Anubhav v. Rishi Kumar) under Section
Case Details
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ********* Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:128539 (Sl.No.16) Court No. - 79 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 19412 of 2024 Applicant :- Anubhav Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Rajeev Kumar Saini Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. Hon'ble Anish Kumar Gupta,J.
Legal Reasoning
1. Heard Sri Rajeev Kumar Saini, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Uday Bhan, learned AGA for the State. 2. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicant seeking quashing of the order dated 13.10.2023 passed by Judicial Officer, Gram Court Modinagar, District-Ghaziabad in Complaint Case No.4476 of 2022 (Anubhav vs. Rishi Kumar) under Section 138 N.I. Act, Police Station- Modinagar, District-Ghaziabad. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that his application under Section 143-A of N.I. Act for payment of interim compensation to the extent of 20% has been rejected by the trial court vide order dated 13.10.2023 without assigning any reason. Learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that since he has established prima facie a case, which is reflected from the summoning order, therefore, the interim compensation in view of Section 143-A ought to have been granted in favour of the applicant. 4. Per contra, learned AGA submits that the provisions of Section 143-A of N.I. Act are discretionary in nature. It is not mandatory that in each and every case, the trial court must grant compensation to the extent of 20% under Section 143- A of the Act. Learned AGA has placed reliance on the judgment of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava vs. The State of Jharkhand and another : (2024) 3 SCR 438 and submits that in the instant case, the accused has denied the issuance of cheque and it has been alleged by the accused that cheque was stolen by the applicant herein, therefore, there was no liability on the part of opposite party No.2 towards the applicant. Therefore, considering the aforesaid fact, the application under Section 143 of the Act, 1881, has been rejected by the trial court. 5. Having heard the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, this Court has carefully gone through the record of the case. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to note the provisions of Section 143-A of the N.I. Act, 1881, which reads as under: " Section 143 A. Power to direct interim compensation: 1. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant— (a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and (b) in any other case, upon framing of charge. 2. The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty percent of the amount of the cheque. 3. The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque. 4. If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant. 5. The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 6. The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim compensation under this section." 6. From the plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is crystal clear that the aforesaid provision is a discretionary provision and the trial court in an appropriate case may pass the order granting interim compensation to the complainant, however, the same cannot be granted mechanically. The trial court must apply its mind to the facts of each case. Existence of prima facie case is essential for exercising the powers under Section 143-A of the Act, 1881 and even only existence of prima facie case, would not be sufficient to order interim compensation under Section 143-A of the Act, the trial court is obligated to look into the defence version as well and after considering the version of the complainant as well as the accused and thereafter on application of mind, if the trial court deems it appropriate only then such order under Section 143-A of the Act, 1881 granting interim compensation can be passed. 7. In the judgment of Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava (supra), the Apex Court has held as under: "14. In the case of Section 143A, the power can be exercised even before the accused is held guilty. Sub-section (1) of Section 143A provides for passing a drastic order for payment of interim compensation against the accused in a complaint under Section 138, even before any adjudication is made on the guilt of the accused. The power can be exercised at the threshold even before the evidence is recorded. If the word ‘may’ is interpreted as ‘shall’, it will have drastic consequences as in every complaint under Section 138, the accused will have to pay interim compensation up to 20 per cent of the cheque amount. Such an interpretation will be unjust and contrary to the well-settled concept of fairness and justice. If such an interpretation is made, the provision may expose itself to the vice of manifest arbitrariness. The provision can be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In a sense, sub- section (1) of Section 143A provides for penalising an accused even before his guilt is established. Considering the drastic consequences of exercising the power under Section 143A and that also before the finding of the guilt is recorded in the trial, the word “may” used in the provision cannot be construed as “shall”. The provision will have to be held as a directory and not mandatory. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that the word “may” used in Section 143A, cannot be construed or interpreted as “shall”. Therefore, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary." 8. From the aforesaid, it is clear that it is not mandatory for the trial court to grant the interim compensation under Section 143-A in each and every case. Since in the instant case, the accused has denied the issuance of cheque and has stated that the cheque in question was stolen by the applicant and the instant case is nothing but a malicious prosecution, therefore, the trial court taking the defense version into account in its discretion has declined to issue any direction for payment of interim compensation, under Section 143A, which cannot be said to be without application of mind. 9. In view of the aforesaid, this Court does not find any good reason to interfere with the order dated 13.10.2023, passed by the trial court in the instant case. 10. Accordingly, this application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. Order Date :- 8.8.2024 LN Tripathi (Anish Kumar Gupta,J.)