Central Bank of India v. Vikas Kashinath Gaikwad & Ors.

-CRA-580-2024+.DOC1. Kishore Karkera,Adult, Occ: Business, residing at Plot No. 5/2/10, Sector-17, New Panvel,Dist: Raigad – 410 206.2. Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar(since deceased through legal heirs)2a. Rasik Ramesh Kalyankar2b. Rachana Ramesh Kalyankar,Both Adults, Indian Inhabitants,Rasik, Plot No. 7, Road No.4,Sector 12, CIDCO Colony,New Panvel, Dist. Raigad…RespondentsMr. Rohan Sawant, with Vikas Mulik, i/b Sunil Kadam, for the Applicant in all Civil Revision Applications. Mr. A.S. Khandeparkar, Senior Advocate, with Amogh K. Karandikar, for Respondent Nos. 2a and 2b in all Civil Revision Applications. CORAM:N. J. JAMADAR, J. RESERVED ON :19th JANUARY 2026 PRONOUNCED ON :4th FEBRUARY 2026JUDGMENT:1.All these Revision Applications are directed against identicalorders dated 15th June 2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge, SeniorDivision, Panvel, whereby the Applications preferred by the Applicant-Defendant No.2, purportedly seeking the framing and trial of issue ofjurisdiction as a preliminary issue and dismissal of the suit for want ofjurisdiction, came to be rejected. ARS 10/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOC2.Since identical questions of facts and law arise, these RevisionApplications were heard together and are being decided by thiscommon judgment. 3.The facts in Revision Application No. 580 of 2024, assailing theorder in SCS No. 57 of 2007, are noted as a representative case. Thebackground facts can be summarised as under:3.1Late Rohini Ramesh Kalyankar, the predecessor-in-tile of PlaintiffNos. 1A and 1B, initially instituted a suit against Respondent No.1-Defendant No.1 only, seeking declarative reliefs, in the context of atransaction of sale of a developed plot. The Plaintiff claimed that shehad developed a project, “Dwarka Bungalow Scheme” at Survey No.117, Hissa Nos. 1 and 2, Village Taloja Majkur, Taluka: Panvel, District:Raigad.3.2Defendant No.1 had evinced interest in purchasing a BungalowPlot. Post negotiations, Defendant No.1 agreed to purchase Plot No. 86admeasuring 160 sq mtr (“the suit plot”). An Agreement for Sale cameto be executed on 7th January 2005 by and between the Plaintiff andDefendant No.1, under the terms whereof the consideration was settledat Rs.17,60,000/-. In addition, Defendant No.1 had agreed to pay 20%of the total consideration to the Plaintiff at the time of delivery ofpossession of the suit plot, towards charges for development for theARS 11/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCamenities. In the event of default in payment of the amounts as agreed,Defendant No.1 has agreed to pay interest @ 24% per annum.3.3The Plaintiff claims, at the time of the execution of the Agreementfor Sale, Defendant No.1 had drawn a cheque of Rs.3,52,000/- towardsearnest money/booking amount. Though Defendant No.1 paid theamount of Rs.14,08,000/- towards the balance consideration yet thesaid cheque drawn towards the first installment was dishonoured uponpresentment. Defendant No.1 also committed default in payment of20% of the amount, i.e., Rs.3,52,000/- towards the developmentcharges. The Plaintiff repeatedly called upon Defendant No.1 to pay theoutstanding amount.3.4In view of the persistent default, a legal notice was addressed on16th October 2006 calling upon Defendant No.1 to pay due amount ofRs.10,20,800/-. As Defendant No.1 did not comply with the said notice,vide notice dated 28th November 2006, the Plaintiff terminated theAgreement for Sale dated 7th January 2005, and, thereby, forfeited theearnest money and offered to refund the balance amount afterdeducting the expenses incurred towards the stamp duty andregistration charges, after the sale of the said plot to another purchaser.3.5Thus, initially, the Plaintiff prayed for declarations that theAgreement for Sale dated 7th January 2005 between the Plaintiff andARS 12/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCDefendant stood rescinded and the Defendant No.1 was entitled toreceive a refund of Rs.9,32,340/-, only from the Plaintiff.3.5In the meanwhile, Defendant No.1 had mortgaged the suit plotwith Applicant-Defendant No.2, under a Mortgaged Deed dated 11thJanuary 2005. The Plaintiff claimed the said mortgage was in expressbreach of the terms of the Agreement for Sale which prohibitedDefendant No.1 from creating any mortgage in respect of the suit plotuntil the payment of entire consideration. Thus, the Plaintiff amendedthe Plaint to implead the Applicant as Defendant No.2 and seek afurther declaration that mortgage created by Defendant No.1 in favourof Defendant No.2 vide Mortgage Deed dated 11th January 2005 wasnot binding on the Plaintiff.3.6Defendant No.1 did not contest the suit. Defendant No.2 resistedthe suit by filing Written Statement.3.7Defendant No.2 took out an Application seeking framing anddetermination of issue of jurisdiction as preliminary issue in view of thebar contained in Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts and BankruptcyAct, 1993 (“the RDB Act”), purportedly under Section 9A of the Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908 (“the Code”) as it applied to the State ofMaharashtra. It was also contended that in view of the orders passed byDebts Recovery Tribunal (“DRT”) in Original Application No. 39 ofARS 13/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOC2008, the suit was bared by principle of res judicata. Defendant No.2also sought dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction.3.8The Application was resisted by the Plaintiff.3.9By the impugned order, the learned