High Court

Judgment

1. This criminal appeal has been filed under Section 18 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, challenging the judgment and order dated 06.04.2024 passed in Special Session Trial/G.S.T. No. 48 of 1999. By the impugned judgment, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused-respondents— namely Udai Singh, Haribhan, and Ram Mohan—of the charges framed in Case No. 71 of 1996 under Section 2/3 of the said Act, registered at Police Station Sikandara, District Agra.

2. During the pendency of the trial, three co-accused, namely Mahendra, Devi Ram, and Raghunath, passed away, and the proceedings against them stood abated. Consequently, the present appeal is confined to respondents Udai Singh, Haribhan, and Ram Mohan only.

3. The case originated from a written complaint filed on the basis of a statement by S.H.O. Rajendra Singh. It was alleged that the accused-respondents, along with the deceased co-accused, had formed

a gang under the leadership of Udai Singh, the first respondent. This gang was allegedly involved in a series of violent and unlawful activities, spreading fear and terror within the community. Their criminal operations were said to include heinous crimes such as murder, public intimidation, and the generation of illicit income 1 of 6 through criminal acts. Due to the atmosphere of fear created by their activities, witnesses were reportedly reluctant to testify against them.

4. Several cases were registered against the gang members, including charges of attempted murder and violations of the Arms Act. The gang chart presented by the prosecution highlighted four prior cases against the respondents: 1.Case Crime No. 91 of 1988 under Sections 147, 148, 323, 308, 307 IPC; 2.Case Crime No. 69A of 1994 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307 IPC; 3. Case Crime No. 53 of 1996 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 324, 302 IPC; 4.Case Crime No. 53 of 1996 (duplicate listing) under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 324, 302 IPC.

5. After completion of investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused-respondents under Section 2/3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act. The learned Trial Court framed charges under the aforesaid provision. The accused-respondents pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

6. To establish its case, the prosecution examined four witnesses. PW-1 proved the gang chart and the original chick FIR, while PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4, all police officials, supported the prosecution’s version. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the accused-respondents were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied all allegations and claimed false implication. However, no evidence was led in defence.

7. After hearing both sides and evaluating the evidence on record, the learned Trial Court, by the impugned judgment dated 06.04.2024, acquitted the accused-respondents of the charges under Section 2/3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act. Being 2 of 6 aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 06.04.2024, the State has preferred the present appeal.

8. I have heard Shri Vibhav Anand, learned A.G.A. for the appellant–State. None appeared on behalf of the accused-respondents despite due notice.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned judgment is contrary to the evidence on record. It is submitted that there was sufficient and credible evidence to establish the guilt of the accused-respondents under Section 2/3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, but the Trial Court failed to appreciate the same in its correct perspective. According to the State, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, coupled with documentary evidence, clearly make out the offence. The Trial Court, however, erred in law and on facts in acquitting the respondents.

10. On the other hand, the Trial Court, while recording acquittal, observed that the prosecution failed to produce any convincing evidence to prove that the accused-respondents were members of a gang as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act or that they indulged in offences mentioned in the charge sheet. The Court noted the absence of evidence regarding acts of intimidation, extortion, or threats to the public, which are essential ingredients for invoking Section 2/3 of the Act. It further observed that there was nothing on record to show that the respondents were engaged in unlawful activities for economic or material gains. Additionally, the Court highlighted that the base case was registered in 1996, whereas the FIR under the Gangsters Act was lodged after a lapse of 24 years, which undermines the prosecution’s case. Consequently, it held that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-respondents, being members of a “gang,” had committed any offence punishable under 3 of 6 Chapters XVI, XVII, or XXII of the IPC or any other offence that disturbed public order and yielded economic or other benefits to the gang.

11. This appeal challenges an order of acquittal. It is a settled principle of law that an appellate court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, ordinarily does not interfere with the judgment unless the findings of the Trial Court suffer from manifest illegality, or the conclusions drawn are such that no reasonable person would arrive at them, rendering the judgment perverse. The mere possibility of a different view is not a ground to interfere with an acquittal. However, if the lower court’s approach is vitiated by legal error or if material evidence has been ignored, the appellate court has the power—and indeed the duty—to re-appreciate the evidence on record to determine whether the acquittal is sustainable and whether any of the accused are connected with the offence charged.

12. It is the consistent view of the Supreme Court that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors1 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs v. State of MP2. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal, are well settled. In case the Appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. In this regard the decision of Apex Court in Vinod Kumar 1 2 reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5553 reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5589 4 of 6 v. State of Haryana3, and Gulbar Husain v. State of Assam4 may be referred.

13. On a careful perusal of the impugned judgment and the trial court record, it emerges that the prosecution examined four witnesses in support of its case. PW-1, the then Station House Officer, deposed that the criminal cases forming the basis of the gang chart were all registered at his police station. He admitted that in all four cases, the accused-respondents had already been acquitted by the competent courts and that those cases were instituted primarily due to family disputes.

13.1 PW-2 was the complainant in one of the earlier cases, while PW-3 appeared as a formal prosecution witness. PW-4 was a police official who accompanied the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation. Apart from these official witnesses, no independent or neutral witness was examined to establish the allegations against the accused-respondents.

