Chaitanya Singh v. Party(s)

"(14) The first and foremost question in this appeal is whether the High court was right in holding that since it has been found ultimately that the Civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the interim orders made therein are non est and hence Defendants 1 and 2 cannot be punished for their violation even if they had flouted and disobeyed the said interim orders when they were in force. We are of the considered opinion that the High court was not right in saying so. The landlord- plaintiff came forward with the suit alleging that by virtue of the fire resulting in the destruction of the suit house, the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties has come to an end and, therefore, he requested the court to injunct the defendants from carrying on any construction on the suit premises without their permission and without obtaining sanction from the Municipal Corporation. The defendants questioned the jurisdiction of the Civil court to entertain the suit. According to them, the building was not totally destroyed and that, in any event, the relationship of landlord and tenant has not come to an end on that account. The defendants' plea was rejected by the Civil court. It held that it did have the jurisdiction to try the said suit. On appeal, however, the High court, disagreeing with the decision of another High court, held that relationship of landlord and tenant has not come to an end for the reason suggested by the plaintiff and that the Civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. All this took about six years, i.e., from 1991 to 1996. It is not suggested nor can it be suggested that the suit was filed by the plaintiff in the City Civil court only with a view to avoid the Rent Control court nor can it be suggested that they approached the Civil court knowing full well that the Civil court had no jurisdiction to try that suit. It is evident that they approached the Civil court bona fide, thinking that it had jurisdiction to try their suit. They were confirmed in their view by the Civil court. It is true that ultimately the High court found against them but even there, it must be noticed, they did so disagreeing with a decision of the Kerala High court. It, therefore, cannot be said that the plaintiffs did not approach the Civil court a bona fide. (15) The next thing to be noticed is that certain interim orders were asked for and were granted by the Civil court during this period. Would it be right to say that violation of and disobedience to the said orders of injunction is not punishable because it has been found later that the Civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Mr Sorabjee suggests that saying so would be subversive of the Rule of Law and would seriously erode the majesty and dignity of the courts. It would mean, suggests the learned counsel, that it would be open to the defendants- 3 CAPL No. 3574 of 2024 respondents to decide for themselves whether the order was with or without jurisdiction and act upon that belief. This can never be, says the learned counsel. He further suggests that if any party thinks that an order made by the Civil court is without jurisdiction or is contrary to law, the appropriate course open to him is to approach that court with that plea and ask for vacating the order. But it is not open to him to flout the said order assuming that the order is without jurisdiction. It is this principle which has been recognised and incorporated in Section 9-A of Civil Procedure Code (inserted by Maharashtra Amendment Act No. 65 of 1977), says Mr Sorabjee. Section 9-A reads as follows: "9-A. Where at the hearing of an application relating to interim relief in suit, objection to jurisdiction is taken, such issue to be decided by the court as a preliminary issue.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any other law for the time being in force, if, at the hearing of any application for granting or setting aside an order granting any interim relief, whether by way of stay injunction, appointment of a receiver or otherwise, made in any suit, an objection to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain such suit is taken by any of the parties to the suit, the court shall proceed to determine at the hearing of such application the issue as to the jurisdiction as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the order granting the interim relief. Any such application shall be heard and disposed of by the court as expeditiously as possible and shall not in any case be adjourned to the hearing of suit. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Ss. (1), at the hearing of any such application, the court may grant such interim relief as it may consider necessary, pending determination by it of the preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction." (16) Accordiing to this section, if an objection is raised to the jurisdiction of the court at the hearing of an application for grant of, or for vacating, interim relief, the court should determine that issue in the first instance as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the relief already granted. An application raising objection to the jurisdiction to the court is directed to be heard with all expedition. Sub-rule (2), however, says that the command in sub-rule (1) does not preclude the court from granting such interim relief as it may consider necessary pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction. In our opinion, the provision merely states the obvious. It makes explicit what is implicit in law. Just because an objection to the jurisdiction is raised, the court does not become helpless forthwith nor does it become incompetent to grant the interim relief. It can. At the same time, it should also decide the objection to jurisdiction at the earliest possible moment. This is the general principle and this is what Section 9-A reiterates. Take this very case. The plaintiff asked for temporary injunction. An ad interim injunction was granted. Then the defendants came forward objecting to the grant of injunction and also raising an objection to the jurisdiction of the court. The court overruled the objection as to jurisdiction and made the interim injunction absolute. The defendants filed an 4 CAPL No. 3574 of 2024 appeal against the decision on the question of jurisdiction. While that appeal was pending, several other interim orders were passed both by the Civil court as well as by the High court. Ultimately, no doubt, the High court has found that the Civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit but all this took about six years. Can it be said that orders passed by the Civil court and the High court during this period of six years were all non est and that it is open to the defendants to flout them merrily, without fear of any consequence. Admittedly, this could not be done until the High court's decision on the question of jurisdiction. The question is whether the said decision of the High court means that no person can be punished for flouting or disobeying the interim/interlocutory orders while they were in force, i.e., for violations and disobedience committed prior to the decision of the High court on the question of jurisdiction. Holding that by virtue of the said decision of the High court (on the question of jurisdiction), no one can be punished thereafter for disobedience or violation of the interim orders committed prior to the said decision of the High court, would indeed be subversive of the Rule of Law and would seriously erode the dignity and the authority of the courts. We must repeat that this is not even a case where a suit was filed in the wrong court knowingly or only with a view to snatch an interim order. As pointed out hereinabove, the suit was filed in the Civil court bona fide. We are of the opinion that in such a case the defendants cannot escape the consequences of their disobedience and violation of the interim injunction committed by them prior to the High court's decision on the question of jurisdiction. (28) The correct principle, therefore, is the one recognised and reiterated in Section 9-A- to wit, where an objection to jurisdiction of a civil court is raised to entertain a suit and to pass any interim orders therein, the court should decide the question of jurisdiction in the first instance but that does not mean that pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction, the court has no jurisdiction to pass interim orders as may be called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the court from passing any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. The interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that this court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the court to modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain situations, it would be its duty to modify such orders or make appropriate directions. For example, take a case, where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise; in such a case, the court should, while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in force, these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even 5 CAPL No. 3574 of 2024 after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the court on the question of jurisdiction."