Civil Judge rejected theApplication negativing the contention of Defendant No.2 that the Plaintwas liable to be rejected in view of the bar of res judicata and thejurisdictional interdict contained in Section 18 of RDB Act. The learnedCivil Judge was of the view that, since the Plaintiff had instituted theSuit for rescission of contract, only the Civil Court would havejurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the said issue.3.10Being aggrieved, Defendant No.2 has invoked the revisionaljurisdiction.4.I have heard Mr. Rohan Sawant, the learned Counsel for theApplicants and Mr. A.S. Khandeparkar, the learned Senior Advocate, forRespondent No.2-Plaintiff at some length. With the assistance of thelearned Counsel for the parties, I have also perused the material onrecord including the judgment and order dated 28th April 2010 passedby the DRT and judgment and order dated 25th November 2014 passedby the DRAT.5.Mr. Sawant, the learned Counsel for the Applicant, submittedthat, the learned Civil Judge committed a factual error in construing theimport of the order passed by the DRAT in Appeal No. 296 of 2010.ARS 14/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCIndeed, the DRT in its judgment and order dated 28th April 2010 hadheld that no liability can be fastened on the Plaintiff, her husband, andR.R. Kalyankar Construction Pvt Ltd; Defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 5 therein.However, in the Appeal the DRAT modified the order passed by DRTand allowed the O.A. against all the Defendants. Yet, in the impugnedorder, the learned Civil Judge has recorded that Defendant No.2 did notsucceed in DRAT also. This factual error has vitiated the approach of thelearned Civil Judge and renders the impugned order perverse,submitted Mr. Sawant. 6.Mr. Sawant would urge that, all the grounds which have beenraised by Plaintiff in the instant suit qua the Defendant No.2, had beenraised and negatived by the forums created under RDB Act. It has beenin terms held that the security interest created in the suit plot, by way ofmortgage, binds the Plaintiff-developer as well. The dispute sought tobe raised falls within the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the DRTunder Section 17 of the RDB Act. Thus, as the suit is clearly barred byprovisions of Section 18 of the RDB Act, the learned Civil Judgecommitted a grave error in law in rejecting the Application. 7. Mr. Sawant submitted that the jurisdiction of Civil Court inrespect of claims relating to mortgages stands explicitly barred by theprovisions of Section 18 of the RDB Act, as the aspect of securityinterest in the secured assets created by way of mortgage is within theARS 15/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCexclusive province of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 17under the RDB Act. Mr. Sawant made a concerted effort to persuade theCourt to hold that the legal position as regards the exclusion ofjurisdiction of civil Court over the matters falling within the exclusivejurisdiction of the Tribunal under RDB Act in the context of the barcontained in Section 18 of the RDB Act and Section 34 of theSecuritization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcementof Security Interest Act, 2002 (“the SARFAESI Act”) is no longer resintegra. Reliance was sought to be placed on the judgment of theSupreme Court in the cases of Mardia Chemicals Ltd Vs Union of India,1Jagdish Singh Vs Heeralal2 and Sree Anandhakumar Mills Ltd Vs IndianOverseas Bank.38.Mr. Sawant would urge that the three Judge Bench judgment ofthe Supreme Court in the case of Bank of Rajasthan Ltd Vs VCK Sharesand Stock Broking Services Ltd4 which, on a reference, has enunciatedthat the interdict contained in Section 18 of the RDB Act, does not barthe jurisdiction of the civil court to try a suit by a borrower against thebank or a financial institution, does not govern the facts of the case athand as the Plaintiff had participated in the proceedings before the1 (2004) 4 SCC 311.2 (2014) 1 SCC 479.3 (2019) 4 SCC 788.4 (2023) 1 SCC 1.ARS 16/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCTribunals under RDB Act and the defence of the Plaintiff has beenfinally rejected. 9.Lastly, Mr. Sawant would urge that the proposition that a Plaintcannot be rejected in part does not apply to a situation where there iseither no cause of action against one of the Defendants or the suitagainst such Defendants is barred by any law. The binding efficacy ofthe decision in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust andEducational Charitable Society Vs Ponniamman Educational Trust5 isnot diluted by the subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court of co-equal Benches. 10.In any event, Mr. Sawant would urge, in view of the DivisionBench judgment of this Court in the case of Sheela Ram Vidhani Vs S.K.Trading Co6 which holds that the judgment in the case of Church ofChrist (Supra) commands precedential value and needs to be followedas the subsequent judgments in the case of Sejal Glass Ltd Vs NavilanMerchants Pvt Ltd7 and Madhav Prasad Aggarwal Vs Axis Bank8 havenot considered the previous binding decision in Church of Christ(Supra), this Court cannot take a different view of the matter. To thisend, Mr. Sawant placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment in thecase of R Parthasarathy, Asst Collector, Central Excise, Kalyan Dn and5 (2012) 8 SCC 706.6 (2021) 5 BCR 409.7 (2018) 11 SCC 780.8 (2019) 7 SCC 158.ARS 17/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCAnr Vs Dipsi Chemicals Private Ltd9 wherein it was enunciated that aninterpretation (and equally a misinterpretation) of a binding decision ofthe Supreme Court is itself binding subsequently on coordinate Courtsand can be corrected only by a higher Court. 