saran and Ram Saran (1960 (58) ALJ 836) in which this Court, construing Section 41 of the Consolidation Act, made the following observation: - “Chapter X of the Land Revenue Act includes Section 220 which confers upon the Board of Revenue the power to review its own orders in certain circumstances, and it is contended that in applying this Section to proceedings under the U.P.Consolidation of Holdings Act a power of review must be deemed to be conferred upon the Deputy Director of Consolidation who corresponds to the Board of Revenue in so far as he is the final court of Revision. In our opinion this argument in not well founded, for section 41 makes no provision for the modification, alter-ation or adaptation of any of the Sections in Chapters IX and X of the Land Revenue Act in their application to proceedings under the U.P.Consolidation of Holdings Act. Section 220 specifically confers the power to review its own decision on the Board of Revenue and on no other authority, and it is not possible for this Court to hold that under that Section read with Section 41 of the U.P.Consolidation of Holdings Act a power to review its own decision is conferred upon all Deputy Directors of Consolidation.”

109. Having noticed the dictum in Smt. Anar Kali (supra) and now taking note of Sections 38, 39, 41 of the Act, it appears that the Act does not import the provisions of C.P.C. and, therefore, the principles of ‘legislation by reference’ and ‘legislation by incorporation’ cannot be applied to the U.P.C.H. Act of 1953 to broaden the scope of the Act so as to read in the inherent powers or the power of substantive review, in proceedings governed by the U.P.C.H. Act of 1953. Moreover, this Court 62 WRIB No. 757 of 2024 does not doubt the correctness of the reasoning of another Bench of co- equal strength in Smt. Anar Kali (supra) rather this Court is in agreement with it.

110. It will be pertinent to put forward that Courts do not legislate but only interpret and this does not permit the Court to read something which is not present in the Act, unless it is a case of casus omissus, which it is not. The Apex Court in State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, (2005) 10 SCC 437 in Para 16 to 22 held as under: - “16. It is true that this Court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys a freedom which is not available in interpreting a statute and, therefore, it will be useful at this stage to reproduce what Lord Diplock said in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs [(1980) 1 All ER 529 : (1980) 1 WLR 142] (All ER at p. 542c-d): “It endangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest.”

17. Where, therefore, the “language” is clear, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. What is to be borne in mind is as to what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words, has to be avoided, unless it is covered by the rule of exception, including that of necessity, which is not the case here. [See Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests [1990 Supp SCC 785 : AIR 1990 SC 1747] (AIR at p. 1752), Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn. [AIR 1966 SC 1678 : (1966) 3 SCR 466] (AIR at p. 1682) and A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak [(1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] (SCC at pp. 518, 519).] Indeed, the court cannot reframe the legislation as it has no power to legislate. [See State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese [(1986) 4 SCC 746 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 3] (SCC at p. 749) and Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 248 : (1992) 19 ATC 219 : AIR 1992 SC 96] (AIR at p. 101).]

18. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. “Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid”, Judge Learned Hand said, “but words must be construed 63 WRIB No. 757 of 2024