Lailabala Dalei v. Authorized Officer, Bandhan Bank

CORAM: JUSTICE DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA ORDER 06.01.2026 Order No. 01. The petitioner, Lailabala Dalei has filed this writ petition with the following prayers:- “i) The petitioner therefore prays that your lordship’s may be graciously pleased to consider the facts stated in this petition after hearing the counsels admit the same ,issue notice to the opposite parties to show cause as to why a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ shall not be issued quashing the proceeding against the petitioners property under the provisions of SURFEASI ACT, AND further as to why they will not be directed to consider the loan of the petitioner for OTS, and if they show insufficient cause, allow this writ application and quash the proceedings pending against the petitioners property under the provisions of SURFEASI ACT, and further direct them to consider the loan of the petitioner for OTS and pass such other order/orders as your Lordship’s deem just and proper And for this she shall ever pray.”

2. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court that issuance of the impugned letter dated

19.08.2025 under Annexure-7 is arbitrary and the action of opp. parties suffers from procedural impropriety in posing threat of taking recourse to the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002 is wholly disproportionate, unjust, arbitrary & mala fide and in violation of statutory as well as constitutional mandates.

3. In United Bank of India -Vrs.- Satyawati Tondon; (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 110, Balkrishna Rama Tarle - Vrs.- Phoenix Arc Private Limited; (2023) 1 Supreme Court Cases 662 & CELIR LLP -Vrs.- Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Private Limited; (2024) 2 Supreme Court Cases 1, it has been held that the High Court should not exercise the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution when alternative remedy is available under section 17 of the 2002 Act.

4. Above apart, in Satyawati Tondon (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under section 13(4) or action taken under section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under section 13(4) or section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. aggrieved person

43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto contain themselves comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.” they not only inasmuch as

5. In Balkrishna Rama Tarle (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “18. Thus, the powers exercisable by CMM/DM under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are ministerial steps and section 14 does not involve any adjudicatory process qua points raised by the borrowers against the secured creditor taking possession of the secured assets. In that view of the matter once all the requirements under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are complied with/satisfied by the secured creditor, it is the duty cast upon the CMM/DM to assist the secured creditor in obtaining the possession as well as the documents related to the secured assets even with the help of any officer subordinate to him and/or with the help of an advocate appointed as Advocate Commissioner. At that stage, the CMM/DM is not required to adjudicate the dispute between the borrower and the secured creditor and/or between any other third party and the secured creditor with respect to the secured assets and the aggrieved party to be relegated to raise in the proceedings under section 17 of objections the SARFAESI Act, before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.”

6. In Bafna Motors (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “110.3. In accordance with the unamended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset was available till the sale or transfer of such secured asset. In other words, the borrower’s right of redemption did not stand terminated on the date of the auction-sale of the secured asset itself and remained alive till the transfer was completed in favour of the auction- purchaser, by registration of the sale certificate and delivery of possession of the secured asset. However, the amended provisions of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, make it clear that the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset stands extinguished thereunder on the very date of publication of the notice for public auction under Rule 9(1) of the 2002 Rules. In effect, the right of redemption available to the borrower under the present statutory regime is drastically curtailed and would be available only till the date of publication of the notice under Rule 9(1) of the 2002 Rules and not till the completion of the sale or transfer of the secured asset in favour of the auction-purchaser.”

7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in M/s. South Indian Bank Ltd. -Vrs.- Naveen Mathew Philip; 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 320, has deprecated the interference of High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act, where efficacious alternative remedy has been prescribed in the statute itself. The Hon’ble Court held as follows: “16. Approaching the High Court for the consideration of an offer by the borrower is also frowned upon by this Court. A writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ. In the absence of any legal right, the Court cannot exercise the said power. More circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non-compliance of approaching the Tribunal which requires the prescription of fees and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative.” After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner and taking into account the ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases and since the alternative remedy is available to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order, we are not inclined to entertain the writ petition. However, it is open to the petitioner to seek such remedy in accordance with law before the appropriate forum. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. Accordingly, writ petition stands dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall pale into insignificance. (Dixit Krishna Shripad) Judge Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BASUDEV NAYAK Designation: Addl. Deputy Registrar-cum-Addl. Principal Secreary Reason: Authentication Basu Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA : CUTTACK Date: 08-Jan-2026 16:26:31 (Sibo Sankar Mishra) Judge