11.Thus, looked at from any perspective, Mr. Sawant would urge, thePlaint in the instant case is required to be rejected qua the Applicant-Defendant No.2, in view of the incontrovertible facts and well settledposition in law. 12.In opposition to this, Mr. A.S. Khandeparkar, the learned SeniorAdvocate for the Respondent Nos. 2a and 2b-Plaintiff, stoutly supportedthe impugned order. 13.Mr. Khandeparkar laid emphasis on the fact that the Agreementfor Sale contained a clear prohibition against the mortgage of the suitplot (Clause 12). In the face of such clear prohibition, creation ofsecurity interest in the suit plot by way of mortgage was completelyunlawful. Such security interest, under no circumstances, could havebeen enforced against the developer. Mr. Khandeparkar would urge thefact that DRAT in Appeal No. 296 of 2010 has decreed the Applicationagainst the Plaintiff as well, does not preclude the Plaintiff frominstituting a suit seeking a declaration that the Agreement for Sale itselfstands terminated and, consequently, the Deed of Mortgage is notbinding on the Plaintiff. 9 1987 MhLJ 900.ARS 18/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOC14.Mr. Khandeparkar further submitted that the entire premise of thejurisdictional objection is flawed. The Defendant No.2-Bank has notresorted to any action under the SARFAESI Act. Only an OriginalApplication was filed before the DRT under the RDB Act. Since thePlaintiff was not a party to the transaction between Defendant Nos. 1and 2; neither a borrower nor a guarantor, the Plaintiff cannot beprecluded from asserting his civil rights before the civil court. 15.Mr. Khandeparkar joined the issue on the bar of jurisdiction byplacing a strong reliance on the three Judge Bench judgment of theSupreme Court in case of Bank of Rajasthan Ltd (Supra). Mr.Khandeparkar forcefully submitted that the decision of the SupremeCourt in the case of Central Bank of India and Anr Vs Prabha Jain andOrs10 which has analysed all the previous precedents, including thejudgment in the case of Jagdish Singh (Supra) and enunciated that thecivil courts jurisdiction is not ousted in respect of matters which do notfall within the ambit of jurisdiction, as conferred under Section 17 ofRDB Act, is a complete answer to the submissions sought to becanvassed on behalf of the Applicant.16.Mr. Khandeparkar would urge, even if one of the reliefs survives,the Plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. Thisposition in law is consistently followed in a line of judgments.10 (2025) 4 SCC 38.ARS 19/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCTherefore, the endeavour of Defendant No.2 to seek the rejection of thePlaint qua Defendant No.2 cannot be countenanced. 17.Mr. Sawant, the learned Counsel for the Applicant, made anendeavour to distinguish the case of Prabha Jain (Supra), it was urgedthat the said decision eventually proceeds on the premise that a Plaintcannot be rejected in part, even against one of the Defendants which inview of the judgment in the case of Church of Christ (Supra), is notcorrect position in law. 18.The aforesaid rival submissions now fall for consideration. 19.First and foremost, it is necessary to note that the prayers in theApplications filed on behalf of Defendant No.2 were to frame and trythe issue of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue, and dismiss the suit. Inaddition to the ground of bar contained in Section 18 of the RDB Act, itwas contended that the suit was liable to be dismissed on the principleof res judicata in view of the judgment in Appeal No. 296 of 2010delivered by the DRAT.. 20.The learned Civil Judge, however, construed the Application to beone for rejection of the Plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code,in view of bar of jurisdiction propounded by Defendant No.2 and, in theview of this Court, rightly so. The prayer for dismissal of suit was in asense misconceived. Before this Court as well, parties have proceededon the premise that the Application filed by Defendant No.2 andARS 20/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCconsideration thereof by the trial Court was for rejection of the Plaintunder Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code. 21.Before adverting to the contentious issues, it is necessary to keepin view the object of the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 ofthe Code. The Court is conferred jurisdiction to reject the Plaint so as tonip in the bud a fruitless and vexatious litigation. It is well-settled thatwhile considering the Application for rejection of the Plaint, the Courtshould confine the inquiry to the averments in the Plaint and thedocuments annexed with it. The defence of the Defendant is not at allgermane, for a plea for rejection of the Plaint is by way of demurrer.Secondly, the Court is required to read the averments in the Plaint as awhole in a meaningful and not formalistic manner. When upon such ameaningful reading of the Plaint as a whole, the Court finds that thesuit is manifestly vexatious and fruitless, in the sense that, either it doesnot disclose a clear right to sue or that it is barred by the provisions oflaw, the Court need not hesitate in exercising the power under Order VIIRule 11 of the Code as the rejection of such Plaint at the very thresholdsub-serves the interest of public justice. 22.In the instant case, one of the grounds on which the bar to thetenability of the suit was sought to be urged was that, it was barred bythe principle of res judicata in view of the decision of DRAT in AppealNo. 