7. Learned counsel for the opposite party has further submitted that compliance with the interim order was reciprocal. As per the agreement, the applicant was required to bear the expenses for the upbringing of the child of the opposite party; however, payments were made irregularly, with gaps extending up to seven months. Hence, it cannot be said that only the opposite party is liable to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. It has also been submitted that the conduct of the applicant compelled the opposite party, on certain Sundays, to deny him to meet the child. Further, it is submitted that the applicant misbehaved with the parents of the opposite party, due to which she had to prevent him from visiting her house. It is also contended that the applicant, the grandparents of the child, as well as the applicant's brother and sister, whenever requested, were permitted to meet the child.

8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the agreement forming part of the order provides that during long vacations, for 50% of the holidays, the child shall stay with the applicant, and the said condition has never been complied with by the opposite party.

9. Learned counsel for the opposite party has further submitted that a modification/clarification application had been filed, which was disposed of after the final judgment dated 08.12.2025.

10. Learned counsel for the applicant is unable to dispute the long gaps in payment as per the clause of the agreement.

11. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, it is found that both parties have disobeyed the orders passed in the habeas corpus writ petition. In the aforesaid circumstances, a case under Rule 5 of Chapter XXXV-E of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (Rules framed under Section 23 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971) is made out, accordingly the following charge is being framed against both the applicant and the respondent :- "Why contemnors - applicant and the opposite party both be not punished for willful and deliberate disobedience of the interim order dated 15.05.2023, passed in Habeas Corpus (W.P) No. 16 of 2023".

12. Both the parties i.e the applicant and the opposite party are granted four weeks' time to file their reply to the aforesaid charge levelled against them. 6 CAPL No. 3574 of 2024

13. List this case in the week commencing 16.03.2026.

14. On that date, the applicant and the opposite party both shall appear in person. February 5, 2026 DiVYa (Manish Kumar,J.)