13.2 The prosecution failed to bring on record any credible evidence to show that the accused-respondents were members of a gang as defined under Section 2(b) of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, or that they had engaged in activities generating material or pecuniary benefits. There is also a complete absence of evidence regarding acts of intimidation, extortion, or threats to the public—ingredients essential for constituting the offence under Section 2/3 of the Act.

14. The learned trial court, while appreciating the evidence, specifically considered the four criminal cases reflected in the gang chart, which formed the basis for registration of the present FIR. It

a gang under the leadership of Udai Singh, the first respondent. This gang was allegedly involved in a series of violent and unlawful activities, spreading fear and terror within the community. Their criminal operations were said to include heinous crimes such as murder, public intimidation, and the generation of illicit income 1 of 6 through criminal acts. Due to the atmosphere of fear created by their activities, witnesses were reportedly reluctant to testify against them.

4. Several cases were registered against the gang members, including charges of attempted murder and violations of the Arms Act. The gang chart presented by the prosecution highlighted four prior cases against the respondents: 1.Case Crime No. 91 of 1988 under Sections 147, 148, 323, 308, 307 IPC; 2.Case Crime No. 69A of 1994 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307 IPC; 3. Case Crime No. 53 of 1996 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 324, 302 IPC; 4.Case Crime No. 53 of 1996 (duplicate listing) under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 324, 302 IPC.

5. After completion of investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused-respondents under Section 2/3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act. The learned Trial Court framed charges under the aforesaid provision. The accused-respondents pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

6. To establish its case, the prosecution examined four witnesses. PW-1 proved the gang chart and the original chick FIR, while PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4, all police officials, supported the prosecution’s version. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the accused-respondents were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied all allegations and claimed false implication. However, no evidence was led in defence.

7. After hearing both sides and evaluating the evidence on record, the learned Trial Court, by the impugned judgment dated 06.04.2024, acquitted the accused-respondents of the charges under Section 2/3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act. Being 2 of 6 aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 06.04.2024, the State has preferred the present appeal.

8. I have heard Shri Vibhav Anand, learned A.G.A. for the appellant–State. None appeared on behalf of the accused-respondents despite due notice.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned judgment is contrary to the evidence on record. It is submitted that there was sufficient and credible evidence to establish the guilt of the accused-respondents under Section 2/3 of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, but the Trial Court failed to appreciate the same in its correct perspective. According to the State, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, coupled with documentary evidence, clearly make out the offence. The Trial Court, however, erred in law and on facts in acquitting the respondents.

10. On the other hand, the Trial Court, while recording acquittal, observed that the prosecution failed to produce any convincing evidence to prove that the accused-respondents were members of a gang as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act or that they indulged in offences mentioned in the charge sheet. The Court noted the absence of evidence regarding acts of intimidation, extortion, or threats to the public, which are essential ingredients for invoking Section 2/3 of the Act. It further observed that there was nothing on record to show that the respondents were engaged in unlawful activities for economic or material gains. Additionally, the Court highlighted that the base case was registered in 1996, whereas the FIR under the Gangsters Act was lodged after a lapse of 24 years, which undermines the prosecution’s case. Consequently, it held that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-respondents, being members of a “gang,” had committed any offence punishable under 3 of 6 Chapters XVI, XVII, or XXII of the IPC or any other offence that disturbed public order and yielded economic or other benefits to the gang.

11. This appeal challenges an order of acquittal. It is a settled principle of law that an appellate court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, ordinarily does not interfere with the judgment unless the findings of the Trial Court suffer from manifest illegality, or the conclusions drawn are such that no reasonable person would arrive at them, rendering the judgment perverse. The mere possibility of a different view is not a ground to interfere with an acquittal. However, if the lower court’s approach is vitiated by legal error or if material evidence has been ignored, the appellate court has the power—and indeed the duty—to re-appreciate the evidence on record to determine whether the acquittal is sustainable and whether any of the accused are connected with the offence charged.

12. It is the consistent view of the Supreme Court that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors1 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs v. State of MP2. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal, are well settled. In case the Appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. In this regard the decision of Apex Court in Vinod Kumar 1 2 reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5553 reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5589 4 of 6 v. State of Haryana3, and Gulbar Husain v. State of Assam4 may be referred.

13. On a careful perusal of the impugned judgment and the trial court record, it emerges that the prosecution examined four witnesses in support of its case. PW-1, the then Station House Officer, deposed that the criminal cases forming the basis of the gang chart were all registered at his police station. He admitted that in all four cases, the accused-respondents had already been acquitted by the competent courts and that those cases were instituted primarily due to family disputes.

13.1 PW-2 was the complainant in one of the earlier cases, while PW-3 appeared as a formal prosecution witness. PW-4 was a police official who accompanied the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation. Apart from these official witnesses, no independent or neutral witness was examined to establish the allegations against the accused-respondents.

13.2 The prosecution failed to bring on record any credible evidence to show that the accused-respondents were members of a gang as defined under Section 2(b) of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, or that they had engaged in activities generating material or pecuniary benefits. There is also a complete absence of evidence regarding acts of intimidation, extortion, or threats to the public—ingredients essential for constituting the offence under Section 2/3 of the Act.

14. The learned trial court, while appreciating the evidence, specifically considered the four criminal cases reflected in the gang chart, which formed the basis for registration of the present FIR. It