296 of 2010. The contention need not detain the Court. It is well-ARS 21/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCrecognized that a Plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 ofthe Code on the ground that the suit would be barred by the principle ofres judicata as the said issue warrants investigation into facts andascertainment as to whether the matter before the Court was directly orsubstantially in issue in the former suit. In the case of ShrihariHanumandas Totala Vs Hemant Vithal Kamat and Ors,11 the SupremeCourt has enunciated in clear and explicit terms that a plea for rejectionof the Plaint on the ground of res judicata would be beyond the scope ofOrder VII Rule 11(d), where only the averments in the Plaint will haveto be perused. 23.Since the thrust of the submission on behalf of the DefendantNo.2 is that the suit is barred by the provisions of Section 18 of the RDBAct, certain fundamental principles with regard to the jurisdiction of thecivil court vis-a-vis a Tribunal, which is created under a statute, alsodeserve to be kept in mind. Jurisdiction of the civil court is of wideamplitude. In a sense, it is plenary and omnipotent. The civil court hasjurisdiction to entertain all suits of civil nature, unless its jurisdiction isexpressly or impliedly barred. An exclusion of the jurisdiction of thecivil court is not readily to be inferred. 24.In contrast, in the context of case at hand, the DRT is a creatureof RDB Act. It is empowered to exercise the powers under RDB Act andSARFAESI Act. A Tribunal is thus bound by the powers conferred on it11 (2021) 9 SCC 99.ARS 22/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCunder the provisions of the Act by which it is created. Being a creatureof the statute, the Tribunal has limited jurisdiction. It has to dischargethe statutory functions within the four-corners of the statute creating it.The Tribunal, thus, cannot transgress its jurisdictional limits and delveinto the matters which do not strictly fall within its adjudicatoryprovince. 25.The relevant part of Section 17 of the RDB Act which provides forjurisdiction, power and authority of the Tribunal reads as under:“17. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals.—(1) ATribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, thejurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decideapplications from the banks and financial institutions forrecovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions.[(1-A) Without prejudice to sub-section (1),— (a) the Tribunal shall exercise, on and from thedate to be appointed by the Central Government,the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertainand decide applications under Part III ofInsolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016;(b) the Tribunal shall have circuit sittings in alldistrict headquarters.] (2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from theappointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority toentertain appeals against any order made, or deemed to havebeen made, by a Tribunal under this Act. [(2-A) Without prejudice to sub-section (2), theAppellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the date to beappointed by the Central Government, the jurisdiction, powersand authority to entertain appeals against the order made byARS 23/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCthe Adjudicating Authority under Part III of the Insolvency andBankruptcy Code, 2016.26.Section 18 of the Act which bars the jurisdiction of Court orauthority reads as under:“18. Bar of jurisdiction.—On and from the appointed day, nocourt or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, anyjurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court, anda High Court exercising jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified in section17:Provided that any proceedings in relation to the recovery of debtsdue to any multi-State co-operative bank pending before the dateof commencement of the Enforcement of Security Interest andRecovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2012 under theMulti-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 (39 of 2002) shallbe continued and nothing contained in this section shall, aftersuch commencement, apply to such proceedings.27.A conjoint reading of the provisions contained in Sections 17 and18 of the RDB Act, would indicate that the Tribunal under DRT hasbeen conferred with jurisdiction to entertain and decide applicationsfrom the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts. TheTribunal has no jurisdiction to try suits or proceedings at the instance ofthe borrowers or others against the banks and financial institutions.Indeed, under Section 19, defendant may claim set-off, or, in addition,to his right of pleading of set-off, put up a counter-claim. ARS 24/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOC28.It is in this context, the decision in the case of Bank of RajasthanLtd (supra), assumes significance. In the said case, a three JudgeBench of the Supreme Court exposited in clear and explicit terms that,there is no provision in the RDB Act, by which the remedy of a civil suitby the Defendant in a claim by the Bank is ousted, but, it is a matter ofchoice of that defendant. Such a defendant may file a counter-claim ormay be desirous of availing of the more strenuous procedure establishedunder the Code, and that is the choice he takes with the consequencesthereof. The three Judge Bench answered the reference on the questionof ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the negative, in thefollowing terms : “56(c) Is the jurisdiction of a civil court to try a suit filedby a borrower against a bank or financial institutionousted by virtue of the scheme of the RDB Act, inrelation to the proceedings for recovery of debt by abank or financial institution ?The aforesaid question ought to be answered first and isanswered in the negative.” 29. At this juncture, it may be apposite to appreciate the bar ofjurisdiction of the Civil Court sought to be mounted with reference tothe provisions contained in Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Asnoted above, Mr. Sawant sought to draw support from thepronouncements of the Supreme Court in the cases of Mardia ChemicalsARS 25/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCLtd (supra), Jagdish Singh (supra), and Sree Anandhakumar Mills Ltd(supra).30.The legal position in regard to the bar of jurisdiction of the CivilCourt is fairly crystallized. It may not be necessary to trace thedevelopment of law. In the context of the controversy at hand, it wouldbe suffice to make a reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court inthe case of Central Bank of India and Anr Vs Prabha Jain and Ors(supra) and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Bankof Baroda V/s. Gopal Shriram Panda and Anr.12 31.Since the judgment of this court in the case of Bank of Baroda(supra), has the imprimatur of approval by the Supreme Court in thejudgment in the case of Central Bank of India and Anr. V/s. Prabha Jainand Ors. (supra), in relation to the import of the judgment of theSupreme Court in the case of Jagdish Singh (supra), which constitutedthe sheet anchor of the submission of Mr. Sawant, it may be appropriateto first note the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Bank ofBaroda (supra). The Division Bench considered, on a reference, thefollowing question : “Whether the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to decide allthe matters of civil nature, excluding those to be triedby the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 ofthe Securitisation Act, in relation to enforcement of12 2021 SCC Online Bom 466ARS 26/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCsecurity interest of a secured creditor, is barred bySection 34 of the Securitisation Act ?”32.The Division Bench after an elaborate analysis, including thejudgments in the cases of Mardia Chemicals Ltd (supra), Jagdish Singh(supra), answered the above question, as under : “The answer, looking to the nature of the question, in our view, is inparts :- (A) Jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to decide allmatters relating to Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI Act, isexclusive. (B) In all cases, where the title to the property, in respect ofwhich a 'security interest', has been created in favour of theBank or Financial Institution, stands in the name of theborrower and/or guarantor, and the borrower has availed thefinancial assistance, it would be only the DRT which would haveexclusive jurisdiction to try such matters, to the total exclusionof the Civil Court. Any pleas as raised by the borrowers orguarantors, vis-a-vis the security interest, will have to bedetermined by the DRT. (C) The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide all the mattersof civil nature, excluding those to be tried by the Debts RecoveryTribunal under Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI Act, in relation to enforcement of security interest of a secured creditor,is not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. (D) Where civil rights of persons other than the borrower(s) orguarantor (s) are involved, the Civil Court would havejurisdiction, that too, when it is prima facie apparent from theface of record that the relief claimed, is incapable of beingdecided by the DRT, under Section 17 of the DRT Act, 1993 readwith Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI Act. (E) Even in cases where the enforcement of a security interestinvolves issues as indicated in M ardia Chemicals (supra) of fraud as established within the parameters laid down in A. Ayyasamy (supra); a claim of discharge by a guarantor underSections 133 and 135 of the Contract Act [Mardia Chemicals (supra)] ; a claim of discharge by a guarantor under Sections 139, 142 and 143 of the Contract Act; Marshaling under Section56 of the Transfer of property Act [J.P. Builders (supra)] ; the Civil Court shall have jurisdiction. (F) Examples as indicated in para 22.3, are illustrative of theCivil Court's jurisdiction. (G) The principles laid down in para 33 (i) to (ix) of SagarPramod Deshmukh (supra) are in accordance with what weARS 27/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOChave discussed and held above.” (emphasis supplied)33.The Division Bench has held in clear and explicit terms that thejurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide all the matters of Civil nature,excluding those to be tried by the Tribunal under Sections 13 and 17 ofthe SARFAESI Act, 2002, in relation to enforcement of security interestof a secured creditor, is not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act,2002. Where civil rights of persons other than the borrowers orguarantors are involved, the Civil Court would have jurisdiction,especially when it is prima facie apparent from the face of the recordthat the relief claimed is incapable of being granted by the Tribunalunder Section 17 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993(“the RDB Act”) read with Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI Act,2002.34.In the case of Central Bank of India and Anr Vs Prabha Jain andOrs (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with a fact situation whichresembled with the facts of the case at hand in regard to the prayers. Inthe said case, Plaintiff therein was asserting a right of inheritance in aproperty in which security interest was created and, incidentally,Defendant No.2 – Central Bank had decided to proceed in accordancewith the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002. The Plaintiff had, inter alia,sought the following reliefs : ARS 28/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOC“(1) declaration that the sale deed executed by thebrother-in-law of the Plaintiff in favour of the borrowerwas illegal; (2) declaration that the mortgage deed executed by theborrower in favour of the bank was illegal; (3) delivery of possession of the subject property” 35. It is in that context, the Supreme Court held that, so far as thefirst and second reliefs were concerned, they were not in relation to anymeasures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of theSARFAESI Act, 2002. Rather, those reliefs were in relation to actiontaken prior to the secured creditor stepped into the picture and wellprior to the creditor invoking the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002.Therefore, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction under Section 17 ofthe SARFAESI Act, 2002 to grant declarations sought in the first andsecond reliefs. 36.To retain emphasis, reverting to the facts of the case, it may beapposite to note that, the Plaintiffs in the instant case, are seeking thefollowing reliefs : “(a)declaration that the agreement for sale dated 7January 2005 between the Plaintiffs and DefendantNo.1 is rescinded; (aa)declaration that the mortgage deed executedbetween Defendant No.1 and Defendant No.2 Bank isnot binding on the plaintiffs; ARS 29/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOC(b)direction as to which Defendants, the Plaintiffsshould refund the balance amount as agreement forsale is rescinded.”37.If the principles adverted to above, are applied to the facts of thecase at hand, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction under Section 17of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, much less, under Section 17 of the RDB Act,to grant declarations sought in prayer clauses (a) and (aa), extractedabove. 38.While explaining the ratio in the case of Jagdish Singh (supra),the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India and Anr VsPrabha Jain and Ors (supra), observed, inter alia, in relation to theDivision Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Bank of Baroda(supra), as under :“29.I n para 24 (of Jagdish Singh) this Court held that DRT has jurisdiction with respect to “measures”taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) andthat in respect of such matters, the civil court’sjurisdiction is ousted. However, thereafter, there is nofurther discussion on the nature of the suit and withoutrecording any finding that DRT has the power to decidepartition suits, this Court straightaway affirmed therejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11. Whiledoing so, this Court missed to consider that underSection 17, DRT has no power to partition properties andhence, civil court’s jurisdiction to grant a decree ofpartition cannot be said to be ousted. When there is nofinding in the judgment that the DRT has the jurisdictionARS 30/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCto grant the relief of partition, the judgment cannot besaid to be a precedent on that point. 30.The aforesaid was looked into by a DivisionBench of the Bombay High Court in Bank of Baroda(supra), and the reasonings assigned in our view arevery commendable………..” (emphasis supplied)39.In view of the aforesaid clarification of law, in the context of thejurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002,reliance placed by Mr. Sawant on the decisions in the cases of JagdishSingh (supra) and Sree Anandhakumar Mills Ltd (supra), whichfollowed Jagdish Singh (supra), does not advance the cause of thesubmission on behalf of the Applicant. 40.As the provisions contained in Section 18 of the RDB Act, 1993and Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, are not prima facieattracted, in view of the nature of the suit and the reliefs claimedtherein, in the facts of the case at hand, the submissions made asregards the conundrum over the rejection of the plaint, in part, is notrequired to be delved into elaborately. 41.Mr. Sawant would urge that, in view of the Division Benchjudgment of this Court in the case of Sheela Ram Vidhani (supra), sofar as this Court is concerned, the position stands settled that thedecision of the Supreme Court in the case of Church of Christ (supra),ARS 31/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCthat the plaint as a whole can be rejected against some of theDefendants needs to be followed. 42.In the case of Kaycee Corporation V/s. Suresh Ramchand Mehtaand Ors.13, this Court had an occasion to deal with the question as towhether the plaint can be rejected as a whole against some of theDefendants, in the context of the submissions based on the decision inthe case of Sheela Ram Vidhani (supra). After referring to a threeJudge Bench judgment in the case of D. Ramachandran v/s. R.V.Janakiraman and Ors.14, this Court opined that the attention of theDivision Bench of this Court did not seem to have been drawn to thesaid prior three Judge Bench judgment in the case of D. Ramachandran(supra). The observations in para No.23 read as under : “23. Firstly, the proposition that a plaint can berejected, as a whole against defendant No.5, or for thatmatter, on account of the declarations sought in respectof the consent decree, cannot be accepted unreservedly.It is pertinent to note that in the case of Sheela RamVidhani (supra), attention of the Division Bench of thisCourt does not seem to have been drawn to a Three-Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the caseof D. Ramchandran vs. R. V. Jankiraman and others,which preceded the decision in the case of Church ofChrist (supra). In the case of D. Ramchandran (supra),the Three-Judge Bench has explicitly enunciated thatunder Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code, there cannot be13 2025 SCC Online Bom 143114 (1999) 3 SCC 267ARS 32/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCa partial rejection of the plaint or the petition. In thesaid decision, a reference was made by the SupremeCourt to an earlier judgment in the case of Roop LalSathi vs. Nachhattar Singh Gill (supra), wherein theSupreme Court enunciated that where the plaintdiscloses no cause of action, it is obligatory upon theCourt to reject the plaint as a whole under Order VIIRule 11(a) of the Code, but the rule does not justify therejection of any particular portion of a plaint.”43. Mr. Sawant made an endeavour to draw a distinction betweenpartial rejection of the portion of the plaint, which was the case in D.Ramchandran (supra), and rejection of the plaint as a whole qua one ofthe Defendants. 44.In the case of Church of Christ (supra), a two Judge Bench of theSupreme Court considered the decision in the case of Roop Lal SathiV/s. Nachhattar Singh Gill15 pressed into service in support of theproposition that the rejection of the plaint in respect of one of theDefendants was not sustainable. In paragraph No.29, the SupremeCourt observed as under : “29. F inally, learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted that in view of a decision ofthis Court in Roop Lal Sathi V/s. Nachhattar SinghGill (supra), rejection of the plaint in respect of oneof the defendants is not sustainable. We have gonethrough the facts in that decision and the materials15 (1982) 3 SCC 487ARS 33/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCplaced for rejection of plaint in the case on hand. Weare satisfied that the principles of the said decisiondoes not apply to the facts of the present case wherethe appellant-1st defendant is not seeking rejectionof the plaint in part. On the other hand, the 1stdefendant has prayed for rejection of the plaint as awhole for the reason that it does not disclose a causeof action and not fulfilling the statutory provisions.In addition to the same, it is brought to our noticethat this contention was not raised before the HighCourt and particularly in view of the factual details,the said decision is not applicable to the case onhand.” (emphasis supplied) 45.The decision in the case of Church of Christ (supra), as is evident,proceeds on the premise that there was no cause of action in a suit forspecific performance against one of the Defendants against whom theplaint as a whole was rejected by the learned Single Judge of the HighCourt. 46.In the case of Sejal Glass Ltd (supra), a two-judge Bench of theSupreme Court was confronted with a situation where, in a commercialsuit, the plaint was directed to be bifurcated, in the sense, that itdisclosed no cause of action against the directors of the company, butwas to continue against the defendant No.1 company. Holding that thejudgment was wrong on principle, the Supreme Court traced theprecedents on the rejection of the plaint and enunciated that, if theplaint survives against certain defendants and/or properties, Order VIIARS 34/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCRule 11 will have no application at all, and the suit as a whole mustthen proceed to trial. 47.In the case of Madhav Prasad Aggarwal Vs Axis Bank (supra), theNotice of Motion filed by Axis Bank, one of the Defendants in the suit,came to be allowed and the suit filed by the appellant therein, wasrejected against the Axis Bank by invoking the provisions under OrderVII Rule 11(d) of the Code, by the Division Bench of this Court, as beingbarred by the provisions contained in Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act,2002. 48.Following the decision in the case of Sejal Glass Ltd. (supra), atwo-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court enunciated the law, inter alia,as under : “10.We do not deem it necessary to elaborate onall other arguments as we are inclined to accept theobjection of the appellant(s) that the relief of rejectionof plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d)of CPC cannot be pursued only in respect of one of thedefendant(s). In other words, the plaint has to berejected as a whole or not at all, in exercise of powerOrder 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC. Indeed, the learned SingleJudge rejected this objection raised by the appellant(s)by relying on the decision of the Division Bench of thesame High Court. However, we find that the decision ofthis Court in the case of Sejal Glass Limited (supra) isdirectly on the point. In that case, an application wasfiled by the defendant(s) under Order 7 Rule 11(d) ofCPC stating that the plaint disclosed no cause of action.ARS 35/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCThe civil court held that the plaint is to be bifurcated asit did not disclose any cause of action against thedirector’s defendant(s) 2 to 4 therein. On that basis, theHigh Court had opined that the suit can continueagainst defendant No.1 company alone. The questionconsidered by this Court was whether such a course isopen to the civil court in exercise of powers under Order7 Rule 11(d) of CPC. The Court answered the saidquestion in the negative by adverting to severaldecisions on the point which had consistently held thatthe plaint can either be rejected as a whole or not at all.The Court held that it is not permissible to reject plaintqua any particular portion of a plaint including againstsome of the defendant(s) and continue the same againstthe others. In no uncertain terms the Court has held thatif the plaint survives against certain defendant(s) and/orproperties, Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC will have noapplication at all, and the suit as a whole must thenproceed to trial.……12.Indubitably, the plaint can and must berejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d)of CPC on account of non compliance of mandatoryrequirements or being replete with any institutionaldeficiency at the time of presentation of the plaint,ascribable to clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11 of Order 7 ofCPC. In other words, the plaint as presented mustproceed as a whole or can be rejected as a whole but notin part. In that sense, the relief claimed by respondentNo.1 in the notice of motion(s) which commended tothe High Court, is clearly a jurisdictional error. The factthat one or some of the reliefs claimed againstARS 36/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCrespondent No.1 in the concerned suit is barred bySection 34 of 2002 Act or otherwise, such objection canbe raised by invoking other remedies including underOrder 6 Rule 16 of CPC at the appropriate stage. Thatcan be considered by the Court on its own merits and inaccordance with law. Although, the High Court hasexamined those matters in the impugned judgment thesame, in our opinion, should stand effaced and we orderaccordingly.” (emphasis supplied)49. I am conscious of the position that in the case of Sheela RamVidhani Vs S.K. Trading Co (supra), the Division Bench of this Court hasheld that the decision in the case of Church of Christ (supra),commands precedential value in contradistinction to Sejal Glass Ltd.(supra) and Madhav Prasad Aggarwal (supra). Yet with all humility atmy command, it must be noted that, in a line of decisions prior to andpost Church of Christ (supra), the Supreme Court has consistentlyenunciated the principle that a plaint cannot be rejected in part, and, ifone of the reliefs survives, the suit must go for trial. 50.In the case of V. Narayanaswamy V/s. C.P.Thirunavukkarasu16, athree-judge Bench of the Supreme Court enunciated that, where theelection petition does not disclose any cause of action it has to berejected. The Court, however, cannot dissect the pleadings into severalparts and consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of16 (2000) 2 SCC 294ARS 37/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOCaction. The petition has to be considered as a whole. There cannot bea partial rejection of the petition. 51.In the case of Central Bank of India and Anr Vs Prabha Jain andOrs (supra), as well, the Supreme Court after following the decision inthe case of Madhav Prasad Aggarwal (supra), enunciated that even ifthe third relief (that of possession) was barred by Section 17(3) of theSARFAESI Act, 2002, still the plaint must survive because there cannotbe a partial rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.Hence, even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected underOrder VII Rule 11 of the Code. It was held, since the first and secondreliefs were not clearly barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002,and were within the Civil Court’s jurisdiction (like the case at hand), theplaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. 52.In the case of Kum. Geetha and Ors. V/s. Nanjundaswamy andOrs.17, the Supreme Court observed that in an application under OrderVII Rule 11 of the Code, the plaint cannot be rejected in part. Thisprinciple is well established and has been consistently followed since1936 decision in the case of Maqsud Ahmad V/s. Mathra Datt and Co. 18A reference was made by the Supreme Court to the decisions in thecases of Sejal Glass Ltd Vs Navilan Merchants Pvt Ltd (supra) andMadhav Prasad Aggarwal Vs Axis Bank (supra). 17 (2024) 14 SCC 39018 1936 SCC Online Lah 337ARS 38/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOC53.The aforesaid being the position in law, in my considered view,the principle that a plaint cannot be rejected in part, either in relation toa property or the reliefs or defendants, is well ingrained and has beenconsistently followed. Moreover, the decision in the case of MadhavPrasad Aggarwal (supra), appears nearer home to the controversy athand. 54.For the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders do not warrantany interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. The CivilRevision Applications, thus, deserve to be dismissed. 55.Hence, the following order :: O R D E R : (i) Civil Revision Applications stand dismissed. (ii)No costs. [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]56.Mr. Sawant, the learned Counsel for the Applicants, seekscontinuation of ad-interim relief in the nature of the stay to theproceedings before the trial Court. 57.The suits are instituted in the year 2007. Thus, at this length oftime, this Court does not consider it expedient to stay the proceedingsbefore the trial Court. ARS 39/40 -CRA-580-2024+.DOC58.Oral Application for stay, thus, stands rejected. [N. J. JAMADAR, J.] ARS 40/40